High CourtsDivision Bench(2026) 09 KL CK 1124

Sofi Sanal vs State Of Kerala & Ors.

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 8 September 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Soumen Sen, C.J · Syam Kumar V. M., J
CASE NUMBER
WP(CRL.) NO. 606 OF 2026

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

71 paragraphs · 4,835 words

Soumen Sen, C. J.

This writ petition is filed by the wife of the detenu, Shri. Muhammed Thahir @Kavu challenging detention order dated 24th September, 2025 under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P)A, for short] and Ext.P2 Government Confirmation order dated 11th February 2026, by which the detention order was subsequently confirmed.

2.

The process leading to the issuance of the detention order commenced with the proposal submitted by the District Police Chief, Thiruvanthapuram Rural, who, in his capacity as the Sponsoring Authority, forwarded the report dated 27th August, 2025 to the detaining authority recommending action under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A. The detaining authority issued the detention order dated 24th September, 2025 under the KAA(P)A for a period of 1 year. Thus, the detenu was arrested on 5th December 2025 and he was detained in the Central Prison, Viyyur.

3.

A perusal of the detention order reveals that it is founded on three criminal cases involving the detenu, namely Crime No. 475 of 2024 of Anchethengu Police Station, registered for offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 296(b), 351(2) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’, for short). In the said crime the detenu was arrested on 27th July 2024.

4.

The second Crime relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 841 of 2025 of Varkkala Police Station, registered under Section 296(b), 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), and 3(5) of the BNS. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 26th May 2025.

5.

The third Crime that is the last prejudicial activity relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 669/2025 of Anchethengu Police Station, registered under Section 296(b), 126(2), 118(1), 118(2) and 3(5) of the BNS. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 13th July 2025 and bail was granted on 16th July 2025 to the detenu in CMP No. 5887/2025 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Varkkala and the investigation is under process.

6.

On a consideration of the materials placed on record, it appears that the impugned detention order dated 24th September 2025 is the second detention order issued against the detenu. The detenu had earlier undergone detention under the KAA(P)A for a period of 6 months as per the detention order dated 4th May 2023 and was released on 5th November 2023.

7.

The Government approved the impugned detention order on 16th December 2025. The case was thereafter referred to the Advisory Board under Section 9 of the KAA(P)A. The Advisory Board, after considering the relevant records and hearing the detenu, reported that there was sufficient cause for his detention. The Government thereafter considered the matter afresh, including the relevant records, the opinion of the Advisory Board and the representation submitted by the detenu, and confirmed the detention under Section 10(4) of the KAA(P)A by Government Confirmation order dated 11th February,2026, directing that the detenu be continued in detention for a period of one year.

8.

The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the mandatory requirements under Section 7 of the KAA(P)A have not been complied with. According to the learned counsel, the records do not disclose that the detention order was duly read over to the detenu or that he was informed in writing, under acknowledgment, of his right to make a representation to the Government and before the Advisory Board. It was submitted that no material was produced along with the detention proceedings to establish due compliance with the statutory requirements.

9.

The learned counsel further submitted that several pages of the documents supplied to the detenu along with the detention order, particularly pages 70, 71, 76, 91, 92, 93 and 108, were illegible. According to the learned counsel, the supply of illegible copies of relied-upon documents deprived the detenu of an effective opportunity to make a representation against the detention order and thereby caused serious prejudice to him.

10.

The learned counsel also submitted that the detention order suffers from non-application of mind. It was contended that preventive detention is intended to prevent a person from indulging in prejudicial activities in future and that, in the facts of the present case, there was no real or proximate possibility of the detenu indulging in such activities so as to warrant preventive detention.

11.

The learned counsel also contended that the requirements under Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A had not been complied with. According to the petitioner, the detention order and the connected records ought to have been forwarded to the Government and the Director General of Police in accordance with the statutory mandate. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hetchin Haokip v. State of Manipur and Others1.

12.

The learned counsel submitted that the impugned detention order is the second preventive detention of the detenu and that the three cases relied upon for the impugned detention cannot legitimately justify the invocation of the extraordinary power of preventive detention. It was contended that Crime No.475/2024 and Crime No.841/2025 arose out of disputes relating to monetary transactions and were essentially personal in nature, without any element of disturbance of public order.

13.

With regard to Crime No.669/2025, which constitutes the last prejudicial activity, the learned counsel pointed out that the alleged occurrence was on 12th July 2025 and the detenu was arrested on 13th July 2025. It was submitted that the said case was under investigation and that mere involvement in a criminal case cannot, by itself, justify preventive detention.

14.

The learned counsel further challenged the Government confirmation order dated 11th February 2026 on the ground that the maximum period of one year had been imposed without assigning any specific reason for imposing the maximum permissible period of detention.

15.

The learned counsel further contended that there was a delay of 42 days in sponsoring the detenu after his release in connection with the last prejudicial activity and considerable delay in passing the detention order. It was submitted that there was also a delay of about two months and twelve days in executing the detention order. According to the petitioner, the said delays remained unexplained and had snapped the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activity and the necessity for preventive detention.

16.

Lastly, the Learned counsel submitted that the representation dated 19th March 2026 submitted by the petitioner on behalf of the detenu before the first respondent had not been disposed of or its result have not been communicated to the detenu or the petitioner. It was contended that such failure seriously prejudiced the detenu's right to have his representation considered in accordance with law.

17.

On the above grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detention order dated 24th September 2025 and the Government confirmation order dated 11th February 2026 are illegal and unsustainable and that the detenu is entitled to be released from detention.

18.

Per contra, the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents supported the impugned detention order and submitted that the same was passed by the competent authority after due consideration of the criminal antecedents and subsequent activities of the detenu.

19.

The learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the detenu is a habitual offender and had been involved in several criminal cases from 2017 onwards. It was contended that the earlier preventive detention had failed to deter him and that, after his release on 5th November 2023 he again became involved in three criminal cases. According to the respondents, the subsequent criminal activities demonstrated a continuing propensity to indulge in anti-social activities.

20.

The learned Senior Government Pleader placed reliance on the earlier detention proceedings. It was submitted that the first detention order dated 4th May 2023 had been challenged before this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.805/2023 and that the said writ petition was dismissed on 20th October 2023.According to the respondents, the grounds relating to delay, reporting of the detention order and sufficiency of bail conditions had already been considered and rejected by this Court.

21.

It was submitted that the three subsequent cases, namely Crime Nos.475/2024, 841/2025 and 669/2025, were sufficient material for initiating fresh proceedings under the KAA(P)A. The learned Senior Government Pleader contended that the fact that the detenu had already undergone preventive detention did not create any bar against a subsequent detention order when fresh prejudicial activities were committed after his release.

22.

With regard to the allegation of non-compliance with Section 7 of the KAA(P)A, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the allegation is contrary to the records. It was submitted that the detention order was read over to the detenu, its contents were explained to him in Malayalam, and he was informed in writing of his right to make a representation before the Government and the Advisory Board. It was further submitted that the detenu had acknowledged receipt of the detention order and the connected records.

23.

The respondents also disputed the allegation that the documents supplied to the detenu were illegible. According to the learned Senior Government Pleader, legible copies of the entire records relied upon for passing the detention order had been furnished to the detenu and acknowledgments had been obtained. It was therefore submitted that the allegation regarding illegibility was factually incorrect and that no prejudice had been caused to the detenu.

24.

As regards the alleged delay in passing the detention order, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the last prejudicial activity relied upon against the detenu was on 12th July 2025 and that the detention order was passed on 24th September 2025 approximately 70 days thereafter. According to the respondents, the proceedings were actively pursued during the intervening period and there was no inordinate or unexplained delay.

25.

With regard to the delay in execution, it was submitted that the detenu had absconded and was evading execution of the detention order. The respondents therefore contended that the delay in execution could not be attributed to the authorities. It was pointed out that proceedings under Section 6 of the KAA(P)A had been initiated and a proclamation order had been issued before the detenu was ultimately apprehended on 5th December 2025.

26.

The learned Senior Government Pleader further submitted that the Government had approved the detention order within eight days of its execution, excluding public holidays, and that the order of confirmation was passed within the prescribed period. According to the respondents, there was no delay at any stage of the detention proceedings so as to snap the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities and the necessity for detention.

27.

As regards the contention of non-application of mind, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the proposal of the sponsoring authority was subjected to the necessary verification and consideration by the competent detaining authority. It was contended that the records clearly disclose that the detaining authority was satisfied that the criminal antecedents of the detenu demonstrated a likelihood of his continuing to indulge in anti-social activities prejudicial to public peace and order.

28.

It was further submitted that the detenu had continued to commit criminal activities even after his earlier preventive detention and had become involved in three further cases. According to the respondents, the involvement of the detenu in those cases was revealed from the statements of the complainants and the investigation conducted in the respective cases.

29.

The learned Senior Government Pleader also submitted that the Advisory Board had considered the matter and reported that there was sufficient cause for detention. The Government, after considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the relevant records and the representation submitted by the detenu, confirmed the detention for a period of one year. It was therefore contended that the statutory safeguards had been duly followed.

30.

Finally, it was submitted that, if the detenu were released prematurely, there was a likelihood of his again becoming involved in anti-social activities affecting public peace and safety. According to the respondents, his continued detention was therefore necessary for maintenance of public order and public peace. The learned Senior Government Pleader accordingly submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.

31.

We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader.

32.

We shall first deal with the contention regarding the alleged delay in passing the order of detention. According to the petitioner, there was inordinate delay between the last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu and the issuance of the detention order. It is contended that such delay has the effect of snapping the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities relied upon and the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority.

33.

It is well settled that the prejudicial activities relied upon must bear a live and proximate nexus with the order of detention. If there is undue and unexplained delay in passing the detention order, such delay may, in a given case, have the effect of snapping the nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose sought to be achieved by the detention. At the same time, where the delay is satisfactorily explained by the time consumed in investigation, collection of materials, administrative processing, scrutiny by the sponsoring and screening authorities and consideration by the Government, the detention order cannot be invalidated merely on the ground of lapse of time.

34.

To ascertain whether the live and proximate link gets snapped, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.A Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala2 wherein the Apex Court has reiterated an observation in Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta3 as follows:-

“10.

The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

(emphasis supplied)

35.

In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:

6.

“It is further true that there must be a “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention, namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is “snapped” if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.”

(emphasis supplied)

36.

As regards the contention relating to the question of delay it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala5 wherein it was observed as follows:

“9.

While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

(emphasis supplied)

37.

Similarly in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India6, it was held as follows:

“15.

Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78: 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)

“There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.”

(emphasis supplied)

38.

This Court in Anjana Das v. State of Kerala7, has reiterated that lack of promptitude may vitiate a detention order. It was held as follows:

“11.

If the jurisdictional authority had a bona fide apprehension regarding the repetition of anti-social activities, it would have acted swiftly after the receipt of the proposal, as well as the screening committee’s report. If the true objective was to prevent the detenu from engaging in anti-social activities, the authority ought to have acted with greater alacrity in passing the detention order. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention has been snapped.”

(emphasis supplied)

39.

We have carefully perused the records produced before us. It is evident from the materials on record that the last prejudicial activity relied upon by the detaining authority is Crime No.669/2025 dated 12th July 2025. The detenu was arrested on the following day and was enlarged on bail on 16th July 2025. Thereafter, the Sponsoring Authority submitted a proposal dated 27th August 2025, recommending preventive detention of the detenu under the provisions of the KAA(P)A. Upon consideration of the said proposal and the materials placed before it, the detaining authority passed the detention order dated 24th September 2025. The said detention order was subsequently confirmed by the Government by order dated 11th February 2026, whereby the detenu was directed to be detained for a period of one year.

40.

The materials placed before us disclose considerable delay at every stage of the proceedings. The impugned detention order dated 24th September 2025 came to be passed 74 days after the last alleged prejudicial activity dated 12th July 2025 in Crime No.669/2025. The sponsoring authority had submitted the proposal dated 27th August 2025 with a delay of 46 days. The explanation offered by the detaining authority in the detention order does not satisfactorily explain the delay.

41.

Having regard to the cumulative effect of the unexplained delay of 74 days from the last prejudicial activity and the delay of 46 days for the submission of the proposal, we are of the considered view that the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities and the necessity for preventive detention stands snapped. Consequently, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority cannot be sustained.

42.

We have already discussed the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman (supra), Licil Antony (supra), Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji (supra), Adishwar Jain (supra) and the aforesaid principles have also been applied by this Court in Anjana Das (supra), wherein it has been consistently held that, although no rigid period is prescribed for passing an order of preventive detention, every substantial period of delay must be satisfactorily explained and the Court must examine whether the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention has been maintained. In the present case, the explanation offered by the respondents is only a broad reference to the movement of the proposal through various departmental authorities. No material has been placed before this Court explaining the necessity for the considerable time consumed at each stage of the proceedings. The chronology of events reveals unexplained intervals in processing the proposal even after the Sponsoring Authority had initiated preventive detention proceedings and after the detenu had been released on bail. In the absence of any specific and convincing explanation for such delay, we are unable to hold that the respondents have discharged the burden cast upon them under law.

43.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the delay in passing the detention order has not been satisfactorily explained. The unexplained delay has the effect of snapping the live and proximate nexus between the alleged prejudicial activities and the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority. Consequently, the detention order is rendered unsustainable. Accordingly, we hold that the delay in submitting the proposal and the subsequent delay in passing the detention order have not been satisfactorily explained.

44.

On the ground of non-supply of legible copies to the detenu, it was submitted by the petitioner that, at the time of execution of the detention order, although copies of the relevant documents were furnished to the detenu, pages 70, 71, 76, 91, 92, 93 and 108 of the documents supplied by the sponsoring authority were illegible, thereby depriving the detenu of an effective opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention.

45.

This Court while considering a similar issue, in Aleena Alex v. State of Kerala and Ors8, has held as follows:

8.

“…..As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and as is apparent from the original documents produced before us pursuant to our direction in a sealed cover, certain pages of the Exhibit P1 order that had been furnished to the detenu were illegible and could not be read. The specific reference made by the learned counsel to page Nos.33, 34 and 35 of Exhibit P1 in the W.P.(Crl.) being illegible and unreadable is found to be factually correct upon our perusal of the original records produced before us. It is trite and settled that unless a legible copy is provided to the detenu, he may not be able to exercise his right to respond to the same by way of a representation/explanation validly and adequately. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in this respect is valid and tenable…..”

46.

Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramod Singla v. Union of India9, has held that:

“34.

In cases where illegible documents have been supplied to the detenue, a grave prejudice is caused to the detenue in availing his right to send a representation to the relevant authorities, because the detenue, while submitting his representation, does not have clarity on the grounds of his or her detention. In such a circumstance, the relief under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and the relevant statutory provisions allowing for submitting a representation are vitiated, since no man can defend himself against an unknown threat.” (emphasis supplied)

47.

However, in order to verify the correctness of the contention that the copies of the relied-upon documents served on the detenu are illegible, we have perused the pages made available before us (Exhibit P1) by the learned counsel for the petitioner. On such perusal, we are satisfied that the copies of the pages 70, 71, 76, 91, 92, 93 and 108 were found to be illegible. However, it is to be seen that, contents in pages 91, 92, 93 and 108 are material documents concerning the last prejudicial activity relied upon by the detaining authority, thereby depriving the detenu of an effective opportunity to understand the material relied upon by the Detaining Authority and to make an effective representation against the order of detention as guaranteed under Article 22(5) and Article 47 of the Constitution of India.

48.

The learned Senior Senior Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State has produced a file which apparently contains the original documents supplied to the alleged detenu. It is submitted that each page of the file bears the signature of the detenu with the endorsement “legible copies received”. However, at page 71 of the original file, though the same endorsement is made, the document is indisputably illegible. If this document is compared with the corresponding document in the file produced earlier, it would be seen that the latter is legible. Hence, a serious doubt is raised as to whether legible copies of the documents were in fact served on the detenu, notwithstanding the strenuous submission made today, with reference to the file produced, that the detenu had received legible copies.

49.

In fact, the detenu had made a representation on 19th March 2026. The affidavit filed by the State does not deny the allegations made in the said representation or state that the same are untrue. In fact, till the filing of the affidavit on 14th July 2026, there had been no consideration of the representation. The affidavit is also silent with regard to the representation dated 19th March 2026 received by the authorities concerned. It has not been alleged in the said affidavit that no such representation was received by the authorities concerned.

50.

In any event, serious doubts have been raised with regard to the supply of legible copies of the documents, and we are satisfied that the document referred to above is not legible when compared with the document in the file produced earlier. In the circumstances we should give the benefit of doubt to the detenu.

51.

We also notice that, in several matters before us, allegations are being raised regarding the supply of illegible copies of documents to detenus. Henceforth, the Police authorities shall, while supplying copies of documents to the alleged detenu, put a counter-signature on each copy of the document supplied, in addition to obtaining the signature of the detenu, so as to obviate future controversies regarding the supply of illegible copies of documents by the authorities concerned. This is necessary to ensure compliance with Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

52.

In view of the aforesaid findings, we do not consider it necessary to examine the other issues raised by the petitioner. We hold that the detaining authority has failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the considerable delay in processing the proposal and issuing the detention order after the last prejudicial activity. The unexplained delay has snapped the live and proximate nexus between the alleged prejudicial activities and the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority. Further, the supply of illegible copies of the relied-upon documents has deprived the detenu of his valuable constitutional right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to make an effective representation against the order of detention.

53.

Consequently, the detention order is vitiated and is liable to be set aside.

54.

Accordingly, the detention order (Ext.P1) dated 24th September, 2025 and the consequential Government Confirmation Order (Ext.P2) dated 11th February, 2026 are hereby set aside. The writ petition is allowed.

55.

The Superintendent of Central Prison, Viyyur, is directed to release the detenu, Sri. Muhammed Thahir @Kavu, if his detention is not required in connection with any other case.

56.

The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Superintendent of Central Prison, Viyyur, forthwith.

Footnotes

  1. 1.(2018) 9 SCC 562
  2. 2.(1989) 4 SCC 741
  3. 3.(1974) 4 SCC 530
  4. 4.(1979) 1 SCC 465
  5. 5.(2014) 11 SCC 326
  6. 6.(2006) 11 SCC 339
  7. 7.2026:KER:16817
  8. 8.Judgment dated 5th day of June 2026 in WP(Crl.) No. 599 of 2026
  9. 9.2023 SCC OnLine SC 374