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Judgment
Soumen Sen, C.J.
This writ petition is filed by the mother of the detenu, Shri. Renjith @ Renju challenging Ext.P1 detention order dated 10th December, 2025 under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P)A, for short] and Ext.P2 Government Confirmation order dated 23rd February, 2026, by which the detention order was subsequently confirmed.
The process leading to the issuance of the detention order commenced with the proposal submitted by the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural, who, in his capacity as the Sponsoring Authority, forwarded the report dated 18th October, 2025 to the detaining authority recommending action under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A. The detaining authority issued the detention order dated 10th December, 2025 under the KAA(P)A for a period of six months. Thus, the detenu was arrested on 13th December, 2025 and he was detained in the Central Prison, Viyyur and later he was shifted to the Central Prison, Kannur.
A perusal of the detention order would reveal that it is founded on seven criminal cases involving the detenu. The first adverse case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No. 1302 of 2019 of Njarakkal Police Station, registered for offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 294(b) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’, for short). The detenu was granted bail in the said case on 2nd November, 2019 and the investigation in the said case is completed and a charge sheet is filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Njarakkal on 2nd November, 2019.
The second Crime relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 37 of 2022 of Njarakkal Police Station, registered under Sections 324 and 341 of the IPC. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 12th January, 2022. The detenu was granted bail in the said case on the day of arrest itself and the investigation in the said case is completed and a charge sheet is filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Njarakkal on 18th February, 2022.
The third Crime relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 229 of 2022 of Njarakkal Police Station, registered under Sections 120(B), 364(A), 365, 368, 342, 346, 323, 324, 506(ii), 201 and 34 of the IPC. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 22nd February, 2022 and bail was granted to the detenu on 5th May, 2022, in Crl.M.C No. 1000/2022 of the Court of Session (Vacation Court), Ernakulam Division. The investigation in the said case is completed and a charge sheet is filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Njarakkal on 02nd April, 2023.
The fourth Crime relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 63 of 2024 of Njarakkal Police Station, registered under Sections 452, 427 and 34 of the IPC. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 14th January, 2024 and bail was granted on 20th January, 2024 in CMP No. 71 of 2024 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Njarakkal. The investigation in the said case is completed and the charge sheet is submitted before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Njarakkal on 14th January, 2024.
The fifth Crime relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 504 of 2024 of Munambam Police Station, registered under Sections 341, 323, 294(b), 34 of the IPC. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 29th June, 2024 and he was released on station bail and charge sheet was filed on the same day.
The sixth Crime relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 339 of 2025 of Njarakkal Police Station, registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 296(b) of the BNS. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 24th March, 2025 and bail was granted to the detenu on the same day itself. The investigation in the said case was completed and a charge sheet was filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Njarakkal on 2nd June, 2025.
The seventh Crime that is the last prejudicial activity relied on by the detaining authority is Crime No. 1077 of 2025 of Njarakkal Police Station, registered under Sections 109, 115(2), 118(1), 3(5) of BNS. In the said crime, the detenu was arrested on 15th September, 2025 and bail was granted to the detenu on 3rd December, 2025 in Crl.M.C No. 3539 of 2024 of the Sessions Court, Ernakulam.
On a consideration of the materials placed on record, it appears that the impugned detention order dated 10th December, 2025 is the third detention order issued against the detenu. The detenu had earlier undergone detention under the KAA(P)A for a period of 6 months from 18th May, 2010 to 17th November, 2010 and he was externed earlier under section 15 of the KAA(P)A for a period of one year.
The Government approved the impugned detention order on 22nd December, 2025. The case was thereafter referred to the Advisory Board under Section 9 of the KAA(P)A. The Advisory Board, after considering the relevant records and hearing the detenu, reported that there was sufficient cause for his detention. The Government thereafter considered the matter afresh, including the relevant records, the opinion of the Advisory Board and the representation submitted by the detenu, and confirmed the detention under Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A by Government Confirmation Order dated 23rd February, 2026, directing that the detenu be continued in detention for a period of 6 months.
The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the mandatory requirements under Section 7 of the KAA(P)A have not been complied with. According to the learned counsel, the records do not disclose that the detention order was duly read over to the detenu or that he was informed in writing, under acknowledgment, of his right to make a representation to the Government and before the Advisory Board. It was submitted that no material was produced along with the detention proceedings to establish due compliance with the statutory requirements.
The Learned counsel also submitted that the Exts.P1 and P2 orders are illegal, arbitrary and vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record and are, therefore, liable to be quashed. It was contended that the Detaining Authority failed to apply its mind to the relevant materials before passing Ext.P1 order and that the order was issued in a mechanical manner without due consideration of the materials placed before it. According to the learned counsel, the non-application of mind is evident from the contents of Ext.P1 itself and, on that ground alone, the detention order is liable to be interfered with.
The Learned counsel further submitted that the statutory requirements under the KAA(P)A are mandatory in nature and that non-compliance with the safeguards prescribed under the KAA(P)A has caused serious prejudice to the detenu. It was contended that the detention order, together with the entire records, ought to have been forwarded to the Government and the State Police Chief for verification and approval in terms of Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A. According to the learned counsel, Ext.P1 detention order does not disclose that copies of the detention order and the connected records were forwarded to the authorities in the manner mandated under the KAA(P)A.
The learned counsel further submitted that there was a delay of 35 days in sponsoring the case of the detenu from the date of the last prejudicial activity and there is a delay of nearly three months between the last prejudicial activity and the passing of Ext.P1 detention order. It was submitted that the very object of preventive detention, namely, immediate prevention of prejudicial activities, would stand defeated by such unexplained delay. The learned counsel submitted that there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay and that the same vitiates the detention proceedings.
The Learned counsel also submitted that the continued detention of the detenu on the ground that the representation submitted on his behalf, produced as Ext.P3, was not duly considered. It was submitted that the non-consideration of the representation has seriously prejudiced the detenu and has affected his valuable constitutional right to make an effective representation against his detention.
Lastly the learned counsel had submitted that the detenu was not supplied with a legible copy of the documents relied upon in support of the detention. It was submitted that the supply of illegible documents deprived the detenu of a meaningful opportunity to understand the materials relied upon against him and consequently impaired his right to make an effective representation.
On the above grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detention order dated 10th December, 2025 and the Government confirmation order dated 23rd February, 2026 are illegal and unsustainable and that the detenu is entitled to be released from detention.
Per contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents supported the impugned detention order and submitted that the same was passed by the competent authority after due consideration of the criminal antecedents and subsequent activities of the detenu.
The learned Senior Public Prosecutor submitted that the detenu is a habitual offender who has been continuously and repeatedly involved in grave offences affecting public peace, order and safety in Ernakulam District. According to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, a comprehensive report detailing the anti-social activities of the detenu was submitted by the Sponsoring Authority and the basis of the said report and the materials placed before her, the Detaining Authority independently considered the materials and arrived at the requisite satisfaction before issuing Ext.P1 detention order dated 10th December, 2025 under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P)A.
With regard to the contention relating to non-compliance with Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A and the alleged supply of illegible documents, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that the detenu was arrested and placed under detention on 13th December, 2025 and was admitted to Central Prison, Viyyur on 14th December, 2025, from where he was subsequently shifted to Central Prison, Kannur. It was submitted that, at the time of execution of the detention order, all mandatory statutory requirements under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the KAA(P)A were duly complied with.
The learned Senior Public Prosecutor submitted that the arresting officer had read over and explained the contents of the detention order and the grounds of detention to the detenu in his mother tongue, namely Malayalam. A complete and legible set of the detention order, grounds and all documents relied upon was also served upon the detenu under written acknowledgment and the detenu was further informed in writing of his constitutional and statutory right to make representations against his detention before the Detaining Authority, the State Government and the KAA(P)A Advisory Board. The Learned Senior Public Prosecutor, therefore, contended that the allegation of violation of Section 7 of the KAA(P)A or non-supply of legible documents is wholly unfounded.
With regard to the contention relating to Section 3(3) of the KAA(P)A, it was submitted that the detention order was executed on 13th December, 2025 and that the statutory procedure contemplated under Section 3(3) was duly followed. According to the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, the 2nd respondent forwarded the detention order, together with the grounds and all relevant records, to the State Government and the State Police Chief within the statutory period. It was further submitted that the State Government, after scrutinising the materials, approved the detention order within the prescribed period of 12 working days by Order of Approval dated 22nd December, 2025.
The learned Senior Public Prosecutor further submitted that, in accordance with the statutory procedure, the case of the detenu was placed before the Advisory Board under Section 9 of the KAA(P)A. The Advisory Board, consisting of a former Judge of this Court and a retired District Judge, considered the matter after affording a personal hearing, which was conducted through Google Meet on 4th February, 2026. According to the respondents, the Advisory Board considered the entire records as well as the representation submitted on behalf of the detenu and opined that there was sufficient cause for the continued detention of the detenu.
It was further submitted that the Advisory Board noticed that the detenu had undergone preventive detention for a period of six months in the year 2010, prior to the amendment of Section 12 of the KAA(P)A on 31st December, 2014. According to the respondents, on that account, the maximum detention period of one year was not applicable in the present case and the Advisory Board recommended confirmation of the detention for a period of six months.
With regard to the last prejudicial activity, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor submitted that Crime No.1077 of 2025 of Njarakkal Police Station was registered against the detenu for offences punishable under Sections 109, 115(2) and 118(1) read with Section 3(5) of the BNS. The detenu was stated to be the prime accused in the said crime, which, according to the respondents, involved a serious assault affecting public order. It was further submitted that the invocation of the preventive detention law became necessary since the ordinary law, the history-sheet proceedings against the detenu, earlier proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C./Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and other restrictive measures, including externment proceedings, had failed to deter him from continuing his criminal activities.
The learned Senior Public Prosecutor refuted the contention regarding delay between the last prejudicial activity and the passing of the detention order. It was submitted that the last prejudicial activity occurred on 14th September, 2025 and that the detenu was arrested on 15th September, 2025 and that he was released on bail on 3rd December, 2025. According to the respondents, the period during which the detenu remained in custody has to be excluded while considering the alleged delay. It was further submitted that the preliminary report was submitted by the Station House Officer on 13th October, 2025 and the report of the Sponsoring Authority was submitted on 18th October, 2025. The detention order was thereafter passed on 10th December, 2025.
It was submitted that the time taken in the intervening period was utilised for investigation, collection of the relevant criminal records and detailed examination of the materials, and that the delay, if any, cannot be characterised as unexplained or unreasonable. According to the Learned Senior Public Prosecutor, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the necessity for preventive detention remained intact and unbroken.
With regard to the contention regarding non-consideration of Ext.P3 representation, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor submitted that the representation dated 15th December, 2025 submitted by the petitioner on behalf of the detenu was duly received by the 1st respondent and was processed and considered in accordance with law. It was submitted that, upon consideration of the contents of the representation, the Government found that the grounds stated therein did not warrant release of the detenu from detention and accordingly rejected the representation. A formal reply was furnished to the detenu on 26th December, 2025 and another representation dated 15th December, 2025 submitted on behalf of the detenu before the KAA(P)A Advisory Board was received by the Government on 16th February, 2026 along with the report of the Advisory Board. The said representation was also considered and rejected and a reply was furnished to the detenu on 24th February, 2026. It was therefore contended that all representations submitted for and on behalf of the detenu were duly considered by the competent authority.
Lastly, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that on the remaining contentions the allegations raised by the petitioner are contrary to the factual and statutory position. It was contended that all actions taken by the respondents were valid and in strict compliance with the provisions of the KAA(P)A and Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. According to the respondents, the detention order is supported by sufficient material demonstrating the threat posed by the detenu to public order and the necessity for his preventive detention.
On the aforesaid submissions, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
We have heard Mr. M.H. Hanis, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. O.A Nuriya, learned Senior Public Prosecutor.
We shall first deal with the contention regarding the alleged delay in passing the order of detention. According to the petitioner, there was inordinate delay between the last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu and the issuance of the detention order. It is contended that such delay has the effect of snapping the live and proximate link between the prejudicial activities relied upon and the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority.
It is well settled that the prejudicial activities relied upon must bear a live and proximate nexus with the order of detention. If there is undue and unexplained delay in passing the detention order, such delay may, in a given case, has the effect of snapping the nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose sought to be achieved by the detention. At the same time, where the delay is satisfactorily explained by the time consumed in investigation, collection of materials, administrative processing, scrutiny by the sponsoring and screening authorities and consideration by the Government, the detention order cannot be invalidated merely on the ground of lapse of time.
To ascertain whether the live and proximate link gets snapped, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.A Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala1 wherein the Apex Court has reiterated an observation in Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta2 as follows:-
“10.The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.” (emphasis supplied)
In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:
6.“It is further true that there must be a “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention, namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is “snapped” if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.”
(emphasis supplied)
As regards the contention relating to the question of delay, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala4 wherein it was observed as follows:
“9.While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”
(emphasis supplied)
Similarly in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India5, it was held as follows:
“15.Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78: 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)
“There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.”
(emphasis supplied)
This Court, in Anjana Das v. State of Kerala6, has reiterated that lack of promptitude may vitiate a detention order. It was held as follows:
“11.If the jurisdictional authority had a bona fide apprehension regarding the repetition of anti-social activities, it would have acted swiftly after the receipt of the proposal, as well as the screening committee’s report. If the true objective was to prevent the detenu from engaging in anti-social activities, the authority ought to have acted with greater alacrity in passing the detention order. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be arrived at is that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention has been snapped.”
(emphasis supplied)
We have carefully perused the records produced before us. It is evident from the materials on record that the last prejudicial activity relied upon by the detaining authority is Crime No.1077/2025 dated 15th September, 2025. The detenu was arrested on the same day and was enlarged on bail on 3rd December, 2025. In the meantime, the Sponsoring Authority submitted a proposal dated 18th October, 2025, recommending preventive detention of the detenu under the provisions of the KAA(P)A. Upon consideration of the said proposal and the materials placed before it, the detaining authority passed the detention order dated 10th December, 2025, without considering adequacy of the bail conditions. The bail conditions have not even been referred to in the detention order. It proceeds on the basis that in the past the alleged detenu had violated the bail conditions. If it were to mean the violation of bail conditions mentioned in the order dated 2nd June, 2025, there was no explanation offered for non-filing of an application for cancellation of the bail. This issue came up for consideration in our judgment in W.P.(Crl.)No.812 of 2026 dated 14th August, 2026 (Ayammakutty P. v. State of Kerala and Others) in which this Court has held:
“43.The third issue that arises for consideration is whether the Detaining Authority has exercised the remedy of cancellation of bail before resorting to the measures of preventive detention under PITNDPS Act.
44.In the above context, it is relevant to refer to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala & Others12. The said Special Leave Petition and the Criminal Appeal arose from the final judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.874/2024, dated 4th September, 2024. This Court had affirmed the order of detention. The appellant’s husband, Rajesh, was kept under preventive detention in prison in terms of Section 3 of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Preventive) Act, 2007 [KAA(P)A]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the Criminal Appeal, finding that, in view of the attending facts and circumstances, the case would not fall under the category of a public order situation, as the detention order did not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu were against the public order of the State. The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the Criminal Appeal, finding that, in view of the attending facts and circumstances, the case would not fall under the category of a public order situation, as the detention order did not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu were against the public order of the State, and further observed that the State had not filed any application for cancellation of bail in respect of the earlier cases.
45.In Dhanya M. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above context, has observed in paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 as follows:
“20.Moreover, it has been stated therein by the authority that the detenu is violating the conditions of bail imposed upon him in the cases that have been considered for passing the order of detention.
However, pertinently, no application has been filed
by the respondent-State in any of the four cases, alleging violation of such conditions, if any, and moreover, have not even been spelt out here.
21.This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed that the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu, instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention, which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, this Court observed:
“59.… It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal proceedings where the detenu had been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading to the impugned detention order. There may have existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention.”
60.In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361], Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)
32.…It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” (Emphasis supplied)
22.Keeping in view the above expositions of law, we have no doubt that the order of detention cannot be sustained. The circumstances pointed out in the order by the detaining authority may be ground enough for the State to approach the competent Courts for cancellation of bail, but it cannot be said that the same warranted his preventive detention. We clarify that if such an application for cancellation of the detenu's bail is made by the respondent-State, the same must be decided uninfluenced by the observations made hereinabove.” (emphasis supplied)
46.In Dhanya M. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also reiterated at paragraph 9 as follows:
“It is well settled that the provision for preventive detention is an extraordinary power in the hands of the State that must be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of an individual in anticipation of the commission of further offence(s), and therefore, must not be used in the ordinary course of nature.”
(emphasis supplied)
47.The principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Narain Singh (supra) and Dhanya M. (supra) unequivocally underscore that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure which can be invoked only when the ordinary remedies available under the criminal law are found to be ineffective or inadequate. The power of preventive detention is not intended to supplant the ordinary criminal process but to supplement it in exceptional situations where the latter has demonstrably failed to prevent the detenu from engaging in prejudicial activities.”
The failure of the Detaining Authority to consider the material relating to the cancellation of bail, despite its direct relevance to the necessity and imperative nature of resorting to preventive detention, amounts to non-application of mind and vitiates the subjective satisfaction. The impugned detention order is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
It is noted that the above detention order had been confirmed by the Government by order dated 23rd February, 2026, whereby the detenu was directed to be detained for a period of six months.
The materials placed before us disclose considerable delay at every stage of the proceedings. The impugned detention order dated 10th December, 2025 came to be passed 87 days after the last alleged prejudicial activity dated 14th September, 2025 in Crime No.1077/2025. The sponsoring authority had submitted the proposal dated 18th October,2025 with a delay of 34 days from the date of the last prejudicial activity. No reasonable explanation offered by the detaining authority in the said delay in the impugned detention order.
Having regard to the cumulative effect of the unexplained delay of 87 days from the last prejudicial activity and the delay of 34 days for the submission of the proposal, we are of the considered view that the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities and the necessity for preventive detention stands snapped. Consequently, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority cannot be sustained.
We have already discussed the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman (supra), Licil Antony (supra), Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji (supra), Adishwar Jain (supra) and the aforesaid principles have also been applied by this Court in Anjana Das (supra), wherein it has been consistently held that, although no rigid period is prescribed for passing an order of preventive detention, every substantial period of delay must be satisfactorily explained and the Court must examine whether the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention has been maintained. In the present case, the explanation offered by the respondents is only a broad reference to the movement of the proposal through various departmental authorities. No material has been placed before this Court explaining the necessity for the considerable time consumed at each stage of the proceedings. The chronology of events reveals unexplained intervals in processing the proposal even after the Sponsoring Authority had initiated preventive detention proceedings and after the detenu had been released on bail. In the absence of any specific and convincing explanation for such delay, we are unable to hold that the respondents have discharged the burden cast upon them under law.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the delay in passing the detention order has not been satisfactorily explained. The unexplained delay has the effect of snapping the live and proximate nexus between the alleged prejudicial activities and the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority. Consequently, the detention order is rendered unsustainable. Accordingly, the issue relating to the delay in passing the detention order are answered in favour of the petitioner.
Thus, the other grounds urged by the petitioner, namely, alleged non-compliance with Section 7 of the KAA(P)A, alleged violation of Section 3(3), non-consideration of the representation, supply of illegible documents and non-application of mind, do not, on the materials before us, warrant interference with the detention order.
Preventive detention is an exceptional measure and the power is intended to prevent the commission of prejudicial activities in future. The authority exercising such power must, therefore, act with reasonable promptitude. Where there is a substantial delay between the last prejudicial activity and the passing of the detention order, the respondents are required to furnish a satisfactory and convincing explanation for the delay. In the present case, the last prejudicial activity relied upon by the detaining authority occurred on 14th September, 2025. The Sponsoring Authority submitted its proposal on 18th October, 2025, with a delay of 34 days. The detention order was thereafter passed on 10th December, 2025, with a delay of 87 days after the occurrence of the last prejudicial activity. Although the respondents have referred to investigation, collection of records and administrative processing, no satisfactory explanation has been placed before us for the time consumed at the respective stages. The mere movement of the proposal through the various authorities cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, constitute a sufficient explanation for the substantial delay.
The fact that the detenu remained in custody from 15th September, 2025 until 3rd December, 2025 does not, by itself, cure the delay in initiating and processing the preventive detention proceedings. More importantly, after the detenu was released on bail, the detention order was not passed until 10th December, 2025. The respondents have not placed before us any material indicating that, during the intervening period, there was a fresh application of mind to the necessity of preventive detention or that any changed circumstance justified the time consumed.
We accordingly hold that, though the other grounds urged by the petitioner do not merit acceptance, the detention order cannot be sustained on account of the unexplained delay in passing the same. The issue relating to delay is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. The remaining issues are answered in favour of the respondents.
Accordingly, Ext.P1 detention order dated 10th December, 2025 and Ext.P2 Government Confirmation Order dated 23rd February, 2026 cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed. This writ petition is allowed.
In view of the fact that the petitioner has already undergone the detention and the period of detention is over on 12th June, 2026, granting relief by way of release does not arise.