Thasmitha Abukutty vs State Of Kerala

Soumen Sen, C.J.

This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 25^th November, 2025, passed against Shameer @ Bellari Shameer (the detenu), aged 35 years, under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities Prevention Act, 2007 [“KAA(P)A”, for brevity]. The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. The said order of detention was confirmed by the Government under Section 10(4) of KAA(P)A vide order dated 30^th January, 2026, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year from the date of detention. Thereafter, the Government reduced the period of detention from one year to six months by a subsequent order dated 3^rd March, 2026.

The detention order was passed on the basis of a proposal submitted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram, on 11^th August, 2025. The said proposal was, however, rejected on the ground that, at that point of time, the detenu had not applied for bail. Subsequently, by letter dated 30^th October, 2025, the proposal was revived, alleging that the detenu was involved in the following cases:

Before dealing with the submissions of the parties, it appears from the records that, on 19^th March, 2024, proceedings under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A were initiated against the detenu by the District Collector, Malappuram, and he was arrested on 25^th March, 2024 pursuant to the order of detention. The order of detention was approved by the Government on 5^th April, 2024. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Advisory Board, which, after hearing the detenu, recommended that he be detained for a period of six months. Accepting the said recommendation, the Government confirmed the detention by order dated 25^th June, 2024. Aggrieved thereby, the detenu approached this Court by filing W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024. This Court, by judgment dated 30^th July, 2024, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of detention, pursuant to which the detenu was released from custody. Thereafter, according to the respondents, the detenu again involved himself in Crime No. 992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, registered on 30^th July, 2025 for offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(3), 110, 111(2)(b), 111(3) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It is on the basis of the said subsequent involvement, along with the earlier antecedents, that the present proceedings under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A came to be initiated.

The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the impugned order of detention on several grounds. Firstly, it was contended that the impugned order suffers from total non-application of mind, as neither the sponsoring authority nor the Detaining Authority independently recorded its satisfaction that the detenu continued to be a "known rowdy" within the meaning of the provisions of the KAA(P)A. According to the learned counsel, the authorities merely proceeded on the basis of the registration of criminal cases against the detenu without examining whether the statutory requirements for classifying him as a "known rowdy" were, in fact, satisfied. It was further argued that no independent assessment was undertaken to ascertain whether the detenu was habitually engaging in anti-social activities affecting public order so as to warrant the invocation of the provisions of the KAA(P)A. Consequently, it was contended that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority stands vitiated for want of proper application of mind.

Secondly, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the reliance placed by the respondents upon the earlier judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024 (Exhibit-P2). According to the learned counsel, in Exhibit-P2 nowhere it is recorded that there existed sufficient grounds for passing a fresh order of preventive detention against the detenu. On the contrary, this Court had quashed the earlier order of detention and directed the release of the detenu. It was, therefore, argued that the sponsoring authority and the Detaining Authority have misread and misconstrued the observations contained in Exhibit-P2 and have erroneously relied upon the same to justify the present order of detention, thereby vitiating the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority.

Thirdly, it was submitted that the sponsoring authority proceeded on the erroneous premise that the detenu had deliberately refrained from filing a bail application in order to evade preventive detention proceedings under the KAA(P)A. According to the learned counsel, such a conclusion is founded on mere assumptions and conjectures unsupported by any material on record. It was argued that the mere non-filing of a bail application cannot, by itself, be construed as a deliberate attempt to avoid preventive detention and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at on the basis of such speculation is legally unsustainable.

Fourthly, it was submitted that the respondents suppressed the material fact that the earlier order of detention had been challenged before this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024 and that the said detention order had been quashed by judgment dated 30^th July, 2024. According to the petitioner, the failure to place the said judgment before the Detaining Authority materially affected the process of arriving at the subjective satisfaction and has consequently vitiated the impugned order of detention.

Fifthly, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the representations submitted by the detenu before the Government and the Advisory Board were not duly considered before the confirmation order was passed. According to the petitioner, such non-consideration constitutes a violation of the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and renders the continued detention illegal. Reliance was placed upon the decisions in Bhupinder Kumar @ Papu v. UT of J&K¹ and Geetha v. State of Kerala².

Sixthly, it was contended that the Detaining Authority failed to consider the adequacy of the bail conditions imposed upon the detenu and did not record any reason as to why those conditions were insufficient to prevent him from indulging in further criminal activities. According to the learned counsel, the failure to advert to this vital aspect vitiates the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.

Seventhly, it was submitted that, before invoking the extraordinary power of preventive detention under the KAA(P)A, the respondents had not explored the preventive measures available under the ordinary law, particularly the proceedings contemplated under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was submitted that, in the absence of resorting to such ordinary remedies, the invocation of the provisions of the KAA(P)A was wholly unwarranted.

Eighthly, the learned counsel submitted that none of the criminal cases relied upon by the Detaining Authority disclose any disturbance to "public order" and, at the highest, relate only to issues concerning "law and order". It was therefore submitted that the essential jurisdictional requirement for invoking Section 3 of the KAA(P)A was absent, rendering the impugned order of detention unsustainable.

Apart from the above submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, an argument note was also filed by pointing out that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order is snapped. The date of the last prejudicial activity is on 30^th July, 2025 and the detention order was passed on 25^th November, 2025, which is after a delay of three months and twenty-five days. To support the above averment, reliance was placed upon Anandhavally v. State of Kerala³ and Kumari A v. State of Kerala⁴.

It was further submitted that the investigation in the last prejudicial activity, namely Crime No. 992/2023, relied upon by the Detaining Authority, was not completed and, therefore, the same cannot be taken as a case for passing the order of detention. Reliance was placed upon Abdul Wahab v. State of Kerala and Others⁵.

It was also submitted that the detention order is silent as to the fact whether the detenu has preferred any bail application before the court or not in the last prejudicial case and whether the Detaining Authority has resorted to cancellation of bail proceedings after the conditions of bail gets violated. In order to substantiate the above said submission reliance was placed on Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu⁶.

Lastly, it was submitted that the confirmation order passed by the Government suffers from complete non-application of mind. The learned counsel pointed out that the Government had initially confirmed the detention for a period of one year and, thereafter, by a subsequent order issued after thirty-three days, reduced the period of detention to six months. According to the petitioner, the subsequent modification of the detention period itself demonstrates that the original confirmation order had been passed mechanically and without a proper appreciation of the relevant materials. It was, therefore, contended that the contradictory stand adopted by the Government vitiates the confirmation order as well as the continued detention of the detenu.

Per contra, the learned Senior Government Pleader supported the impugned order of detention and submitted that the detenu is a habitual offender and a "known rowdy" within the meaning of Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A. It was submitted that, at the time of sponsoring the proposal, four of the five crimes relied upon had culminated in the filing of final reports but the remaining crime, namely Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, was charge sheeted on 12^th January, 2026. It was further submitted that two earlier crimes of the years 2015 and 2017 were not relied upon, as they fell beyond the statutory period prescribed under the KAA(P)A, and the NDPS case registered as Crime No.253/2022 of Alappuzha South Police Station was also not taken into consideration since it did not fall within the ambit of Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A.

The learned Senior Government Pleader further submitted that, in view of the continuous involvement of the detenu in criminal activities, a Rowdy History Sheet had been opened against him as early as on 21^st May, 2015. Despite the opening of the Rowdy History Sheet and the initiation of proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the year 2017, the detenu continued to indulge in several criminal offences, including offences of robbery, causing hurt, attempt to commit culpable homicide and offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. It was, therefore, contended that the preventive measures available under the ordinary law had proved ineffective in preventing the detenu from indulging in anti-social activities. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of this Court in Anita Antony v. State of Kerala⁷, to contend that proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be treated as a substitute for preventive detention under the KAA(P)A.

It was further submitted that the detenu had repeatedly violated the conditions imposed while granting him bail in earlier criminal cases by involving himself in subsequent offences. Applications for cancellation of bail had also been moved before the competent courts. According to the learned Senior Government Pleader, these circumstances clearly established that the bail conditions imposed by the criminal courts had failed to deter the detenu from continuing his criminal activities.

The learned Senior Government Pleader further submitted that proceedings under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A had earlier been initiated against the detenu in the year 2024 and, although the said order of detention was subsequently quashed by this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024, immediately after his release the detenu again involved himself in Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station. It was contended that the subsequent involvement of the detenu in yet another serious offence clearly demonstrated his propensity to continue indulging in anti-social activities and justified the initiation of fresh proceedings under the KAA(P)A.

It was also submitted that there was no delay whatsoever in initiating or completing the detention proceedings. The last prejudicial activity occurred on 30^th July, 2025 and the detenu was arrested on 2^nd August, 2025. While he remained in judicial custody, the Station House Officer submitted the preliminary report on 11^th August, 2025, whereupon the sponsoring authority forwarded the proposal for preventive detention after examining the relevant records. The Detaining Authority, being satisfied that the detenu was a "known rowdy" and that his activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, passed the detention order on 25^th November, 2025. Since the detenu continued to remain in judicial custody, permission was obtained from the competent court to execute the detention order inside the prison, and the same was executed on 28^th November, 2025 after completing all the formalities, as per Section 7(1)(2) of the KAAPA without any delay.

Thereafter, the detention order was duly approved by the Government, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board within the statutory period, and the detention was confirmed in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

It was submitted that, though the detenu had not filed any bail application in Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, such non-filing was not a mere circumstance but a deliberate strategy adopted by him to evade proceedings under the KAA(P)A. It was contended that the investigation had revealed that the detenu had consciously refrained from seeking bail anticipating the initiation of preventive detention proceedings against him. At the same time, having regard to the fact that he had remained in judicial custody since 2^nd August, 2025, there was a real possibility of his being released on bail in the near future. It was, therefore, submitted that the absence of a pending bail application did not preclude the Detaining Authority from arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu was likely to be released from custody and, upon such release, was likely to resume his anti-social activities, particularly in view of his previous conduct of repeatedly violating bail conditions.

Lastly, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that every procedural safeguard contemplated under the KAA(P)A had been strictly complied with and that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority was founded on relevant materials. It was, therefore, contended that none of the grounds urged by the petitioner warrants interference and that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

The merits of the detention order require consideration taking into account the submissions made on behalf of the parties and the original record produced by the learned Senior Government Pleader.

The first issue that arises for consideration before us is whether the statutory requirements for classifying the detenu as a "known rowdy" under the KAA(P)A were duly satisfied and whether the materials on record establish that he is a habitual offender indulging in anti-social activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order so as to warrant the invocation of the provisions of the KAA(P)A.

To bring a detenu within the ambit of “known rowdy” as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A, he must be found on investigation or enquiry by a competent Police Officer or other authority on complaints initiated by persons other than Police Officers in three separate instances, not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in Clause (t) of Section 2 of the KAA(P)A.

Now, it is necessary to consider the definitions of “Rowdy” as defined under Section 2(t) and “known rowdy” in Section 2(p), which read as follows:

On a consideration of the materials placed on record, we find no merit in the aforesaid contention. The records reveal that the Detaining Authority has relied upon five criminal cases, namely, Crime No.38/2019 of Vadakkekad Police Station, Crime No.625/2021 of Alappuzha South Police Station, Crime No.62/2022 of Ponnani Police Station, Crime No.1062/2023 of Kuttipuram Police Station and Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station. The offences alleged in the said crimes substantially fall under Chapters XVI, XVII and XXII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, or their corresponding provisions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which are offences contemplated under Section 2(t) of the KAA(P)A. Although certain offences, such as Section 201 and Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, do not independently fall within the ambit of Section 2(t), the remaining offences in the very same crimes, including robbery, voluntarily causing hurt, wrongful restraint, criminal intimidation and attempt to commit culpable homicide, are offences specifically covered by the said provision.

The materials further disclose that the detenu has been involved in five separate criminal cases involving offences falling within the ambit of Section 2(t) of the KAA(P)A. These offences were committed within the period of seven years as contemplated under Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act and are sufficient to classify the detenu as a "known rowdy".

In the above circumstances, we are satisfied that the Detaining Authority had sufficient material before it to classify the detenu as a "known rowdy" within the meaning of Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A and to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction for invoking the provisions of the Act. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the impugned order on this ground, and the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected.

The second issue that arises for consideration is whether the earlier judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024, whereby the previous order of detention was quashed and the detenu was directed to be released, was duly considered by the Detaining Authority and, if so, whether the authorities have misread or misconstrued the observations contained therein while passing the impugned order of detention.

It is true that the impugned order of detention does not specifically refer to the earlier judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024, whereby the previous order of detention was quashed and the detenu was directed to be released. However, in our considered view, the mere omission to make a specific reference to the earlier judgment in the order of detention cannot, by itself, be regarded as a material defect so as to vitiate the impugned order. Reference to the said fact of setting aside the previous detention order was duly taken note by the Government in the confirming order of detention under the KAA(P)A.

In our considered view, the prime aspect to be looked into is the subsequent commission of a fresh offence by the detenu after his release pursuant to the earlier judgment of this Court. It is this subsequent conduct, rather than the earlier detention proceedings, that assumes significance while examining the validity of the impugned order of detention. The earlier order of detention, which was founded on six criminal cases, came to be quashed by this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No.757 of 2024 solely on the ground of procedural infirmity, namely, the delay in passing the order of confirmation. Subsequent thereto, the detenu allegedly involved himself in yet another crime, namely, Crime No. 992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, registered on 30^th July, 2025. It is this subsequent prejudicial activity, read along with the antecedent criminal history of the detenu, that formed the basis for the sponsoring authority to initiate fresh proceedings under the KAA(P)A.

It also appears that, in the earlier order of detention, six criminal cases were relied upon by the Detaining Authority. Out of those six cases, four, namely, Crime No.38/2019 of Vadakkekad Police Station, Crime No.625/2021 of Alappuzha South Police Station, Crime No.62/2022 of Ponnani Police Station and Crime No.1062/2023 of Kuttipuram Police Station, have once again been relied upon in the impugned order of detention. The only additional material relied upon in the present proceedings is the subsequent prejudicial activity in Crime No.992/2025 of Ponnani Police Station, which was registered after the detenu was released pursuant to the earlier judgment of this Court.

It is pertinent to refer to Section 13 of the KAA(P)A so as to understand the necessity for passing a preventive detention order even after the previous one. This section reads as follows:

The involvement of the detenu in a fresh offence, apart from the offences which had already formed the basis of the earlier order of detention, constitutes a significant intervening circumstance. Such subsequent prejudicial activity provides a fresh cause of action for initiating preventive detention proceedings and distinguishes the present proceedings from the earlier order of detention, which was set aside by this Court. Thus, we find nothing wrong with the detention order on this ground.

The third issue for consideration before us is whether the mere failure of the detenu to seek bail in the last prejudicial activity, by itself, be treated as a conscious attempt to frustrate or avoid preventive detention proceedings.

It appears from the records that the detenu had repeatedly violated the bail conditions imposed by the competent criminal courts. In Vadakkedathu Police Station, Crime No.38/2019 registered for offences punishable under Sections 392 and 506(1) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the detenu was granted bail by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Kunnamkulam, on 22^nd February, 2019. While being on bail in the said case, the detenu allegedly involved himself in Alappuzha South Police Station Crime No.625/2021 registered for offences punishable under Sections 392 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, on 24^th August, 2021, thereby violating the bail conditions imposed upon him.

It also appears that, in Crime No.625/2021 of the said Alappuzha South Police Station, the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Alappuzha, granted bail to the detenu on 2^nd April, 2022, in C.M.P. No.798/2022, subject to specific conditions. However, even thereafter, the detenu allegedly violated the said conditions by involving himself in Kuttippuram Police Station Crime No.1062/2023 registered under Sections 419, 465 and 394 of the Indian Penal Code and Ponnani Police Station Crime No.992/2025 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(3), 110, 111(2)(b), 111(3) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, along with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. It is also seen from the records that necessary applications have been submitted before the respective courts seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the detenu.

The argument that the mere failure of the detenu to seek bail in respect of the last prejudicial activity cannot, by itself, be treated as a conscious attempt to frustrate or avoid preventive detention proceedings is devoid of merit, as such a consideration is of no relevance in the present context. The question that arises for consideration is whether there exists any legal impediment in passing an order of preventive detention while the detenu is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. When a detenu is already in custody, the mandatory parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and Another⁸ for passing an order of preventive detention against a person already in custody are required to be satisfied, namely: (i) the Detaining Authority must be aware of the fact that the detenu is in custody; (ii) there must be reliable material indicating a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail; and (iii) there must be a necessity to prevent the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activities upon such release.

The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that there were no compelling circumstances warranting the preventive detention of the detenu when he was already in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. On perusing the materials placed before us, we are of the view that the first mandatory condition that the Detaining Authority shall be aware of the fact that the detenu is in custody, is very well taken note of by the Detaining Authority. As regards the second and third requirements, though no bail application had been filed by the detenu in the case in which he was in custody, the Detaining Authority has recorded cogent reasons for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that there existed a real possibility of his securing release on bail. The detention order specifically notes that, having regard to the detenu's past conduct and criminal antecedents, there was every likelihood of his obtaining bail on technical or other legal grounds. The authority has further taken into account the consistent pattern exhibited by the detenu, namely, that immediately after securing liberty in earlier cases, he resumed his involvement in prejudicial activities without any sign of reformation. On the contrary, the materials disclose that each successive crime reflected an increased degree of audacity and aggression, indicating that the detenu had remained undeterred by previous prosecutions or periods of incarceration. The apprehension entertained by the Detaining Authority that, upon his release, the detenu would again indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order is, therefore, founded on objective materials and his antecedent conduct and cannot be said to be either speculative or without basis. We are, therefore, satisfied that the parameters prescribed in Kamarunnissa (supra) stand duly complied with in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Thus, the Detaining Authority was satisfied that the existing bail conditions had proved insufficient to deter the detenu from pursuing his prejudicial activities.

The fourth issue that arises for consideration is whether the representation submitted by the detenu on 19^th December, 2025, was duly considered by the Government and the Advisory Board in accordance with law.

This Court while dealing with a similar issue of non-consideration of the representation in Lamiya A.P. v. State of Kerala⁹, has held as follows:

The consideration of a representation made by or on behalf of a detenu is not an empty formality but a valuable constitutional safeguard flowing from Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The failure of both the Government and the Advisory Board to advert to and consider the representation amounts to a serious procedural irregularity, which has deprived the detenu of his constitutional right to have his representation effectively considered.

From the records produced before us, it appears that altogether three representations were preferred by the detenu. One is representation dated 5^th December, 2025, filed by the detenu before the Additional Chief Secretary, Home and Vigilance, S.S.A Department, Thiruvananthapuram, the second one is of 19^th December, 2025, filed by the detenu before the Chairman of the KAA(P)A Advisory Board and the third one is of 3^rd February, 2026 filed before the Home Department, Thiruvananthapuram.

On perusal of the records we are duly satisfied that these representations were duly considered and taken note of by the Detaining Authority and the Advisory Board. The Government, while considering the representation submitted by the detenu, took note of the specific contention that the earlier order of preventive detention had been set aside by this Court before confirming the impugned order of detention. Therefore, the submission that these representations were not considered is devoid of merit.

The fifth issue that arises for consideration is whether the failure of the authorities to initiate preventive proceedings under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) before invoking the provisions of the KAA(P)A renders the order of preventive detention illegal or unsustainable.

The purpose and object of an order of detention under Section 3 of the KAA(P)A is different from the purpose and object of an order under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. A Division Bench of this Court in Thejas v. Inspector General of Police, Kannur Range¹⁰ held that the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. is of a lesser magnitude when compared to preventive detention order under the laws of preventive detention. Simply because proceedings were initiated against the person under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that an order of preventive detention cannot be passed against him.

The object of proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. is merely to require a person to execute a bond for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour for the period stipulated by the competent Magistrate. Such proceedings are preventive in nature, but they operate in an entirely different field from a preventive detention order under the KAA(P)A. While proceedings under Section 107 are intended to secure future good conduct by imposing a bond, an order of preventive detention is aimed at preventing a person, whose activities are found to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, from continuing such activities where the ordinary criminal law is found to be inadequate to achieve that object.

In the present case, the records disclose that the detenu had been repeatedly involved in serious criminal activities despite being subjected to the ordinary criminal process and despite the imposition of bail conditions by the competent courts. The Detaining Authority has specifically recorded its satisfaction that the existing measures available under the ordinary criminal law had failed to deter the detenu from indulging in anti-social activities and that his continued activities posed a threat to the maintenance of public order. In such circumstances, the mere fact that proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. were not initiated would not, by itself, render the order of detention illegal or vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.

The sixth ground of challenge raised by the petitioner was that all the alleged activities relied upon by the Detaining Authority does not disclose any disturbance to "public order" and, at the highest, relate only to issues concerning "law and order". To understand the above issue, it would be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration¹¹, wherein it was held that the true distinction between the areas of “public order” and “law and order” lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced as follows:

In Angoori Devi v. Union of India¹², the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

The interpretation of the term ‘public order’ by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Supdt., Central Prison v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia¹³, is as follows:

In the instant case, the question that has to be considered is whether the criminal incidents relied upon by the Detaining Authority for passing an order of detention under the KAA(P)A falls within the domain of ‘public order’ or ‘law and order’.

In examining this question, it is necessary to advert to the statutory scheme of the KAA(P)A. Section 2(a) of the said Act defines the expression "anti-social activity" to mean acting in such a manner as to cause, or be likely to cause, directly or indirectly, any feeling of insecurity, danger or fear among the general public or any section thereof, or any danger to the safety of individuals, public safety, public health or the ecological system, or any loss or damage to the public exchequer or to any public or private property, besides indulging in the activities enumerated in clauses (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m), (n), (q), (qb) and (s) of the said section.

While Section 2(a) defines the expression "anti-social activity", Section 2(t) defines the expression "rowdy" as follows:

On consideration of the materials placed on record, it could be deduced that all the crimes relied upon by the Detaining Authority for passing the detention order predominantly relate to offences of robbery, voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery, criminal intimidation, causing disappearance of evidence, cheating by personation, forgery, wrongful restraint, voluntarily causing hurt, voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means and attempt to commit culpable homicide. The detenu has a history of repeatedly involving himself in such offences, and the incidents cannot be regarded as isolated or stray occurrences. By their very nature and frequency, such activities have the tendency to create a sense of insecurity and fear amongst members of the public regarding the safety of their persons and properties.

The repeated criminal activities attributed to the detenu clearly establishes his habitual criminal conduct that are capable of disturbing the even tempo of life of the community as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Angoori Devi (Supra) and also creates a feeling of insecurity among the public, thereby attracting the definition of "anti-social activity" under Section 2(a) of the KAA(P)A. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offences relied upon by the Detaining Authority for ordering the preventive detention of the detenu do not affect the maintenance of public order.

The final issue for consideration before us is whether the subsequent modification of the period of detention by the Government, reducing it from one year to six months, establishes non-application of mind while passing the original order of confirmation and thereby vitiates the continued detention of the detenu. To answer the said issue we refer to the case of Radhika B. v. State of Kerala¹⁴, wherein it was held as follows:

It emerges from the aforesaid decision that the power conferred upon the Government under Section 13(1) of the KAA(P)A to revoke or modify a detention order is an independent statutory power which can be exercised at any stage, provided such exercise is fair, reasonable and in conformity with the object of the Act. The mere fact that the Government, in exercise of the said statutory power, subsequently modified the period of detention from one year to six months does not, by itself, lead to the inference that the original order of confirmation suffered from non-application of mind. On the contrary, the subsequent order reflects that the Government reconsidered the matter and exercised the statutory discretion vested in it under Section 13(1) of the Act. Thus, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is unsustainable and devoid of merit.

As regards the delay in passing the order of detention it appears that the proposal for preventive detention was initially submitted by the District Police Chief, Malapuram, on 11^th August, 2025, which was rejected on the ground that the detenu had not at that time applied for bail. But, later the said proposal was revived on a request made by the District Police Chief.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that none of the grounds raised by the petitioner merit acceptance. The materials placed before the Detaining Authority were sufficient to classify the detenu as a "known rowdy" within the meaning of Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P)A. The subjective satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority is founded on relevant and cogent materials and cannot be said to suffer from non-application of mind or consideration of irrelevant factors. The records further disclose that all the procedural safeguards contemplated under the KAA(P)A have been duly complied with. We also find that the repeated involvement of the detenu in serious offences, despite earlier preventive measures and the imposition of bail conditions, justified the invocation of the provisions of the KAA(P)A. The impugned order of detention cannot, therefore, be said to be either arbitrary or illegal so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.