Tribunals and CommissionsDivision Bench(2026) 10 CAT CK 4346

Sanjai Kumar Jain vs The Union Of India & Ors.

Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad · Decided on 28 October 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajiv Joshi, Member (Judicial) · Anjani Nandan Sharan, Member (Administrative)
RESULT
Disposed Of
CASE NUMBER
Original Application No. 330/431 of 2021

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

71 paragraphs · 5,941 words

By Justice Rajiv Joshi, Member (Judicial):

Heard Shri Shyamal Narain, learned counsel for the applicant and Chakrapani Vatsyayan, assisted by Shri Manoj Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents at the time of hearing.

2.

The instant Original Application under Section 19 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 has been filed for the following reliefs:

I. To allow this O.A. and quash the impugned major penalty order (F. No.PCIT/ITO (HQ)/Vig. /SKJ/2020-21/C-25) dated 29.05.2020 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Aligarh/Disciplinary Authority, removing the applicant from service w.e.f. 29.05.2020, along with all consequential benefit, treating the impugned order as void ab initio or as having never been passed.

II. Issue a suitable order or direction that following the quashing of the aforesaid impugned order dated 29.05.2020, the respondents shall treat the applicant as having been reinstated in service w.e.f. 29.05.2020 with all consequential benefits, including continuity of service and pay ment of all retiral benefits, by treating him to have retired from service, upon reaching the age of superannuation on, and w.e.f. 31.05.2020.

III. Issue such other suitable orders or directions as might be found just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

IV. Award the costs of this original application in favour of the applicant throughout.

3.

The brief facts as narrated in the Original Application is that the applicant joined the Income Tax Department as a Lower Division Clerk on 12.08.1985, and his service record remained unblemished, with his ACR gradings consistently being “Outstanding” or “Very Good”. On 28.02.2018, a false complaint was made by Shri Arvind Kumar Bharadwaj, alleging that the applicant had demanded illegal gratification. At that time, the applicant was posted as Income Tax Officer, Farrukhabad. Subsequently, a CBI trap was organised on 06.03.2018, and the applicant was allegedly caught red-handed while accepting a bribe of Rs. 1,50,000/- and was detained the following day. On 07.03.2018, the applicant was arrested and CBI FIR Case Crime No. RC0062018A0005 was registered against him under Section 120-B of the IPC and Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

3.1

On 14.03.2018, the Disciplinary Authority deemed the applicant to have been suspended w.e.f. 06.03.2018, and his suspension continued until the removal order dated 29.05.2020. On 02.05.2018, the CBI filed the charge-sheet before the designated CBI Court at Lucknow. On 03.08.2018, sanction for prosecution was accorded by the Disciplinary Authority and forwarded to the CBI/ACB, Lucknow. Thereafter, the applicant was granted bail by the High Court vide its order dated 05.12.2018. Subsequently, on 21.06.2019, a major penalty charge memorandum was issued under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which was received by the applicant on 28.06.2019. The allegations and evidence contained therein were identical to those in the CBI charge-sheet. Pursuant thereto, the applicant submitted his reply to the charge memorandum on 04.07.2019.

3.2

Thereafter, the respondents appointed the Presenting Officer and the Inquiry Officer vide order dated 13.08.2019. The Inquiry Officer fixed 04.03.2020 as the first date of the inquiry proceedings vide letter dated 28.02.2020, i.e., more than six months after the appointment of the Inquiry Officer. On 04.03.2020, the applicant appeared in the inquiry proceedings. However, the hearing was adjourned to 12.03.2020 to enable him to arrange for a Defence Assistant and evidence. On 12.03.2020, the applicant sought an adjournment until 27.03.2020. Accordingly, vide letter dated 19.03.2020, the Inquiry Officer fixed 27.03.2020 as the next date. Despite 27.03.2020 being the notified date, the Inquiry Officer recorded the statement of the complainant, Shri Arvind Kumar Bharadwaj, on 19.03.2020 behind the applicant’s back, without prior notice that evidence would be recorded on that date and without providing him an opportunity for cross-examination.

3.3

On 25.03.2020, a nationwide lockdown was commenced due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On 26.03.2020, the applicant informed the Inquiry Officer that travelling to Farrukhabad for the inquiry on 27.03.2020 was impossible due to the lockdown restrictions. On 04.05.2020, the applicant requested the Disciplinary Authority to stay the departmental proceedings until the disposal of the criminal case. On the same day, the Inquiry Officer issued a notice requiring the applicant to participate in the proceedings on 06.05.2020. Also on 04.05.2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Inquiry Officer recorded the statement of the second important witness, Shri Pramod Kumar Sharma, behind the applicant’s back, although 04.05.2020 was not a notified date for the inquiry.

3.4

On 18.05.2020, the Inquiry Officer initially fixed 03.06.2020 as the next date of hearing but withdrew that communication on the same day and preponed the inquiry to 21.05.2020, citing the Disciplinary Authority’s direction to complete the inquiry before 25.05.2020 as the applicant’s retirement on 31.05.2020. The statements of the two witnesses were enclosed only at that stage. On 21.05.2020, the Inquiry Officer forwarded voluminous documents stated to have been received from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and the CBI and required the applicant to appear in person on 22.05.2020 and comment on them. On 21.05.2020, the applicant replied that he could not able to attend because of the lockdown and objected to the use of the statements of the two witnesses, which had been recorded without cross-examination. On 22.05.2020, the applicant stated that the newly furnished documents were still under examination and that less than 24 hours was wholly inadequate for this purpose, particularly when he had not been allowed to cross-examine the complainant and the other witness.

3.5

On 23.05.2020, the Inquiry Officer concluded the inquiry and submitted the inquiry report to the Disciplinary Authority, which forwarded it to the applicant on the same day, requiring him to submit his representation by 26.05.2020. In response, the applicant submitted his representation on 26.05.2020, specifically complaining of the denial of natural justice, denial of the opportunity for cross-examination, the impossibility of attending the proceedings due to the lockdown, and the inadequacy of the time granted. He also sought an additional 15 days to submit a comprehensive response. However, vide order dated 29.05.2020, the Disciplinary Authority rejected the request for further time and imposed the major penalty of removal from service, just two days before the applicant’s scheduled retirement.

3.6

Aggrieved by the aforesaid major penalty order dated 29.05.2020, the applicant earlier approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 280/2020, which was disposed of vide order dated 15.07.2020, directing the applicant to prefer a statutory departmental appeal and the Appellate Authority to decide the same within two months. In compliance with the said order, the applicant preferred a statutory appeal against the removal order on 22.07.2020 before the Appellate Authority. Subsequently, on 14.12.2020, the office of the Principal Chief Commissioner informed the applicant that the competent Appellate Authority was the Director General of Income Tax (Vigilance) and forwarded the departmental appeal accordingly. However, the statutory departmental appeal remained undecided until the filing of the present Original Application on 29.06.2021, and more than six months had elapsed since the communication dated 14.12.2020. Hence, the present O.A. was filed seeking adjudication on merits and quashing of the penalty order.

4.

On the other hand, counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents on 30.09.2024, wherein it has been stated that the applicant had prepared a preparatory note for seeking permission from the complainant, Shri Arvind Kumar Bhardwaj, but the same was neither submitted to the senior officers nor was any approval obtained in this regard. The said preparatory note was intentionally withheld by the applicant, and under the cover of the same, the applicant conspired with Shri Pramod Kumar Sharma, Advocate, and both entered into a conversation with the complainant and successfully created an impression in his mind that he should deliver the bribe money to them. These facts disclosed the commission of offences by the applicant and Shri Pramod Kumar Sharma, Advocate, punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The criminal and departmental proceedings are different in nature, and the penalties/punishments imposed in these proceedings are also different. There is no bar to initiating departmental proceedings subsequently if the same were not initiated earlier.

4.1

The Disciplinary Authority has been vested with the powers to discharge its statutory duties and obligations by initiating appropriate departmental proceedings, and it is not open to the Disciplinary Authority to await the outcome of the investigation by the investigating/prosecuting agency or the decision of the Court in the criminal trial. The Disciplinary Authority duly considered the written submissions of the applicant and thereafter appointed the Inquiry Officer as well as the Presenting Officer vide order dated 13.08.2019 to conduct a proper inquiry. A copy of the inquiry letter, along with the statements of the complainant and Shri P.K. Sharma, was issued to the applicant on 18.05.2020. On the date fixed by the Inquiry Officer, the applicant sent an email stating that he and his Defence Assistant were unable to appear before the Inquiry Officer due to the lockdown, as no train or bus services were available to enable them to reach the office and offer their comments on the statements of Shri Arvind Kumar Bhardwaj, the complainant, and Shri P.K. Sharma, Advocate. While submitting his reply through email, the applicant could have rebutted the contents of the statements made by the complainant and Shri P.K. Sharma by submitting a written representation. However, he failed to do so and did not avail himself of that opportunity.

4.2

As per Office Order No. 34-9/207 dated 27.09.2007 of the Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi, the Inquiry Authority must complete the departmental proceedings before the retirement of the public servant. Therefore, the Inquiry Officer preponed the date of compliance from 30.06.2020 to 21.05.2020, as the applicant was due to retire on 31.05.2020. The applicant was provided with an opportunity to offer his comments on the statements of both witnesses. However, he did not submit any comments.

4.3

As per CVC Circular No. 08.07.2018 dated 31.07.2018, the Disciplinary Authority may withhold departmental proceedings only in exceptional cases where the charges in the criminal trial involve complicated questions of law and fact. However, the applicant was unable to establish that any complicated questions of law and fact were involved in his case. He also failed to provide any justification for staying the departmental proceedings. In view of the same, the Disciplinary Authority found no merit in the application dated 04.05.2020 filed by the applicant and rejected the same vide letter dated 21.05.2020.

4.4

The Inquiry Officer fixed the matter for hearing on 04.03.2020, 12.03.2020, 27.03.2020, 04.05.2020, and 21.05.2020, but the applicant chosen not to avail himself of any of the opportunities of being heard. The applicant stated that he could not comply with the directions due to the lockdown; however, he did not submit his reply by email or through any other mode. After submission of the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority rightly passed the impugned order removing the applicant from service. Hence, the Original Application is liable to be dismissed.

5.

In reply, a rejoinder affidavit was filed by the applicant on 27.02.2025, reiterating the averments made in the Original Application. However, it is stated that the Inquiry Officer recorded the statements of the complainant as well as Shri Pramod Kumar Sharma ex-parte, who had allegedly managed the entire conspiracy against the applicant, and held the charges against the applicant to be proved. It is an admitted position that the Inquiry Officer did not intimate the applicant before recording the statements of the witnesses and the complainant. Despite the applicant’s request, he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and the witness. If judicial proceedings are initiated on the basis of the same set of charges, relied-upon documents, and witnesses, the departmental proceedings ought to be kept in abeyance until the outcome of the judicial proceedings.

6.

During the pendency of the Original Application, Misc. Application No. 4848/2026 (Stay Application) was filed by the learned counsel for the applicant, with a prayer that the respondents be expressly and strictly restrained from proceeding further with the matter of deciding the applicant’s departmental appeal dated 22.07.2020, preferred against the penalty of removal from service dated 29.05.2020, since the said appellate proceedings had long since abated and no longer had any existence in the eyes of law, and the validity and legality of the same penalty order were then poised for final adjudication before this Tribunal.

6.1

It is stated in the said stay application that, after waiting for a long period for the decision on his appeal, the applicant approached this Tribunal by way of the present Original Application, challenging the penalty order dated 29.05.2020. The present Original Application was admitted vide order dated 30.06.2021, and notices were issued to the respondents for filing a counter affidavit. Since this Tribunal had already admitted the aforesaid O.A. and had become actively seized of the matter after taking cognizance thereof, the appellate proceedings pending before the Appellate Authority prior to the admission of the O.A., in terms of the express provisions of Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, stood automatically abated. Save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, the said appeal dated 22.07.2020, which had been referred to the Appellate Authority for decision, could no longer be entertained or decided by the Appellate Authority.

6.2

The representation was dispatched on 12.07.2021, but nothing further was heard regarding the applicant’s appeal, either from the Appellate Authority or from any other source, leading the applicant to believe that the averments made in his representation had been duly considered, heeded, and accepted.

6.3.

At this belated stage, when the applicant’s O.A., admitted as far back as 30.06.2021, is now on the verge of being decided by the Tribunal on merits, and nearly five years after the appellate proceedings allegedly stood abated in terms of Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has been served with letters dated 30.07.2026 and 04.08.2026, purporting to furnish him with an Office Memorandum dated 14.07.2026. By the said communication, the applicant has been supplied with a copy of the advice of the UPSC dated 22.05.2026, given in connection with his appeal, and has been called upon to submit his representation against the same before the appellate proceedings are taken further.

6.4

The appellate proceedings, which the respondents have sought to revive unilaterally after the lapse of six years and in which they are now calling upon the applicant to participate, allegedly stood abated more than five years ago and are no longer in existence.

7.

Learned counsel for the applicant assailed the impugned orders on the following grounds:-

a)

At this belated stage, when the present Original Application has already been admitted by this Tribunal vide order dated 30.06.2021 and is pending adjudication on merits, the respondents are seeking to proceed with the applicant’s statutory appeal dated 22.07.2020 against the impugned penalty order dated 29.05.2020 in view of advice of UPSC.

b)

Upon admission of the Original Application, the appellate proceedings stood abated by operation of law in terms of Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and, therefore, the Appellate Authority cannot proceed to decide the said appeal at this belated stage, particularly when the legality and validity of the very same penalty order are already under consideration before this Tribunal. After waiting for a considerable period for a decision on his appeal as per the order of this Tribunal passed in O.A. No.280/2020, the approached this Tribunal and, thereafter, the respondents remained silent for several years. However, after the lapse of more than five years from the admission of the Original Application, the respondents issued communications dated 30.07.2026 and 04.08.2026, forwarding the Office Memorandum dated 14.07.2026 along with the advice of the UPSC dated 22.05.2026 and calling upon the applicant to submit his representation before proceeding further with the appellate proceedings. Therefore, such action amounts to an attempt to revive appellate proceedings which had already abated under Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

c)

The respondents should not be permitted to proceed with the said appeal during the pendency of the present Original Application.

d)

On merits, the entire departmental inquiry stands vitiated on account of serious violations of the principles of natural justice and denial of a fair and effective opportunity to defend himself. The Inquiry Officer recorded the statements of the complainant, Shri Arvind Kumar Bharadwaj, and the other material witness, Shri Pramod Kumar Sharma, behind the applicant’s back and without prior intimation that their statements would be recorded on the dates in question. Despite the applicant’s request, neither the complainant nor the other material witness was made available for cross-examination. The applicant was thus deprived of an effective opportunity to test the veracity of the allegations and the evidence relied upon against him. The denial of the opportunity to cross-examine material witnesses, whose statements formed the basis of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, goes to the root of the inquiry and vitiates the proceedings.

e)

The inquiry proceedings were conducted on dates that had not been duly notified for the recording of evidence. In particular, although 27.03.2020 had been fixed as the next date of hearing, the Inquiry Officer recorded the statement of the complainant on 19.03.2020 without notifying the applicant that evidence would be recorded on that date. Similarly, the statement of Shri Pramod Kumar Sharma was recorded on 04.05.2020 without adequate prior notice that his evidence would be recorded on that date. The notice of the date, place and nature of the hearing is not a mere procedural formality but an essential requirement for ensuring a meaningful opportunity of hearing. A delinquent employee cannot reasonably be expected to appear for cross-examination on a date that has not been notified for the recording of evidence. The subsequent supply of the statements could not cure the prejudice caused by denying the applicant an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses when their statements were recorded.

f)

The entire episode occurred during the COVID-19 lockdown, when travelling to Farrukhabad and coordinating with the Defence Assistant were materially constrained. The applicant had specifically informed the Inquiry Officer of the difficulties in attending the proceedings owing to the lockdown and the non-availability of public transport. Despite these circumstances, the inquiry was expedited and abruptly concluded on 23.05.2020.

g)

The applicant’s inability to attend the proceedings in person under such exceptional circumstances could not have been treated as a waiver of his right to defend himself, particularly when he had raised specific objections regarding the recording of evidence in his absence and the denial of an opportunity for cross-examination.

h)

At the fag end of the inquiry, voluminous additional documents received from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and the CBI were furnished to the applicant on 21.05.2020, and he was directed to appear on 22.05.2020 to examine and comment upon the same. Thus, the applicant was afforded less than 24 hours to examine the documents and prepare his response. It is contended that such an unreasonably short period was wholly inadequate, particularly in view of the volume of documents, the lockdown restrictions and the absence of an effective opportunity to consult his Defence Assistant. The applicant had specifically informed the authorities that the documents required proper examination and that the time granted was insufficient. Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer proceeded to conclude the inquiry on 23.05.2020 without granting reasonable additional time to the applicant to submit his defence.

i)

The Inquiry Officer relied upon the statements of the complainant and Shri Pramod Kumar Sharma, as well as documents received from the CBI, without ensuring that the evidence was properly tested in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

j)

The evidence which has not been subjected to a fair and effective process of examination and challenge cannot be treated as reliable merely because it has been reproduced or referred to in the inquiry report. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, therefore, cannot safely form the foundation of a major penalty, particularly when the applicant was denied an effective opportunity to challenge the oral and documentary evidence relied upon against him.

k)

The applicant had requested the Disciplinary Authority on 04.05.2020 to keep the departmental proceedings in abeyance until the disposal of the criminal case, as both proceedings arose out of the same set of allegations and substantially relied upon the same evidence and witnesses. It is submitted that, in the circumstances of the present case, the simultaneous continuation of the departmental inquiry and the criminal prosecution, coupled with the denial of an effective opportunity to defend himself in the departmental proceedings, caused serious prejudice to the applicant. However, the request was rejected, and the inquiry was completed in undue haste before the applicant’s scheduled date of superannuation on 31.05.2020.

l)

Despite the applicant having submitted his representation against the inquiry report on 26.05.2020, specifically raising objections regarding the denial of natural justice, the absence of cross-examination, the lockdown-related difficulties and the inadequacy of the time granted to examine the additional documents, the Disciplinary Authority rejected his request for further time and passed the impugned order dated 29.05.2020, removing him from service just two days before his scheduled retirement. Therefore, the haste with which the inquiry was concluded, the denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and the failure to adequately consider his objections rendered the impugned penalty order unsustainable in law.

m)

The impugned order dated 29.05.2020 is liable to be quashed and set aside, with all consequential benefits, including continuity of service and retiral benefits, treating the applicant as having retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2020.

n)

Learned counsel for the applicant placed heavy reliance on the following order/judgments:-

i.

In case of Dhirendra Chandra Debnath Vs. Union of India in CAT Kolkata Bench.

ii.

In case of Shiv Kumar B. Nair Vs. Union of India passed by CAT Bombay Bench

iii.

In case of Yashvi Parekh Vs. Administration passed by CAT Patna Bench.

8.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Misc. Application No. 4848/2026 (Stay Application) and opposed the prayer made therein and submitted as under:-

a)

The applicant’s statutory appeal dated 22.07.2020 against the penalty order dated 29.05.2020 was duly preferred before the competent authority and that the appellate proceedings are being pursued in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The mere admission of the present Original Application vide order dated 30.06.2021 does not, by itself, render the pending statutory appeal non-existent or prevent the competent Appellate Authority from discharging its statutory functions, unless such a consequence follows from the applicable statutory provisions or an order passed by this Tribunal.

b)

The applicant’s contention that the statutory departmental appeal automatically stood abated under Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is misconceived. The respondents have merely proceeded with the consideration of the appeal and furnished the applicant with a copy of the advice tendered by the UPSC, calling upon him to submit his representation before a final decision is taken. The aforesaid action is part of the prescribed appellate process and cannot, by itself, be construed as an attempt to revive proceedings that have ceased to exist.

c)

The communications dated 30.07.2026 and 04.08.2026, along with the Office Memorandum dated 14.07.2026 and the UPSC advice dated 22.05.2026, were issued to provide the applicant an opportunity to submit his representation before the Appellate Authority proceeds further. Rather than causing any prejudice to the applicant, the said opportunity enables him to place his objections on record before a final decision is taken on his appeal.

d)

The applicant cannot seek to prevent the Appellate Authority from completing the statutory appellate process merely because the present Original Application challenging the penalty order is pending before this Tribunal.

e)

The impugned penalty order dated 29.05.2020 had been passed in accordance with the applicable rules and after following the prescribed procedure. The criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings are distinct in nature and serve different purposes. The standards governing the two proceedings and the consequences arising therefrom are also different. Therefore, there is no legal bar to initiating or continuing departmental proceedings merely because criminal proceedings arising out of the same allegations are pending before a competent court.

f)

The Disciplinary Authority is under a statutory obligation to initiate and conclude appropriate departmental proceedings and is not required to await the outcome of the criminal trial in every case.

g)

The Disciplinary Authority duly considered the written submissions made by the applicant and thereafter appointed the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer vide order dated 13.08.2019 to conduct the departmental inquiry. The applicant was afforded opportunities to participate in the inquiry proceedings and to submit his defence. A copy of the inquiry communication, along with the statements of the complainant, Shri Arvind Kumar Bharadwaj, and Shri P.K. Sharma, was forwarded to the applicant on 18.05.2020. The applicant was also given an opportunity to offer his comments on the statements of the said witnesses.

h)

On the date fixed by the Inquiry Officer, the applicant sent an email stating that he and his Defence Assistant were unable to appear before the Inquiry Officer due to the lockdown and the non-availability of train and bus services. However, the applicant could have submitted his comments or rebuttal to the statements of the complainant and Shri P.K. Sharma through email or by any other available mode. Despite having been afforded such an opportunity, the applicant did not submit his comments on the statements of the witnesses. Therfore, the applicant cannot attribute the failure to participate effectively in the inquiry proceedings solely to the respondents.

i)

In view of the applicant’s impending retirement on 31.05.2020, the Inquiry Officer was required to conclude the departmental proceedings before his retirement, in accordance with the relevant instructions of the Central Vigilance Commission. It is contended that the inquiry was expedited for this reason and that the applicant was afforded opportunities to participate in the proceedings and submit his defence. The respondents, therefore, deny that the inquiry was concluded arbitrarily or without affording the applicant a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

j)

The applicant’s request dated 04.05.2020 for keeping the departmental proceedings in abeyance until the disposal of the criminal case was duly considered by the competent authority and rejected vide letter dated 21.05.2020.

k)

As regards the allegation that the statements of the complainant and the other witness were recorded behind the applicant’s back is concerned, the copies of the statements were subsequently supplied to the applicant and that he was given an opportunity to submit his comments thereon. However, the applicant failed to avail himself of that opportunity. The respondents, therefore, contend that the applicant’s allegations of denial of natural justice and procedural irregularity are not sustainable.

l)

After considering the inquiry report and the material available on record, the Disciplinary Authority rightly passed the impugned order dated 29.05.2020, imposing the penalty of removal from service upon the applicant. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or procedural infirmity warranting interference by this Tribunal. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondents prayed that the Original Application be dismissed as being devoid of merit.

9.

We have considered the submissions so raised by the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the records, it appears that the applicant had earlier approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 280/2020, which was disposed of vide order dated 15.07.2020, with a direction to the applicant to prefer a statutory appeal against the impugned penalty order and to the competent Appellate Authority to decide the same within a period of two months. In compliance with the aforesaid order, the applicant preferred a statutory appeal on 22.07.2020. Subsequently, vide communication dated 14.12.2020, the office of the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax informed the applicant that the competent Appellate Authority was the Director General of Income Tax (Vigilance) and forwarded the appeal to the said authority. However, as the appeal remained undecided, the applicant instituted the present Original Application on 29.06.2021, seeking, inter alia, quashing of the penalty order dated 29.05.2020. The present Original Application was admitted on 30.06.2021 and has remained pending before this Tribunal.

10.

The principal issue that arises for consideration at this stage is whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicant is entitled to prevent the competent Appellate Authority from proceeding with the statutory appeal on the ground that the present Original Application has already been admitted and that, according to the applicant, the statutory appeal stood abated by operation of Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

11.

Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides that where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under Sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as a redressal of grievances in relation to the subject matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules.

12.

The said provision, however, contains the expression “save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal”. The scope and effect of this provision have to be considered in the context of the earlier order passed by this Tribunal, the statutory appellate remedy available to the applicant and the subsequent developments in the matter. The effect of the aforesaid provision has to be considered in the context of the facts of the present case, particularly the earlier order dated 15.07.2020 passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 280/2020.

13.

From perusal of the earlier order passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No.280/2020, it appears that the applicant was directed to avail himself of the statutory appellate remedy and the Appellate Authority was, in turn, directed to decide the appeal within a period of two months. The applicant thereafter preferred the appeal in compliance with the said direction. Significantly, the earlier order does not stipulate that, in the event of the appeal not being decided within the prescribed period, the appeal would automatically stand abated or that the jurisdiction of the competent Appellate Authority to decide the same would cease. Nor does the said order record any finding that the failure to decide the appeal within two months would render the appellate proceedings non est. Therefore, the mere expiry of the period stipulated in the earlier order cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive of the question whether the statutory appeal ceased to be maintainable.

14.

It is also relevant to note that the statutory appeal was preferred before the competent authority and was subsequently forwarded to the Director General of Income Tax (Vigilance), who was identified as the competent Appellate Authority. The subsequent communications dated 30.07.2026 and 04.08.2026, read with the Office Memorandum dated 14.07.2026 and the advice of the Union Public Service Commission dated 22.05.2026, indicate that the appeal is under consideration and that the applicant has been called upon to submit his representation on the advice tendered by the Commission before a final decision is taken. Thus, the material available on record does not indicate that the respondents have abandoned the appellate proceedings; rather, it reflects that the process of consideration of the statutory appeal is being pursued.

15.

Further even where the matter had remained pending before the Court for substantial period there was nothing wrong or illegal in relegating the party to approach the Appellate Authority provided under the Rule. There can be no issue that the Appellate Authority would be having wider scope and jurisdiction as compared to this Tribunal and therefore, apparently no prejudice can be caused to the applicant. It is also an admitted fact that there is no interim order operative in favour of the applicant during the pendency of this Original Application. Similar issue fell for consideration before the Allahabad High Court in case of Sitaram Vishwakarma Vs. Engineer in Chief, PWD and Others, reported in (2012) 8 ADJ 574 (DB). Relevant para of the said judgment is quoted as under:-

The second argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the Writ Court ought to have heard the petition on merits also cannot be accepted in view of the settled legal preposition that where an alternative remedy is available, the Writ Court would be slow in entertaining the petitions directly. Further even where the matter had remained pending before the Writ Court for substantial period there was nothing wrong or illegal in relegating the party to approach the Appellate Authority provided under the statute. There can be no issue that the Appellate Authority would be having wider scope and jurisdiction as compared to the writ jurisdiction and, therefore, apparently no prejudice can be caused to the appellant. It is also an admitted fact that there is no interim order operative in favour of the appellant during the pendency of the writ petition.

16.

In these circumstances, and having regard to the earlier direction issued by this Tribunal, we are not inclined to interdict the ongoing appellate proceedings at this stage. The applicant's contention regarding the applicability and effect of Section 19(4) does not, in the facts of the present case, furnish sufficient ground for granting the interim protection sought in M.A. No. 4848/2026. It would be appropriate that the competent Appellate Authority is permitted to bring the statutory appellate proceedings to their logical conclusion in accordance with law, instead of keeping the matter pending indefinitely. It is settled law that the Appellate Authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence and the penalty, which a court or tribunal in judicial review does not.

17.

At the same time, the fact remains that the statutory departmental appeal has remained undecided for a considerable period, notwithstanding the earlier direction of this Tribunal requiring its disposal within two months. The pendency of the departmental appeal for such a prolonged period cannot be overlooked. The subsequent steps taken by the respondents, including obtaining the advice of the Union Public Service Commission and calling upon the applicant to submit his representation thereon, must now be carried forward to their logical conclusion without any further avoidable delay. The applicant shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit his representation, if not already submitted, and the same shall be duly considered by the competent Appellate Authority before passing the final order. The judgment relied upon the counsel for the applicant is not applicable in the instant case.

18.

In view of the foregoing discussion, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the impugned penalty order dated 29.05.2020 or the grounds raised by the applicant in the present Original Application, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the matter with a direction to the competent Appellate Authority to consider the representation, if any, submitted by the applicant in response to the advice tendered by the Union Public Service Commission and thereafter decide the statutory appeal dated 22.07.2020 by passing a reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with law, preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

19.

The applicant shall extend necessary cooperation in the appellate proceedings and submit his representation, if not already submitted, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is clarified that the Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal independently, in accordance with law and on the basis of the material available on record, without being influenced by any observation made herein.

20.

Accordingly, the Original Application as well as M.A. No. 4848/2026 (Stay Application) stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

21.

All MAs pending in this O.A. also stand disposed off.

22.

No order as to costs.