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Judgment
O R D E R
Hon’ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J): By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:
“8.1Quash and set aside the Order dated 07/07/2025 (Annex-Al) passed by the respondent No. 3/ The Additional Commissioner of Income Tax (AU), 15(1), Mumbai;
8.2Hold and declare that appointment of Shri Vijaykumar G Subrahmanyam, The Additional Commissioner of Income Tax (AU),15(1), Mumbai the respondent No.3 herein by the President of India vide order dated 11/03/2022 (ANNEXURE-A-2) is bad in the eyes of law and be pleased to quash and set aside the same;
8.3Direct the respondent Nos.2 and 3 not to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry against the applicant with Annexure-I of the Memorandum of Charge-Sheet bearing No. F. No. CIT(Audit)/NGP/Estt./M.D./2011-12, dated 01/02/2012 (Annex-A2), pending the final disposal of Special Case No. 5/2008 pending on the file of the learned Principal District Sessions Judge & Special judge, Anti Corruption, Gondia;
8.3Saddle the costs of the present proceedings on the respondents; and
8.4Grant any other appropriate relief, which this Hon’ble circumstances of the case.”
Facts of the case in brief are that the applicant was working as an Income Tax Officer/Tax Recovery Officer-2, Nagpur, a Group-B post. He was compulsorily retired from service vide order dated 12.05.2020 by exercising the powers under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules.
The controversy in the present Original Application arises out of the Memorandum of Charge-Sheet dated 01.02.2012 issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Audit), Nagpur, proposing to hold departmental proceedings against the applicant (Annexure-A/3). Article of charges levelled against him vide the said Charge Memorandum which reads as under:-
“Article-I
Central Administrative TribunalMr. Mohan Dattatraya Jagdale, ITO during the period May 2006 to 17.06.2008 was working as ITO, Gondia Ward, Gondia. Mr. M.D. Jagdale entered into a criminal conspiracy with Mr.M.K.M. Agrawal, C.A., Gondia with a view to obtain illegal gratification demanded a sum Rs. 2 lakhs from one Mr.Roshan R. Jaiswal of M/s Jai Bambleshwari Guuop of Companies, Gondia for giving undue favours to the company by way of accepting the declaration given by him after the survey conducted by the Income tax Department for settling the pending TDS matters in their favour and not for harassing the company in future in Income tax matters. Accordingly Mr. M.D. Jagdale, ITO obtained gratification of Rs. 2 lakhs bv corrupt and illegal means on 17.06.2008. By the aforesaid act Mr. M.D. Jagoale, ITO has shown lack of integrity as also lack of devotion to his duty and as such his aforesaid conduct amounts to "Unbecoming of Govt. Servant and his this conduct contravened the provisions of the Sub Clauses-(i),(ii) and (iii) of sub-rule (1) of Rule-3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
Article-11
Mr. Mohan Dattatraya Jagdale, ITO, while working as ITO, Gondia Ward, Gondia during the period May, 2008 to 17.06.2008 had accepted a Nokia Mobile handset from Mr. Roshan Jaiwal of M/s Bamleshwari Group of Companies, Gondia. By the aforesaid act Mr. M.D. Jagdale ITO has shown lack of integrity and lack of devotion to his duty and as such his said conduct amounts to "Unbecoming of Govt. Servant and his this conduct contravened the provisions of the Sub-Clauses-(i),(ii) and (iii) of Sub-rule -(1) of Rule-3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964".
Article-III
In the Scrutiny assessment finalized u/s 143(3) of the Income tax Act, 1961 on 30.12.2010 for A.Y. 2008-09 in the six relevant cases of the Bambleshwari Group of cases of Gondia the additional income of the group has been worked out at Rs.2,53,28,325/- as against Rs.50 lakhs worked out by Mr. M.D. Jagdale, ITO at the survey stage. It can thus be fairly inferred that Mr, Jagdale, ITO had with ulterior motives tried to extend favours to the assessee-group by abusing his official position for his illegal personal gains from the assessee-group by way of the illegal gratification of Rs. 2 lakhs which he had subsequently demanded and accepted as stated in articles-l & II of this Annexure. By the aforesaid act Mr. M.D. Jagdale, ITO has shown lack of integrity as also lack of devotion to his duty and as such his aforesaid conduct amounts to "Unbecoming' of Govt. Servant and his this conduct contravened the provisions of the Sub Clauses-(i),(ii) and (iii) of sub-rule (1) of Rule-3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
Central Administrative TribunalArticle-IV
All the facs and circumstances mentioned/contained in the charge sheet filed by the CBI Nagpur in the Court of Hon’ble Special Judge CBI constituted under Prevention of Corruption Act, Gondia, vide case No.05/2008 filed on 26.12.2008 also makes it very clear that Mr. M.D. Jagdale. ITO had demanded and accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 2 lakhs from Mr. Roshan R. Jaiswal of M/s Jal Bambleshwari Gruop of Companies, Gondia through Mr. M.K.M. Agrawal, CA., of Gondia. This act of Mr. M.D. Jagdale, ITO has shown lack of integrity as also lack of devotion to his duty and as such his aforesaid conduct amounts to "Unbecoming of Govt. Servant and his this conduct contravened the provisions of the Sub Clauses-(i);(ii) and (iii) of sub-rule (1) of Rule-3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
The applicant is also facing criminal prosecution in respect of the allegations contained in Articles-I, II and IV of the departmental Charge-Sheet. Special Case No.5/2008 is pending before the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Gondia, for offences punishable under Sections 7, 11 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Shri Mahesh Kumar Agrawal, Chartered Accountant, is also arrayed as accused No.2 in the said criminal case. The Central Bureau of Investigation filed the Charge-Sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 26.12.2008. The report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., along with the list of documents and witnesses, is annexed collectively as Annexure-A/4. According to the applicant, the allegations, witnesses and documents in the criminal case and the departmental proceedings are substantially identical.
Contending that simultaneous continuation of the departmental proceedings would prejudice his defence in the criminal trial, particularly as he would be required to disclose his defence and cross-examine witnesses in the departmental proceedings, the applicant submitted an application dated 19.08.2016 (Annexure-A/5) seeking stay of the departmental proceedings till disposal of the criminal case. The Disciplinary Authority, upon consideration of the matter, passed an order dated 21.09.2016 (Annexure-A/6) staying the departmental proceedings in respect of Articles-I, II and IV of the Charge-Sheet dated 01.02.2012 till final disposal of the said criminal case.
The applicant states that he cooperated with the departmental proceedings in respect of Article-III and submitted his defence. Subsequently, respondent No.2 issued an order dated 25.07.2018 directing resumption of the departmental enquiry and expeditious submission of the enquiry report (Annexure-A/7). According to the submissions made by the respondents before this Tribunal in OA No.2171/2018 filed by the applicant, the Inquiry Officer had submitted a report holding that the charge under Article-III was without basis and evidence. The said OA was disposed of by this Tribunal vide Order dated 21.02.2020 (Annexure-A/8), the operative portion of which reads as under:-
“11.In view of the above there is no doubt that there is the disposal of the criminal proceedings on account of applicant. Thus in view of the no objection given by learned counsel for the respondents as referred to above and judgments of this Tribunal in OA Nos.2136/2018 & 2023/2020, to balance the interest of the department as well as the present applicant, keeping in mind the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgment, we allow this OA with directdion to the respondents Nos. 2 & 3 not to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry against the applicant pursuant to charge sheet dated 01.02.2012 bearing No.F.No.CIT(Audit)/NGP/Estt./M.D./2011I-12 (Annex A-2) for a period of six months from the date of this order. No order as to costs.”
In the meanwhile, owing to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the nationwide lockdown, the proceedings before the learned said criminal Court were substantially affected. The applicant stated that the trial could not progress normally during this period and that the period of limitation had also been suspended by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with effect from 15.03.2020.
The applicant appeared before the learned Special Judge, Gondia, on 27.11.2020 (Annexure-A/10), when directions were issued to the prosecution to ensure the presence of witnesses on the next date. The applicant further stated that he had already moved an application before the learned Special Judge seeking expeditious, preferably day-to-day, hearing of Special Case No.5/2008. The said application was allowed vide order dated 07.01.2020, directing that the matter be listed every Wednesday for expeditious disposal.
After expiry of the period of six months referred to by the applicant, respondent No.3 issued communication dated 18.09.2020 informing him that the period of stay had expired and that the departmental proceedings had been fixed for 25.09.2020. The applicant, vide communication dated 24.09.2020, again requested the Disciplinary Authority to stay the departmental proceedings in view of the pendency of said Special Case No.5/2008 and the disruption of the criminal trial on account of the pandemic.
The request for stay was rejected by the Disciplinary Authority vide communication dated 28.10.2020. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer issued communication dated 03.11.2020 requiring the applicant to appear on 17.11.2020 and furnish his explanation to the Articles of Charge. The applicant again sought stay vide communication dated 10.11.2020, but the request was rejected by the Disciplinary Authority vide communication dated 23.11.2020.
Aggrieved by the communications dated 28.10.2020 and 23.11.2020, the applicant filed OA No.2162/2021 before this Tribunal. Vide order dated 27.01.2021 (Annexure-A/9) passed in the said OA, this Tribunal extended the stay of the departmental proceedings for a further period of six months, the operative portion of which reads as under:-
“5.We have heard both the counsels for the parties and perused the copy of order in OA No.2171/2018 at Annex A-9 on record. As per this order while allowing the OA, we had directed the respondents Nos. 2 & 3 not to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry, against the applicant pursuant to chargesheet dated 01.02.2012 for a period of six months from the date of this order. As the applicant has explained he could not effectively avail of benefit of the stay to the disciplinary proceedings granted vide OA No.2171/2018 due to covid-19 pandemic, therefore, in view of the circumstances, we dispose of this OA by directing the respondents to stay the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for another period of six months or till the disposal of criminal proceedings, whichever is earlier. This order shall come in operation from today itself.
6.With the above directions. the Original Application is disposed of at the admission stage itself. No order as to costs.”
The applicant stated that the delay in disposal of the criminal case was not attributable to him. He further stated that the trial made progress pursuant to the order directing its hearing every Wednesday. However, the CBI subsequently changed its counsel, who expressed inability to conduct the trial every Wednesday. The proceedings were also affected by the second wave of the COVID-19Central Administrative Tribunal pandemic.
Vide order dated 11.03.2022, respondent No.3 was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. According to the applicant, nothing substantial happened in the departmental proceedings during the period from 2021 to 2025. The relevant order sheets of the departmental proceedings are annexed as Annexure-A/11.
The applicant, vide communication dated 13.03.2023, challenged the appointment of respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer and also sought certified copies of the documents relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-A/12). The applicant statesd that, despite repeated requests, only photocopies of the documents were supplied and certified copies were not furnished.
The applicant reiterated his request for certified copies of the relied upon documents and his objection to the appointment of respondent No.3 vide communication dated 10.06.2024 (Annexure-A/13). The objection to the appointment of the Inquiry Officer was rejected vide communication dated 04.03.2024, (Annexure-A/14). According to the applicant, certified copies of the relied-upon documents have still not been furnished.
Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer issued notice dated 28.03.2025 requiring the applicant to appear on 08.04.2025 and 09.04.2025 for recording of the depositions of witnesses (Annexure-A/15). The applicant vide communication dated 06.04.2025, sought inspection of the original statement recorded by the Inquiry Officer and informed him that he would be unable to attend the proceedings on 08.04.2025, as the said criminal case was fixed before the learned trial Court on that date. He accordingly requested that the departmental proceedings be kept in abeyance (Annexure-A/16).
The applicant stated that he attended the departmental proceedings on 09.04.2025 and reached the venue at about 12.00 noon. The depositions of two witnesses, namely Shri P.N. Shrote and Shri V.N. Raj, were recorded(Annexure-A/17).
Subsequently, the Inquiry Officer issued notice dated 07.07.2025 fixing the departmental proceedings for 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 28th and 29th July 2025 for examination of witnesses. The applicant has challenged the said notice in the present Original Application, contending, inter alia, that continuation of the departmental proceedings during the pendency of the said criminal prosecution would cause serious prejudice to his defence in the criminal case. Hence, this OA.
Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply opposing the claim of the applicant to which the applicant has also filed his rejoinder.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the applicant argued that the allegations levelled against the applicant in the criminal proceedings and those contained in Articles-I, II and IV of the departmental Charge-Sheet are identical. The documentary evidence as well as the witnesses proposed to be examined in both proceedings are also substantially the same. It was, therefore, contended that continuation of the departmental proceedings would compel the applicant to cross-examine the same witnesses and disclose his line of defence, thereby seriously prejudicing his defence in the pending criminal trial.
Learned counsel also submitted that the right of cross-examination is a valuable facet of the principles of natural justice and constitutes an important component of a fair trial. If the applicant is required to cross-examine witnesses in the departmental proceedings before conclusion of the said criminal trial, the prosecution would become aware of the questions likely to be put to its witnesses and of the defence sought to be taken by the applicant. The applicant may also be required to lead evidence in the departmental proceedings, which would further disclose his defence. According to learned counsel, such disclosure would cause serious and irreparable prejudice to the applicant in the criminal trial and would adversely affect his right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel further submitted that it is well settled that where the criminal case involves complicated and vexed questions of law and facts, and the charges, witnesses and documentary evidence in the criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings are substantially identical, the departmental proceedings ought to be stayed until conclusion of the criminal case. Learned counsel argued that the present case falls squarely within the said principle, as the allegations in Articles-I, II and IV of the departmental Charge-Sheet are the subject matter of the pending criminal prosecution.
Learned counsel also submitted that this Tribunal had earlier granted stay of the departmental proceedings vide order dated 27.01.2021, having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases concerning simultaneous criminal prosecution and departmental proceedings. According to learned counsel, there has been no change in the legal position since then and the criminal case against the applicant continues to remain pending. Rather, the said criminal trial is stated to be at its fag end and nearing completion. Therefore, he urged that there is greater justification for continuing the stay so that the applicant's defence in the said criminal case is not compromised at this stage.
Learned counsel also submitted that there is no urgency whatsoever in proceeding with the departmental enquiry, particularly as the applicant has already been compulsorily retired from service. He also contended that the conduct of the departmental proceedings with undue haste, including examination of witnesses in the absence of the applicant and without providing him inspection of the relevant documents, demonstrates arbitrariness on the part of the respondents. According to learned counsel, such circumstances indicate that the departmental enquiry is being proceeded with as an empty formality and that the impugned notice issued by the Inquiry Officer is liable to be quashed.
Learned counsel placed reliance upon the order passed by this Tribunal in the case of Harshvardhan Nanoti (supra), wherein, according to him, stay of the departmental proceedings was extended during pendency of the criminal proceedings. It was submitted that the facts of the applicant’s case are identical to those considered in the said matter and, therefore, the applicant is also entitled to similar relief.
Learned counsel further submitted that the earlier orders passed by this Tribunal were understood by the parties to mean that the departmental proceedings would remain stayed till culmination of the criminal proceedings. If the said understanding is accepted, the respondents could not have unilaterally resumed the enquiry before conclusion of the said criminal case. Learned counsel contended that, before recommencing the enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have afforded an opportunity of hearing to the applicant and recorded reasons justifying resumption of the proceedings. In the absence of such an exercise, the recommencement of the departmental enquiry was stated to be legally unsustainable.
Learned counsel additionally contended that the applicant had already been compulsorily retired under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules and, therefore, continuation of the departmental proceedings on the same allegations amounted, according to him, to subjecting the applicant to double jeopardy.
Learned counsel lastly challenged the competence of respondent No.3 to continue as Inquiry Officer after the applicant’s compulsory retirement. He submitted that the departmental proceedings had been initiated when the applicant was in service and, upon his retirement, the proceedings were required to be dealt with in accordance with the applicable provisions governing proceedings against a retired employee. According to learned counsel, in terms of Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the President alone was competent to take further action in the matter. The Disciplinary Authority, therefore, allegedly had no jurisdiction to appoint respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer or to decide the applicant’s objection to such appointment.
Learned counsel submitted that the applicant had specifically raised an objection regarding the appointment of respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer, but the same was rejected by respondent No.2. According to learned counsel, respondent No.2 ought to have referred the matter to the President for an appropriate decision instead of rejecting the objection himself. The appointment of respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer and the rejection of the applicant’s objection were, therefore, assailed as being without jurisdiction and contrary to the applicable rules.
On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the applicant prayed that the impugned notice issued by the Inquiry Officer be quashed and set aside and the departmental proceedings in respect of Articles-I, II and IV of the Charge-Sheet be stayed till final disposal of Special Case No.5/2008 pending before the competent criminal Court.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents by drawing our attention to the reply submitted that the present OA is devoid of merit. The applicant has challenged the notice dated 07.07.2025 issued by respondent No.3, whereby he was directed to appear in the departmental proceedings for examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Learned counsel contended that the said notice merely affords the applicant an opportunity to participate in the enquiry and cross-examine the witnesses and is part of the regular procedure prescribed for conducting a disciplinary enquiry. There is, therefore, no illegality in the impugned notice.
Learned counsel submitted that the statements recorded during the departmental proceedings had already been furnished to the applicant along with the notice dated 07.07.2025. The applicant himself has placed the depositions of the witnesses on record as Annexure-A/17 to the OA. Further, as on the date of issuance of the impugned notice, there was no subsisting order staying the departmental proceedings.
As regards the challenge to the appointment of respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer, learned counsel submitted that the appointment was made by the competent authority with the approval of the competent authority, vide order dated 11.03.2022. The relevant order itself explains the circumstances and authority under which respondent No.3 was appointed. The challenge to his appointment has also already been considered and rejected by the competent authority vide communication dated 04.03.2024. Thus, no further challenge to the appointment of respondent No.3 survives.
Learned counsel submitted that the earlier orders passed by this Tribunal did not grant any blanket or indefinite stay of the departmental proceedings till final disposal of the said criminal case. The stay was initially granted for a period of six months and was thereafter extended for another six months. The Tribunal did not extend the stay beyond the period specifically granted. Consequently, after expiry of the period of stay, the respondents were entitled to resume the departmental proceedings.
With regard to the applicant's contention that he had constructively cooperated with the enquiry, learned counsel submitted that the said assertion was specifically denied. The remaining averments concerning the history of the departmental and criminal proceedings were stated to be matters of record.
Learned counsel further submitted that the then Disciplinary Authority, after considering the applicant's submissions and the report of the Inquiry Officer, had, vide order dated 21.09.2016, directed that the departmental proceedings in respect of Articles-I, II and IV be kept in abeyance till the decision of the Special CBI Court, Gondia. However, the said order did not operate as an indefinite stay. Subsequently, the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1, Nagpur, being the Disciplinary Authority, considered the relevant DoP&T instructions, including the Office Memoranda dated 01.08.2007 and 21.07.2016, concerning simultaneous criminal prosecution and departmental proceedings. Vide communication dated 25.07.2018, the Inquiry Officer was directed to resume the departmental proceedings. According to the respondents, the DoPT instructions specifically clarify that there is no bar against simultaneous initiation or continuation of criminal and departmental proceedings arising out of the same allegations.
Learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena & Ors., reported in (1996) 6 SCC 417, wherein the need for expeditious conclusion of disciplinary proceedings was emphasized. Learned counsel also submitted that the interests of administration require that allegations of misconduct be enquired into promptly and that the pendency of criminal proceedings should not, by itself, result in indefinite postponement of departmental proceedings.
Learned counsel also relied upon Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679, to contend that there is no absolute bar in law against simultaneous continuation of departmental and criminal proceedings. According to the respondents, the two proceedings operate in different fields and the departmental enquiry is concerned with disciplinary misconduct, whereas the criminal prosecution is concerned with commission of an offence. On this basis, he submitted that the decision dated 25.07.2018 directing resumption of the departmental enquiry was legally sustainable.
As regards the communications dated 18.09.2020, 28.10.2020 and 23.11.2020, learned counsel submitted that the applicant's version was factually incorrect insofar as it attributed the communication dated 18.09.2020 to respondent No.3. Respondent No.3 had not been appointed as Inquiry Officer at that point of time; his appointment was made only on 11.03.2022. The requests made by the applicant for further stay were considered and rejected by the competent Disciplinary Authority after expiry of the period of stay granted by this Tribunal.
Learned counsel submitted that the respondents were required to proceed with the departmental enquiry so as to bring it to its logical conclusion at the earliest. The applicant could not claim an indefinite suspension of the departmental proceedings merely because the criminal case continued to remain pending.
With regard to the applicant's allegation that certified copies of the relied-upon documents had not been furnished, learned counsel submitted that copies of the relevant documents, duly certified by the ACIT (Vigilance & Prosecution), O/o the Pr. CCIT, Nagpur, and certified on the basis of documents supplied by the CBI authorities vide letters dated 25.01.2023 and 16.08.2023, had been provided to the applicant. The allegation that no documents had been furnished was, therefore, disputed.
Learned counsel further submitted that the assertion that nothing substantial had transpired in the departmental proceedings between 2021 and 2025 was also incorrect. A number of preliminary hearings had been conducted by the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer and the relevant documents had been supplied to the applicant. Thereafter, notices dated 07.07.2025 were issued for examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The applicant, instead of participating in the enquiry, challenged the said notice before this Tribunal.
Learned counsel contended that the impugned notice dated 07.07.2025 does not cause any prejudice to the applicant. The applicant was afforded an opportunity to remain present during recording of the statements of witnesses and to cross-examine them. He was also permitted to cross-examine witnesses whose statements had already been recorded in his absence. Further, departmental proceedings did not merely reproduce the statements recorded by the CBI; rather, specific questions were put to the witnesses and their responses were recorded during the departmental enquiry. Therefore, according to the respondents, no prejudice was caused to the applicant by permitting the witnesses to be examined and cross-examined.
Learned counsel opposed the reliance placed by the applicant upon the case of Harshvardhan Nanoti (supra), submitting that the facts and circumstances of that case were not within the respondents' knowledge and that the applicant could not claim parity with another case without establishing the factual and legal identity of the two matters.
Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant's contention that the departmental enquiry could not have been resumed before conclusion of the criminal case was misconceived. The period of stay granted by this Tribunal had already expired. The Disciplinary Authority had thereafter considered the applicant's request for further stay and rejected the same vide communications dated 28.10.2020 and 23.11.2020. Thus, there was no subsisting judicial order restraining the respondents from proceeding with the enquiry.
Learned counsel reiterated that, in terms of the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 21.07.2016, departmental proceedings cannot be stayed merely because criminal proceedings arising out of the same allegations are pending. Reliance was again placed upon State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena (supra)and Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra), to submit that simultaneous continuation of both proceedings is legally permissible and that the departmental proceedings should not be unnecessarily delayed.
As regards the plea of double jeopardy, learned counsel submitted that the principle of double jeopardy has no application to the present case. The applicant's compulsory retirement under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules and the disciplinary proceedings arising out of the Charge-Sheet dated 01.02.2012 operate in different fields, and the applicant cannot contend that continuation of the departmental proceedings amounts to a second punishment for the same misconduct.
Learned counsel lastly addressed the challenge to the appointment of respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer. He submitted that the original Inquiry Officer, Shri A.R. Ninawe, expired on 23.11.2021 before completion of the enquiry and submission of the enquiry report. Consequently, vide order dated 11.03.2022, Shri Vijaykumar Subramaniyam, Jt. CIT, Range-4, Nagpur, was appointed as the Inquiry Officer to enquire into the charges contained in the Charge Memorandum dated 01.02.2012. The order was issued with the approval of the competent authority.
Learned counsel submitted that the appointment of a fresh Inquiry Officer did not amount to initiation of a fresh departmental enquiry. The disciplinary proceedings had already been initiated under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 while the applicant was in service. Upon his retirement, such proceedings were liable to be continued and concluded in accordance with the applicable pension rules, in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service. According to the respondents, the authority which had commenced the disciplinary proceedings was competent to take further action therein.
Learned counsel, therefore, contended that the order dated 11.03.2022 appointing respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer was valid and within the competence of the respondents. The applicant's objection to the appointment had already been considered and rejected vide communication dated 04.03.2024. Consequently, no ground was made out to interfere with either the appointment of respondent No.3 or the subsequent notice dated 07.07.2025. Further, learned counsel also produced during the course of hearing a copy of order dated 23.07.2026 vide which one Ms. Fariya Ejaz (Civil Code 14091), Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-2, Nagpur, was now appointed as Inquiry Officer in placed of Shri Vijaykumar G. Subramaniyam, who retired on attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f.31.10.2025.
Learned counsel thus submitted that there was neither any subsisting stay against the departmental proceedings nor any legal prohibition against their continuation during the pendency of the criminal case. The applicant had been afforded adequate opportunity to participate in the enquiry and cross-examine the witnesses, and the impugned notice did not suffer from any illegality or procedural infirmity. Thus, the instant OA, being devoid of merit and also suffering from delay and laches, is liable to be dismissed.
In rebuttal, learned counsel for the applicant while reiterating the above noted submissions additionally referred to additional affidavit dated 09.09.2026 wherein it is stated that the present OA primarily raises two issues: first, the legality of the appointment of respondent No.3, Shri Vijaykumar G. Subrahmanyam, as Inquiry Officer vide order dated 11.03.2022; and secondly, the legality of continuation of the departmental proceedings in respect of Articles-I, II and IV of the Charge-Sheet dated 01.02.2012 during the pendency of Special Case No.5/2008, subsequently transferred to Nagpur and re-registered as Special Case No.33/2025.
Learned counsel reiterated that the allegations forming the basis of Articles-I, II and IV of the departmental charge-sheet are substantially identical to those involved in the pending criminal prosecution. The allegations relate to the alleged demand and acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs.2 lakh, acceptance of a mobile handset and the alleged manipulation of the assessment of the Jai Bambleshwari Group of Companies. The documentary evidence and material witnesses in both proceedings are also substantially common. In such circumstances, continuation of the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the applicant's defence in the criminal trial. In order to defend himself in the departmental proceedings, the applicant would necessarily have to cross-examine witnesses and disclose his defence and, if required, lead evidence. Such disclosure, particularly in respect of witnesses common to both proceedings, would enable the prosecution to become aware of the applicant's line of defence before the same witnesses are finally dealt with in the criminal trial.
Learned counsel submitted that the apprehension of prejudice has now become particularly real and immediate in view of the subsequent developments in the criminal proceedings. The learned Sessions Court, vide order dated 27.07.2026, permitted the prosecution to re-examine PW-1, Shri Roshan Jaiswal, the complainant. Pursuant thereto, the complainant's re-examination-in-chief was conducted on 13.08.2026, and the matter was thereafter adjourned to 11.09.2026 for further proceedings, including the playing of the cassette.
Learned counsel emphasised that the applicant is yet to cross-examine the complainant after completion of his re-examination. Since the complainant is a material witness in the criminal prosecution and his evidence is directly connected with the allegations forming the basis of the departmental proceedings, permitting the departmental enquiry to proceed before completion of his evidence in the criminal case would compel the applicant to disclose his defence prematurely. Such disclosure, according to learned counsel, would cause serious and irreversible prejudice to the applicant's right to a free and fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel further submitted that the earlier orders passed by this Tribunal granting stay of the departmental proceedings demonstrate that the issue of prejudice arising from simultaneous proceedings had already been considered in the applicant's case. Vide order dated 21.02.2020 in OA No.2171/2018 and thereafter vide order dated 27.01.2021 in OA No.2162/2021, this Tribunal had granted protection against continuation of the departmental proceedings. Although the earlier orders were for specified periods, the applicant contended that the subsequent developments, particularly the re-examination of the complainant, furnish an independent and stronger ground for continuing the protection at the present stage.
Learned counsel submitted that the applicant is not seeking to delay either proceeding and that the prolonged pendency of the criminal case is not attributable to him. On the contrary, the applicant is interested in an expeditious conclusion of the criminal trial. The prayer for stay of the departmental proceedings is confined to protecting his defence in the criminal case during the crucial stage when the principal complainant is being re-examined and is yet to be cross-examined.
Learned counsel also challenged the manner in which the departmental enquiry was conducted by respondent No.3. It was submitted that, despite the applicant informing the Inquiry Officer that he could not remain present on 08.04.2025 because the criminal proceedings were fixed before the Trial Court on that date, and despite his request for inspection of the original statements and for keeping the departmental proceedings in abeyance, respondent No.3 proceeded to record the depositions of two witnesses in the applicant's absence.
According to learned counsel, recording the evidence behind the applicant's back, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, constituted a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and demonstrated undue haste on the part of the Inquiry Officer. He further contended that the applicant had already questioned the very appointment of respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer and, therefore, the manner in which the proceedings were conducted gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that the enquiry would not be fair and impartial.
Learned counsel further that the departmental enquiry had earlier been stayed by the Disciplinary Authority itself in respect of Articles-I, II and IV pending the criminal trial, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The subsequent decision dated 25.07.2018 directing resumption of the enquiry, according to the applicant, was not supported by cogent reasons. It was argued that a decision to keep proceedings in abeyance could not be reversed merely because there was a change of officer and that the respondents were required to demonstrate compelling reasons for such reversal.
Learned counsel next submitted that the applicant had been compulsorily retired from service on 12.05.2020 under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. He reiterated his challenge to the appointment of respondent No.3 as Inquiry Officer vide order dated 11.03.2022 and submitted that the legality of the said appointment assumes significance because respondent No.3 subsequently proceeded to record evidence in the departmental enquiry.
Learned counsel submitted that respondent No.3 has since retired and the respondents are in the process of appointing another Inquiry Officer. However, his retirement does not render the challenge to his appointment entirely academic, since two witnesses were examined by him during the departmental enquiry and the validity of the evidence so recorded would depend upon the legality of his appointment. If the appointment of respondent No.3 is found to be without authority of law, the evidence recorded by him would also require appropriate consideration.
Learned counsel relied upon the settled principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.K. Meena (supra) and Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) to submit that although there is no absolute prohibition against simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings, departmental proceedings ought to be stayed where the criminal charge is grave, the facts and evidence are substantially identical and continuation of the departmental enquiry is likely to prejudice the defence of the employee in the criminal case. The present case falls within the aforesaid exception. The criminal prosecution and departmental enquiry arise out of the same transaction, involve substantially the same allegations, witnesses and documents, and the criminal trial has now reached the stage of re-examination and cross-examination of the complainant. The applicant's apprehension of prejudice is, therefore, concrete and not merely speculative.
Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents' reliance upon the absence of any subsisting order of stay cannot, by itself, justify continuation of the departmental proceedings. The issue before the Tribunal is whether, in the changed circumstances and particularly in view of the subsequent stage reached in the criminal trial, the applicant is entitled to fresh protection against prejudice to his defence. Further, the fact that the applicant has already been compulsorily retired and that the departmental proceedings relate to events of the year 2008 demonstrates that there is no overriding urgency warranting continuation of the departmental enquiry at the cost of the applicant's right to a fair criminal trial. Conversely, any prejudice caused to the applicant's defence in the criminal case by premature disclosure cannot subsequently be effectively remedied. Therefore, prayed that the departmental proceedings in respect of Articles-I, II and IV of the Charge-Sheet dated 01.02.2012 be stayed at least until completion of the re-examination and cross-examination of PW-1, Shri Roshan Jaiswal, and, preferably, till final disposal of Special Case No.33/2025. He further prayed that appropriate orders be passed regarding the validity and evidentiary effect of the proceedings conducted by respondent No.3.
We have heard and considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings, documents and the orders passed in the earlier Original Applications. The controversy, though arising from a long history of departmental and criminal proceedings, essentially turns upon the question whether the applicant has made out a legally sustainable ground for restraining the respondents from proceeding with the departmental enquiry merely because the criminal prosecution arising out of substantially the same allegations is still pending.
At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind that there is no absolute rule of law that departmental proceedings must invariably remain stayed during the pendency of a criminal prosecution on the same set of facts. The governing principle is that the two proceedings ordinarily operate in different fields and may proceed simultaneously, although in an appropriate case the departmental proceedings may be stayed where the criminal charge is grave, the factual and evidentiary foundation is substantially identical, complicated questions of law and fact arise, and continuation of the departmental proceedings is demonstrably likely to prejudice the defence of the delinquent in the criminal case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly explained this position, including in B.K. Meena, (supra) and Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra). More recently, in State Bank of India v. P. Zadenga, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 675, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering the earlier authorities, reiterated that there is no bar to simultaneous continuation of departmental and criminal proceedings; stay of the departmental proceedings is not a matter of course and has to be determined upon consideration of all relevant circumstances. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also emphasized that departmental proceedings cannot be permitted to remain unduly and unjustly delayed. The relevant portion of the above judgment is reproduced as under:-
20.Further, this Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] elucidated the following principles in dealing with departmental and criminal proceedings simultaneously:
(a)No bar exists on both proceedings continuing simultaneously, though in an appropriate, separate forum.
(b)If said proceedings are on identical/similar facts and if the Central Administrative Tribunalcharges levied against the delinquent employee are of a serious nature, then it would be desirable if the departmental proceedings are stayed till the conclusion of the other.
(c)The nature of the charge or the involvement of complex questions of law and fact depends on the facts and circumstances of each case i.e. the offence, nature of the case launched, evidence and material collected.
(d)Sole consideration of the abovementioned factors cannot be the reason to stay the departmental proceedings.
(e)It must be remembered that departmental proceedings cannot be unduly and unjustly delayed.
(f)If the criminal proceedings are delayed, the other, having been stayed on account thereof, may be resumed to conclude the same at the earliest. This may result in two possibilities : either the vindication of the position of the delinquent employee or he being found guilty, enabling the department concerned to show him out the door.
21.The view taken in M. Paul Anthony [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] was referred to by this Court in Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju [Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju, (2019) 10 SCC 367 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 92] .
22.As is evident from the judicial pronouncements referred to above, it may be desirable or, in certain circumstances, advisable for disciplinary proceedings to be stayed when criminal proceedings are ongoing; however, stay is not “a matter of course” and is only to be given after consideration of all factors, for and against.
23.Keeping in view Neelam Nag [SBI v. Neelam Nag, (2016) 9 SCC 491 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 818] , the following essentialities may be culled out for the operation of Clause 4:
(a)At least one year ought to have passed since attempts to get the delinquent employee prosecuted;
(b)If, after the passage of such time, no prosecution is initiated, then the department may proceed in accordance with its procedure for disciplinary action;
(c)If the prosecution commences later in point of time to the disciplinary proceedings, the latter shall be stayed, but not indefinitely. Such proceedings are to be stayed only for a reasonable period of time, which is a matter of determination Central Administrative Tribunalas per the circumstances of each case.”
In the present case, there can be little dispute that Articles-I, II and IV of the departmental Charge-Sheet and the criminal prosecution arise substantially from the same transaction. The criminal prosecution concerns the alleged demand and acceptance of illegal gratification and the other acts attributed to the applicant, while the departmental charges proceed upon substantially the same factual allegations. We, therefore, proceed on the assumption, favourable to the applicant, that there is substantial identity of allegations and overlapping evidence. However, identity of allegations by itself does not furnish an automatic entitlement to stay the departmental proceedings. The further and decisive question is whether continuation of the departmental enquiry, in the circumstances presently obtaining, is shown to cause such real and substantial prejudice to the applicant's defence in the criminal case as would justify another order of stay.
In our considered view, the applicant has failed to establish such prejudice. The principal apprehension projected by the applicant is that, if he cross-examines the departmental witnesses, the prosecution in the criminal case would become aware of his defence and would thereby obtain an advantage in the criminal trial.Central Administrative Tribunal The apprehension cannot be accepted as an absolute proposition of law. A departmental enquiry and a criminal prosecution have different objects, standards of proof and consequences. In the departmental proceeding, the question is whether the conduct of the employee constitutes misconduct warranting disciplinary action, whereas in the criminal case the prosecution must establish the ingredients of the criminal offence in accordance with the criminal standard of proof. The mere fact that some witnesses or documents may be common does not convert the departmental enquiry into a substitute for the criminal trial. The judgment in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) itself does not lay down that identity of witnesses or documents creates an indefeasible right to stay the departmental proceedings. The principle is one of likelihood of prejudice, to be assessed in the facts of each case. This position has subsequently been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. P. Zadenga (supra).
Significantly, the applicant's apprehension is founded substantially upon the possibility that he may disclose his defence while cross-examining departmental witnesses. Such apprehension, without demonstrating what particular defence would necessarily be disclosed and how such disclosure would irreversibly prejudice the pending criminal trial, remains essentially speculative. It is also relevant that the departmental enquiry is not at its inception. The charge-sheet was issued as far back as 01.02.2012. The criminal case arose from events of the year 2008. The departmental proceedings have already remained in abeyance on more than one occasion. The Disciplinary Authority initially stayed the proceedings in respect of Articles-I, II and IV by order dated 21.09.2016. Thereafter, this Tribunal granted protection for six months vide order dated 21.02.2020 and again for six months vide order dated 27.01.2021. Thus, the departmental proceedings have already suffered considerable delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court's caution that departmental proceedings should not be unduly or unjustly delayed assumes particular significance in the present case.
We are unable to accept the submission that the earlier orders of this Tribunal created a continuing stay until conclusion of the criminal trial. The language of the orders is explicit. By order dated 21.02.2020, the respondents were directed not to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry for a period of six months from the date of the order. Similarly, by order dated 27.01.2021, the Tribunal directed stay for another period of six months or till disposal of the criminal proceedings, whichever was earlier. The expression "whichever is earlier" cannot be construed as creating an indefinite stay merely because the criminal case continued beyond the specified period. The subsequent conduct of the parties also demonstrates that the respondents treated the stay as having expired and the applicant thereafter sought further protection, which was considered and rejected by the competent authority. Consequently, once the period expressly stipulated by the Tribunal had expired, there was no subsisting judicial order prohibiting the respondents from proceeding with the departmental enquiry.
The submission that the respondents could not resume the departmental proceedings without obtaining a fresh order from this Tribunal is equally untenable. The earlier stay orders were passed for specified periods and did not permanently divest the Disciplinary Authority of its jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry. The respondents, after expiry of the period of stay, considered the applicant's request for further deferment and rejected it. Whether that decision was administratively wise or otherwise cannot be equated with violation of a subsisting judicial prohibition. The principle emerging from B.K. Meena (supra), Paul Anthony (supra) and P. Zadenga (supra) is that stay of disciplinary proceedings is an exception based upon the possibility of prejudice and not a consequence that follows automatically from the mere pendency of the criminal prosecution.
The subsequent development relied upon by the applicant, namely, the order of the criminal Court permitting re-examination of PW-1 and the re-examination conducted on 13.08.2026, does not alter the legal position. It is true that PW-1 is an important witness and that his evidence is relevant to the allegations in both proceedings. Nevertheless, the mere fact that his evidence in the criminal case is not yet finally concluded cannot result in an indefinite restraint upon the departmental enquiry. The applicant has not demonstrated any order of the criminal Court prohibiting him from participating in the departmental proceedings, nor has he shown any specific direction of the criminal Court that the departmental enquiry would prejudice the pending trial.
The applicant's argument essentially seeks to convert the possibility of prejudice into an automatic rule of postponement. Such a proposition is wider than the ratio of Paul Anthony (supra) and is inconsistent with the subsequent clarification by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the question of stay has to be decided upon the facts and circumstances of each case and that delay in the criminal proceeding may justify resumption of the departmental proceeding.
The fact that the criminal case has remained pending for a very long period is also a circumstance which cannot be ignored. The departmental charge-sheet was issued in 2012 in respect of allegations dating back to 2006-2008. The criminal prosecution was instituted in 2008. Despite passage of many years, the criminal trial has not yet reached its final conclusion. The applicant has stated that the delay is not attributable to him. Even assuming the same to be correct, the legal consequence cannot be that the departmental proceedings must remain frozen indefinitely. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Zadenga (supra) has specifically reiterated that where criminal proceedings are delayed, the departmental proceedings, if earlier stayed, may be resumed so that they can be concluded expeditiously. Accordingly, on the present facts, the prolonged pendency of the criminal case militates against, rather than necessarily in favour of, another indefinite stay.
We also find no substance in the submission that there was no administrative necessity to continue the departmental enquiry because the applicant had already been compulsorily retired under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules. Compulsory retirement under Rule 56(j) is not a punishment imposed upon the employee for proved misconduct. It is an exercise of the power vested in the Government in public interest. It does not amount to adjudication of the charges contained in the departmental charge-sheet. Consequently, the compulsory retirement cannot by itself extinguish disciplinary proceedings which were validly instituted while the applicant was in service.
The plea of double jeopardy is therefore misconceived. Article 20(2) of the Constitution embodies the principle against prosecution and punishment for the same offence; it does not prohibit a departmental enquiry merely because the employee has been subjected to an independent administrative action such as compulsory retirement under Rule 56(j). The departmental proceeding and compulsory retirement operate in distinct legal fields.
We shall now consider the challenge to the appointment of Shri Vijaykumar G. Subrahmanyam as Inquiry Officer. The applicant was admittedly served with the charge memorandum on 01.02.2012 while he was in service. The departmental proceedings were thus instituted during his service. The subsequent compulsory retirement on 12.05.2020 does not render the entire disciplinary proceeding non est. Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 specifically contemplates that departmental proceedings instituted while the Government servant was in service shall, after retirement, be deemed to be proceedings under Rule 9 of the Rules ibid and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognised this statutory scheme. In Brajendra Singh Yambem v. Union of India, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the effect of Rule 9(2)(a) in relation to disciplinary proceedings instituted while the employee was still in service. Thus, the applicant cannot contend that his compulsory retirement automatically brought the pending disciplinary proceedings to an end or that appointment of a successor Inquiry Officer necessarily required commencement of an entirely new proceeding. The applicant's reliance upon Rule 9(2)(a) is, in fact, misplaced to the extent that the Rule does not prohibit continuation of an enquiry after retirement. The Rule provides the mechanism by which an enquiry instituted during service continues after retirement. The proviso requiring submission of the findings to the President where the proceedings were instituted by an authority subordinate to the President concerns the stage of final decision and does not render the prior stages of the enquiry void.
The distinction between conducting the enquiry and imposing the ultimate pensionary consequence is material. The authority competent to conduct the enquiry may record findings in accordance with the statutory scheme, while the final decision affecting pensionary rights must follow the requirements of Rule 9 of the Rules ibid. The principle reflected in the statutory scheme has also been noticed in judicial decisions dealing with continuation of disciplinary proceedings after retirement.
The applicant has also not demonstrated any provision under which appointment of a successor Inquiry Officer, after the original Inquiry Officer expired on 23.11.2021, became impermissible merely because the charged employee had meanwhile been compulsorily retired. The original Inquiry Officer having died before completion of the enquiry, appointment of another officer was a practical and necessary step to carry the pending proceedings to their logical conclusion. The order dated 11.03.2022 did not initiate a fresh charge or institute a fresh proceeding; it merely substituted the Inquiry Officer for completion of an already instituted enquiry. The applicant's objection to such appointment was admittedly considered and rejected by the competent authority on 04.03.2024. No material has been placed before us to establish that the authority which passed the order dated 11.03.2022 lacked jurisdiction under the applicable service rules. The fact that respondent No.3 has subsequently retired and that another Inquiry Officer has now been appointed vide order dated 23.07.2026 also substantially changes the complexion of this part of the challenge. The applicant seeks to invalidate the appointment of an officer who is no longer conducting the enquiry.
We are conscious of the submission that two witnesses were examined during the tenure of the former Inquiry Officer and that the applicant seeks to challenge the evidentiary effect of those proceedings. However, the mere fact that an Inquiry Officer subsequently ceased to hold office does not, by itself, invalidate the proceedings lawfully conducted by him while he was competent to act. The question whether any particular piece of evidence was recorded in violation of the principles of natural justice is a separate matter and can appropriately be considered by the competent authority/Inquiry Officer at the appropriate stage, if such objection is specifically raised and established.
We now turn to the allegation that the evidence of two witnesses was recorded on 09.04.2025 in the applicant's absence and that the same amounts to violation of natural justice. The record, as placed before us, indicates that the applicant was admittedly present in the departmental proceedings on 09.04.2025 and that the depositions of Shri P.N. Shrote and Shri V.N. Raj were recorded on that date. The respondents have also stated that the applicant was afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses whose statements had earlier been recorded. In any event, a disciplinary proceeding is not vitiated merely because the delinquent employee alleges violation of natural justice. The Tribunal has to examine whether there was actual and demonstrable prejudice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that natural justice is not a ritualistic requirement and that the doctrine of prejudice is relevant while examining alleged procedural violations. Here, the applicant has not demonstrated before us the precise prejudice caused to him by the recording of the evidence, particularly when the respondents state that opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses has been made available. Whether the applicant has adequately availed such opportunity is a matter to be dealt with in the departmental enquiry itself.
The applicant's further allegation that the respondents failed to furnish certified copies of the relied-upon documents also does not justify quashing the entire enquiry at this interlocutory stage. The respondents have specifically stated that relevant documents were supplied and that certified copies were obtained from the concerned authorities. This factual controversy involves appreciation of the material supplied and cannot be resolved merely on the basis of competing assertions. If any relied-upon document has in fact not been furnished or if inspection of the original is legally necessary for an effective defence, the applicant is entitled to raise that objection before the Inquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority. The respondents are equally bound to ensure reasonable opportunity of defence in accordance with Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. But a disputed allegation concerning supply of documents, without establishing actual prejudice, does not warrant wholesale quashing of the disciplinary proceedings.
The reliance placed upon Harshvardhan Nanoti (supra) also does not advance the applicant's case. An order granting stay in another matter cannot be treated as laying down an inflexible rule that every departmental proceeding involving allegations also forming part of a criminal case must remain stayed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressly held that the question is fact-dependent and that the factors relevant for deciding stay cannot be considered in isolation. The present matter is also distinguishable in the important respect that the departmental proceedings here have already remained pending for an extraordinarily long period and have been stayed on earlier occasions for specified periods.
We are also unable to accept the submission that, merely because the departmental authority had once stayed the proceedings by order dated 21.09.2016, the respondents were thereafter legally precluded from reconsidering the matter and directing resumption. An administrative decision to keep disciplinary proceedings in abeyance, particularly one founded upon the pendency of criminal proceedings, does not create an irrevocable right in favour of the delinquent employee to have the enquiry suspended for all time. The authority is entitled to reconsider the circumstances, subject of course to the applicable rules and judicial orders. In the present case, the Tribunal itself subsequently passed orders granting stay only for specified periods. The respondents thereafter considered the applicant's request for continuation of the stay. We therefore find no legal basis for treating the original order dated 21.09.2016 as an indefinite prohibition against continuation of the enquiry.
The contention that the departmental enquiry is being conducted with undue haste also does not persuade us to interfere. On the contrary, the chronology placed before us indicates substantial delay extending over many years. The charge-sheet was issued in 2012; the original Inquiry Officer died in 2021; a successor was appointed in 2022; and the enquiry has still not reached its conclusion. The respondents are under a corresponding obligation to conclude the disciplinary proceedings expeditiously and in accordance with law. The fact that the applicant has retired does not justify keeping the proceedings pending indefinitely. Indeed, the Hon’ble Supreme Court's consistent concern has been that disciplinary proceedings should not be allowed to become interminable.
We may clarify that our conclusion should not be understood as expressing any opinion on the merits of the criminal allegations or the departmental charges. Whether the applicant demanded or accepted illegal gratification, whether he accepted the mobile handset, whether he abused his official position, and whether the assessment-related allegations are established are matters which must be adjudicated by the competent forums in accordance with law. Likewise, our refusal to stay the departmental enquiry does not amount to a finding of guilt. The departmental authority must independently evaluate the evidence in accordance with the applicable rules, and the learned criminal Court must adjudicate the criminal charges independently on the basis of the evidence before it.
On a cumulative consideration of the circumstances, we are of the view that the applicant has not established the exceptional circumstances necessary for another stay of the departmental proceedings. Though the criminal case and departmental enquiry have overlapping factual foundations, the pendency of the criminal prosecution by itself does not create an indefeasible right to stay the departmental proceedings. The earlier stays were expressly time-bound; there is no subsisting judicial order restraining the respondents; the criminal prosecution has remained pending for a very long period; and the applicant has failed to establish concrete, irreversible prejudice to his defence merely from the continuation of the departmental enquiry. The law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.K. Meena (supra), Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) and, in particular, the subsequent synthesis in State Bank of India v. P. Zadenga (supra) requires a balancing of the competing considerations rather than application of a mechanical rule based solely on identity of allegations.
As regards the challenge to the appointment of Shri Vijaykumar G. Subrahmanyam, we find no jurisdictional infirmity established by the applicant. The disciplinary proceeding was instituted while the applicant was in service and its continuation after his compulsory retirement is contemplated by Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules. The subsequent appointment of another Inquiry Officer consequent upon the retirement of Shri Vijaykumar G. Subrahmanyam also renders the prayer to restrain him from functioning as Inquiry Officer substantially academic.
Consequently, we find no ground to quash the impugned notice dated 07.07.2025 merely on the ground of pendency of Special Case No.33/2025 or on the ground that the allegations and some of the evidence overlap. The departmental proceedings shall, however, be conducted strictly in accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules and the principles of natural justice. The applicant shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to inspect and obtain the relied-upon documents, participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the witnesses in accordance with law. Any specific objection regarding admissibility or evidentiary value of material already recorded may be raised before the competent authority and shall be dealt with in accordance with law.
At the same time, considering the extraordinary age of the departmental proceedings and the fact that the charge memorandum dates back to 01.02.2012, we deem it appropriate to observe that the respondents shall make all endeavour to conclude the departmental proceedings expeditiously, without granting unnecessary adjournments, while ensuring full and fair opportunity to the applicant. The pendency of the said criminal case shall not, by itself, be treated as a ground for indefinitely prolonging the departmental enquiry.
In the result, for the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in the present OA and the same is accordingly dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
We make it clear that anything stated in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the said criminal prosecution or the departmental charges, and both proceedings shall be decided by the respective competent forums independently and in accordance with law. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated.