Murlidhar s/o Meghraj Bhattad & Anr. vs The State Of Maharashtra & Anr.

Admit. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

The applicants seek quashing of the First Information Report bearing Crime No.1146/2025 dated 04.11.2025 registered with Police Station, Gadchiroli, District Gadchiroli for the offences punishable under Sections 296(b) and 351(2) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNS”) and Charge-sheet No.568/2025 dated 27.12.2025 as well as consequent proceedings arising out of the said FIR.

The FIR indicates that the helper of the complainant/ non-applicant no.2 was washing the vehicle of the complainant in front of his house. The applicants who are neighbours of the complainant objected to washing of the vehicle on the road. On this count, an altercation took place between the applicants and the wife of the complainant wherein, the applicants abused the wife of the complainant in filthy language in the name of her mother and also threatened the helper of the complainant with his life. Therefore, on the complaint of non-applicant No.2, the aforesaid offences came to be registered against the applicants.

Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants as well as learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for non applicant No.1/ State. Perused the charge-sheet.

Learned Counsel for the applicants submits that if the contents of the FIR as well as the statements of the witnesses are read together, they do not constitute any offence under Section 296 of the BNS as alleged by the prosecution. Learned counsel further contends that the alleged act of uttering abusive words does not amount to obscenity within the meaning of Section 296 of the BNS. According to him, mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 296 of the BNS unless the prosecution establishes that such utterance caused annoyance to others.

Per contra, learned A.P.P. contended that there are specific allegations against the applicants of having used abusive language and also threatened the complainant’s wife and helper. It is further submitted that from perusal of the record, it is apparently clear that the offence as mentioned in the FIR is clearly made out. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicants can be gone into only during trial and therefore, she sought rejection of the application.

Before proceeding to deal with the submissions of the parties, it would be appropriate to reproduce the Sections with which the applicants are charged, which read as under:

It appears from the reading of Section 296 of the BNS that if any person does any obscene act in any public place or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words in or near any public place, which causes annoyance to others, he will be guilty of the offence.

The test of obscenity has been explained in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N.S. Madhanagopal and another Vs. K. Lalitha reported in (2022) 17 SCC 818, wherein it has been observed that the test of obscenity is the substantial tendency to corrupt those minds which are open to such immoral influences. This test has been followed in India and was recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court way back in the year 1964 in the decision in the case of Ranjit D. Udeshi Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1964 SCC Online SC 52 by observing that the test of obscenity is whether the matter has the substantial tendency to corrupt those minds which are open to such immoral influences, by arousing lustful desires, which corrupt thoughts.

It will be appropriate to make a reference to another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2026) 2 SCC 622, wherein it has been observed that the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b) of the IPC. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) of the IPC. The Supreme Court has observed that mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient, there must be further proof to establish that it caused annoyance to others.

Here, in the present case, except the allegation of uttering abusive and filthy language, there is no other allegation of obscenity by virtue of which the applicants corrupted the mind of the complainant to such immoral influences. Besides that, the applicants merely used abusive language, there is nothing on record to suggest that it caused annoyance to anybody. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that there exists prima facie material against the applicants to attract the offence under Section 296 of the BNS.

So far as the offence punishable under Section 351(2) of the BNS is concerned, the material on record prima facie discloses the allegations that the applicants threatened the helper and the wife of the complainant of dire consequence if they wash the vehicle on the road. However, it is pertinent to note that the said offence is non-cognizable in nature and therefore, the police could not have undertaken an investigation without obtaining a prior order from the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. Once the offence under Section 296 of the BNS is excluded, the FIR does not prima facie disclose any other cognizable offence.

The case of the applicants is covered under Clause (4) of Para 102 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported at (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein it has been observed that where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. The High Court can exercise its extraordinary powers to quash the FIR.

Therefore, without adverting into further details, I am of the view that continuation of prosecution against the applicants would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the application deserves to be allowed. Hence, this order :