Sunil Manohar Wankhede & Ors. vs The State Of Maharashtra & Anr.

RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.

The application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), seeks quashing of First Information Report (FIR) bearing No. 1233/2023 registered with Police Station, Awadhootwadi, Yavatmal for the offences punishable under Sections 186, 353, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) as well as Charge sheet and Regular Criminal Case No. 221/2026 pending before the 2^nd Joint Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yavatmal.

(i) The law was set into motion on the report lodged by the complainant/non-applicant No.2, who was serving as the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council, Yavatmal. On 22.09.2023, the complainant was patrolling the city in his official vehicle to inspect the cleanliness in the city. When he reached near Ayurvedic College on Arni Road, he noticed two employees of the Nagar Parishad engaged in cleaning the road. He also noticed a four-wheeled handcart selling coconuts and found that the area around the said cart was untidy. The complainant attempted to stop the owner of the cart, however he fled away from the spot on noticing the complainant. Consequently, the complainant, along with the other staff members, proceeded to seize the said cart. When the complainant and the staff were taking the cart to the Nagar Parishad office, the applicants arrived at the spot and obstructed them. The applicants allegedly raised their voices and abused the complainant in filthy language.

ii] Thereafter, a panchnama of the coconut cart was prepared and the said cart was brought to the Police Station. Thus, alleging that the applicants had obstructed the complainant, a public servant, while he was discharging his official duties, and had abused him in filthy language in a public place. Therefore, the report came to be lodged against the applicants. On the basis of the said report, the FIR came to be registered against the applicants for the aforesaid offences.

Heard Mr. V. D. Darne, learned counsel appearing for the applicants, Mr. Nikhil H. Joshi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for non-applicant no.1/State and Mr. Pravin P. Deshmukh, learned counsel appearing for non-applicant no.2/ complainant. Perused the charge-sheet.

Mr. Darne, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, vehemently submitted that there is no allegation of assault or use of criminal force by the applicants in the alleged obstruction caused to the complainant while he was discharging his official duties as a public servant. Therefore, according to him, the essential ingredients of Section 353 of the IPC are not attracted against the applicants. He further submitted that the other offences alleged against the applicants are non-cognizable in nature.

Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, assisted by Mr. Deshmukh, learned counsel appearing for the complainant, opposed the application on the ground that there is ample material on record demonstrating that the applicants had obstructed and prevented the complainant from discharging his official duties as a public servant. It was, therefore, submitted that the FIR has been rightly registered against the applicants. Learned counsel accordingly sought rejection of the application.

In order to appreciate the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, it will be apt to reproduce Section 353 of the IPC, which reads thus :

A close examination of the said Section would indicate that, to attract the offence thereunder, there must be an assault or use of criminal force against a public servant while such public servant is acting in the discharge of his official duties, or with an intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as a public servant. It is thus evident that Section 353 of the IPC is an aggravated form of the offence under Section 186 of the IPC, wherein criminal force or assault is involved. Unlike Section 186 of the IPC, where voluntary obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions is sufficient to attract the provision, Section 353 of the IPC requires the actual use of criminal force or assault against the public servant in addition to such obstruction. Thus, mere obstruction, in the absence of assault or use of criminal force, would not, by itself, attract the provisions of Section 353 of the IPC.

Coming to the allegations in the charge-sheet, no doubt there are allegations against the applicants that when the complainant and other officials went to seize the coconut cart, the applicants started abusing them in a loud voice and prevented them from seizing the cart. However, there is no allegation in the entire charge-sheet that either of the applicants assaulted the complainant or used criminal force against him when they allegedly tried to prevent the complainant from seizing the cart. Thus, the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 353 of the IPC are absent. It is, therefore, crystal clear that the offence under Section 353 of the IPC is not attracted against the applicants.

The prosecution has also invoked Section 186 of the IPC against the applicants, which, in my view, has rightly been invoked. I shall deal with the ingredients of Section 186 of the IPC little later to see whether the police can investigate in the said offence.

This takes me to the allegation of the applicants having abused the complainant. In respect of the said allegation, the prosecution has also invoked Section 294 of the IPC against the applicants. It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 294 of the IPC, which reads as under:

It appears from the reading of Section 294 of the IPC that if any person does any obscene act in any public place or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words in or near any public place, which causes annoyance to others, he will be guilty of the offence.

The test of obscenity has been explained in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N.S. Madhanagopal and another Vs. K. Lalitha, reported in (2022) 17 SCC 818, wherein it has been observed that the test of obscenity is the substantial tendency to corrupt those minds which are open to such immoral influences. This test has been followed in India and is recognized by the Supreme Court way back in the year 1964 in the decision in the case of Ranjit D. Udeshi Vs. State of Maharashtra (1964 SCC Online SC 52) by observing that the test of obscenity is whether the matter has the substantial tendency to corrupt those minds which are open to such immoral influences, by arousing lustful desires, which corrupt thoughts.

It will be appropriate to make a reference to the another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others [(2026) 2 SCC 622], wherein it has been observed that the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b) of the IPC. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) of the IPC. The Supreme Court has observed that mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient, there must be further proof to establish that it caused annoyance to others.

Here, in the present case, except the allegation of uttering abusive and filthy language, there is no other allegation of obscenity by virtue of which the applicant corrupted the mind of the complainant to such immoral influences. Besides that, the applicant merely used abusive language, there is nothing on record to suggest that it caused annoyance to anybody. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that there exists prima facie material against the applicant to attract the offence under Section 294 of the IPC.

So far as the offence punishable under Section 186 of the IPC is concerned, the material on record prima facie discloses the allegations that the applicants prevented the complainant from performing his official duty as a public servant. However, it is pertinent to note that the said offence is non-cognizable in nature. Therefore, the police could not have undertaken an investigation without obtaining a prior order from the jurisdictional Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. Once the offence under Sections 294 and 353 of the IPC are excluded, the FIR does not prima facie disclose any other cognizable offence.

The case of the applicants is covered by Clause (4) of paragraph 102 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported at (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein in clause (4) of para 102 it has been observed that where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C., the High Court can exercise the extraordinary power to quash FIR.

Therefore, without adverting to further details, I am of the view that continuation of prosecution against the applicants would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, the application deserves to be partly allowed. Hence, this order :

The Criminal Application is allowed.

First Information Report bearing No. 1233/2023 registered with Police Station, Awadhootwadi, Yavatmal for the offences punishable under Sections 186, 353, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) as well as Charge sheet and Regular Criminal Case No. 221/2026 pending before the 2^nd Joint Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yavatmal, are quashed and set aside qua the applicants.

The application stands disposed of in the above terms.