Abhiral Dubey And Others vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others

B. P. Sharma, J

This petition has been filed for invoking inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment of FIR bearing crime No.232/2025 dated 26.05.2025 and entire charge sheet for commission of offence punishable under Sections 296, 351(3) and 3(5)of BNS, 2023, against the petitioners.

As per the prosecution story the respondent no.2 lodged an FIR alleging that on 25.05.2025, the petitioners approached at her cafe at around 6. 30 P.M. where the meeting on water related issued of the society was being held and the petitioners started hurling abusive words. It is also mentioned in the FIR that the petitioners threatened her that they would take her life. On the basis of FIR, aforesaid offence has been registered.

It is submitted by counsel for the petitioners that petitioners and respondent No.2 entered into heated argument regarding their old grudges and respondent No.2 in order to take revenge, lodged the false FIR against the petitioners lodged. It is further submitted that on perusal of the contents of the FIR and statements recorded by the police, no offence has been made out against the respondent. Even if the allegations are taken as it is, there are no material in the FIR or the charge sheet to make out the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 296 of BNS (section 294 of IPC). In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioners have relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amit Ashok Jagdale v. State of Maharashtra : 2025 SCC Online Bom 3323.

It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that offence under Section 351(3) (i.e. Section 506 of IPC) provides for criminal intimidation to cause hurt to the present applicants. The mandatory / required ingredients to constitute offence u/s 351(3) include- "Causing alarm to the victim". Mere threats given to the victim without an intention to cause alarm would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation.

Learned counsel for the State submits that the FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences and the allegations made therein, taken at their face value, prima facie constitute the offences alleged. The investigation is at a nascent stage and the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations cannot be adjudicated in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, and the present case does not fall within the settled parameters. Hence the petition deserves to be dismissed.

For just adjudication the facts of the FIR is taken note off-

A bare reading of the FIR and the statement recorded under Section 180 of BNSS reflects that essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section 296 of BNS are wholly absent. Section 296 requires that of act of complainant must involve the occurrence of obscene words or doing of obscene act in a public place as defined under the law. The FIR does not specify a single obscene word nor the nature of the alleged obscenity.

As regards the offence under Section 351(3) of BNS is concerned even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value there is no material to satisfy the statutory requirements of offence under the said section which deals with aggravated assault. For the application of Section 351(3) of BNS there must be an assault or use of some criminal force which must be recognized as aggravating circumstances such as use of a weapon used to cause a grievous hurt or any circumstances specified in the statute. The allegations in the FIR, though stated to be grave, are devoid of any physical force or any overt act capable of creating a reasonable apprehension of harm. The mere allegation that the applicant threatened to take the complainant’s life is bald and unsupported by particulars of time, manner, or context. Such vague assertions, in the absence of any accompanying act or conduct, do not constitute an offence of assault, much less an aggravated form thereof. Hence, the very foundation of section 351(3) of BNS is totally absent. In this regard reference can be had of a decision of the Honb'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 wherein it is held -

"14- A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

15- ... It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. ..."

On perusal of the record especially FIR, the prosecution story is arrogantly improbable, lacks specificity and does not disclose any criminality. The FIR as well as the statement of the witnesses do not contain any details of the alleged abused words or the role played by the applicant or the particulars of the alleged threat. The absence of such fundamental details makes the allegation wholly vague and legally incapable of forming the basis of criminal prosecution. The allegation in the FIR even if they are taken in their face value do not disclose the commission of the offence punishable under Section 296, 351(3) of BNS.

Therefore, in the considered view of this Court the FIR bearing crime No.232/2025 dated 26.05.2025 and entire charge sheet for commission of offence punishable under Sections 296, 351(3) and 3(5)of BNS, 2023, against the petitioners are hereby quashed.

Petition stands allowed and disposed off.