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Judgment
Date : 28-08-2026 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the Respondents.
The present writ petition has been filed for restraining Respondent No. 8 and the police authorities from forcibly evicting the petitioner and her family from the house in which the petitioner is residing.
As per the petitioner, a dispute arose between the petitioner and her landlord with respect to the said tenancy, but in the midst of the dispute, a settlement was arrived at, according to which the landlord agreed to sell the house in question to the husband of the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, a deed of agreement was executed, and a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs was paid by the husband of the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after execution of the deed of agreement in favour of the husband of the petitioner, the landlady sold the house in question to one Shailendra Kumar Rai vide a registered sale deed executed in his favour, in respect of which the petitioner was in the process of filing a suit before the Civil Court. It was further submitted that, at the instance of the purchaser, Respondent No. 8, being an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Shashtrinagar Police Station, attempted to vacate the petitioner from the house. It was also submitted that the petitioner filed an application before the Director General of Police in this regard. The Counsel lastly submitted that the illegal actions of the respondents have resulted in demolition of petitioner's residential house which led to the dispossession of the petitioner from the property in question.
Learned counsel for the State submitted that all requisite steps have been taken by the police in respect of the complaint filed either by the purchaser or by the petitioner and that the police had nothing to do with the eviction of the petitioner with respect to the property in question. The Learned Counsel also submitted that the petitioner failed to produce any document with respect to her right over the concerned property.
Learned counsel for Respondent No. 9 submitted that he, being a bona fide purchaser, had purchased the said property from Ms. Rekha through a valid sale deed and proposes to construct an office-cum-residential building thereon for his company. Thereafter, the name of Respondent No. 9 was mutated in the records of the Patna Municipal Corporation, and an electric connection was subsequently obtained in his name. It was further submitted that after execution of the sale deed, when Respondent No. 9 visited the house, he found one Chandra Shekhar Sharma, who claimed to be a tenant therein. When Respondent No. 9 confronted him and asked him to furnish proof of his tenancy, he refused to produce any such proof. Learned counsel further submitted that when Respondent No. 9 contacted Ms. Rekha, she stated that she did not know Chandra Shekhar Sharma and had never let out the house to him. It was further submitted that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and has suppressed material facts.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records, it would be apposite to first examine the role played by the State authorities in the present case. A perusal of the affidavit filed by the concerned authorities reveals that all necessary steps have been taken in accordance with law.
Taking into account the various disputed questions arising in respect of possession and the facts pleaded by the petitioner and controverted by the respondents, it is pertinent to discuss a few principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the adjudication of civil rights in writ jurisdiction under Article 226. It has repeatedly been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the appropriate forum for adjudication of property disputes related to the title. In case of Mohd. Hanif v. State of Assam reported in (1969) 2 SCC 782, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while explaining the general principles governing writ jurisdiction under Article 226, held that this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is not meant for declaring the private rights of the parties. The relevant portion is reproduced as below,
“It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court not for the purpose of declaring the private rights of the parties but for the purpose of ensuring that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that the various tribunals and public authorities are kept within the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, a jurisdiction meant to supervise the work of the tribunals and public authorities and to see that they act within the limits of the irrespective jurisdiction. In a proceeding under Article 226 the High Court is not concerned merely with the determination of the private rights of the parties; the only object to such a proceeding under Article 226 is to ensure that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that various authorities and tribunals act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. Article 226states that the High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. All these writs are known in English law as prerogative writs, the reason being that they are specially associated with the King's name. These writs were always granted for the protection of public interest and primarily by the Court of the King's Bench. As a matter of history the Court of the King's Bench was held to be coram rego inso andwas required to perform quasi-governmental functions. The theory of the English Law is that the King himself superintends the due course of justice through his own Court preventing cases of usurpation of jurisdiction and insisting on vindication of public rights and protecting the liberty of the subjects by speedy and summary interposition. That is the theory of the English law and as pointed out by this Court in Basappa v. Nagappa² our Constitution-makers have borrowed the conception of prerogative writs from the English Law and the essential principles relating to such prerogative writs are applicable in Indian law. It is obvious that the remedy provided under Article 226 is a remedy against the violation of the rights of a citizen by the State or statutory authority. In other words, it is a remedy in public law. But as already pointed out the appellant in the present case is not merely attempting to enforce his contractual right but important constitutional issues have been raised on behalf of the appellant.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
The above principles have been reiterated in case of P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar reported in (2006) 4 SCC 501, where the court held that it would be an abuse of process to approach a writ court in connection with dispute in question of title for deciding which the civil court is the appropriate forum.
In view of the above, it would be an abuse of process of law for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking direction to the authorities concerned to protect her claimed possession of a property without first establishing her possession in an appropriate civil court. It is necessary to add that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations.
Hence, the present writ petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate civil court for redressal of the grievance.
Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.