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Judgment
Heard Learned Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Counsel for the private Respondent Nos. 8, 10 and 11, and the learned Counsel for the State.
The relief sought in the writ application is as under:-
"(i)For issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to remove the boundary wall which is constructed 7 feet height from 10.08.2022 to 20.08.2022 upon the petitioners land by private Respondents."
"(ii)For issuance of direction to Respondents to strict action against the private Respondents and erring officers."
"(iii)For issuance of any other relief or reliefs for which the petitioners are found entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case."
The petitioners are aggrieved by the construction of a 7-feet-high boundary wall, with an iron gate, over their land at Mauza Bhatarih/Batadih, Khata No. 35 (old Khata No. 31), Plot No. 2, by private Respondent Nos. 8 to 11, between 10.08.2022 and 20.08.2022, and by the consequent dispossession alleged to have taken place on 11.08.2022, as also by the inaction of the official respondents despite repeated representations.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the land in question, Mauza Bhatarih, P.S. No. 128, Khata No. 35 (old Khata No. 31), Plot No. 2, Area 0.9 decimal, was originally purchased by Most. Bhagiya, grandmother of petitioner No. 2, from Ram Adhar Ram and Ram Jag Ram, sons of Mahadeo Ram, vide registered sale deed dated 29.04.1970, pursuant to which mutation was effected in her name by the Circle Officer, Sasaram, and rent was paid continuously by her and thereafter by her family members. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that Ram Jag Ram, one of the original vendors, subsequently sold half of the said plot, i.e., 4½ decimal, to one Kedar Pandey vide sale deed dated 29.08.1990, who in turn sold the same to petitioner No. 1, Sumitra Devi, vide registered sale deed dated 05.03.1998, pursuant to which petitioner No. 1's name was mutated and rent was paid up to 2004.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that a dispute having arisen between petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 themselves, Title Suit No. 271/2005 was filed by petitioner No. 1 against petitioner No. 2, which came to be compromised vide Sulahnama dated 24.08.2022, both petitioners being thereafter in physical possession of the land as per their respective shares; and that upon filing of the said title suit, the Circle Officer, Sasaram, had stopped issuing rent receipts in respect of the said Khata/Plot pending disposal of the suit.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that private Respondent Nos. 9 to 11, on the strength of a different and independent chain of title — traced through the same vendor Ram Jag Ram's subsequent sale to Radhika Devi, who sold to Rinku Devi, who along with Rama Shankar Paswan sold to Sushila Kunwar and Sunita Singh in June 2022 — forcibly dispossessed the petitioners from 0.4½ decimal of their land, by engaging 40-50 local persons, constructing a 7-feet boundary wall and fitting an iron gate, and that upon the petitioners' wives attempting to stop the construction, the private respondents fired shots in the air. It is submitted that despite written applications to the S.H.O., Darigaon, on 11.08.2022, daily visits from 10.08.2022 to 20.08.2022, WhatsApp representations to the S.P., Rohtas, and a representation during the public grievance hearing before the Circle Officer, Sasaram, on 13.08.2022, no action was taken by the official respondents, and relies upon Yasin Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das,AIR 1956 All 1 (F.B.), as approved in Lallu Yashwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620, for the proposition that "law respects possession even if there is no title to it" and does not permit any person to take the law into his own hands to dispossess a person in actual possession without recourse to a court.
Learned Counsel for private Respondent Nos. 8, 10 and 11 submitted, that out of the total 9 decimal of Khata No. 35, Plot No. 2, the Khatiyani Raiyat Ram Jag Ram had executed a registered sale deed (Deed No. 1333) in respect of 4½ decimal in favour of Radhika Devi, who, after the demise of her husband Ramashankar Ram, had a further sale deed executed in favour of Rinku Devi (Deed No. 15094) for 2.25 decimal, with mutation effected and rent being paid; and that the said 4½ decimal was purchased by Sushila Kunwar and Sunita Singh from Ramashankar Paswan and Rinku Devi vide registered sale deed (Deed No. 10268), possession having been handed over, mutation effected in favour of Respondent Nos. 8 to 10, and rent being paid, pursuant to which the boundary wall was constructed over the land so purchased.
Learned Counsel for private Respondent Nos. 8, 10 and 11 further submitted that petitioner No. 2 has produced no document to establish inheritance/succession from his grandmother, Most. Bhagiya, in his favour; that petitioner No. 1 claims title through an entirely separate and independent sale deed executed by Kedar Pandey in 1998, rendering the petitioners' claims inconsistent and self-contradictory; and that petitioner No. 1 has, in any event, already transferred the land purchased by her to third persons through registered sale deeds, and therefore has no subsisting right, title or interest, and consequently no locus standi, to maintain the present writ petition.
Learned Counsel for private Respondent Nos. 8, 10 and 11 submitted that the dispute is essentially a private dispute relating to title and possession of immovable property between the petitioners and the private respondents, involving two independent and competing chains of title traced from the common vendors, which necessarily requires appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; that the petitioners have attempted to convert a purely civil dispute into a writ proceeding, suppressing material facts, including the existence of the rival sale deeds and the private respondents' own mutation and rent payment; and that the appropriate remedy lies before the competent Civil Court.
Learned Counsel for the State/Respondent submitted that the question of title and possession over the land in question, being contested between the petitioners and private Respondent Nos. 8 to 11 on the basis of two independent and competing chains of registered sale deeds, both sides claiming mutation and rent payment in their favour, involves disputed questions of fact not amenable to adjudication in writ jurisdiction; and that the role of the official respondents, including the Circle Officer, Sasaram, and the S.H.O., Darigaon, in the matter is confined to maintenance of law and order, the grievance regarding inaction on the petitioners' representations being a separate matter from the underlying title dispute.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the records, and taking into account the various disputed questions pleaded by the petitioner, it is pertinent to discuss a few principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the adjudication of civil rights in writ jurisdiction under Article 226. It has repeatedly been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the appropriate forum for adjudication of property disputes related to the title. In Mohd. Hanif v. State of Assam reported in (1969) 2 SCC 782, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while explaining the general principles governing writ jurisdiction under Article 226, held that this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is not meant for declaring the private rights of the parties. The relevant portion is reproduced as below,
“It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court not for the purpose of declaring the private rights of the parties but for the purpose of ensuring that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that the various tribunals and public authorities are kept within the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, a jurisdiction meant to supervise the work of the tribunals and public authorities and to see that they act within the limits of the irrespective jurisdiction. In a proceeding under Article 226 the High Court is not concerned merely with the determination of the private rights of the parties; the only object to such a proceeding under Article 226 is to ensure that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that various authorities and tribunals act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. Article 226states that the High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. All these writs are known in English law as prerogative writs, the reason being that they are specially associated with the King's name. These writs were always granted for the protection of public interest and primarily by the Court of the King's Bench. As a matter of history the Court of the King's Bench was held to be coram rego inso and was required to perform quasi-governmental functions. The theory of the English Law is that the King himself superintends the due course of justice through his own Court preventing cases of usurpation of jurisdiction and insisting on vindication of public rights and protecting the liberty of the subjects by speedy and summary interposition. That is the theory of the English law and as pointed out by this Court in Basappa v. Nagappa² our Constitution-makers have borrowed the conception of prerogative writs from the English Law and the essential principles relating to such prerogative writs are applicable in Indian law. It is obvious that the remedy provided under Article 226 is a remedy against the violation of the rights of a citizen by the State or statutory authority. In other words, it is a remedy in public law. But as already pointed out the appellant in the present case is not merely attempting to enforce his contractual right but important constitutional issues have been raised on behalf of the appellant. (Emphasis Supplied)
The above principles have been reiterated in P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar reported in (2006) 4 SCC 501, where the court held that it would be an abuse of process to approach a writ court in connection with dispute in question of title for deciding which the civil court is the appropriate forum.
In view of the above, it would be an abuse of the process of law for the petitioners to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking removal of the boundary wall, action against private respondents, and enforcement of their claimed title and possession over the subject land, without first establishing their rights and resolving the conflicting claims of ownership in an appropriate civil court. The dispute raised herein is essentially a private title and boundary dispute between private parties involving rival claims of ownership and possession, requiring adjudication upon complex factual matrix and evidence, and is not one this Court would ordinarily interfere with in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. It is necessary to add that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations.
However, the police authorities are expected to take necessary actions if either party faces a law and order situation.
Hence, the present writ petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to approach the appropriate civil court for redressal of their grievances.
The pending I.A.(s) shall also stand disposed of.