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Judgment
ORAL ORDER
This OA has been filed by the applicant seeking the following relief:
“To call for the records of the 2nd respondent pertaining to his order which is made in Memo No. ADA dated 13.11.2017 and the order of 1st respondent made in Memo. No. App dated 26.11.2018 and set aside the same; consequently, to direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant into service with all attendant benefits; and to pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case”.
Brief facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant are as follows: The applicant, working as GDS Mail Deliverer (GDS MD), Peralam SO, had rendered about 22 years of service when he was issued a charge sheet dated 29.09.2016 under Rule 10 of the GDS (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 by the 2nd respondent. He denied the charges. During the inquiry, his request for 11 additional documents was rejected. The applicant contended that he had paid the amounts to relatives of the concerned payees based on their representation that the payees were unwell. He requested the Inquiry Officer (IO) and Presenting Officer (PO) to summon the relatives to verify the payments and also to summon the authors of the Revenue Authority's letters for cross-examination. Both requests were not acted upon, and the inquiry was concluded relying on the said letters. After receiving the inquiry report, the applicant submitted a detailed representation denying misconduct and seeking reinstatement. However, without addressing his material contentions, the 2nd respondent removed him from engagement with immediate effect by order dated 13.11.2017. His appeal dated 08.02.2018 was rejected by the 1st respondent on 26.11.2018. Aggrieved by these orders, the applicant filed the present OA.
When the matter was taken up for final hearing, the learned counsel for the applicant contended that the applicant was denied access to 11 additional documents which were essential for establishing his innocence and effectively defending himself against the charges. The denial of such documents deprived the applicant of a reasonable and effective opportunity to defend his case. Consequently, the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated on account of violation of the principles of natural justice, and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside, with a consequential direction to reinstate the applicant with all attendant benefits.
The learned counsel further submitted that, though the Inquiry Officer (IO) and the respondents contended that the applicant had been permitted to peruse the relevant documents, such contention itself establishes that the documents were not actually supplied to the applicant. The applicant was thus denied copies of the relied-upon documents as well as the 11 additional documents sought by him. Mere permission to peruse documents cannot be equated with furnishing copies thereof, particularly when the documents were required for preparing an effective defence. Despite such denial of reasonable opportunity, the respondents proceeded to impose the major penalty of removal from engagement, rendering the impugned orders arbitrary and illegal.
It was further contended that the IO and the Disciplinary Authority relied substantially upon certificates/letters issued by the Revenue Authority in arriving at the finding of guilt. The applicant specifically requested that the authors of those certificates/letters be summoned for examination so that he could test the correctness and veracity of their contents through cross-examination. However, the said witnesses were not summoned and the applicant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine them. Such denial of an opportunity to confront and cross-examine material witnesses whose statements/documents were relied upon against the applicant constitutes a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and has materially prejudiced his defence. Therefore, the findings recorded in the inquiry report and the consequential punishment cannot be sustained.
The learned counsel also submitted that the relatives of the deceased payees, to whom the applicant stated that the e-MO amounts had been paid, were not summoned for examination or cross-examination. The applicant had specifically requested their examination to ascertain the true facts regarding receipt of the amounts. The failure to examine these material witnesses, despite a specific request by the applicant, rendered the inquiry incomplete and the findings of the IO unsustainable.
It was further contended that reliance was placed upon the statements allegedly given by the applicant during the preliminary inquiry. However, during his self-examination in the regular inquiry, the applicant categorically stated that those statements had been obtained under compulsion and were not voluntary. In such circumstances, the said statements could not have been mechanically relied upon as substantive evidence for imposing the extreme penalty of removal from engagement, particularly when their voluntariness and evidentiary value were specifically disputed by the applicant.
Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that, even assuming the charges against the applicant were established, the penalty of removal from engagement was wholly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the alleged misconduct. The disciplinary authority failed to consider the applicant's long service of about 22 years and the mitigating circumstances before imposing the extreme penalty of removal. The punishment is therefore arbitrary, excessive and disproportionate to the charges. On the above grounds, the learned counsel for the applicant prayed that the impugned orders be set aside and that the applicant be granted the reliefs sought in the present OA, including reinstatement with all consequential and attendant benefits.
In contrast, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the applicant and relied upon the reply statement filed by the respondent. He contended that the enquiry conducted by the Inspector of Posts, Mayiladuthurai South Sub-Division, Mayiladuthurai, revealed that the applicant had misappropriated six Old Age Pension Electronic Money Orders relating to the amounts payable to Shri R. Govindasamy, who had expired on 22.08.2015. The applicant had shown all six Old Age Pension Electronic Money Orders as having been duly paid to the payee by affixing his Left Thumb Impression on the respective Electronic Money Orders and had thereafter utilized the amount of Rs.6,000/- for his personal use. It was further contended that the applicant had also misappropriated the amounts covered by Old Age Pension Electronic Money Orders pertaining to three other deceased Old Age Pension beneficiaries, which had been received for payment during the month of February 2016. In those cases also, the applicant affixed his Left Thumb Impression on the respective Electronic Money Orders and utilized the total amount of Rs.3,000/- for his personal expenses. The details of the Electronic Money Orders alleged to have been misappropriated by the applicant are furnished below:
| Amount | Name of Payee | Date of Booking | Date of Death of Payee | Date of Payment |
| 1,000/- | R. Govindasamy | 21.08.2015 | 22.08.2015 | 24.08.2015 |
| 1,000/- | R. Govindasamy | 22.09.2015 | 22.08.2015 | 25.09.2015 |
| 1,000/- | R. Govindasamy | 16.10.2015 | 22.08.2015 | 19.10.2015 |
| 1,000/- | R. Govindasamy | 27.11.2015 | 22.08.2015 | 30.11.2015 |
| 1,000/- | R. Govindasamy | 17.12.2015 | 22.08.2015 | 21.12.2015 |
| 1,000/- | R. Govindasamy | 06.02.2016 | 22.08.2015 | 08.02.2016 |
| 1,000/- | R. Periyasamy | 06.02.2016 | 03.01.2016 | 08.02.2016 |
| 1,000/- | K. Sarangapani | 06.02.2016 | 05.01.2016 | 09.02.2016 |
| 1,000/- | U. Panchavarnam | 06.02.2016 | 22.01.2016 | 09.02.2016 |
He contended that there was no procedural irregularity or violation of the prescribed procedure in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. He further submitted that the applicant had committed acts reflecting a lack of integrity, which had been duly established during the course of the inquiry. It was argued that an official whose integrity has been found to be lacking ought not to be retained in Government service, as such conduct would adversely affect the functioning and credibility of the administrative system as a whole. He further submitted that the applicant had committed acts involving moral turpitude, which stood proved during the inquiry, and that he was, therefore, not fit to be considered for reinstatement in Government service, as his reinstatement would have an adverse impact on the integrity and efficiency of the official machinery. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the respondent prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
The applicant has filed a rejoinder to which the respondents have also a filed a reply reiterating the contentions made in the OA and the reply statement.
We have heard the rival submissions made by the learned counsel on either sides, perused the pleadings and the materials placed on record. We have also carefully considered judicial decisions relied upon by the respective parties.
It is seen that the applicant while he was working as GDS MD, Peralam SO was issued with a Charge Sheet, dated 29.09.2015 under Rule 10 of GDS (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011, alleging that he has not paid the eMO amount of Rs.1000/- payable to the beneficiaries who had actually was reported deceased but made entry as if he had paid the amount. As such, the 2nd respondent following 3 Articles of charge framed against him:
Article I
Shri. G. Meganathan, GDS MD (off duty), Peralam S.O. while working as such, was trusted with payment of OAP e-MO No.115204160206255882 dated 06.02.2016 booked at Nannilam, S.O. for Rs.1000/- payable to Shri. R. Govindasamy, S/o Rethinam, Andakudi Road Jikudi, Peralam. But Shri. G. Meganathan had actually not paid the e-money order to the payee, instead he accounted the e-money order as paid on 08.02.2016. Even though the payee as reported deceased on 22.08.2015, Shri. G. Meganathan, GDS MD, Peralam S.O. took the e-money order amount of Rs.1000/- by putting his LTI in the e-money order form as like the payee and utilized the amount of Rs.1000/- for his personal expenses instead of returning the e-MO to the remitter.
Article II
Shri. G. Meganathan, GDS MD (off duty), Peralam S.O. while working as such, was entrusted with payment of OAP e-MO No.115204160206255881 dated 06.02.2016 booked at Nannilam, S.O. for Rs.1000/- payable to Shri. Periyasamy, S/o Ramasamy, Maharajapuram Road, Injikudi, Peralam. But Shri. G. Meganathan had actually not paid the e-money order to the payee, instead he accounted the e-money order as paid on 08.02.2016. Even though the payee was reported deceased on 03.01.2016, Shri. G. Meganathan, GDS MD, Peralam S.O. took the e-money order amount of Rs.1000/- by putting his LTI in the e-money order form as like the payee and utilized the amount of Rs.1000/-for his personal expenses instead of returning the e-MO to the remitter.
Article III
Shri. G. Meganathan, GDS MD (off duty), Peralam S.O. while working as such, was trusted with payment of OAP e-MO No.115204160206256074 dated 06.02.2016 booked at Nannilam, S.O. for Rs.1000/- payable to Shri. Sarangapani, S/o Kaliyaperuamal, Akilampettai, Injikudi, Peralam. But Shri. G. Meganathan had actually not paid the e-money order to the payee, instead he accounted the e-money order as paid on 09.02.2016. Even though the payee is reported deceased on 05.01.2016, Shri. G. Meganathan, GDS MD, Peralam S.O. took the e-money order amount of Rs.1000/- by putting his LTI in the e-money order form as like the payee and utilized the amount of Rs.1000/- for his personal expenses instead of returning the e-MO to the remitter. Thus, it is imputed that Shri. G. Meganathan, GDS MD (Off duty), Peralam S.O. contravened the provisions of Rules 121 (2) and 127 (1) of Postal Manual Volume VI Part III (Sixth Edition - Corrected up to 30th June 1986) and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty as required in Rule 21 of GDS (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011.”
The applicant denied all the charges levelled against him. Consequently, the Disciplinary Authority ordered a departmental inquiry and appointed an Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer for the purpose. The applicant participated in the preliminary inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer and was permitted to engage a Defence Assistant during the course of the proceedings. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced during the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer, in his report dated 28.08.2017, held that all the three Articles of Charge framed against the applicant were “proved beyond doubt”. A copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the applicant, who submitted his representation dated 25.09.2017, denying the charges levelled against him. After considering the inquiry report and the representation submitted by the applicant, the Disciplinary Authority, by order dated 13.11.2017, imposed the penalty of “Removal from Engagement”, observing that the misconduct committed by the applicant warranted a deterrent punishment. It is further seen that the applicant preferred an appeal against the order imposing the penalty of removal from service. The Appellate Authority considered the grounds raised by the applicant and observed that the charges proved against him were grave in nature and that his retention in service was not desirable. The Appellate Authority further held that the penalty of removal from service was commensurate with the gravity of the charges proved against the applicant. Accordingly, by order dated 26.11.2018, the Appellate Authority rejected the appeal preferred by the applicant and confirmed the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
Judicial review of administrative actions is well-established through numerous court decisions and aims to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias, and mala fide intent. It is not an appeal against a decision, but a review of the decision-making process itself. Punishment imposed should not be one that shocks the conscience. The Apex Court in Govt of A.P. v. Mohd, Nasrullah Khan-2006 (2) SCC 373 held :
'27.......The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion if the inquiry officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.'
It is pertinent to emphasize that this Tribunal does not function as an appellate authority over disciplinary decisions arising out of departmental proceedings. Its role is limited to examining the manner in which such decisions are arrived at. The primary duty of the Tribunal is to ensure that the delinquent employee has been afforded fair and just treatment in accordance with law. The Tribunal must ascertain whether the inquiry into the alleged misconduct was conducted in adherence to the principles of natural justice and in conformity with the applicable rules and procedures. It must also assess whether the conclusions drawn by the Disciplinary Authority are supported by some evidence and whether the authority conducting the inquiry had the requisite jurisdiction. Interference by the Tribunal is warranted only where it is evident that the delinquent employee was subjected to a process inconsistent with statutory rules, or where the findings are based on a perverse interpretation of evidence, or arrived at in the absence of any evidence.
It is also to be pointed out that ordinarily, the Tribunal does not interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority unless such punishment shocks the conscience of the adjudicating body. The determination of the appropriate penalty lies squarely within the domain of the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities. Neither the Tribunal nor the Court can substitute its own judgment for that of the competent authority in matters relating to the nature or extent of punishment. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authorities is, therefore, very limited and may be exercised only where the punishment imposed is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Tribunal.
Coming to the contention of the applicant that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) Vs A.T.Mane 2005 (3) SCC 254, on the quantum of punishment for misappropriation of funds. Paragraphs 12 and 13, of the judgment are relevant and are extracted as hereunder:
"12.Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment, on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating corporation's fund, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal.
13.This Court in the case of B.S. Hullikatti (supra) held in a similar circumstance that the act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent therein was not fit to be retained as a conductor. It also held that in such cases there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and thereby interfere with the quantum of punishment."
In Divisional Controller, NEKRTC Vs H.Amaresh (2006 (6) SCC 187), the amount said to have been misappropriated was only Rs.360.95. Charges were held as proved. On the quantum of penalty, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
"This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence as the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of mis-appropriating a corporation’s funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment. The judgment in Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. B.S. Hullikatti, (2001) 2 SCC 574 was also relied on in this judgment among others. Examination of passengers of vehicle from whom the said sum was collected was also not essential. In our view, possession of the said excess sum of money on the part of the respondent, a fact proved, is itself a mis-conduct and hence the Labour Court and the learned Judges of the High Court misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence of the passengers which is wholly not essential. This apart, the respondent did not have any explanation for having carried the said excess amount. This omission was sufficient to hold him guilty. This act was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a conductor because such action or inaction of his was bound to result in financial loss to the appellant irrespective of the quantum."
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Union of India & Ors. vs. Indraj (Civil Appeal No. 13183 of 2025, arising out of SLP (C) No. 31515 of 2025 and Diary No. 28631 of 2025), by judgment dated 13.11.2025 (2025 INSC 1313), upheld the dismissal of a Gramin Dak Sevak (GDS) who was found to have misappropriated deposits made in post office accounts. In paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
“11…………………The documents clearly established the factum of embezzlement. The passbooks of the account holders were stamped with the receipt of the amount with no corresponding entries in the books of accounts maintained in the post office. It is a matter of chance that the embezzlement made by the respondent came to the notice of the authorities that action could be taken against him while restoring the amount to the post office. However, the fact remains that mere deposit of the embezzled amount will not absolve an employee of the misconduct. Relationship of a customer with a banker is of mutual trust. Any account holder will be satisfied once an entry is made in his passbook regarding deposit of any amount by him in the post office where he had maintained the account. An account holder may not be privy to the manner in which the accounts are maintained by the post office and also whether the corresponding entries were made or not in the books of accounts maintained there. The respondent tried to explain the embezzlement by stating that on account of ignorance of the Rules, the passbooks of the account holders were stamped. Such an explanation cannot be accepted being farfetched. He had been in service for about 12 years. Ignorance of rules of the procedure with so much experience cannot be accepted. There was no defect or error pointed out in the course of inquiry. The High Court had travelled beyond its jurisdiction in trying to explain the admission of the respondent which was nothing else but an afterthought.
12.For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The punishment imposed upon the respondent is upheld.”
We have carefully considered the applicant’s pleadings, the grounds urged, and the materials available on record. Upon such consideration, it is evident that the applicant was involved in defrauding vulnerable and underprivileged beneficiaries who were dependent upon monetary assistance provided by the State Government during their old age. The applicant misappropriated Old Age Pension Electronic Money Orders that were payable to beneficiaries who had already expired. Despite their demise, the applicant falsely represented that the amounts had been duly paid to the respective payees by affixing his own left thumb impression, and thereby dishonestly appropriated the pension amounts for his personal use. Such conduct constitutes a serious financial irregularity and amounts to a grave breach of the trust reposed in a public servant. The misconduct committed by the applicant is of a nature that is likely to adversely affect public confidence in the integrity and functioning of the Department and to tarnish its reputation. A public servant cannot be permitted to evade accountability for acts of misconduct, nor can dereliction of duty or fraudulent conduct be excused merely in the exercise of judicial review. Further, extending undue leniency in cases involving financial loss to the public exchequer or deprivation of benefits meant for vulnerable beneficiaries would amount to misplaced sympathy. Such an approach may have the undesirable effect of encouraging officials to commit similar irregularities in the belief that their misconduct would ultimately be viewed sympathetically. Therefore, having regard to the gravity and nature of the misconduct, no undue indulgence or leniency is warranted in the present case.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, and for the reasons stated above, coupled with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to supra, we find no error or illegality in the penalty of removal from engagement imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The said order is well-reasoned one and has been duly confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, we find no ground warranting interference. In the result, the OA is dismissed. No order as to costs.
