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Judgment
ORDER
The applicant being aggrieved by the order of the 2nd respondent, dated 29.01.2018 in removing the applicant from engagement as BPM and which has been confirmed in appeal by the 1st respondent vide his order dated, 01.10.2018, the applicant has filed the OA to set aside the said orders and for a direction to conduct a de-nova inquiry afresh after reinstating the applicant into service and to pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
The essential facts which are necessary for adjudication of the case are as follows:
The applicant was initially recruited and appointed as an EDDA (Extra Departmental Delivery Agent), now re-designated as GDS (Gramin Dak Sevak) DA, at Jodukuli BO attached to Kadayampatti SO on 10.03.1997. In the year 2004, the GDS BPM was entrusted with the duties of GDS DA. Consequently, in the interest of service, the applicant was accommodated as GDS BPM at Thottivalasu BO attached to Attanur SO in the capacity of a “thrown-out GDS”. While the applicant was working as GDS BPM, the 2nd respondent issued a charge sheet dated 29.02.2016, alleging that the applicant had committed fraud in the accounts of depositors of the Post Office. The applicant denied the charges levelled against him. However, he was unable to arrange for a Defence Assistant to represent him in the disciplinary proceedings. He therefore requested the 2nd respondent to grant him reasonable time to arrange for a Defence Assistant, but the request was not acceded to. In the meantime, the 2nd respondent appointed an Inquiry Officer (IO) and a Presenting Officer (PO) to conduct a regular inquiry into the charges framed against the applicant. The applicant submits that the lapses attributed to him were not committed with any mala fide intention or ulterior motive, but occurred due to the circumstances prevailing at the relevant point of time. He further submits that he had suffered a financial loss of approximately Rs.1,20,000/- during the said period. In view of his financial hardship and penury, the applicant requested the Inquiry Officer to permit him to engage a Defence Assistant. However, the said request was not considered. The applicant was also not paid ex-gratia allowance for the period during which he was kept off duty. Owing to his severe financial difficulties and non-payment of the ex-gratia amount, he was unable to attend the inquiry proceedings as directed by the Inquiry Officer. The applicant brought the non-payment of the ex-gratia amount to the notice of the Inquiry Officer. Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer proceeded to conduct the inquiry ex parte against the applicant. Thereafter, the Presenting Officer’s brief was furnished to the applicant. However, without granting him reasonable and sufficient time to submit his defence, the Inquiry Officer proceeded to hold all the charges as proved. The inquiry report was thereafter furnished to the applicant for submitting his written representation. Even at that stage, the 2nd respondent failed to grant the applicant adequate time and reasonable opportunity to submit his reply. Consequently, without affording the applicant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the 2nd respondent passed an order dated 29.01.2018 dismissing the applicant from engagement. Aggrieved by the said order dated 29.01.2018, the applicant preferred a detailed appeal dated 02.04.2018 before the 1st respondent. However, the said appeal was rejected by an order dated 01.10.2018. Hence, the applicant has been constrained to file the present Original Application challenging the impugned orders.
The main contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the applicant was deliberately denied payment of the ex-gratia amount during the period he was kept off duty. Consequently, owing to his acute financial hardship and penury, he was unable to attend the inquiry proceedings. This material fact was not duly considered by the respondents. The learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was denied a reasonable opportunity to engage a Defence Assistant to assist him in defending the charges. Therefore, the inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer was vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice, and the consequent inquiry report cannot be sustained in law.
The learned counsel further submitted that the charge sheet was framed without following the provisions contained in sub-clause (f) of sub-rule 6 under the heading “Procedure for Imposing Major Penalties” in Chapter 10, “Disciplinary Proceedings—A Digest”, Swamy’s Compilation of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, 34th Edition, 2011, corrected up to August 2010. According to the learned counsel, the charge sheet is therefore defective in law. He further submitted that, while framing charges, the allegations ought to be carefully and objectively worded without giving an impression of any pre-determined conclusion or prejudice against the charged GDS employee. However, in all the four Articles of Charge, the 2nd respondent had, according to the applicant, predetermined the issues and allegations against him. Consequently, the inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer was reduced to a mere formality.
The learned counsel further submitted that the applicant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity by the Inquiry Officer to submit his written submissions in response to the Presenting Officer’s brief. More importantly, the applicant was not granted sufficient and reasonable time by the 2nd respondent to submit his representation against the Inquiry Officer’s report. It was contended that such denial of reasonable opportunity is arbitrary, illegal, and contrary to the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel submitted that, had the applicant been afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to participate in the inquiry proceedings and present his defence, he would have been able to establish that the charges levelled against him were false, misconceived, and motivated.
The learned counsel submitted that the applicant had not committed any fraud as alleged in the charge sheet. According to him, owing to the heavy workload and the financial loss suffered by the applicant, certain procedural lapses had occurred. The applicant, accepting moral responsibility for the alleged amount, subsequently credited the amount into the Post Office account as advised by the Inspector of Posts (IP). It was therefore contended that there was neither any mala fide intention nor any wilful or deliberate act on the part of the applicant to cause loss to the Department or to derive any wrongful gain. In the circumstances, the imposition of the major penalty of dismissal from engagement was highly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the alleged lapses. Hence the present OA for the aforementioned relief.
Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the contentions advanced on behalf of the applicant and placed reliance upon the reply statement filed on behalf of the respondents. He submitted that the applicant had committed serious financial irregularities involving a total amount of Rs.2,72,127/- in respect of 68 depositor accounts. He further submitted that the applicant himself had admitted the misappropriation in his statements dated 14.07.2015 and 22.07.2015, wherein he stated that he had utilised the public money for his personal expenses. The learned counsel submitted that the applicant’s plea of mental agony is an afterthought and has no bearing upon the serious misconduct established against him. According to him, it was the applicant’s bounden duty and primary responsibility, as the concerned GDS BPM, to ensure the safe custody of the cash, vouchers, and other records of the Post Office. Any loss or misappropriation relating thereto could not be attributed to any other person, as the applicant was entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining and safeguarding the same.
He further submitted that the allegation that the applicant had requested permission to engage a Defence Assistant and that such request was not considered by the Inquiry Officer is wholly incorrect and contrary to the contemporaneous records of the inquiry proceedings. In this regard, the learned counsel drew the attention of the Tribunal to the Daily Order Sheets maintained during the inquiry. He submitted that, in Daily Order Sheet No.1 dated 27.08.2016, the Inquiry Officer specifically recorded that the Charged GDS (CGDS) had requested ten days’ time to arrange a Defence Assistant and that the said request was permitted. Again, in Daily Order Sheet No.2 dated 08.10.2016, the Inquiry Officer recorded that the CGDS had sought ten days’ time for preparation of the list of defence documents and for arranging a Defence Assistant, and the same was duly permitted. Further, in Daily Order Sheet No.3 dated 15.11.2016, the applicant was granted a further five days’ time for preparation of the defence documents and for arranging a Defence Assistant.
The learned counsel further submitted that, during the sitting held on 15.11.2016 for examination of the State Exhibits, the applicant was again granted sufficient opportunity to nominate a Defence Assistant. Significantly, the applicant had personally attended the inquiry proceedings held on 27.08.2016, 08.10.2016 and 15.11.2016 and had duly signed the respective Daily Order Sheets. Thus, the documentary record clearly demonstrates that the applicant was repeatedly granted adequate opportunity to engage a Defence Assistant. In these circumstances, the learned counsel contended that the applicant’s allegation that he was denied an opportunity to engage a Defence Assistant, either at the preliminary sitting or during the regular inquiry proceedings, is factually incorrect and contrary to the records. According to him, the applicant cannot now seek to take advantage of his own failure to avail himself of the opportunities repeatedly granted by the Inquiry Officer.
The learned counsel next refuted the contention that the applicant was unable to attend the inquiry proceedings on account of non-payment of the ex-gratia amount. He submitted that the applicant had failed to attend the inquiry proceedings fixed by the Inquiry Officer on 01.12.2016 and during the period from 05.01.2017 to 07.01.2017, despite having been duly informed of the dates of hearing through notices and telephonic communication. Consequently, the inquiry sittings scheduled on those dates could not be conducted.
He further submitted that the Presenting Officer had pasted a notice dated 01.05.2017 on the door of the applicant’s residence in his native village, informing him of the inquiry sittings scheduled from 18.01.2017 to 20.01.2017. Despite such notice, the applicant failed to appear before the Inquiry Officer and did not participate in the proceedings. According to the learned counsel, the applicant repeatedly failed to cooperate with the inquiry proceedings and did not receive the notices issued to him for attending the scheduled sittings. His whereabouts were also not known to the authorities during the relevant period. In view of the applicant’s continued absence and failure to participate in the inquiry despite repeated opportunities and due notices, the Inquiry Officer, having satisfied himself that sufficient and reasonable opportunities had been afforded to the applicant, proceeded to conduct the inquiry ex parte.
The learned counsel therefore submitted that the inquiry proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed procedure and after affording the applicant adequate and reasonable opportunities to defend himself. There was no violation of the principles of natural justice, as alleged by the applicant. The applicant, having failed to avail himself of the opportunities granted to him, cannot subsequently contend that he was denied a reasonable opportunity of defence. He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the OA.
We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side at length, perused the pleadings and the materials placed on record. We have also carefully gone through the case laws referred to by the respective counsel.
It is seen that the applicant while he was working as GDS BPM, Thottivalasu BO, a/w Attanur SO, the 2nd respondent issued a Charge Sheet, dated 29.02.2016, framing 4 Articles of charge against him to the effect that he has committed fraud in the depositors' accounts of the Post Office. The 4 Articles of charge are extracted hereunder:
“Article-I
Shri C. Ramachandran while working as GDS BPM, Thottivalasu BO, a/w Attanur SO during the period from 30.10.2004 to 18.06.2015, had fraudulently withdrawn the following amount in SB Account No.319823 in the name of Kum. S. Vinodha, D/o Sakthivel, Thottivalasu on the dates noted against each: 19.12.2014 : Rs. 1000/-28.03.2015 : Rs.1200/-15.06.2015 : Rs.1800/-Shri C. Ramachandran had taken the above withdrawals by forging the signature of the depositor Kum. S.Vinodha in the SB-7 form without her knowledge.
Article-II
Shri C. Ramachandran while working as GDS BPM, Thottivalasu BO, a/w Attanur SO during the period from 30.10.2004 to 18.06.2015, did not bring into post office accounts a sum of Rs.1000/- each deposited in SSA account No.20009 in the name of A.S. Vegada, D/o Sri P. Selvaraju Father & Guardian, S/O Periasamy, Thottivalasu on 11.05.2015 and 04.06.2015 respectively
Article-III
Shri C. Ramachandran while working as GDS BPM, Thottivalasu BO, a/w Attanur SO during the period from 30.10.2004 to 18.06.2015, had fraudulently withdrawn Rs.15000/- as part withdrawal in RD Account No.406747 in the name of Sri C. Nallaiyan, S/o Chinnagounder, Thottivalasu on13.09.2014 Without the knowledge of depositor. Sri C. Ramachandran had also accepted RD deposit amount of Rs.750/- each on 12.05.2015 and 06.06.2015 in the account, made entries in the passbook but did not bring the deposit amount of Rs.750/-each into PO accounts on 12.05.14 and 06.06.15 respectively.
Article-IV
Shri C. Ramachandran while working as GDS BPM, Thottivalasu BO, a/w Attanur SO during the period from 30.10.2004 to 18.06.2015, had accepted the deposits of Rs.3000/- on 06.05.2015 for the months of April, May and June 21015 from Smt.K. Ramani W/o Kandasamy, Thottivalasu depositor of RD account No. 4021041 made entries in the passbook but did not credit the RD deposit amount of Rs.3000/- into PO accounts on 06.05.2015. He had also accepted the deposit of Rs.1000/- from the depositor on 16.02.2015 for the month of March 2015 in the account, made deposit entry in the passbook as accepted on 28.03.2015 but brought the deposit amount of Rs.1000/- belatedly into PO accounts on 01.04.2015 with default interest of Rs.10/-.
Thus, it is imputed that Shri C. Ramachandran while working as GDS BPM, Thottivalasu BOI, a/w Attanur SO did not follow the provisions of Rules 131 and 144 of Rules for Branch Offices (Sixth edition) and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty as required of him vide Rule 21 of GDS (Conduct & Engagement), Rules, 2011.”
In the preliminary sitting held on 27.08.2016, the applicant admitted Article II of the Charge, while denying Articles I, III and IV. Thereafter, a regular inquiry was ordered by the Disciplinary Authority, who appointed an Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer to conduct the proceedings. The applicant participated in the preliminary inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer and was permitted to engage a Defence Assistant for assisting him in the disciplinary proceedings. It is evident from the records that sufficient and reasonable opportunities were afforded to the applicant to defend himself. However, instead of availing himself of the opportunities granted, the applicant repeatedly sought adjournments and failed to cooperate with the inquiry proceedings. Consequently, the Inquiry Officer proceeded with the inquiry and, in his report dated 11.10.2017, held all the charges framed against the applicant as “proved beyond doubt”. A copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the applicant on 31.10.2017, but the applicant did not submit any representation against the findings recorded therein.
Based upon the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of “Removal from Engagement”, holding that the misconduct committed by the applicant warranted a deterrent punishment. Aggrieved by the said order, the applicant preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority considered the grounds raised by the applicant in the appeal and observed that the charges proved against him were grave in nature and that his continued retention in engagement was not desirable. It was further held that the penalty of removal from engagement was commensurate with the gravity of the proved charges. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority, by order dated 01.10.2018, rejected the appeal preferred by the applicant and confirmed the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
17, It is worthwhile to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) Vs A.T.Mane 2005 (3) SCC 254, on the quantum of punishment for misappropriation of funds. Paragraphs 12 and 13, of the judgment are relevant and are extracted as hereunder:
Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment, on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating corporation's fund, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal.
13.This Court in the case of B.S. Hullikatti (supra) held in a similar circumstance that the act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent therein was not fit to be retained as a conductor. It also held that in such cases there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and thereby interfere with the quantum of punishment."
In Divisional Controller, NEKRTC Vs H.Amaresh (2006 (6) SCC 187), the amount said to have been misappropriated was only Rs.360.95. Charges were held as proved. On the quantum of penalty, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that,
"This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence as the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of mis-appropriating a corporation’s funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment. The judgment in Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. B.S. Hullikatti, (2001) 2 SCC 574 was also relied on in this judgment among others. Examination of passengers of vehicle from whom the said sum was collected was also not essential. In our view, possession of the said excess sum of money on the part of the respondent, a fact proved, is itself a mis-conduct and hence the Labour Court and the learned Judges of the High Court misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence of the passengers which is wholly not essential. This apart, the respondent did not have any explanation for having carried the said excess amount. This omission was sufficient to hold him guilty. This act was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a conductor because such action or inaction of his was bound to result in financial loss to the appellant irrespective of the quantum."
Recently similar issue was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs Indraj, order dated 13.11.2025, reported in 2025 INSC 1313 on 13 November, 2025, has observed with regard to misappropriattion of money as follows:
'11. Still aggrieved, the respondent challenged the order passed in the Original Application before the High Court. Vide impugned order, the High Court had misdirected itself while extending the scope of jurisdiction which could be exercised in matter of judicial review. The merits of controversy were gone into. Even the admission made by the respondent and voluntary deposit of the amount misappropriated by him were dealt with and finally the punishment imposed on the respondent was set aside. He was directed to be reinstated back in service. The High Court opined that mere suspicion is not enough to punish him, not realizing the fact that it was not a case of mere suspicion. The documents clearly established the factum of embezzlement. The passbooks of the account holders were stamped with the receipt of the amount with no corresponding entries in the books of accounts maintained in the post office. It is a matter of chance that the embezzlement made by the respondent came to the notice of the authorities that action could be taken against him while restoring the amount to the post office. However, the fact remains that mere deposit of the embezzled amount will not absolve an employee of the misconduct. Relationship of a customer with a banker is of mutual trust. Any account holder will be satisfied once an entry is made in his passbook regarding deposit of any amount by him in the post office where he had maintained the account. An account holder may not be privy to the manner in which the accounts are maintained by the post office and also whether the corresponding entries were made or not in the books of accounts maintained there. The respondent tried to explain the embezzlement by stating that on account of ignorance of the Rules, the passbooks of the account holders were stamped. Such an explanation cannot be accepted being farfetched. He had been in service for about 12 years. Ignorance of rules of the procedure with so much experience cannot be accepted. There was no defect or error pointed out in the course of inquiry. The High Court had travelled beyond its jurisdiction in trying to explain the admission of the respondent which was nothing else but an afterthought.
12.For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The punishment imposed upon the respondent is upheld.“
The contention of the applicant that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to engage a Defence Assistant cannot be accepted in the light of the contemporaneous records of the inquiry proceedings. The Daily Order Sheets disclose that the applicant was granted repeated opportunities and sufficient time to arrange for a Defence Assistant. Despite such opportunities, the applicant failed to avail himself of the same and continued to seek adjournments, thereby delaying and failing to cooperate with the inquiry proceedings.
A similar issue was considered by this Tribunal in G. Samuthiravelu v. Ministry of Communications, in OA No.89/2021, decided on 31.03.2023, wherein it was held, in substance, that where a delinquent employee delays in selecting or arranging a Defence Assistant or otherwise fails to cooperate with the inquiry proceedings, the disciplinary authorities are entitled, after affording reasonable opportunity, to proceed with the inquiry in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The settled legal position is that a delinquent employee who, despite being afforded reasonable and adequate opportunities, fails to avail himself of such opportunities cannot subsequently contend that there has been a denial of reasonable opportunity or violation of the principles of natural justice.
In the present case, the materials on record demonstrate that the applicant was granted adequate opportunities to arrange a Defence Assistant and to participate in the inquiry proceedings. Having failed to avail himself of those opportunities, he cannot be permitted to contend at this stage that the inquiry stood vitiated on that account. We therefore find no merit in the said contention.
We have also considered the applicant’s contention that the alleged misconduct was committed without any mala fide intention and was attributable to procedural lapses. However, the Inquiry Officer, upon consideration of the evidence and materials placed before him, recorded findings holding all the Articles of Charge as proved. The applicant was furnished with a copy of the inquiry report and was afforded an opportunity to submit his representation, but he failed to avail himself of the said opportunity. The findings of the Inquiry Officer, therefore, cannot be said to have been arrived at in violation of the principles of natural justice.
The charges proved against the applicant relate to serious financial irregularities involving public money. The conduct established in the disciplinary proceedings is of such a nature as to undermine the trust and confidence reposed in an employee entrusted with the custody and handling of public funds. Such misconduct, if viewed leniently, is capable of adversely affecting public confidence in the integrity and functioning of the Department and is likely to bring disrepute to its image.
As regards the quantum of punishment, it is well settled that the question of imposing an appropriate penalty primarily falls within the domain of the disciplinary authority. Interference by the Tribunal is warranted only where the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct or is otherwise vitiated by illegality, arbitrariness, or procedural impropriety. In the present case, having regard to the nature and gravity of the charges proved against the applicant and the circumstances in which the misconduct was committed, we are not persuaded to hold that the penalty imposed is shockingly disproportionate.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no procedural irregularity, violation of the principles of natural justice, or other infirmity warranting interference with the disciplinary proceedings or the penalty imposed. The penalty of removal from engagement imposed by the Disciplinary Authority has been duly considered and affirmed by the Appellate Authority. We therefore find no ground to interfere with the impugned orders.
In the result, the OA is dismissed as devoid of merits. No order as to costs.
