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Judgment
O R D E R
Hon’ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A): The grievance of the applicant in the instant OA is that Respondent No.1, vide the impugned order dated 20.09.2024 bearing F. No. C-14011/47/2012-V&L (Annexure –A1), passed in the name of the Hon’ble President of India under Rule 8 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 2021’), has imposed the penalty of withholding of 50% of the applicant’s monthly pension for a period of 10 years by holding the charges contained in the Memorandum of Charge as proved. The charges relate to the alleged acquisition of disproportionate assets during the check period from 01.04.1999 to 14.04.2005, purportedly constituting violation of Rules 18(2), 18(3) and 3(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
By filing the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:
1.Quash the impugned order dated 20th September 2024 passed by the Respondent No. 1 i.e., Annexure – A1 to this OA, whereby penalty of withholding 50% of monthly pension for 10 years has been imposed upon the Applicant under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, as being arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional, and contrary to the principles of natural justice;
2.Direct the Respondents to grant the Applicant notional promotions with all consequential service and pensionary benefits, including refixation of pension
3.Direct the Respondents to release in full the Applicant’s regular pension and retiral benefits forthwith, with arrears and admissible interest thereon.
4.Award the cost of litigation in favour of the Applicant therein
5.Pass such further order(s) or direction(s) as this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case in the interests of justice.”
Facts of the case are that the applicant, Shri Baldev Singh Sandhu, is a retired officer of the Indian Revenue Service, 1981 batch. Hee was inducted into service as an Income Tax Officer on 07.12.1981 and was promoted from time to time, ultimately reached to the post of Commissioner of Income Tax on 16.07.2001. He superannuated from service on 30.09.2015 while holding the post of Commissioner of Income Tax at Chandigarh.
The controversy in the present OA arises out of a search operation conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short ‘CBI’) on 14.04.2005 at the residential premises of the applicant, as well as the premises of his parents, namely, Shri Gurdial Singh and Smt. Tej Kaur, and the family of his brother, Shri Bhagwan Singh Sandhu, situated at three different locations. The CBI adopted the check period from 01.04.1999 to 14.04.2005 and alleged that the assets held by the applicant and his immediate family, were disproportionate to their known sources of income.
Initially, the alleged disproportionate assets attributable to the applicant and his immediate family were stated to be Rs.10,24,346/-. Subsequently, the CBI also attributed to the applicant the alleged difference between the assets and income of his parents and brother, quantified at Rs.54,39,513/- and Rs.1,94,80,062/- respectively, thereby enhancing the alleged disproportionate assets to Rs.2,59,43,921/-. The applicant disputes such attribution and stated that there was no material establishing that the assets of his parents and brother had been acquired out of funds provided by him.
In the course of consideration of the proposal for sanction of prosecution, the Central Vigilance Commission (in short ‘CVC’) and the Parent Ministry raised objections regarding attribution of the assets of the applicant's parents and brother to him, observing that there was no cogent material, at that stage, to establish that such assets had been acquired by the applicant or out of funds provided by him. Notwithstanding the said objections, sanction for prosecution was granted on 28.09.2012.
Meanwhile, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the applicant by issuance of Memorandum of Charge dated 05.10.2012 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1965’). The principal allegation was that, while working in different capacities in the Income Tax Department during the period from 01.04.1999 to 14.04.2005, the applicant had allegedly acquired movable and immovable assets in his own name and in the names of his family members, disproportionate to his known legal sources of income, to the extent of Rs.2,59,43,921/-. It was further alleged that the applicant had made investments without obtaining prior permission or giving requisite intimation, thereby violating Rules 18(2) and 18(3) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1964’), and had consequently failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and conduct becoming of a Government servant, in violation of Rules 3(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) thereof.
The said Charge Memorandum was served upon the applicant on 08.10.2012 along with statements relating to him, his parents and his brother. A list of 212 documents and 138 witnesses was also furnished. The applicant states that copies of the relied-upon documents and statements of witnesses were not supplied along with the said Charge Memorandum. In his reply dated 16.10.2012, the applicant denied the charges, objected to the non-supply of relied-upon documents and disputed the attribution to him of the assets allegedly held by his parents and brother.
The disciplinary inquiry thereafter continued for several years. The applicant had also approached the Chandigarh Bench of this Tribunal by way of O.A. No.060/00908/2014, inter alia, seeking directions regarding the conduct of the inquiry. The said OA was disposed of on 28.10.2014 with a direction to conclude the inquiry expeditiously in accordance with the CVC guidelines. Despite the said direction, the inquiry proceedings remained pending and there were changes of Inquiry Officers from time to time.
The aapplicant superannuated from service on 30.09.2015 while holding the post of Commissioner of Income Tax. Thereafter, the inquiry proceedings continued. On 10.04.2018, an Inquiry Officer was appointed and subsequently, the proceedings resumed. The applicant states that the relied-upon documents were received by the Presenting Officer only on 25.01.2021, nearly several years after initiation of the disciplinary proceedings.
The applicant also challenged the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings pending conclusion of the connected CBI trial by filing O.A. No.1135/2021. The said OA was dismissed on 18.04.2022, and the challenge to the said order before the High Court did not result in interference at that stage, as stated by the applicant. The inquiry proceedings consequently continued.
The Inquiry Officer proceeded with the inquiry during 2021-2022. The applicant has alleged that he was not afforded adequate opportunity in respect of the preliminary hearing and that certain prosecution witnesses were examined in his absence despite his requests for adjournment on medical grounds. The Presenting Officer closed his case on 31.05.2022, while the applicant was allowed only a limited period for producing defence witnesses. The applicant thereafter submitted his defence brief on 28.06.2022.
The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 30.06.2022 holding the charge against the applicant as proved. The report, inter alia, recomputed the alleged disproportionate assets at Rs.2,58,51,865/-. The applicant was afforded an opportunity to submit his representation against the inquiry report, who submitted his detailed representation on 30.09.2022, disputing the findings and pointing out alleged factual, evidentiary and procedural deficiencies in the inquiry report.
Since the applicant had already retired from service, the proceedings were thereafter continued under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, corresponding to the post-retirement disciplinary jurisdiction earlier governed by Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. The respondents considered the matter for imposition of penalty and referred it to the Union Public Service Commission (in short ‘UPSC’) for its advice.
The Respondent No.1 initially proposed imposition of the penalty of withholding of 50% of the monthly pension otherwise admissible to the applicant for a period of five years. The matter was referred to the UPSC, which tendered its advice on 15.03.2024 and advised that the charge stood proved and constituted grave misconduct, recommending a harsher penalty of withholding of 50% of the monthly pension for a period of ten years. The applicant was thereafter afforded an opportunity to submit his representation against the UPSC advice.
The applicant submitted his detailed representation on 31.05.2024, reiterating his earlier objections and disputing the findings recorded against him. He specifically contested, inter alia, the attribution to him of the assets held by his parents and brother and the computation of the alleged disproportionate assets.
Ultimately, Respondent No.1 passed the impugned order dated 20.09.2024 in the name of the Hon'ble President of India under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, imposing upon the applicant the penalty of withholding of 50% of his monthly pension otherwise admissible to him for a period of ten years. In the impugned order, the alleged disproportionate assets were quantified at Rs.2,56,86,865/-, out of which Rs.9,02,204/- was stated to pertain to assets held in the name of the applicant and his wife and son, whereas Rs.52,74,513/- was attributed to his parents and Rs.1,95,09,448/- to his brother, his wife and children.
The impugned order dated 20.09.2024 was served upon the applicant on 01.10.2024 through a letter issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Hq.) (Vig.), Chandigarh. On 28.05.2025/29.05.2025, the pension payment order of the applicant was revised, giving effect to the impugned penalty order of the Respondent No.1, thereby reducing the pension from Rs. 98,190/- to Rs. 49,095/- w.e.f. 20.09.2024 to 19.09.2034. Despite the said revision, the pension disbursement has been completely stopped, and till date, the applicant has not received even the reduced pension, causing grave financial hardship and deprivation of livelihood. Hence, being aggrieved by the said order and the consequential withholding of 50% of his monthly pension for ten years, the applicant has filed the instant OA seeking the reliefs as quoted above.
Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply opposing the claim of the applicant and the applicant has also filed his rejoinder in response to the said reply. The parties have also filed their written arguments as well.
Shri Arun Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant, at the outset, submitted that the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the Inquiry Report dated 30.06.2022 and the consequential penalty order dated 20.09.2024 stand vitiated on account of several fundamental and mutually reinforcing procedural and evidentiary defects. He submitted that the objections raised by the applicant are not matters of afterthought, having been consistently raised in the Defence Brief dated 28.06.2022, the detailed reply dated 30.09.2022 to the Inquiry Report, the representation before the Disciplinary Authority and thereafter in the present OA.
Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the proceedings relate to a check period from 01.04.1999 to 14.04.2005, whereas the Charge MMemorandum was issued only on 05.10.2012 and the applicant ultimately superannuated on 30.09.2015. He contended that the extraordinary delay assumes particular significance because the Presenting Officer collected the prosecution documents and witness statements from the Directorate of Vigilance only on 25.01.2021, while as many as 1,842 pages contained in seven volumes were supplied to the applicant only on 22.12.2021. The Inquiry Report was thereafter submitted on 30.06.2022 and the final penalty was imposed on 20.09.2024. According to learned Senior Counsel, the Department thus sought to adjudicate transactions dating back to 1999-2005 on the basis of a prosecution record which itself remained incomplete, unauthenticated and in the process of being reconstructed even during the inquiry.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the departmental correspondence itself demonstrates that, even in 2018-2019, unauthenticated photocopies were being relied upon and discrepancies and missing documents were still being identified. Even thereafter, authenticated and missing documents were sought from the CBI in November 2020, while the CBI informed the Department in December 2020 that certain documents and statements were not readily available. The Presenting Officer was still seeking missing and legible documents in January 2022. Learned Senior Counsel therefore contended that the prosecution record was neither complete nor stable when the evidence was being recorded.
On the question of the validity of initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, learned Senior Counsel drew attention to the composite approval note of September 2012 and submitted that the sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, initiation of regular departmental proceedings for major penalty, approval concerning appointment of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer and approval of the draft Charge Memorandum were processed together in one composite exercise. Thus learned Senior Counsel argued that the statutory requirement of a distinct and conscious application of mind to the definite Articles of Charge was, therefore, not satisfied. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. B.V. Gopinath, reported in (2014) 1 SCC 351, wherein it was held that initiation of disciplinary proceedings and approval of the charge memorandum constitute separate statutory acts requiring independent application of mind by the competent Disciplinary Authority. Reliance was also placed upon Sunny Abraham v. Union of India & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 7764 of 2021, decided on 17.12.2021, wherein the said principle was reiterated.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the defect in the approval process assumes greater significance because the material forming the basis of the charge was itself incomplete and unsettled at the relevant time. According to him, the subsequent correspondence regarding authentication, discrepancies and missing documents, coupled with the fact that the Presenting Officer obtained the prosecution papers only in January 2021, raises a serious question as to whether the competent authority had, in 2012, applied its independent and informed mind to a definite and complete charge in the manner required by Rule 14 the Rules, 1965.
The principal submission of learned Senior Counsel, however, was that the inquiry stood fundamentally vitiated by denial of a reasonable opportunity of defence to the applicant. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel submitted that although 138 prosecution witnesses had been cited in the said Charge Memorandum, only 21 witnesses were ultimately examined, and eight of them were examined during a period when the applicant was admittedly incapacitated on account of COVID-1919 pandemic. The applicant had submitted an adjournment application dated 22.02.2022 supported by a positive laboratory report, yet the witnesses were examined in his absence. More importantly, according to learned Senior Counsel, those witnesses were never subsequently recalled and made available to the applicant for effective cross-examination, although their statements were relied upon in the inquiry and penalty proceedings.
Learned Senior Counsel further contended that there was an independent and serious violation of Rule 14(18) of the Rules, 1965. Learned counsel reiterated that the applicant was never examined by the Inquiry Officer in terms of the said provision and that the Counter Affidavit did not identify any date, questions or answers demonstrating compliance. According to learned Senior Counsel, merely stating that the Inquiry Report had considered the issues could not substitute the mandatory examination contemplated under Rule 14(18) of the Rules, 1965. Reliance was placed upon Ministry of Finance & Anr. v. S.B. Ramesh, reported in (1998) 3 SCC 227, and Union of India & Anr. v. D.S. Manchanda, W.P.(C) No. 215/2009, decided by the Delhi High Court on 10.03.2011, to contend that the opportunity to meet adverse evidence is substantive and that incriminating circumstances emerging from the evidence must be put to the charged employee.
Learned Senior Counsel also assailed the reliability of the inquiry record itself. He submitted that the order sheet dated 21.01.2022 records “Present: None” and merely records adjournment, whereas another sheet bearing the same date was subsequently relied upon to suggest that the Presenting Officer had produced the prosecution documents and witness statements and that the same had been taken on record. He argued that the latter sheet was never supplied to the applicant. The two documents, according to learned Senior Counsel, record materially different proceedings for the same date and therefore raise a serious issue concerning the authenticity and chronology of the inquiry record.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Inquiry Officer’s own communication dated 22.04.2022 provides an independent chronological check, since the entry concerning 21.01.2022 records the applicant’s request for adjournment on account of his wife having tested COVID positive, his consequent quarantine and adjournment of the proceedings. It does not record that the prosecution documents were subsequently tendered or taken on record on that date. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the Inquiry Report, however, presents a materially different chronology by introducing a recital that the prosecution documents and witness statements had been received and taken on record on 21.01.2022.
Another serious contradiction, according to learned Senior Counsel, concerns prosecution witness Niranjan Singh. He submitted that his statement is shown to have been recorded on 02.03.2022, whereas the corresponding daily order sheet records “Did not appear”. Learned Senior Counsel contended that both documents form part of the official inquiry record and cannot simultaneously represent the true factual position. The response of the respondents, relying merely upon the signatures and thumb impression appearing on the statement, does not explain the contrary recital in the daily order sheet.
Learned Senior Counsel then addressed the substantive finding of disproportionate assets. HeHe submitted that the final alleged disproportionate amount was computed at Rs.2,56,86,865/-, out of which only Rs.9,02,904/-, approximately 3.52%, was attributed to the applicant, his wife and son. In contrast, Rs.1,95,09,448/- was attributed to the family of the applicant’s brother and Rs.52,74,513/- to his parents. Thus, approximately 96.48% of the alleged disproportion represented assets standing in the names of persons other than the applicant, his wife and son. He then argued that there was no evidentiary bridge connecting these assets with the applicant. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that no property-wise fund trail was produced demonstrating that any particular asset standing in the name of the applicant’s parents or brother’s family had actually been funded by the applicant or was held for his benefit. The Presenting Officer had failed to establish the alleged transactions through documentary evidence or by examining the relevant witnesses. Reliance was placed upon Union of India v. H.C. Goel, reported in AIR 1964 SC 364, Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, and M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88, to submit that a finding in disciplinary proceedings must nevertheless rest upon relevant and legally admissible evidence and cannot be founded upon conjecture or unproved investigation material.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the respondents had failed to correctly apply Rule 2(c) read with Rules 18(2) and 18(3) of the Rules, 1964. According to him, the expression “member of his family” has to be understood in conjunction with the requirement of dependency. Reliance was placed upon Union of India v. V. Kannathasan, reported in 2025:MHC:2176, W.P. No. 8524 of 2024, decided on 09.09.2025 by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Madras. He contended that the record itself contained material concerning the independent agricultural holdings, income streams and economic identity of the applicant’s parents and brother’s family, but the respondents failed to establish either their dependency upon the applicant or that the properties standing in their names had actually been acquired from funds provided by him.
Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the respondents’ own computation concerning agricultural income from land standing in the name of the applicant’s son. He pointed out that the penalty order itself computed, “for argument sake”, agricultural income of Rs.12,88,057/--, which exceeded the entire amount of Rs.9,02,904/- attributed to the applicant, his wife and son. He then argued that once the unproved assets of the other relatives are excluded, the respondents own alternative computation materially undermines the conclusion of disproportionate assets.
Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Disciplinary Authority could not supplement the Inquiry Report by relying upon extraneous material. He submitted that the penalty order and the Counter Affidavit repeatedly relied upon the CBI report, subsequent CBI clarifications, CVC/Expert Committee views, UPSC material and statements of persons, who were not examined during the departmental inquiry. According to learned Senior Counsel, such material could not retrospectively supply the evidentiary deficiencies in the departmental proceedings. Reliance was placed upon State Bank of India v. D.C. Aggarwal, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 13 and ECIL v. B. Karunakar, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727, in support of the proposition that adverse material cannot be relied upon without fair disclosure and opportunity to meet the same.
Learned Senior Counsel emphasised that the aforesaid objections had been consistently raised by the applicant and were not afterthoughts. The Defence Brief dated 28.06.2022, the reply dated 30.09.2022, the representation before the Disciplinary Authority and the instant OA all contained specific objections regarding the absence of evidence, the computation of disproportionate assets, the treatment of the relatives’ properties, the disputed order-sheet entry dated 21.01.2022 and the contradiction concerning Niranjan Singh. He also submitted that the Counter Affidavit had failed to satisfactorily answer these central factual issues.
On the question of remand, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the present case was not one in which an isolated or curable procedural defect could be rectified by remitting the matter to the Inquiry Officer. According to him, the defects went to the very foundation of the proceedings and concerned the approval and charge process, introduction of the prosecution record, denial of cross-examination, non-compliance with Rule 14(18) of the Rules, 1965, contradictory inquiry records, absence of foundational evidence concerning the overwhelming portion of the alleged disproportionate assets and reliance upon material outside the inquiry.
Learned Senior counsel also submitted that any remand at this stage would, in substance, require reconstruction of the entire disciplinary case. If the composite approval did not satisfy the requirements laid down in B.V. Gopinath (supra), there would be no surviving lawful inquiry stage to which the matter could simply be restored. A fresh statutory decision and charge exercise would necessarily be required. Similarly, the missing and unauthenticated documents, unresolved contradictions in the order sheets and absence of evidence linking the relatives’ properties with the applicant could not be cured merely by directing compliance with Rule 14(18) of the Rules, 1965.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the applicant had already retired in September 2015, whereas the transactions under examination commenced in 1999 and ended in April 2005. A fresh inquiry in 2026 would, therefore, concern events almost twenty-seven years old. Reliance was placed upon Rule 8(2)(c)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, corresponding to erstwhile Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, and upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Union of India & Anr. v. S.K. Das, W.P.(C) No.453/2015, decided on 05.09.2016, to contend that the statutory scheme reflects a policy of finality and repose in respect of stale post-retirement proceedings.
Distinguishing Sunny Abraham (supra), learned Senior Counsel submitted that the said decision could not be treated as authority for granting an unrestricted liberty to the respondents in the present case. He pointed out that Sunny Abraham (supra) involved a challenge confined essentially to the defect in approval of the charge memorandum, whereas the present case involves a completed inquiry challenged on multiple grounds, including denial of cross-examination, non-compliance with Rule 14(18), an incomplete and disputed prosecution record, contradictions in the order sheets and witness record, absence of evidence concerning approximately 96.48% of the alleged disproportion and reliance upon material outside the inquiry. The applicant had also retired in 2015 and the proposed fresh exercise would relate to transactions commencing in 1999.
Learned Senior Counsel placed particular reliance upon Durga Prasad v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., reported in 2025 INSC 548, submitting that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognised that although remand may ordinarily be a permissible consequence of a deficient disciplinary proceeding, the same need not be ordered where the passage of time and supervening circumstances render a fresh inquiry unfair, harsh or unnecessary. Reliance was also placed upon Allahabad Bank & Ors. v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308, P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636 and Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, reported in (2015) 16 SCC 415.
Lastly learned Senior Counsel submitted that remand would cause grave prejudice to the applicant, who had retired more than a decade ago, since a fresh inquiry would necessarily involve reconstruction of transactions, family arrangements, land holdings, conversations and sources of funds dating back to 1999-2005. Learned Senior Counsel argued that witnesses may have retired, relocated, become unavailable or lost their recollection, while records may have deteriorated or disappeared. Remand would consequently afford the respondents a second opportunity to reconstruct its case with the benefit of knowledge of the deficiencies exposed during the completed inquiry and the present litigation, while requiring the retired applicant to defend himself against increasingly stale allegations.
Accordingly, learned Senior Counsel prayed that the instant OA be allowed; the Inquiry Report dated 30.06.2022 and penalty order dated 20.09.2024 be set aside; and the disciplinary proceedings arising from the said Charge Memorandum dated 05.10.2012, insofar as they relate to the same Article of Charge, check period and alleged disproportionate-assets transactions, be brought to a final conclusion without granting liberty to the respondents to recommence, supplement or conduct a fresh/de novo inquiry. He further prayed for restoration of the applicant’s full pension and retiral dues with consequential arrears and admissible interest, along with the other consequential service benefits claimed in the instant OA.
Per contra, Shri Rajeev Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the CBI registered a case against the applicant on 12.04.2005 under Sections 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on allegations of acquisition of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. A search was conducted at the applicant’s residential premises on 14.04.2005, during which documents relating to movable and immovable assets held in the names of the applicant and his family members were reportedly recovered. The CBI investigation examined the applicant’s assets, agricultural income attributed to his family members, inter se transfers of agricultural land, the genuineness of receipts produced in support of agricultural income and a cash loan of Rs.40 lakh allegedly advanced by the applicant. The CBI quantified the disproportionate assets at Rs.3,03,13,303/- and recommended prosecution as well as initiation of major penalty proceedings. The CVC, after examining the investigation report and subsequent clarifications, recommended prosecution and departmental action vide its first-stage advice dated 21.07.2010. Thereafter, an Expert Committee comprising officers of the CBI, CVO and CVC, on 31.08.2012, concluded that the increase in the assets of the applicant and his extended family was beyond their known sources of income. The competent Disciplinary Authority, namely, the Hon’ble Finance Minister, accordingly approved the initiation of major penalty proceedings on 28.09.2012.
The learned counsel submitted that, pursuant thereto, a Memorandum of Charge dated 05.10.2012 was issued containing a single Article of Charge alleging that the applicant had acquired movable and immovable assets disproportionate to his known lawful sources of income to the extent of ₹2,59,43,921/- during the period from 01.04.1999 to 14.04.2005. It was also alleged that the applicant had made investments without obtaining prior permission or furnishing the requisite intimation, in violation of Rules 18(2) and 18(3) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, thereby contravening Rules 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) thereof. The respondents’ counsel contended that the Charge Memorandum was issued after due application of mind and consideration of the CBI’s findings, the Expert Committee’s recommendations and the CVC’s advice, and not merely on the basis of the investigating agency’s recommendation.
Learned counsel further submitted that, after considering the applicant’s written statements of defence, the Inquiry Officer, vide report dated 30.06.2022, held the said single Article of Charge proved. The Disciplinary Authority examined the inquiry report and afforded the applicant an opportunity to submit his representation under Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. After considering and rejecting his representation, the matter was referred to the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) for its advice. The UPSC, vide advice dated 15.03.2024, concluded that the charge stood proved and constituted grave misconduct, recommending withholding of 50% of the applicant’s monthly pension for ten years. The applicant was afforded a further opportunity to represent against the UPSC’s advice, and his representations dated 31.05.2024 and 19.07.2024 were duly considered.
The respondents’ learned counsel submitted that the Disciplinary Authority, after examining the inquiry report, the applicant’s objections, the CBI’s clarifications and the UPSC’s advice, concluded that the charge stood proved on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. Consequently, the President, in exercise of powers under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, passed the impugned order dated 20.09.2024, withholding 50% of the applicant’s monthly pension for ten years, with the stipulation that gratuity could be released, if it was not required to be withheld in any other case. The said order was served upon the applicant on 03.10.2024. Learned counsel also submitted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant remained pending at the examination stage, as confirmed by the CBI on 24.12.2025.
With regard to the applicant’s allegation of violation of the principles of natural justice, the learned counsel contended that the applicant had been supplied with the relevant relied-upon documents and afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself during the inquiry. Since the original documents were before the competent criminal court, the departmental proceedings were conducted on the basis of certified copies of the relied-upon documents. The applicant’s objections and representations were considered by the Inquiry Officer and the competent authorities and were rejected by recording reasons. The respondents, therefore, denied that the proceedings suffered from any procedural irregularity, arbitrariness or non-application of mind.
The respondents’ learned counsel also submitted that the applicant’s objections concerning agricultural income, family landholdings, land transactions and the computation of disproportionate assets had been examined by the CBI and the CVC, which had obtained and considered further clarifications in this regard. They maintained that the penalty was imposed after consideration of the entire material on record and the applicant’s defence at various stages.
Regarding the appointment of the Inquiry Officer after the applicant’s retirement on 30.09.2015, the respondents’ counsel contended that the applicant’s reliance on the DoP&T Office Memorandum dated 06.01.1971 was misplaced, as, according to them, it was not applicable in the manner asserted by the applicant after his retirement. They further maintained that the inquiry had been conducted in accordance with Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, including Rule 14(24).
In view of the above submissions, the respondents contended that the impugned penalty order had been passed by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable rules, after due consideration of the inquiry findings, the applicant’s representations and the UPSC’s advice. He accordingly prayed that the O.A., being devoid of merit, be dismissed.
We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the pleadings, written submissions and material placed on record.
It emerges from the records that the applicant has assailed the impugned penalty order dated 20.09.2024 on several grounds, including alleged absence of valid approval for initiation of disciplinary proceedings, prolonged delay, non-supply and disputed authenticity of relied-upon documents, denial of an effective opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, non-compliance with Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and absence of sufficient evidence connecting the assets held by his relatives with his own sources of income. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the proceedings were initiated after due consideration by the competent authority, that the applicant was afforded adequate opportunities to defend himself, and that the charge was held proved after consideration of the inquiry report, his representations and the advice of the UPSC.
The controversy, therefore, requires examination of whether the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the impugned penalty order were conducted in accordance with the applicable rules and the principles of natural justice, and whether the applicant was afforded a reasonable and effective opportunity to defend himself.
At the outset, we consider it appropriate to examine the allegation concerning denial of an effective opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. The applicant has specifically contended that eight prosecution witnesses were examined on 23.02.2022, 24.02.2022 and 20.03.2022 in his absence, notwithstanding his application dated 22.02.2022 seeking adjournment on account of the COVID--related circumstances in his household and his consequent quarantine. The application was supported by the relevant laboratory report. According to the applicant, the witnesses were not subsequently recalled to afford him an opportunity to cross-examine them, although their evidence was relied upon in the inquiry proceedings.
The respondents have generally maintained that the applicant was afforded adequate opportunity to defend himself and that the inquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable rules. However, despite the specific direction issued by this Tribunal on 18.11.2025 to verify the applicant’s factual assertions, the respondents have not satisfactorily controverted the material circumstance that the aforesaid eight witnesses were examined in his absence despite request for adjournment.
In our considered view, the aforesaid circumstance cannot be treated as a mere technical irregularity. The applicant had sought an adjournment by placing the relevant circumstances before the Inquiry Officer. There is no material before us establishing that he had voluntarily waived off his right to cross-examine the witnesses or that he was subsequently afforded an effective opportunity to test their testimony. Where evidence is recorded against a charged officer in his absence, despite a duly supported request for adjournment, the fairness of the inquiry necessarily requires scrutiny, particularly when such evidence forms part of the material relied upon to establish the charge.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1623, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised the importance of affording a delinquent employee an opportunity to meet the evidence produced against him, including through cross-examination. For better appreciation, we deem it appropriate to quote the relevant portion of the same as under:-
In our opinion, this decision cannot assist the appellant's case because, as we have already pointed out, the documents which the respondent wanted in the present case were relevant and would have been of invaluable assistance to him in making his defence and cross-examining the witnesses who gave evidence against him. It cannot be denied that when an order of dismissal passed against a public servant is challenged by him by a petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 it is for the High Court to consider whether the constitutional requirements of Article 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such a case it would be idle to contend that the infirmities on which the public officer relies flow from the exercise of discretion vested in the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer may have acted bona fide but that does not mean that the discretionary orders passed by him are final and conclusive. Whenever it is urged before the High Court that as a result of such orders the public officer has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity it would be open to the High Court to examine the matter and decide whether the requirements of Article 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such matters it is difficult and inexpedient to lay down any general rules; whether or not the officer in question has had a reasonable opportunity must always depend on the facts in each case. The only general statement that can be safely made in this connection is that the departmental enquiries should observe rules of natural justice, and that if they are fairly and properly conducted the decisions reached by the enquiry officers on the merits are not open to be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not exactly in accordance with that which is observed in courts of law. As Venkatarama Aiyar, J. has observed in Union of India v. T.R Varma 1958 SCR 499 at p. 507 “stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them”. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice. That is the view taken by the High Court, and in the present appeal which has been brought to this Court under Article 136 we see no justification for interfering with it. In this connection it would be relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India 1958 SCR 1080 at p. 1096 where this Court has emphasised the importance of giving an opportunity to the public officer defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him.”
At the same time, as explained in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364, every procedural irregularity does not automatically vitiate disciplinary proceedings; the nature of the infraction and the prejudice caused to the delinquent employee must be examined. The relevant para of the same is reproduced as under:-
33.We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):
(1)An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.
(2)A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.
(3)In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under — “no notice”, “no opportunity” and “no hearing” categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.
(b)In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] . The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.
(5)Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice — or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action — the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no fair hearing”. (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it ‘void’ or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.]
(6)While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.
(7)There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.”
Applying these principles to the facts before us, the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine the aforesaid eight witnesses assumes particular significance because the Inquiry Officer subsequently relied upon the evidence recorded during the inquiry in arriving at his findings. The applicant was thereby deprived of an effective opportunity to challenge the testimony, test its reliability and place his defence in the proper evidentiary context. The resulting prejudice is substantive and cannot be cured merely by observing that the applicant had submitted written representations at subsequent stages.
We now examine the applicant’s contention regarding non-compliance with Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which provides as under:-
“(18)The inquiring authority may, after the Government servant closes his case, and shall, if the Government servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.”
From a plain reading of the said provision, it transpires that examination of the charged officer by the Inquiry Officer, after the evidence on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority has been closed, on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, so as to enable him to explain them. The applicant has specifically asserted that no such examination was conducted and that the respondents have not identified any particular date, questions or answers establishing compliance with the said provision. The respondents, while maintaining that the inquiry was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure, have not specifically demonstrated compliance with this requirement from the material referred to in their submissions.
The safeguard under Rule 14(18) of the Rules of 1965 is not an empty formality. It provides an opportunity to the charged officer to explain circumstances, emerging from the evidence against him before the Inquiry Officer reaches a conclusion. In the present case, the alleged omission assumes added significance when considered alongside the denial of an effective opportunity to cross-examine the said eight prosecution witnesses. The cumulative effect of these circumstances raises a serious concern as to whether the applicant received a fair and effective opportunity to meet the charge. We, therefore, find substance in the applicant’s grievance on these two procedural grounds.
The applicant has also questioned the reliability and completeness of the inquiry record. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to the alleged discrepancy between the order sheets dated 21.01.2022, the communication of the Inquiry Officer dated 22.04.2022 and the recital in the inquiry report concerning the production and taking on record prosecution documents and witnesses statements. A further discrepancy has been pointed out regarding the statement attributed to prosecution witness Niranjan Singh dated 02.03.2022, when the corresponding daily order sheet is stated to record that the witness ‘did not appear’.
These are specific factual objections and cannot be answered merely by reiterating that the inquiry report was considered by the Disciplinary Authority or that the applicant’s representations were rejected. The relevant original inquiry records, including the contemporaneous order sheets, the witness statements and the material concerning their production and authentication, must be examined to ascertain the correct factual position. Equally, the applicant’s contention that relied-upon documents were supplied belatedly and that discrepancies remained unresolved during the inquiry warrants consideration in the context of the opportunity actually afforded to him.
However, we do not consider it appropriate, on the basis of the rival submissions alone, to record a final finding regarding the authenticity of the disputed documents or the correctness of the competing versions of the inquiry proceedings. These matters shall be examined by the competent authority while reconsidering the evidence in accordance with law. We make it clear that the respondents cannot treat the mere existence of an inquiry report as conclusive proof of the regularity of every procedural step challenged by the applicant.
We have also considered the applicant’s challenge to the approval process preceding the issuance of the Charge Memorandum dated 05.10.2012.Learned Senior Counsel contended that the sanction for prosecution, initiation of departmental proceedings and approval of the charge memorandum were processed through a composite exercise, without the distinct and conscious application of mind required of the competent Disciplinary Authority. Reliance has been placed upon Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath, reported in (2014) 1 SCC 351, and Sunny Abraham v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 7764 of 2021, decided on 17.12.2021.
The respondents submitted that the Hon’ble Finance Minister, being the competent Disciplinary Authority, approved the initiation of major penalty proceedings on 28.09.2012 after consideration of the CBI investigation, the Expert Committee’s findings and the advice of the CVC.
We are conscious that the approval for initiation of proceedings and the approval of a charge memorandum, wherever separately required under the applicable statutory framework, cannot be treated as interchangeable merely because they relate to the same matter. At the same time, the existence of a composite note or the processing of related proposals together, would not, by itself, conclusively establish the absence of the requisite statutory approval. The question has to be determined from the relevant approval note, the decision recorded by the competent authority and the applicable rules.
Since the impugned order is liable to be interfered with on the procedural grounds discussed above, we do not consider it necessary to return a conclusive finding on this issue in the present proceedings. The applicant’s objection, however, shall not be treated as having been rejected merely because the matter was approved by the competent authority. Any action taken pursuant to the remand shall remain subject to the applicable statutory requirements and the legal effect of the relevant approval on record.
We next turn to the applicant’s challenge to the evidentiary foundation of the charge of disproportionate assets. It is not in dispute that the charge relates to the period from 01.04.1999 to 14.04.2005 and that the penalty order attributes a substantial portion of the alleged disproportionate assets to the applicant’s parents and the family of his brother. The applicant contended that only a comparatively small portion of the alleged disproportionate assets was attributed to him, his wife and son, whereas the balance was attributed to other family members. According to him, no property-wise fund trail or other cogent evidence was established to demonstrate that the assets standing in the names of his parents and brother’s family had been acquired from funds provided by him or were held for his benefit.
The applicant has further disputed the computation of agricultural income, the attribution of family assets and the treatment of receipts produced to establish agricultural income. He has also relied upon the respondents’ own alternative computation concerning agricultural income attributed to land held in the name of his son. The respondents maintain that these aspects were investigated by the CBI, that clarifications were obtained regarding landholdings and agricultural income, and that the applicant’s objections were considered by the CVC, the Expert Committee, the Inquiry Officer and the other competent authorities. They contended that the charge was established on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.
We observe that the fact that assets stand in the names of relatives does not, by itself, establish that such assets were acquired from the applicant’s funds. Equally, the mere fact that the assets stand in the names of other family members would not, by itself, exclude them from consideration if relevant evidence establishes their connection with the applicant or demonstrates that the transactions were undertaken for his benefit. The determination must rest upon the evidence produced in the disciplinary proceedings and the inferences reasonably arising therefrom.
The findings in a departmental inquiry are required to be based on relevant material and cannot rest upon conjecture or unproved allegations. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, and M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of supporting disciplinary findings with relevant evidence and applying the proper standard of proof.
The applicant’s objections regarding the absence of a demonstrable connection between his funds and the properties held by his relatives, the computation of agricultural income and the reliance upon material originating from the CBI investigation are, therefore, substantial issues, requiring consideration. The fact that the CBI or the CVC examined these matters cannot, by itself, substitute for an assessment of the evidence properly brought on record in the departmental inquiry. Similarly, the advice of the UPSC, though forming part of the statutory decision-making process, does not dispense with the requirement that the ultimate finding be supported by the material and procedure prescribed by law.
Nevertheless, in view of the procedural deficiencies already identified, as above, we refrain from recording a final conclusion on the correctness of the computation of disproportionate assets or the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the properties of the applicant’s relatives. Those questions must be considered on the basis of the complete and properly tested evidentiary record, without treating the findings presently under challenge as conclusive.
The applicant has also relied upon Rule 2(c) read with Rules 18(2) and 18(3) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, to contend that the department failed to establish the requisite relationship of dependency or a financial connection between him and the relatives in whose names the properties stood. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in Union of India v. V. Kannathasan, W.P. No. 8524 of 2024, decided on 09.09.2025.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the transactions, landholdings and agricultural income of the family members were examined during the investigation and that the applicant’s defence was duly considered.
In our view, the precise application of the aforesaid provisions and the extent to which the properties of the relatives can be attributed to the applicant depend upon the relevant facts, the applicable definition of the expression “member of his family” and the evidence establishing the nature of the transactions. These questions cannot be conclusively determined without examining the evidence in a fair and procedurally valid inquiry. We accordingly leave the issue open for consideration in accordance with law, without expressing any opinion on the ultimate merits of the charge.
We have also considered the applicant’s contention that the disciplinary proceedings suffered from inordinate delay. The check period ended on 14.04.2005, the charge memorandum was issued on 05.10.2012, the applicant retired on 30.09.2015, the inquiry report was submitted on 30.06.2022 and the penalty was imposed on 20.09.2024. The applicant has further pointed out that the prosecution documents were obtained by the Presenting Officer only in January 2021 and that a substantial volume of documents was supplied to him in December 2021. Applicant contended that the prolonged proceedings, coupled with the alleged incompleteness and disputed authenticity of the record, materially prejudiced his defence.
The respondents maintained that the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the prescribed rules and that the delay does not invalidate the findings recorded in the inquiry report.
We are conscious that delay, by itself, does not automatically vitiate disciplinary proceedings. Its effect must be assessed in the context of the nature of the charge, the explanation for the delay and the prejudice caused to the charged officer. In the present case, however, the long duration of the proceedings assumes significance when considered alongside the alleged difficulties in obtaining and authenticating the relied-upon documents and the denial of an effective opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. We do not consider it necessary to hold that delay alone invalidates the proceedings; nor do we find it appropriate to disregard the applicant’s grievance on that ground. The respondents shall bear the age of the matter and the need for expeditious completion while undertaking the further exercise directed herein.
The respondents have also relied upon the fact that the applicant’s objections were considered at several stages and that the Disciplinary Authority ultimately accepted the advice of the UPSC. We are unable to accept that these circumstances, by themselves, answer the applicant’s specific grievance concerning the manner in which the evidence was recorded. Consideration of representations after completion of the inquiry cannot, in every case, cure the denial of an effective opportunity to challenge material testimony at the stage when it was recorded, nor can the subsequent consideration of the matter by the Disciplinary Authority or the UPSC retrospectively supply an opportunity of cross-examination that was not afforded during the inquiry.
The question is not whether the applicant was permitted to submit written representations, but whether the procedure adopted enabled him to meet the evidence relied upon against him in a fair and meaningful manner. For the reasons recorded above, we find that this requirement was not adequately met.
We will now consider what appropriate relief be granted in this case. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant has argued that the defects identified in the proceedings are fundamental and that a remand would effectively provide the respondents with an opportunity to reconstruct their case after the applicant’s retirement and after the passage of more than two decades from the commencement of the check period. He has, therefore, sought setting aside of the inquiry report and the penalty order without granting liberty to the respondents to recommence or conduct a fresh/de nove inquiry. The respondents, on the other hand, seek dismissal of the OA, maintaining that the inquiry was conducted in accordance with law.
We are mindful of the applicant’s retirement in 2015, the age of the transactions under examination and the prolonged duration of the proceedings. A remand should not be ordered mechanically, particularly where the passage of time may materially prejudice a retired employee. At the same time, the procedural prejudice established in the present case arises principally from the failure to afford an effective opportunity to cross-examine the eight prosecution witnesses and the alleged non-compliance with the provision of Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. These defects are identifiable and can, in principle, be addressed without recommencing the entire inquiry from the stage of issuance of charge memorandum. We are, therefore, of the considered view that a limited remand would be a proportionate remedy, provided it is confined to curing the identified procedural deficiencies and is not used as an occasion to fill evidentiary gaps, introduce a new case or improve the prosecution case beyond what is permissible under the applicable rules. The Inquiry Officer must act on the existing charge and the material properly forming part of the proceedings, subject to such further steps as are lawfully necessary to restore a fair opportunity of defence. The applicant’s objections regarding the approval process, authenticity of the inquiry record and evidentiary basis of the charge shall remain subject to consideration in accordance with law and shall not be deemed to have been decided against him by this order.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the denial of an effective opportunity to cross-examine the eight prosecution witnesses, coupled with the failure of the respondents to demonstrate compliance with Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, has materially prejudiced the applicant’s defence. The impugned penalty order dated 20.09.2024, having been passed on the basis of an inquiry affected by these procedural infirmities, cannot be sustained in its present form.
Accordingly, the Original Application is allowed to the extent indicated below, and the matter is remitted for the limited purpose of curing the procedural prejudice identified in this order. We make it clear that we have not expressed any final opinion on the merits of the charge, the computation of the alleged disproportionate assets, the attribution of properties held by the applicant’s relatives, the evidentiary value of the disputed documents or witness statements, or the ultimate penalty, if any, that may lawfully be imposed.
In the result, the instant OA is disposed of with the following directions:
The impugned penalty order dated 20.09.2024, imposing the penalty of withholding 50% of the applicant’s monthly pension for a period of ten years, is hereby set aside;
The disciplinary proceedings are remitted to the competent authority/Inquiry Officer for continuation from the stage at which the applicant was denied an effective opportunity to cross--examine the eight prosecution witnesses examined on 23.02.2022, 24.02.2022 and 20.03.2022;
The aforesaid witnesses shall be made available for further examination, subject to their availability and the applicable rules, and the applicant shall be afforded a meaningful and effective opportunity to cross-examine them. If any witness is unavailable, the Inquiry Officer shall record the reasons and determine the legally permissible course without treating the earlier denial of opportunity as having been cured automatically;
The Inquiry Officer shall thereafter afford the applicant the opportunity contemplated under Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and such consequential opportunity as may be necessary under the applicable rules;
While undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the Inquiry Officer shall examine the relevant inquiry records, including the disputed order sheets of various dates including 21.01.2022, the communication dated 22.04.2022 and the record concerning the statement attributed to prosecution witness Niranjan Singh, to the extent necessary for a fair determination of the proceedings. The applicant shall be afforded an appropriate opportunity to raise objections in accordance with law. The remand shall not be treated as permission to introduce a new charge or to reconstruct the prosecution case beyond what is permissible under the applicable rules;
Upon completion of the aforesaid exercise, the Inquiry Officer shall consider the evidence and the applicant’s defence in accordance with law and submit a fresh report. The competent authority shall thereafter proceed from the appropriate stage under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, after affording the applicant all consequential opportunities available to him in law. The applicant’s objections concerning approval, the evidentiary foundation of the charge and the computation of disproportionate assets shall be dealt with in accordance with law, insofar as they arise for determination at the relevant stage;
The aforesaid exercise shall be completed as expeditiously as possible and, preferably, within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order, subject to the applicant extending full cooperation and any circumstances beyond the control of the parties; and
Consequent upon setting aside of the impugned penalty order, the respondents shall regulate and restore the applicant’s pensionary benefits in accordance with the applicable rules, subject to the further decision in the disciplinary proceedings. Any adjustment, if legally permissible, shall abide by the final order passed by the competent authority.
It is clarified that this Tribunal has not adjudicated upon the ultimate merits of the charge or the applicant’s entitlement to any particular outcome in the disciplinary proceedings. All such matters shall be considered independently, in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any observation in this order beyond the findings necessary to address the procedural prejudice identified herein.
In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
Pending MA(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.
The Registry is directed to return the official records produced by the respondents in the present matter to the concerned official of the respondents against proper acknowledgment of receipt.
