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Judgment
Heard the parties.
This is an application for quashing the order of taking cognizance dated 21.02.2017 against the petitioners by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur under sections 323 & 504 in connection with Complaint Case No.C/2229 of 2014 as well as quash the entire proceeding initiated against the petitioners.
The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 25.10.2014, the accused persons allegedly came to the house of the complainant, used abusive language, pushed the gate and caused injury to the complainant. It is further alleged that the accused persons assaulted the complainant, threatened him and took away articles, including cash of Rs.2,50,000/- and ornaments. On the basis of the said allegations, the complaint petition was filed alleging commission of offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 423, 504, 380, 457 and 120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the allegations made in the complaint petition are vague and omnibus and no specific overt act has been attributed to the petitioners. It is further submitted that there is no injury report on the record to substantiate the allegation of assault. It is also submitted that the complaint has been filed in the background of a matrimonial and family dispute and is a counterblast to Complaint Case No. 2602(C) of 2015 filed by petitioner Vinita Kumari.
It is further submitted that the learned court below proceeded to take cognizance on 21.02.2017 without there being any proper inquiry and without there being sufficient material on record to constitute the offences alleged against the petitioners.
This Court has considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and has perused the materials available on record.
So far as the offence under Section 323 of the IPC is concerned, the essential requirement is that there must be a voluntary act causing hurt to another person. Reliance has been placed to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2025) 3 SCC 612, where while considering the ingredients of Section 323 of the IPC, the court has held that actual hurt in the form of bodily pain, disease or infirmity is an essential ingredient of the said offence.
It would be apposite to reproduce the relevant paragraph nos.17, 18, 24 & 25 of Madhushree Datta Case (supra), which reads as under:-
“17.To determine what are the ingredients of the offence under Section 323IPC, it is important to read Sections 319, 321 and 323 together.
18.What emerges on a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions is that, for a conviction under Section 323IPC, there must be a voluntary act of causing hurt i.e. bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual hurt is caused. XXX XXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
24.A perusal of Section 504IPC reveals that a mere act of insulting someone does not fulfil its requirements; the insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach the public peace or engage in criminal conduct. Therefore, to establish the ingredients of Section 504IPC, it must be demonstrated, based on the available material, that there was intentional insult with the intent or knowledge that such insult would provoke either disturbance of the public peace or the commission of any other offence.
25.We may, at this juncture, profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715 : AIR 2014 SC 957] , wherein Section 504IPC came up for interpretation and it was held as under : (SCC pp. 49-50, paras 13-14)
“13.Section 504IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. : (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.
14.We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504IPC. It is not the law that a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.”
In the present case, although an allegation of assault and injury has been made, there is no injury report or other supporting material placed on record to substantiate the alleged injury. More importantly, no specific overt act has been attributed to the individual petitioners so as to disclose their involvement in the alleged assault.
So far as Section 504 of the IPC is concerned, a mere allegation that abusive or unparliamentary language was used, without stating the specific words or circumstances in which the alleged insult was made, would not by itself constitute the offence. The ingredients of Section 504 require intentional insult of such a nature as is likely to provoke the person insulted to break the public peace or to commit some other offence.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhushree Datta Case (supra) has reiterated that the ingredients of the penal provision have to be disclosed from the allegations and that a vague allegation, without the necessary factual foundation showing the requisite intention and circumstances, cannot by itself sustain a criminal prosecution.
In the present case, the allegations regarding abuse are general in nature. No specific words allegedly used by the petitioners have been disclosed and there is also no material to indicate that the alleged insult was made with the requisite intention or knowledge so as to provoke the complainant to breach public peace or commit any other offence.
It is also relevant that the complaint has admittedly arisen in the background of a family dispute between the parties. The materials placed before this Court indicate that petitioner Vinita Kumari had herself instituted proceedings alleging matrimonial cruelty against persons connected with the complainant side. The existence of such dispute assumes significance while considering whether the present complaint discloses a genuine criminal offence or has been instituted as a counterblast.
This Court is conscious of the settled principle that at the stage of exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court ordinarily does not conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence. However, where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged, continuation of the criminal proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
In the present case, the allegations against the petitioners are general and omnibus. There is no specific overt act attributed to them in respect of the offences for which cognizance has been taken. The allegation of injury is not supported by any injury report and the allegation of abuse does not disclose the necessary particulars or ingredients of Section 504 of the IPC.
Further, the manner in which the proceeding has progressed and the absence of any substantive material supporting the allegations also cast serious doubt on the continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioners. The allegations, taken in their entirety, do not make out a prima-facie case against the petitioners for the offences under Sections 323 and 504 of the IPC.
In the circumstances noticed above, this Court is of the view that allowing the criminal proceeding to continue against the petitioners would serve no useful purpose and would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Accordingly, the impugned cognizance order dated 21.02.2017, with all its consequential proceedings qua all six above-named petitioners as passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur are hereby set aside/quashed.
The present petition stands allowed.
Let the copy of judgment be communicated to the learned trial court forthwith, with TCR, if any.