Villagers Of Chutuk & Ors. vs Mohammad Hussain (Ladakh case)

The petitioners, who are defendants in the civil suit titled Mohammad Hussain v. Mohd. Hanifa and Others, have invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking quashment of orders dated 23.03.2022, 09.06.2022, 25.06.2022 and 19.09.2022 passed by the Trial Court. The principal grievance of the petitioners is that the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and have been passed by adopting a procedure not sanctioned by law. It is contended that the suit, as originally instituted, was not maintainable inasmuch as the plaintiff could not have sought a decree of declaration and injunction in respect of the suit land when his entitlement thereto was specifically disputed by the defendants. It is further urged that, having regard to the nature of the controversy and the interest of the villagers in the suit property, the plaintiff could not have instituted the suit in his individual capacity without obtaining leave of the Court under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the Trial Court committed a manifest error in allowing the applications moved by the plaintiff for amendment of the cause title and the plaint, notwithstanding the preliminary objections raised by the defendants regarding the maintainability of the suit, non-joinder of necessary parties and failure to institute the proceedings in a representative capacity. It is also contended that, once an order directing the parties to maintain status quo had already been passed, the Trial Court could not have issued a further direction of similar nature without appropriately modifying or varying its earlier order.

The facts necessary for adjudication of the present petition may be noticed briefly. The plaintiff/respondent instituted a suit for declaration and injunction against five defendants, asserting that he was a resident of village Chutuk and, as such, entitled to a share in the village land comprising Survey Nos. 3986, 3987, 3988, 3989, 3994 and 3996. According to the plaintiff, the aforesaid land stood mutated in favour of the villagers of village Chutuk, who had nominated defendants 1 to 5 as members of a committee entrusted with the distribution of the land amongst the eligible villagers. The grievance projected in the plaint was that, despite being a resident of the village, the plaintiff had been excluded from the list of beneficiaries and denied his legitimate share in the distribution of the land.

Upon service of summons, the defendants entered appearance and filed their written statement, contesting the claim of the plaintiff primarily on the ground that he was not a resident of village Chutuk but belonged to village Minji and, therefore, had no entitlement to any share in the suit land. The defendants also raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the suit, alleging that the same was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, that the plaintiff had failed to obtain leave of the Court to institute the suit in a representative capacity, and that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. It was further alleged that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts concerning his actual place of residence.

During the pendency of the suit, the Trial Court, vide order dated 14.09.2021, directed the parties to maintain status quo with respect to the suit property. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved an application under Order I Rule 8 CPC, stating that although the suit had initially been instituted against the five persons allegedly nominated as members of the Committee, the relief claimed was directed against the distribution of land being undertaken on behalf of the villagers at large. It was asserted that the defendants, being persons entrusted with the distribution of the village land, were acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the villagers. The defendants, while disputing the constitution of any such Committee, did not deny that the land was being distributed.

The Trial Court, upon consideration of the application, passed order dated 23.03.2022, observing that the villagers of village Chutuk had a common interest in the suit property and that defendants 1 to 5 had been arrayed in the suit in their capacity as persons undertaking the distribution of the land on behalf of the villagers. Accordingly, the application was allowed, the villagers of village Chutuk were permitted to be brought on record, and the plaintiff was granted permission to amend the cause title of the suit.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved another application seeking amendment of the plaint on the ground that, although the cause title had been amended pursuant to the earlier order, the relief clause had not been suitably modified so as to extend the relief claimed against the newly impleaded defendants 6 to 13. The plaintiff explained that he had been under the impression that amendment of the memo of parties would suffice and that no separate amendment of the relief clause was necessary. The Trial Court, vide order dated 25.06.2022, allowed the application to the limited extent of incorporating the relief against the newly added defendants. Subsequently, when the newly impleaded defendants sought an opportunity to file their written statement, the plaintiff objected on the ground that the request was intended to delay the proceedings. The learned Trial Court, however, vide order dated 19.09.2022, directed the defendants, including the newly added defendants, to file their written statement to the amended plaint.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the procedure adopted by the learned Trial Court is legally unsustainable. It is submitted that, once the defendants had specifically raised objections regarding non-joinder of necessary parties and the failure of the plaintiff to institute the suit in a representative capacity, the plaintiff could not have been permitted to cure such fundamental defects by subsequently seeking amendment of the pleadings. According to learned counsel, the amendments have materially altered the nature and scope of the proceedings and have caused serious prejudice to the defendants. It is further contended that the subsequent direction for maintaining status quo was wholly unwarranted in view of the subsisting order dated 14.09.2021.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent has supported the impugned orders and submitted that the suit, as originally instituted, was maintainable in law. It is contended that the plaintiff had initially impleaded only defendants 1 to 5 under the bona fide belief that they alone, being the persons entrusted with the distribution of the village land, were necessary parties to the proceedings. However, when other villagers also allegedly started interfering with the rights asserted by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the subsisting order of status quo, it became necessary to seek their impleadment and consequential amendment of the pleadings. Learned counsel submits that the amendments neither change the fundamental nature of the suit nor take away any substantive defence available to the petitioners. It is further urged that the subsequent order of status quo was necessitated by the impleadment of additional defendants and cannot be said to suffer from any jurisdictional or legal infirmity.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

The controversy involved in the present petition arises out of the distribution of more than 300 kanals of non-cultivable land situated in village Chutuk. It is not in dispute that, in the year 2016, the revenue authorities attested a mutation in respect of the said land in favour of the villagers of village Chutuk. The plaintiff claims that, being a resident of the said village, he is entitled to be included amongst the beneficiaries of the distribution. The defendants, however, dispute his residential status and, consequently, his entitlement to any share in the land. The essential controversy in the suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff is a resident of village Chutuk and, if so, whether he is entitled to be included in the list of persons amongst whom the village land is being distributed.

Having considered the rival submissions, this Court finds no merit in the contention that the suit, as originally instituted, was necessarily required to be filed in a representative capacity under Order I Rule 8 CPC. The distinction between a suit instituted by a person for enforcement of his individual right and a suit instituted by or against persons in a representative capacity is material. Order I Rule 8 CPC is attracted where numerous persons have the same interest in a suit and one or more of such persons seek to sue or defend on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested, subject to the conditions prescribed therein. In the present case, the plaintiff has not sought any relief on behalf of the villagers collectively. His claim is confined to the enforcement of his own asserted right to be included amongst the beneficiaries of the village land. Merely because the adjudication of such claim concerns land in which other villagers also have an interest would not, by itself, render the suit a representative action.

The plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the suit land stands recorded in favour of the villagers of village Chutuk and that defendants 1 to 5 were undertaking its distribution. His grievance is not against the entitlement of the villagers as a class, but against his alleged exclusion from the process of distribution. The relief sought is, therefore, essentially personal to the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the property in question is claimed to be common village land. The objection that the suit was liable to be dismissed merely because it had not initially been instituted in a representative capacity is, thus, misconceived.

Equally untenable is the contention that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to permit impleadment of additional defendants or consequential amendment of the plaint after objections regarding non-joinder of parties had been raised. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to impleadment of parties and amendment of pleadings are intended to facilitate effective and complete adjudication of the real controversy between the parties. The mere fact that a procedural defect has been pointed out by the opposite party does not, in itself, create an absolute bar against its rectification, provided the amendment is otherwise permissible in law and does not occasion such prejudice as cannot be compensated or addressed in the proceedings.

In the present case, the amendments permitted by the Trial Court have neither introduced an altogether new cause of action nor fundamentally altered the character of the suit. The subject matter continues to be the plaintiff's asserted entitlement to inclusion amongst the beneficiaries of the village land. The addition of defendants 6 to 13 and the consequential extension of the relief clause against them are incidental to the existing controversy. Significantly, the defendants have not been deprived of their right to contest the amended pleadings. On the contrary, the Trial Court, vide order dated 19.09.2022, afforded them an opportunity to file their written statement to the amended plaint. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the amendments have caused any irreparable or legally cognizable prejudice to the petitioners.

The contention that the suit was not maintainable for want of a prayer for possession is also without substance in the context of the pleadings and the relief actually claimed. The plaintiff has not instituted the suit on the premise that he is the exclusive owner of any specifically demarcated portion of the suit land. His case is that the land stands recorded in favour of the villagers collectively and that, being a resident of the village, he is entitled to be considered for inclusion in its distribution. The question whether the plaintiff is, in fact, a resident of village Chutuk and whether such residence confers upon him the entitlement claimed are matters requiring adjudication on the basis of pleadings and evidence. The maintainability of the suit cannot be negatived at this stage merely because the defendants dispute the plaintiff's residential status or entitlement.

It is also pertinent to observe that the plaintiff has not sought a declaration of his residential status as an independent substantive relief. His assertion that he is a resident of village Chutuk constitutes the factual foundation of the relief claimed by him. Whether that assertion is correct is a matter of proof. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing the requisite facts and his entitlement under the applicable law, the Trial Court would be competent to consider the relief sought. Conversely, if he fails to establish his claim, the suit would necessarily fail on its merits. These questions cannot be conclusively determined in proceedings arising out of interlocutory orders permitting impleadment and amendment.

The challenge to the subsequent direction for maintaining status quo is equally devoid of merit. The earlier order dated 14.09.2021 was passed when only defendants 1 to 5 were parties to the suit. Upon impleadment of defendants 6 to 13, the learned Trial Court considered it necessary to extend the protective direction to the newly added defendants as well. Such a direction, in the circumstances of the case, cannot be construed as an impermissible modification of the earlier order or as an exercise of jurisdiction unknown to law. The subsequent direction was intended to preserve the subject matter of the suit and to ensure that the proceedings were not rendered infructuous by acts of persons subsequently brought on record. No jurisdictional infirmity or manifest illegality has been demonstrated in the exercise of such discretion by the learned Trial Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon Gian Chand v. Mangi Ram, 2005 (3) JKJ 363, and Kayalulla Parambath Moidu Haji v. Namboodiyil Vinodan, 2021 (6) Supreme 96. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the nature of the relief claimed by the plaintiff, the aforesaid judgments do not advance the case of the petitioners. The controversy herein concerns the permissibility of impleadment and consequential amendment of pleadings in a suit seeking enforcement of an asserted individual entitlement in common village land. The authorities relied upon by the petitioners are distinguishable on facts and do not warrant interference with the impugned orders.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which cannot be overlooked. The jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory and not appellate in character. Such jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction, exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it, failed to exercise jurisdiction, or committed such patent perversity or manifest injustice as would warrant interference. It is not open to this Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, to substitute its own view merely because another view may also be possible on the facts of the case.

The scope and ambit of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 have been elaborately considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329. The principles laid down therein make it abundantly clear that the power of superintendence is intended to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and is not to be exercised as a matter of course for correction of every error of fact or law. Interference is warranted only where the impugned order discloses a patent jurisdictional error, perversity or grave dereliction of duty resulting in manifest injustice.

Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, the impugned orders do not disclose any such illegality, jurisdictional error or perversity as would justify interference by this Court. The Trial Court has exercised its discretion in permitting impleadment of additional defendants, allowing consequential amendment of the plaint and affording the defendants an opportunity to contest the amended pleadings. The orders have been passed in furtherance of effective adjudication of the dispute and do not foreclose any substantive defence available to the petitioners. The petitioners remain at liberty to contest the plaintiff's claim, including his asserted residential status and entitlement to a share in the suit land, in accordance with law.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is made out. The impugned orders neither suffer from patent perversity nor disclose any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the impleadment of defendants 6 to 13 or the consequential amendment of the plaint has occasioned any prejudice of such nature as would justify setting aside the orders passed by the learned Trial Court.

Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Any interim direction passed by this Court in the present proceedings shall stand vacated. The Trial Court shall proceed with the suit in accordance with law and make every endeavour to conclude the trial expeditiously.

It is, however, clarified that any observation made herein shall remain confined to the adjudication of the present petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the rival claims of the parties. The Trial Court shall decide the suit independently, on the basis of the pleadings, evidence and applicable law, uninfluenced by any observation made in this order. Copy of the order be notified to trial court for compliance.