Uttam Tiwari & Ors. vs The State Of Jharkhand & Ors.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Since common issues are involved in all the writ petitions filed by the petitioners, they were heard together and are being disposed by this common order, and the facts relevant to decide the main lis has been taken from W.P.(S) No. 3445 of 2025.

This is one more unending dispute arising between direct recruits and recruits appointed through Limited Examination qua their inter-se seniority to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police. Under Jharkhand Police Manual, method of recruitment for the said post is two folds i.e. direct recruitment, and, recruitment by promotion of Assistant Sub-Inspector. Rule 653(c) of Police Manual provides that vacancies up to 50% shall be filled by selection from the rank of Assistant Sub Inspectors. Rule 659 of Police Manual clearly provides that 50% of the vacancies in the rank of Sub-Inspector shall be filled by selection from the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector who have shown exceptional merit while serving as Assistant Sub Inspector. Rule 659(g) further provides that Assistant Sub Inspector shall be on Probation for a period of twelve months from the date of the order promoting them to the rank of Sub-Inspector.

Appendix-93, vide Clause-9, provides inter alia that Assistant Sub Inspector promoted to Sub-Inspector would be required to undergo three months promotional course for promotion to the rank of Sub-Inspector. In the said course, special emphasis was on supervision and leadership and other allied activities.

Per contra, Rule 653 read with Rule 681 and Appendix 93 provides for rigorous training for directly recruited Sub Inspector. Rule 681 clearly stipulates that all Sub-Inspectors appointed direct shall be required to undergo one year’s training course at Police Training College in terms of Appendix 93, and, upon successful completion of training, Sub- Inspectors shall be given practical training for two years, during which period they shall be on probation and at the end of entire training period, services would be confirmed by Deputy Inspector General of Police.

The distinction drawn under the Rules for providing rigorous training and giving practical experience for directly recruited Sub Inspectors, as opposed to promotee Sub Inspector, has a reasonable nexus to achieve. Promotee Sub Inspectors were already working on the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector for a minimum period of five years before their cases could be considered for promotion to the post of Sub-Inspector and, thus, they have already acquired sufficient training, both practical and theoretical training, during their service tenure and it is for the said reason, in the Rules vide Appendix 93, it has been provided that said Sub Inspectors only required to undergo a three months promotional course. Since directly recruited Sub Inspectors have no previous experience, it was made mandatory for them under Rule 681 to undergo training at Police Academy for one year and two years practical training before which their services could be confirmed.

Apart from above two recruitment methods provided under the Police Manual, Respondent-State of Jharkhand created another method for recruitment/appointment on the post of Sub-Inspector vide Notification bearing No. 252 dated 28.01.2016.

The State of Jharkhand framed ‘Jharkhand State Police Sub Inspector Limited Departmental Competitive Examination Rules, 2016’ (for short ‘Rules of 2016’). Under the said Rules, out of 50% posts, which were to be filled up by promotion from Assistant Sub Inspector to Sub Inspector, 25% posts were reserved to be filled up by Police personnel other than Assistant Sub Inspectors. Said Rules provided, inter alia, the requisite qualification for appearing in Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (for short ‘LDCE’) and the procedure to be adopted under the said Rules of 2016 was; - Written Examination, Physical Fitness Test, Interview and Medical Examination. Rule 27 of Rules of 2016 specifically stipulates, inter alia, that candidates appointed through LDCE on the post of Sub-Inspector will necessarily need to undergo training and they would be on Probation for a period of two years. Said amendment was carried out in exercise of powers under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India read with Section 46(3) of The Police Act, 1861. Consequential amendments to be carried out under the Police Manual were incorporated in the said Rules itself. As already stated above, dispute in present writ application pertains to inter-se seniority between directly recruited Sub Inspectors and Sub Inspectors appointed by way of promotion through LDCE.

The State of Jharkhand issued Advertisement No.05/2017 dated 15.07.2017 inviting applications for direct recruitment to the post of Sub Inspector of Police, and, writ petitioners were appointed pursuant to aforesaid Advertisement. Said Advertisement was issued for recruitment of altogether 2483 posts of Sub Inspector of Police through direct recruitment. Subsequent to said Advertisement, another Advertisement being Advertisement No. 09/2017 dated 04.08.2017 was issued for appointment to the post of Sub Inspector through L.D.C.E. for recruitment of 1544 Sub Inspectors of Police. Although Advertisement for L.D.C.E. was issued subsequent to Advertisement for direct recruitment, the selection process under Advertisement No. 09/2017 was concluded earlier and appointment letters were issued vide Memo No. 192/C dated 06.03.2018 in favour of selected candidates including Respondents and Interveners. Subsequent thereto, on 06.08.2018, Writ Petitioners were appointed as direct recruits to the post of Sub-Inspector.

It is an undisputed fact that direct recruits were sent for training on 06.08.2018 in various Training Institutes including Jharkhand Police Academy, Hazaribagh, JAP Training Centre, Padma and Jungle Welfare School, Netarhat.

Similarly, on 06.03.2018, recruits through L.D.C.E. were directed to report for training at Jharkhand Police Academy, Hazaribagh on 11.03.2018.

It is also an undisputed fact that training of direct recruits was completed earlier in point of time and vide various Departmental Orders, services of direct recruits were confirmed with effect from 06.08.2021.

However, appointees through Limited Departmental Examination had undergone their first semester of training between the period 11.03.2018 to 31.07.2018 followed by District Practical Training of 01.08.2018 to 31.07.2019, second semester training was from 05.09.2021 to 03.01.2022 and, accordingly, their services were confirmed on completion of training with effect from 02.08.2022. These facts are not in dispute between the parties.

Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Manoj Tondon, Advocate and Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate primarily advanced arguments on behalf of Petitioners. Overlapping arguments have been advanced by above counsels apart from individual specific argument which is cumulatively noted herein for brevity.

The main point of argument of Petitioners is that although Private Respondents i.e. Limited Departmental Examination candidates were recruited earlier in point of time, their services were confirmed only after completion of their training with effect from 2^nd August, 2022; whereas services of Writ Petitioners were confirmed with effect from 06.08.2021 and, thus, in terms of Rule 689(C), Petitioners would be treated as senior to that of Private Respondents, as their actual recruitment precedes the date than that of Private Respondents. Heavy reliance was placed upon the term ‘actually” used in Rule 689(C), Chapter-22 of Jharkhand Police Manual to contend that the term “actually” has been interpreted by Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of “Madeva Upendra Sinai & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors,” (1975) 3 SCC 765 (Paras 15 to 17) and “Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Doom Dooma India Ltd.,” (2009) 4 SCC 427 (Paras 2, 10, 12 & 13), to connote something which actually has taken effect or granted or given the effect to.

It was vehemently submitted that although confirmation of service would relate back to the date of initial appointment, but the same would not confer consequential seniority to Private Respondent in view of Rule 682(d) of Jharkhand Police Manual, which provides that the period spent on training and on probation will count as ‘service towards pension’. By placing reliance upon said Rules, it was contended that had the intention of the framers of Rules was to confer seniority even in respect of the period spent for training and on probation, the same would have been specifically enumerated under the Rules. Attention was invited to Rules 653, 659, 682 and 689(C) of the Police Manual and it was submitted that these Rules were to be construed harmoniously being the governing principle for appointment, training, probation and seniority between the Petitioner and Private Respondents.

Reliance was placed upon clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5 of appointment letters of Private Respondents, and, it was contended that under said appointment letter, it was clearly stipulated that recruitment was purely temporary in nature which was subject to completion of training of two years in Jharkhand Police Academy, Hazaribagh and during the said period, recruits appointed through LDCE were to remain under probation. It was clearly stipulated in the appointment letter that in the event, a candidate fails to obtain basic training and successfully passes the same, the employee would not be entitled for confirmation of his service including increment in pay. The appointment letter further stipulated that if any candidate, during training or probation period, resigns from service, the said candidate will have to pay the entire expenditure on training.

Further reliance was placed upon Rule 27 of Rules of 2016 read with Appendix-41, to contend inter alia that Appendix 41 vide Sl. No. 5, was amended to incorporate therein the period when candidates appointed through Limited Departmental Examination would be deemed to be on Probation. Further, Rule 28 of Rules of 2016 was relied upon to contend that anything not governed under Rules of 2016 would be governed through the applicable Code, Rules, Regulations, Instructions and Police Manual. On the strength of above, it was contended that Police Manual would apply with equal force both in favour of Petitioners and Private Respondents and their service conditions, including seniority, would be governed under the Police Manual.

An alternative argument was advanced by Mr. Manoj Tondon, Advocate that since method of recruitment of Private Respondent is alien to the method of recruitment provided under Police Manual, provisions of the Police Manual would not apply. Reliance was placed upon various Service Rules framed by State of Jharkhand, like, Jharkhand Secretariat Clerical Service Rules, 2010 and Jharkhand Secretariat Clerical Service Recruitment Rules, 2012 to contend, inter alia that under the said Rules, it is clearly laid down that if recruitment process started at an earlier point of time for direct recruits, though their appointments were made on subsequent date with that of promotees, the direct recruits would stand senior to the promotees. It was contended that process of direct recruitment was initiated by issuing requisition dated 06.01.2017, whereas requisition for recruitment through LDCE was issued subsequently. Even advertisements were issued anterior in point of time for direct recruitment and merely because recruits through LDCE have been appointed earlier in point of time than that of Petitioners, they cannot be treated as senior to Petitioners.

Lastly, it was submitted that Respondent-State of Jharkhand itself prepared a Seniority List vide Memo No. 667/P dated 13.07.2021, which was the first Seniority List published in the year 2021, wherein, admittedly, names of Private Respondents/candidates appointed through LDCE, were not included, as their services were not confirmed. However, in subsequent Provisional Seniority List dated 09.11.2023, the candidates appointed through Limited Departmental Examination were shown as senior to Writ Petitioners, which led filing of objections and representations by Writ Petitioners and other similarly situated recruits. However, the State Government, ignoring the aforesaid aspect, proceeded to finalize the Seniority List vide impugned Order contained in Memo No. 951/P dated 09.09.2024, wherein persons appointed through LDCE were shown as senior. This order has been impugned and assailed in the manner stated above. Petitioners have relied upon following Judgments:-

Mr. Rohit Roy, learned A.G, assisted by Ms. Oishi Das, AC to AG argued on behalf of State of Jharkhand. Reliance was placed upon Counter Affidavit and reference was made to Police Order No. 102 dated 08.02.1983 and it was contended that in terms of the said order it was decided that seniority will be determined by totalling the number secured by the direct appointee in the Police Training Centre and the number secured in the selection examination. It was contended that following the above principle, final seniority list contained in Memo No. 951/P dated 09.09.2024 has been prepared. However, at the same breath, it was argued that in terms of Rule 689(c) of Police Manual, since LDCE candidates were appointed on 11.03.2018, whereas direct recruit candidates were appointed on 06.08.2018, as per Police Manual LDCE candidates have been rightly declared senior to that of direct recruits.

Mr. Nawnitti Prasad Singh, Ld. Sr. Counsel, assisted by Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate, assisted by Mr. Arpan Mishra, Advocate and Mr. Amritansh Vats, Advocate advanced arguments on behalf of Private Respondents. It was argued that under Police Manual, there were essentially two recognized methods for appointment i.e. direct appointment and promotion, and, a third recruitment process was created by State of Jharkhand by virtue of Rules of 2016 under which promotional post was divided into prescribed quota, and, out of total 50% promotional quota, 25% was to be filled up by promotion from Assistant Sub-Inspectors and balance 25% was to be filled up through LDCE. It was, thus, contended that LDCE candidates cannot be treated as newly appointed, rather, their case should be treated as promotion at par with other Assistant Sub-Inspectors. It was argued that under the scheme of Police Manual read with Rules of 2016, LDCE candidates were also required to undergo training. It was contended that first semester training of LDCE candidates was completed from 11.03.2018 to 31.07.2018 followed by District Practical Training from 01.08.2018 to 31.07.2019, but subsequent training commenced from 05.09.2021 to 03.01.2022 and the delay in completion of the training was not attributable to Private Respondents, but to the Training Directorate. On the strength of above, it was contended that for no fault of Private Respondents in completion of training, they cannot be made junior to Writ Petitioners who were, admittedly, appointed subsequent to the date of appointment of Private Respondents.

In any event, it was contended that after Private Respondents completed their training, the same relates back to the date of their initial appointment and completion of training does not create a new date of appointment, rather, it relates back to original date of employment. In this regard, reliance was placed upon following Judgments:-

It was further contended that the core question for determination in the present case is ‘whether date of appointment is relevant for determining seniority’, or ‘whether date of confirmation in service is relevant for determining seniority’. It was contended that the date of confirmation would relate back to the date of initial appointment and even if Private Respondents were confirmed in service later in point of time, the same would have no effect as said confirmation would relate back to the date of their initial appointment.

It was further argued that Jharkhand Police Manual is not a statutory Rule, but merely is an executive instruction and, therefore, General Service Jurisprudence in determining seniority should be applied, and, date of initial appointment becomes the relevant date for determination of seniority as per General Service Law principle. Extensive reliance was placed upon Judgment in the case of K. Meghachandra Singh & Ors. V. Ningam Siro & Ors, (2020) 5 SCC 689 to contend inter alia that as per General Principle, no employee can claim seniority from the date when said employee was not even born in the cadre. While distinguishing the Judgment relied upon by Petitioner, Respondents relied upon the decision in the case of State of Orissa and Ors v. Md. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 and contended, inter alia, that Judgment is to be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the exposition of the whole law. On the strength of above, it was submitted that seniority determined by Respondent-State is not liable to be interfered with by this Court.

Having considered rival submissions, following questions arise for consideration by this Court:-

Rule 653 of Police Manual contains provisions for appointment of Sub-Inspectors. Said Rule, for brevity, is quoted herein-under:-

A bare perusal of said Rule clearly reveals that Sub-Inspectors were to be appointed through direct recruitment and by promotion, and, 50 per cent of the seats were to be filled up by selection from the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector through promotion.

Rule 654 to 658 extensively deals with the manner of selection which is required to be followed for direct recruitment on the post of Sub-Inspector. Similarly, Rule 659 provided for the manner of promotion of Assistant Sub-Inspector in the rank of Sub-Inspector and Rule 659(a) and (g), which are relevant in the present context, is extracted herein:-

A perusal of Rule 659(a) of Police Manual clearly reveals that selection from the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector in the vacancies of Sub-Inspector required a minimum five years of service on the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector and only such officers were to be selected who have shown exceptional merit while serving as Assistant Sub-Inspector. Rule 659(g) further provided for probation of twelve months from the date of the order promoting Assistant Sub-Inspector to the rank of Sub-Inspector.

Under Rules of 2016, State Government created another category for entry in the rank of Sub-Inspector and amended Rule 653 and 659 and provided that out of 50% vacancies to be filled up by promotion from Assistant Sub-Inspector to the post of Sub-Inspector, 25% vacancies would be filled up through LDCE from officers primarily subordinate in rank to that of Assistant Sub-Inspector.

The procedure provided for entry in the cadre of Sub-Inspector under Rules of 2016 was almost akin to the procedure laid down under Rules 654 to 658 relating to direct recruitment on the post of Sub-Inspector.

The vires of Rule 7(ka) and (kha) of ‘Jharkhand State Police Sub-Inspector Limited Departmental Competitive Examination Appointment Rules (Recruitment Procedure),2016 was challenged before this Court. This Court negated the said challenge and held as under:-

In view of aforesaid Judgment and provisions contained under Rules of 2016, this Court is of the firm opinion that entry in the rank of Sub-Inspector through LDCE is not by that way of “promotion”, but by way of “appointment by promotion”. Issue No. (i) is answered accordingly.

ISSUE NO. (II) - Whether Rule 689(c) of Police Manual lays down the principles of determination of inter-se seniority of Sub-Inspectors, or the principle of seniority is to be determined on the General Principles of Service Jurisprudence?

One of the primary contentions of Private Respondents is that there is no specific Rules governing inter-se seniority dispute; therefore, in absence of such Rule, the matter must be governed by settled Service Jurisprudence. A sequel to the aforesaid argument is that an employee’s seniority would relate back to the date of initial appointment and a person cannot claim seniority from a period anterior to the date from which he/she was born in the cadre.

There is no dispute to aforesaid proposition of law that, ordinarily, seniority is to be determined from the date of initial appointment, and, a person cannot claim seniority from a date anterior to the date from which he/she was born in the cadre. However, in the opinion of this Court, the contentions advanced by Respondents including the contention advanced, in alternative, by Petitioner that there is no Seniority Rules governing the case of Petitioners and Private Respondents, is wholly misconceived. Relevant rule for determining the seniority of Sub-Inspector is Rule 689(c)of Police Manual, which is extracted hereunder:-

Rules of 2016, which was framed in exercise of powers under Article 309 read with Section 46(3) of The Police Act, 1861, vide Rule 28, specifically provided that any subject or context not dealt with in the said Rules, would be governed by the Rules, Code, Circular, Instructions and Police Manual framed by State of Jharkhand. Rule 28 of Rules of 2016 is quoted hereunder: -

Respondents, in their Counter Affidavit, referred to Police Order No. 102 dated 08.02.1983 to contend, inter alia, that seniority will be determined by totalling the number secured by direct appointee in the PTC and the number secured in the selection examination, and, it was contended that seniority was determined on the aforesaid principle.

This court is of the opinion that Police Order No. 102 is applicable for determining inter-se seniority amongst direct recruits and is not relevant for deciding inter-se seniority between direct recruits, promotees and/or entrant in the rank of Sub-Inspector through “appointment by promotion”. In fact, in the Counter Affidavit, Respondent-State has specifically relied upon Rule 689(c) of the Police Manual and has contended that since LDCE candidates were appointed on 11.03.2018, whereas direct recruits were appointed on 06.08.2018, seniority has been determined from the date of initial appointment. Thus, State Government itself is accepting the applicability of Rule 689(c) for the purpose of determination of inter-se seniority, which in the opinion of this Court, is a correct stand. Accordingly, it is held that inter-se seniority shall be determined between direct recruits, promotees and LDCE recruits in terms of Rule 689(c) of Police Manual.

ISSUE NO. (III) - Whether training period should be counted for the purposes of seniority and what would be the meaning of the term ‘actually recruited or promoted against permanent post’ as contained in Rule 689(c)?

The question whether training period should be counted for the purpose of seniority depends upon the Rules, and in absence of Rules, upon decision taken by the authority.

As already held above, Rule 689(c) of Police Manual provides for determination of inter-se seniority and its interpretation read with other enabling rules providing for recruitment to the post of Sub-Inspector would be determining factor for this Court to determine as to whether direct recruits would stand senior to LDCE candidates or vice versa.

Rule 689(c) uses the term “actually recruited or promoted against permanent post”. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Madeva Upendra Sinai and Ors. (supra), while interpreting the word ‘actually’, held that the word ‘actually’ is a comparable statutory setting, and the term is used in contradistinction to what is merely notional, deemed, or provisional, and requires the relevant event to have truly and effectively taken place.

The aforesaid decision was reiterated in the case of Doom Dooma India Limited (supra) and it was held that the expression “actually” imports a requirement of real and effective operation of the relevant fact, and is deliberately used by the Legislature to exclude constructions based on a merely formal or provisional state of affairs.

The term ‘recruitment’ and ‘appointment’ has been subject matter of interpretation in a series of Judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held that the term “recruitment” connotes and clearly signifies enlistment, acceptance, selection or approval for appointment, and, in contradistinction the word “appointment” means an actual act of posting a person to a particular office.

It has been further held that although the word “recruitment” and “appointment” connotes different meaning, but are also used interchangeable under the Service Rules.

In context of the present case, the word used i.e. “actually”, “recruited” and “promoted” is of immense significance as what was intended by Rule Making Authority was to exclude constructions based on a merely formal or provisional state of affairs. The term “actually” deployed before the words recruited/promoted in the Rules would mean that recruitment/promotion should not be merely notional or provisional and requires the relevant event to have truly and effectively taken place.

Aforesaid interpretation is further supported by other rules contained in Police Manual relating to recruitment, promotion/appointment by way of promotion to the rank of Sub-Inspector.

As already enumerated above in detail, promoted Sub-Inspector, under Rule 689, is to remain on probation for a period of twelve months and, in terms of Appendix-93, Clause-9, is only required to undergo three months’ promotional course for confirmation of their service on promotional post. The reason is obvious as promotee Sub-Inspectors have already worked on the immediate lower post of Assistant Sub-Inspector and it is for the said reason, probation period and tranining period is minimal as compared to direct recruits, or recruits appointed by promotion.

Rule 681 contains in details the training programme which is required to be undergone by direct recruit Sub-Inspector. Rules 681. I(a) & (b) is quoted hereunder:-

Appendix 93 contains detailed training programme, which, for the sake of ready reference, is quoted hereunder:-

A perusal of Rule 681 read with Appendix 93 would leave no manner of doubt that Sub-Inspector appointed directly is required to undergo one year Training in Police Training Centre and has to receive Practical Training for two years, during which period, they shall be on probation and would be only confirmed after successful completion of training. The provision relating to training, as contained in Police Manual, has been incorporated under Rules of 2016, and, Rule 27 of Rules of 2016 specifically reads as under :-

The said Rule also compulsorily provides for training and further provides that LDCE candidates would be on Probation for a period of two years. Appointment Letter of LDCE, vide Clauses 2 to 5, specifically incorporate aforesaid facts and further clearly provides, inter alia, that services would be confirmed only after completion of training and services would be purely temporary before such confirmation. It was also provided that in the event a candidate resigns from service during Probation and/or Training period, the amount spent on training of such candidate shall be recovered from the candidate.

Thus, the State Government consciously, while framing enabling Rules for direct recruits or LDCE candidates, emphasised on the need of training to be imparted to such candidates and confirmation of service only upon completion of training. Reference in this regard may further be made to provisions of Rule 682 of the Police Manual, which reads as under:

A perusal of Rule 682 clearly provides for Extension of probationary period, and, Discharge of Probationary Sub-Inspector on being found by the Inspector-General that Probationer is not likely to become a satisfactory Police Officer. Rules 682(d) has been extensively relied upon by both the sides. While Petitioners contend that said Rule clearly provides that period spent under training and/or probation should have been counted only for the purpose of Pension and not towards seniority, Respondents contend that said Rule provides for counting of period spend under training and/or probation as ‘In-service period” and, thus, automatically the said period would be considered for the purpose of determining seniority.

Having considered rival submissions and on careful examination of Rule 682(d), I am of the opinion that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one is the exclusion of another) would apply with full force here. The Rule expressly provides that period spent by a candidate under training and on probation shall be counted only for the purpose of Pension and for no other purpose including seniority. The term ‘seniority’ in particular, is conspicuously and deliberately excluded from the scope of Rule 689(d). Had the framers of the Police Manual intended that the probationary/training period be also reckoned for the purpose of seniority, nothing prevented them from saying so in as many words, exactly as they did for Pension. Their conspicuous silence on seniority, in a provision that otherwise goes out of its way to specify pension, is a deliberate legislative choice and must be respected by this Court, rather than read down or explained away.

This can be illustrated by considering Rule 682(a), which provides for extension of Probation period. Under the said Rules, if in the opinion of Deputy Inspector-General, extension is required for a candidate for being satisfied that said candidate can appropriately perform the duty on the appointed post, probation period of said candidate can be extended. For example, if five candidates are appointed on the same date and are required to undergo Probation, which includes training/practical training, and, if out of five candidates, two candidates, in the opinion of Deputy Inspector-General, on completion of probation/training period, have not performed satisfactorily for being confirmed in service and are granted extension in probation period of one year, then it would be travesty of justice that if, later on, such two candidates, after completion of extended probation period, are confirmed in service and are ranked senior to other three candidates who have successfully completed the training/probation and whose services were earlier confirmed without extending their probation period.

Rule 682(d) read with Rule 689(c) form a coherent and internally consistent scheme i.e. the latter fixes the reckoning point for seniority at the date of actual recruitment to the permanent post i.e. upon confirmation; the former reinforces this scheme by expressly excluding the antecedent training/probation period from that reckoning, save for the limited purpose of pensionary benefit. There is, on this scheme, simply no room left for the Private Respondents to claim seniority with effect from their provisional engagement, as upon confirmation of service, actual recruitment would take place.

During arguments, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate invited attention of this Court to Supplementary Affidavit filed in the case of Praveen Kumar Gupta & Ors. [W.P.(S) No. 5407 of 2025] being Annexure SA-16. In the said Annexure, it was clearly noted inter alia that final examination, consequent upon training, was conducted of LDCE candidates in the month of December, 2021, and, vide Memo No. 1102 dated 02.08.2022, LDCE candidates were declared to have successfully completed training. Attention of this Court was also invited to Annexure SA-20 at Serial No. 195, wherein the date of confirmation of service of Respondent No.5-Mukesh Kumar was noted as 02.08.2022. Several other entries in the said Annexure were referred like Entry Nos. 21, 45, 51, 57 etc. wherein services of LDCE candidates were confirmed with effect from 02.08.2022 by clearly recording, inter alia, that services are confirmed on successful completion of basic training (Buniyadi Prashikshan Utirnta). In the said Notification, further several entries, including entries of some of the Writ Petitioners, were shown, which shows that services of Writ Petitioners were confirmed with effect from 06.08.2021 i.e. the date on which Writ Petitioners completed training, including Practical training.

On the strength of above, it was argued that confirmation of service is an important facet under the Police Manual and before the said date, an employee was merely a Probationer and could have been discharged at any point of time.

I have carefully perused Annexure SA-16 which clearly records that LDCE candidates were declared to have successfully completed their training on 06.08.2022 and have also carefully perused Annexure SA-20 which records that LDCE candidates’ services have been confirmed with effect from the date of successful completion of training.

The Judgment cited by Mr. Sinha that confirmation of service relates back to initial appointment is a well settled law and requires no elaboration. However, the question involved herein is not relating to confirmation of service, but relating to inter-se seniority between two categories of candidates. Aforesaid is a general principle i.e. default rule would apply to fill a vacuum left in any statutory guidelines. However, as already held above, there is a specific provision for determination of inter-se seniority and the general principle must yield to the service rules which already occupied the field.

In the present case, Jharkhand Police Manual does not leave open the question of seniority of Sub-Inspectors of Police to be worked out by resort to general principle, as it deals with subject specifically and exhaustively through Rule 689(c). Even Rule 682(d) excludes the period of training/probation except for counting it towards Pension.

In the cumulative facts mentioned hereinabove, the Judgments cited at Bar by Respondents are clearly distinguishable especially in view of the fact that under the Police Manual, due emphasis and importance is given to completion of training both at Training Academy or Physical training and confirmation of service thereafter.

No doubt, that Private Respondents were appointed earlier in point of time, though advertisement process of Writ Petitioners were initiated earlier in point of time. While Private Respondents contend that their training was delayed due to reasons not attributable to them and they cannot be made to suffer for delay in completion of training, the Writ Petitioners contend that their recruitment process was initiated earlier in point of time, but their appointment has been delayed for the reasons not attributable to them. This Court is not impressed with either of the arguments advanced by Writ Petitioners and Respondents regarding delay either in appointment and/or completion of training, as such delays are not alien in the administrative set up. What is relevant is the determination of inter-se seniority on the basis of existing Rules governing the field.

In view of cumulative facts and circumstances mentioned hereinabove, this Court is of the firm opinion that the date of completion of training and consequent order confirming the Sub-Inspectors in service, is a crucial date for determination of inter-se seniority. The delayed period spent on training and/or probation under the applicable Service Rules has been excluded for the purpose of counting of seniority.

In view of admitted fact that Private Respondents completed their training and were confirmed in service later in point of time to that of direct recruit candidates, the impugned Seniority List published by Respondent-State of Jharkhand, contained in Memo No. 951/P dated 09.09.2024 is, hereby quashed and set aside.

Respondents are directed to re-arrange and publish the Final Seniority List by treating the candidates appointed through direct recruitment as Senior vis-a-vis the candidates appointed through LDCE. The only exception to above is that if any direct recruit candidate was not confirmed in service but his/her probation period was extended, seniority of said candidate would be fixed on the basis of the date when he or she was confirmed in service.

The above exercise would be completed by State of Jharkhand within a period of ten weeks from the date of this Judgment.

This Court specifically records its appreciation to assistance rendered by Advocates appearing for respective parties, as this Court feels that complex issue of inter-se seniority could not have been decided in an expeditious manner by this Court without their able assistance.

Having regards to the above discussions, all these Writ Petitions stand allowed. Pending I.As., if any, also stands disposed of. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.