Usha Devi vs Harish Kumar & Ors.

The appellant/defendant has preferred this appeal challenging the Judgment and Decree dated 27^th May, 2016 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-II, Munger, in Title Suit No. 49 of 2010, whereby the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents.

The factual background leading to the institution of the present proceedings, as discernible from the pleadings and the materials available on record is that the defendant – Usha Devi being the absolute owner and in peaceful possession of the Schedule-I property, comprising 3 Khatas and 5 Dhurs of land appertaining to Municipal Khesra Nos. 524 and 525 expressed her willingness to sell the same, whereupon negotiations ensued between the parties and culminated in the execution of an agreement to sell (Zarbeyana) dated 22^nd August, 2007. Under the terms of the agreement, the total sale consideration was fixed at Rs.10,50,000/- (Rs. Ten Lakh Fifty Thousand only), out of which the plaintiffs paid a sum of Rs.1,15,000/- (Rs. One Lakh Fifteen Thousand only) as earnest money, leaving a balance amount of Rs.9,35,000/- (Rs. Nine Lakh Thirty Five Thousand only) to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed and the receipt of the aforesaid amount was acknowledged by the defendant by way of an endorsement made on the reverse side of the Zarbeyana, bearing her signatures. The agreement further stipulated that the sale deed would be executed and registered on or before the last date of November, 2007, upon payment of the balance sale consideration. It was also agreed that in the event of the defendant’s failure or refusal to execute the sale deed within the stipulated period, the plaintiffs would be entitled to seek enforcement of the agreement through a court of law.

Since the sale deed could not be executed within the agreed period, the plaintiffs paid a further sum of Rs.2,00,000/-(Rs. Two Lakh only) to the defendant on 17^th November, 2007, whereupon the time for execution of the sale deed was extended up to 31^st December, 2007. Thereafter, by successive endorsements made on the reverse side of the Zarbeyana, the parties repeatedly extended the time for completion of the transaction to various dates and finally on 28.05.2009 up to 31.12.2009. According to the plaintiffs, each of these endorsements was duly signed by the defendant, Usha Devi, as well as by her husband, Shivanand Pandit.

Consequently, the total amount paid by the plaintiffs towards the agreed sale consideration came to Rs.3,15,000/-(Rs. Three Lakh Fifteen Thousand only), leaving a balance of Rs.7,35,000/-(Rs. Seven Lakh Thirty-Five Thousand only) payable at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. It is further case of the plaintiffs that the agreement to sell (Zarbeyana) was duly attested by the defendant’s husband, ‘Sivanand Pandit’, as well as by one ‘Awadhesh Kumar’, son of Late ‘Rameshwar Mandal’, who signed as witnesses. It was further pleaded that, after paying a substantial portion of the agreed sale consideration as earnest money, the plaintiffs had, at all relevant times, remained ready and willing to perform their part of the contract by paying the remaining consideration and securing execution of the sale deed. However, despite repeated requests, the defendant allegedly failed to honour the agreement. Consequently, the plaintiffs issued a legal notice dated 23^rd December, 2009 through their counsel, calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Ultimately, plaintiff instituted the suit bearing Title Suit No. 49 of 2010 seeking a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell in respect of the Schedule-I property comprising 3 Kathas and 5 Dhurs of land together with a pucca residential house and the appurtenant open space, appertaining to Municipal Khesra Nos. 524 and 525.

The defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement, raising preliminary objections that the suit was barred under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, as well as on the grounds of limitation, waiver, and acquiescence. While admitting that she had agreed to sell the Schedule-I property, the defendant contended that the actual sale consideration mutually settled between the parties was Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakh only), instead of Rs.10,50,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh Fifty Thousand only) as stated in the agreement. According to her, the lower amount was deliberately mentioned in the Zarbeyana solely to reduce the stamp duty payable at the time of execution of the sale deed, on the assurance given by the plaintiffs that the balance amount would be paid separately. Further contention of the defendant was that being only capable of signing her name, she had relied entirely on the plaintiffs regarding the contents of the agreement. She alleged that the endorsements appearing in the document, apart from her signatures, were not in her handwriting and had been made by the plaintiffs. It was specifically asserted that, except for the amount paid through account-payee Demand Drafts, no cash payment had ever been received by her, and that the plaintiffs had falsely claimed payment of additional cash amounts with the object of fraudulently acquiring the suit property.

The defendant also disputed the alleged extension of the period prescribed for performance of the agreement. She contended that although she and her husband had signed on the reverse of the first page of the Zarbeyana on 17^th November, 2007, those signatures were obtained in good faith and were not intended to acknowledge or record any extension of time. According to her, the plaintiffs subsequently inserted the endorsement extending the period for performance above the signatures without her knowledge or consent. On these premises, the defendant denied that the plaintiffs had ever been ready and willing to perform their obligations under the agreement and prayed for dismissal of the suit.

Upon completion of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed following eight issues for adjudication which are as under:

Whether the suit, as framed, is maintainable?

Whether the suit is barred by limitation, waiver, or acquiescence?

To what other relief or reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled?

In support of their case, the plaintiffs examined four witnesses: (i) Prem Kumar (PW-1); Harish Kumar, one of the plaintiffs (PW-2); Awadhesh Kumar (PW-3); and Ajit Kumar (PW-4). Certain documents were also exhibited on behalf of the plaintiffs. The defendant examined two witnesses in defence, namely: (i) Shivnandan Pandit (DW-1); and (ii) Usha Devi, the defendant herself (DW-2). No document was exhibited on behalf of the defendant.

The main issues were Issue Nos. IV, V and VI and while deciding them the Trial Court found that the plaintiffs had successfully established their continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had paid the earnest money towards the agreed sale consideration of the Schedule-I property and had throughout remained ready and willing to complete the transaction. The Trial Court further found that although the Zarbeyananama (Ext. 2) contained a stipulation that upon expiry of the stipulated period the defendant would be entitled to forfeit the earnest money and the agreement would become unenforceable, the evidence on record established that the period for execution of the sale deed had been extended by mutual consent of the parties. The Court took note of the admission made by the defendant during her deposition regarding such extension.

The Trial Court also observed that the execution of the agreement dated 22^nd August, 2007 had never been denied by the defendant. It found that the signatures of the defendant, Usha Devi, as well as those of her husband, Shivanand Pandit, stood duly proved through the documentary evidence, namely Exts. 1 and 1/I, Exts. 1/J to 1/P, Exts. A to A/4 and Ext. 2, as also through the admissions made during the evidence. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, Issue Nos. IV, V and VI were decided in favour of the plaintiffs.

While deciding Issue Nos. II and III, the Trial Court held that the questions relating to limitation and cause of action were interlinked and were required to be considered together. Referring to Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it observed that a suit for specific performance is required to be instituted within three years from the date fixed for performance or, where no such date is fixed, from the date on which the plaintiff has notice that performance has been refused. The Trial Court found that the agreement to sell had been executed on 22^nd August, 2007 and that the time for execution of the sale deed had subsequently been extended by mutual consent of the parties up to 31^st December, 2009.

The Trial Court further found that the plaintiffs had issued a legal notice dated 23^th December, 2009 (Ext. 3) calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deed and that the defendant failed to comply therewith. The Trial Court accordingly held that the suit had been instituted within the prescribed period of limitation and that the plaintiffs had a valid cause of action to institute the suit. Issue Nos. II and III were, therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiffs.

While deciding Issue Nos. I, VII and VIII, the Trial Court, on the basis of the findings recorded on the preceding issues, held that the suit was maintainable. It further found that the plaintiffs had successfully proved the execution of the agreement dated 22^nd August, 2007, payment of the earnest money, and their continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract.

Consequently, the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement dated 22^nd August, 2007 along with the consequential reliefs prayed for, and accordingly decided the said issues in favour of the plaintiffs.

Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and the respondents.

Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submitted that the learned Trial Court committed a serious error in decreeing the suit for specific performance without recording any clear or reasoned finding on the mandatory requirement of continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Although Issue No. IV was specifically framed on this aspect, the Trial Court failed to examine whether the respondent/plaintiff had discharged the statutory burden cast upon him. It is well settled that readiness and willingness constitute a condition precedent for the grant of a decree for specific performance, and the burden to establish the same lies entirely upon the plaintiff.

It was further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent utterly failed to establish his financial capacity to perform his part of the contract. No documentary evidence whatsoever, such as bank passbooks, statements of account, fixed deposits, negotiable instruments, income records or any other contemporaneous financial documents, was produced to demonstrate that the respondent possessed the requisite funds to pay the balance sale consideration. Mere oral assertions or bald averments in the plaint are wholly insufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.

Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the respondents/plaintiffs have also failed to plead and prove that they remained ready and willing throughout the subsistence of the contract. According to them, the date for execution of the sale deed was allegedly extended on several occasions between 17.11.2007 and 31.12.2009. However, neither the plaint nor the oral evidence contains any assertion that during this entire period the respondents possessed the financial ability or continuously expressed their willingness to perform the contract. The complete absence of pleadings and evidence regarding readiness and willingness during this crucial period is fatal to the suit. It is a settled principle of law that person seeking specific performance must succeed on the strength of his own case and cannot derive any advantage from any weakness in the defence. Compliance with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is mandatory, and unless continuous readiness and willingness are both pleaded and proved, no decree for specific performance can be granted.

The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the aforesaid propositions are fully supported by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar v. Om Prakash reported in AIR 2018 SC 5098, held that readiness necessarily includes proof of the plaintiff's financial capacity at the relevant point of time. Likewise, in P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, reported in (2022) 14 SCC 793, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that "readiness" refers to the financial capacity of the purchaser whereas "willingness" denotes the intention to perform the contract, and both must exist continuously until the disposal of the suit. In Mehboob-ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 415, it was held that mere averments in the plaint or examination-in-chief are insufficient and that the conduct of the plaintiff must establish continuous readiness and willingness. Similar principles have been reiterated in P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 429, and R. Kandasamy v. R.K. Saraswathy, reported in AIR 2025 SC 44, wherein the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must both plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness throughout the relevant period.

Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the decree for specific performance ought to have been refused on equitable considerations. The agreement in question was executed in the year 2007 for a total sale consideration of Rs.10,50,000/- (Rs. Ten Lakh Fifty Thousand only). Owing to the passage of nearly two decades, the value of the suit property has appreciated enormously and is presently worth more than Rs.1 crore. Since, specific performance is an equitable and discretionary remedy, the Court is required to consider whether enforcement of the contract would cause undue hardship to the defendant. Compelling the appellant to convey a property now worth more than one crore rupees at the price agreed in 2007 would result in manifest injustice and confer an unconscionable advantage upon the respondent. In this regard, reliance is placed upon Satya Jain (Dead) through LRs v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie (Dead) through LRs, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 131, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that while escalation in price alone may not invariably defeat a claim for specific performance, the Court must take into account equitable considerations and the hardship that may be caused to the defendant before granting such discretionary relief.

The appellant further submits that the agreement itself became unenforceable in law. The written agreement dated 22.08.2007 stipulated a fixed date for execution of the sale deed, namely 30.11.2007. Admittedly, the agreement does not contain any clause authorising extension of time for performance. Nevertheless, the respondents’ case proceeds on the basis that the period for execution was extended on as many as eight occasions till 31.12.2009. Such repeated extensions are de hors the written contract and have no legal foundation. Once, the stipulated date expired, the consequences contemplated under the default clause became operative, including forfeiture of the earnest money. Consequently, the agreement stood concluded and could not thereafter be specifically enforced on the basis of alleged oral extensions contrary to the written terms. An agreement to sell, within the meaning of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, must constitute a valid and concluded contract containing certainty as to its essential terms. A contract whose performance is repeatedly extended without any contractual provision authorising such extension ceases to possess the certainty necessary for specific enforcement.

Lastly, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant/defendant that the impugned judgment is contrary to the settled principles governing decrees for specific performance as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 704, wherein the Supreme Court held that before granting specific performance, the Court must be satisfied that there exists a valid and concluded contract, that the plaintiff has continuously remained ready and willing to perform his obligations, that the plaintiff has performed or was capable of performing his part of the contract, that no undue hardship would be caused to the defendant, and that the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to the equitable relief claimed. The same principles have been reiterated in P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, reported in (2022) 14 SCC 793, while interpreting Sections 16(c) and 20 of the Specific Relief Act. In the present case, none of these statutory requirements stand satisfied. The respondents have failed to prove financial capacity, continuous readiness and willingness, or the enforceability of the agreement after repeated extensions, and the grant of specific performance would result in grave and irreversible hardship to the appellant. The impugned judgment and decree, therefore, deserve to be set aside.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs contended that a bare perusal of Exhibit-2, together with the subsequent endorsements made thereon, unmistakably demonstrates that the repeated extensions of time for execution of the sale deed were granted either by mutual consent or at the specific request and for the convenience of the defendant/appellant. The total sale consideration was fixed at Rs. 10,50,000/- (Rs. Ten Lakh Fifty Thousand only), out of which Rs. 1,15,000/- (Rs. One Lakh Fifteen Thousand only) was paid as earnest money on 22.08.2007 and a further sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rs. Two Lakh only) was paid on 17.11.2007, leaving a balance of Rs. 7,35,000/- (Rs. Seven Lakh Thirty-Five Thousand only) payable at the time of execution of the sale deed.

Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the agreement was successively extended from time to time and that the extensions dated 28.05.2008, 30.07.2008, 21.12.2008 and 28.05.2009 were granted solely at the request of the appellant on account of her illness, the marriage of her son and her special request. It was, therefore, argued that the appellant, having herself sought repeated extensions, cannot be permitted to contend that the respondents were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract.

It was further submitted that before expiry of the last extended period, P.W.-2 Harish Kumar approached the appellant on 13.12.2009 with the balance consideration amount of Rs. 7,35,000/- (Rs. Seven Lakh Thirty-Five Thousand only) and requested her to execute the sale deed, but she refused to receive the amount or execute the conveyance. Thereafter, the respondents issued a legal notice dated 23.12.2009 (Exhibit-3) calling upon the appellant to accept the balance consideration and execute the sale deed. Although the notice was admittedly received by the appellant, as reflected in paragraph No.22 of the deposition of D.W.-2, no reply was ever furnished thereto, compelling the respondents to institute the present suit on 06.04.2010.

Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the evidence on record conclusively establishes the continuous readiness and willingness of the respondents. Reliance was placed upon the deposition of P.W.-2, who categorically stated in paragraph No.83 of his cross-examination that he was ready to pay the balance consideration within a day. It was further pointed out that the respondents have also deposited the balance consideration amount of Rs. 7,35,000/-(Rs. Seven Lakh Thirty-Five Thousand only) before the Court, thereby further evidencing their bona fide intention to perform the contract.

It was argued that the appellant, after accepting Rs. 3,15,000/- (Rs. Three Lakh Fifteen Thousand only) towards the sale consideration, deliberately avoided execution of the sale deed and cannot now be permitted to take advantage of her own wrong. The substantial increase in the market value of the property during the pendency of the litigation, according to the respondents, is the real reason behind the appellant’s attempt to resile from the concluded contract.

Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the law is well settled that continuous readiness and willingness has to be gathered from the entirety of the pleadings, conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances. In support of the said submission, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. D’Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 649, wherein it has been held that readiness and willingness cannot be construed in a pedantic manner and has to be determined from the overall conduct of the plaintiff. Reliance was also placed upon Bibi Jaibunisha v. Jagdish Pandit reported in (1997) 4 SCC 781, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld a decree for specific performance where the plaintiff had consistently demonstrated his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

It was further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basavraj v. Padmavathi & Others ,reported in (2023) 4 SCC 239, particularly paragraph No. 6.2 thereof, has reiterated that where the plaintiff establishes continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract and the defendant seeks to avoid the transaction for extraneous reasons, the equitable relief of specific performance ought to follow.

Reliance was also placed upon the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arbind Kumar Jaiswal (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Devendra Prasad Jaiswal @ Varun, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 9172 of 2020, wherein the settled principles governing grant of specific performance and the appreciation of evidence relating to readiness and willingness have been reaffirmed.

Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that nearly sixteen (16) years have elapsed since the institution of the suit and the respondents have now become advanced in age. It was, therefore, urged that the matter deserves to attain finality on the basis of the evidence already available on record.

Replying to the criticism against the judgment of the learned Trial Court, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is a settled principle of law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and that upon disposal of the appeal, the decree of the Trial Court merges with that of the Appellate Court. Consequently, even if there is any omission on the part of the Trial Court in discussing a particular piece of evidence, the same can always be examined and rectified by the First Appellate Court while re-appreciating the entire evidence on record.

On the aforesaid submissions and the judgments relied upon, learned counsel for the respondents prayed that the present appeal, being devoid of merit, be dismissed with costs and the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court be affirmed.

After having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials available on record, point for determination in the present appeal is whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court satisfy the essential requirements of a “judgment” as contemplated under Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 , read with Section 33 CPC and Order XX Rules 1 to 5 thereof, particularly Order XX Rule 4(2), and whether the findings recorded therein on the issues arising under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963 are founded upon a proper judicial appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record.

Before going further, it would be appropriate to first consider the relevant statutory provisions governing the controversy and the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which presently hold the field :-

(emphasis supplied)

Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—

(emphasis supplied)

It is now well settled that a judgment is not a mere expression of the ultimate conclusion reached by a Court but is the statement of reasons which logically lead to that conclusion. The very concept of a judicial determination postulates that the Court must analyse the pleadings, evaluate the evidence adduced by the parties, formulate its findings on the issues arising for determination, and assign cogent reasons in support of every conclusion reached. Recording of reasons is not an empty formality; rather, it constitutes the very soul of a judicial decision. A judgment unsupported by reasons ceases to be a judgment in the eye of law, for it neither demonstrates that the dispute has been adjudicated upon in accordance with law nor enables the Appellate Court to effectively examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the Court of first instance.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.V. RAMI REDDY vs PREMA reported in (2009) 17 SCC 308 succinctly enunciated the legal position enumerated in paragraphs quoted below:-

The Hon’ble Supreme Court also in Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto, reported in AIR 1985 SC 736, has held in paragraph 27 as under:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.V. Rami Reddy v. Prema (supra), while relying upon the earlier Constitution Bench principles enunciated in Swaran Lata Ghosh v. H.K. Banerjee (supra), authoritatively held that a judicial determination necessarily requires consideration of the rival contentions, appreciation of the evidence led by the parties, and a reasoned adjudication disclosing the mental process by which the Court reaches its conclusion. The Supreme Court further emphasised that a mere declaration of the result, unsupported by reasons, does not satisfy the statutory concept of a judgment under Section 2(9) CPC. Likewise, in Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that where several factual and legal issues arise for determination, the Court is duty-bound to decide all such issues instead of resting its decision upon a solitary aspect, so that unnecessary prolongation of litigation may be avoided.

Examined in the light of the aforesaid settled principles, the impugned judgment does not withstand judicial scrutiny. Although the learned Trial Court framed the necessary issues and the parties adduced both oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases, but a careful reading of the judgment reveals that the evidence so recorded has not been subjected to any meaningful analysis or judicial evaluation. The testimony of the witnesses has merely remained part of the record without any discussion as to its evidentiary worth, credibility or relevance to the issues framed. Likewise, the documentary evidence has neither been examined nor correlated with the pleadings and the rival contentions. The findings have been recorded in a conclusory manner without disclosing the reasons which persuaded the learned Trial Court to accept or reject the respective cases of the parties. Such an approach is in the teeth of the mandatory requirement contained in Order XX Rule 4(2) CPC, which obligates every Court to record not merely its decision but also the reasons upon which such decision is founded.

The infirmity assumes greater significance having regard to the nature of the present litigation, which is one for specific performance of contract. In such a suit, compliance with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act constitutes a foundational requirement. The plaintiff is under a statutory obligation to establish continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract from the date of the agreement till the passing of the decree. Such readiness and willingness is essentially a question of fact, to be determined not merely from the pleadings or the recitals contained in the agreement but from the entirety of the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, including the conduct of the parties, their cross-examination and the surrounding circumstances. A finding on this indispensable statutory requirement cannot legally be recorded in the absence of a proper appreciation of evidence.

In the present case, however, the impugned judgment is conspicuously silent regarding any evaluation of the evidence bearing upon the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness. Neither the depositions of the parties nor the evidence of the material witnesses has been examined to ascertain whether the mandatory requirement under Section 16(c) stood established. The learned Trial Court has proceeded to decree the suit without undertaking the judicial exercise which the statute unequivocally mandates. Consequently, the findings recorded on the crucial issues cannot be regarded as findings arrived at upon legal evidence or judicial reasoning.

It is trite law that the first Court of facts bears the primary responsibility of appreciating the evidence and recording findings thereon. The appellate Court exercises appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the factual foundation laid by the Trial Court. Where the Trial Court has failed to perform its essential duty of evaluating the evidence and assigning reasons for its conclusions, the Appellate Court cannot substitute itself as the original Court of fact by undertaking, for the first time, an appreciation of the entire evidence on record. Such an exercise would deprive the parties of one effective stage of adjudication and would be wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure.

This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the impugned judgment does not satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 2(9) CPC read with Section 33 and Order XX Rule 4(2) CPC. The judgment is bereft of the reasons which constitute its very foundation and fails to disclose any judicial appreciation of the evidence led by the parties. The omission goes to the root of the matter and vitiates the entire adjudicatory process. A decree founded upon such a judgment cannot be sustained in law. The principles of natural justice are not confined merely to affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties; they equally require that such opportunity culminates in a reasoned and informed adjudication. The right to lead evidence would be rendered illusory if the Court, after recording such evidence, fails to consider and appreciate the same while deciding the issues arising for determination. A reasoned judgment founded upon objective evaluation of the evidence is an indispensable facet of the rule of law and the doctrine of fairness in judicial decision-making. Failure to analyse the evidence and assign reasons for accepting or rejecting the rival cases amounts to denial of effective justice, as the parties are deprived of knowing the basis of the decision and the Appellate Court is simultaneously deprived of the benefit of the Trial Court’s findings on questions of fact. Such an omission strikes at the very root of fair adjudication and constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice, warranting interference by the appellate Court.

Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree dated 27^th May, 2016 passed by the learned Sub-Judge-II, Munger, in Title Suit No. 49 of 2010 is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication. Since the evidence of the parties has already been concluded, no further evidence shall be permitted. The learned Trial Court shall re-appreciate the entire oral and documentary evidence already available on record, independently consider each of the issues framed, with particular emphasis upon the plaintiffs’ continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and thereafter pronounce a fresh, comprehensive and reasoned judgment strictly in conformity with the mandate of Section 2(9) CPC, Section 33 CPC and Order XX Rule 4(2) CPC. The learned Trial Court shall endeavour to conclude the proceedings within a period of four months from the date of receipt or production of a copy of this judgment.