Uraon Bhumij vs Emperor

This matter comes before us by way of a jail appeal. It was admitted on the ground that possibly due effect had not been given to the plea of self-defence raised by the appellant. The appellant, Uraon Bhumij, together with his wife Ratuli, were tried before the Sessions Judge of Manbhum-Sambalpur on a charge of murder of one Dayal Bhumij, who is the chaukidar of village Pitki. It appears that he had settled some land with the appellant and his wife for the construction of a hut and that the appellant had constructed the hut and a cowshed and left a part of the land as bari land on which was planted certain crops. The facts which have been found by the learned Sessions Judge, after a most careful and minute enquiry into the evidence, are now beyond dispute and it is clear that the story originally set up by the prosecution is untrue.

The landlord Dayal Bhumij, whose conduct was the subject of investigation, had been quarrelling with the appellant and his wife and was apparently anxious to regain possession of the land which he had settled with the appellant. The quarrel had lasted for several months. On the day in question the appellant was absent at some short distance from the hut and the appellant''s wife, who was in an advanced stage of pregnancy, was throwing some rubbish out of the hut into a ditch near the bari land. Dayal Bhumij came to the place armed with some weapon, the nature of which has not been positively established, but possibly it was an axe.

He got enraged with the woman, abused her and chased her and she fled into the hut and closed the door, but Dayal broke into the hut, bursting the door open and began to assault her. She bore manifest signs of having been assaulted although the injuries on her body do not seem to indicate that the assault was grievous or they had been inflicted with a cutting weapon. However she was abused by Dayal and a state of reasonable apprehension for her personal safety. At this moment the appellant came in, carrying an axe and with that he violently assaulted the assailant of his wife, struck him several blows on the head by means of which blows the skull was fractured. But it is obvious that the appellant had no intention of killing Dayal, because as Dayal afterwards explained when ha had been knocked down on the ground the appellant suspended the assault, gave him some water and allowed to him to escape, and he did in facts run back to his own house whence be was ultimately taken to the hospital and died on the way.

Now the story told by the injured man in his dying declaration is of a vary different character. Ha gave a story which has been made the case of the prosecution. He said that the appellant would not pay the rent, that he had taken back the bari land and had grown crops upon it and went with some of his relatives to pull up the plants which had been grown, and at the moment the appellant came and made an entirely unprovoked attack upon him and then the appellant and his wife had seized him and dragged him into their house and both there violently set upon him, until he was beaten in a state of helplessness. This story as the learned Sessions Judge has shown, is utterly untrue for reasons which for the purpose of this judgment, it is unnecessary to state, but with the findings of the learned Sessions Judge arrived at in a careful judgment we are in entire agreement.

The Sessions Judge then began to consider whether or not the appellant was entitled to rely upon the plea of self-defence and came to the conclusion that the right of self-defence had been abused and that it was unnecessary for the appellant to have inflicted such severe injuries upon the deceased man. He therefore convicted the appellant u/s 304, Penal Code, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a term of seven years. To our minds the circumstances first of all clearly demonstrate that the right of self-defence did exist. The appellant bad witnessed a violent assault upon his wife who was in an advanced stage of pregnancy, the door of the hut had been broken in by a violent man armed with a weapon.

In these circumstances one cannot be very nice in measuring the precise amount of injury which a husband in that station of life might inflict upon his wife''s assailant. But to our minds the steps taken by the husband were steps to which no exception ought to be taken and he was entirely justified in what he did. Accordingly he cannot be convicted either u/s 302 or u/s 304. We therefore set aside the conviction and direct the release of the appellant.