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Judgment
By Hon’ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J):-
This Review Application has been preferred along with M.A. No. 176/2026 seeking condonation of delay. A counter affidavit to the said MA has been filed.
Learned counsel appearing for the applicant (respondents in the M.A.) has vehemently opposed the MA seeking condonation of delay.
However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated in the M.A. the same is allowed.
Notice is yet to be issued in the Review Application (RA). The only contention urged in the RA is with regard to the observation made in Paragraph 15 of the said RA, which reads as under:
“The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamal Sengupta clarified that review must be confined to material available at the time of the original hearing. The conviction and sentence were already in existence prior to 17.03.2025 and ought to have been disclosed by the Respondent (originally applicant); their suppression vitiates the proceedings.”
Learned counsel for the Review Applicants (Respondents in the OA) submits that the aforesaid observation is factually incorrect to the extent that the order on sentence was passed by the learned competent court of jurisdiction on 05.02.2024 and, therefore, the same ought not to have been recorded in the manner stated in Paragraph 15. It is submitted that the Review Application is sought to be maintained on this ground alone.
Learned counsel further submits that the order on sentence dated 05.02.2024 is the subject matter of challenge before the Hon’ble High Court in the criminal appeal and that the operation of the relevant proceedings has also been stayed by the Hon’ble High Court. It is, therefore, contended that, in view of the subsequent development and the stay operating in the criminal appeal, the Review Application deserves to be entertained, there being an error apparent on the face of the record.
During the course of hearing, however, learned counsel appearing for the respondents fairly conceded that there is no error apparent on the face of the record, though he brought to the notice of the Tribunal the fact that an order on sentence had been passed and was pending consideration before the Hon’ble High Court.
We have considered the aforesaid submission. The aspect relating to the conviction and the circumstances concerning the criminal proceedings had already been noticed and examined by this Tribunal in its order dated 17.03.2025. Paragraph 2.1 of the said order reads as under:
“2.1The CBI also registered second case against the applicant as RC 54 (A) 97-DLI u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) dated 30.06.1997 under the PC Act for possessing assets disproportionate to his known source of income, in which he was arrested on 01.07.1997, thus, his detention in custody was less than 48 hours.”
Learned counsel for the Review Applicant has also drawn our attention to the order dated 05.02.2024 passed in CC No. 69/2019, CBI Vs. R.C. Bakshi & Ors., by the learned competent court of jurisdiction, which reads as under:
“IN THE COURT OF BHUPINDER SINGH, SPECIAL JUDGE, (PC Act) (CBI) -06 RADC/NEW DELHI CC NO. 69/2019 CNR NO. DLCT11-000333-2019 CBI VS. R. C. BAKSHI & ORS.
ORDER ON SENTENCE
1.This order shall decide the quantum of sentence to be awarded to Convicts Sh. R.C. Bakshi and Ms. Anuradha Bakshi.
2.Vide Judgment dated 20/12/2023, Sh. R.C. Bakshi and Smt. Anuradha Bakshi have been convicted for the offence punishable U/s 120-B IPC r/w Section 13 (1) (e) r/w Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and also for the offence U/s 13 (2) r/w Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988 as substantive offence, in as much as they were found to be in possession of assets which were disproportionate to their known sources of income to an extent of Rs. 62,92,088.55 i.e. 479% of their known sources of income.
3.Arguments on the point of sentence heard. 3.
4.Ld. Sr. PP for CBI submitted that the purpose of enactment of 4. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is to achieve purification ofpublic service. He submitted that leniency in sentence affects the society since corruption has eaten up the roots of the civilized society, like a cancer, as per several rulings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Further, that unless special circumstances are shown, no leniency should be shown at the time of sentencing. He submitted that both the convicts were responsible government officers and were expected to serve with sincerity and dedication. He referred to Section 16 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to submit that while imposing fine, the court shall take into consideration the amount of the value of the property, if any, which the accused person has obtained by committing the offence. The learned Sr. PP. prayed that in this case maximum sentence as provided under the Act, be awarded to the convicts.
5.On the other hand, Sh. Bhaskar Upadhyay, Ld. Counsel for the Convicts submitted that Convicts who are husband and wife are more than 75 years of age and have been facing trial for more than 25 years. He stated that except one Trap Case against Convict No.1 /Sh. R.C. Bakshi, in which he was acquitted, the Convicts have clean antecedents. He submitted that the Convicts are suffering from various age-related ailments like B.P., sugar, cataract, knee problems etc. and somehow managing with their lives. He placed on record the photocopies of the medical records of both the Convicts. He submittedthat the Convicts always attended the court hearings regularly and punctually and the matter was never adjourned due to their absence. He submitted that there is no allegation against the Convicts that during the trial, they tried to tamper with the evidence or influence the witnesses. He prayed that a lenient view be taken and the minimum possible sentence may be awarded to the Convicts.
6.Considered.
7.Sentencing is an important part of criminal administration of justice. Judicial discretion plays a pivotal role in sentencing. The objective for which sentence is imposed is not only to punish a convict for an unlawful act committed by him/her but also it is imposed to make it clear that the society as such, denounces the sort of conduct in which the offender was involved. It is also to deter other persons from committing similar offence.
8.Also, Section 16 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as it existed prior to the amendment of the year 2018) reads as under:
"16. Matters to be taken into consideration for fixing fine.
Where a sentence of fine is imposed under sub-section (2) of section 13 or section 14, the court is fixing the amount of the fine shall take into consideration the amount or the value of the property, if any, which the accused person has obtained by committing the offence or where the conviction is for an offence referred to in clause (e) of subsection (1)of section 13, the pecuniary resources or property referred to in that clause for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily."
9.Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions made, Both the Convicts namely Sh. R. C. Bakshi and Smt. Anuradha Bakshi are sentenced as under:
(i)For commission of offence punishable U/s 13 (2) r/w Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988, Two (2) years rigorous imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.2 lakhs each and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months.
(ii)For commission of offence punishable U/s 120-B IPC r/w Section 13 (1) (e) r/w Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Two (2) years rigorous imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.50,000/- each and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of 2 months.
All sentences to run concurrently. Benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C., if applicable be given to the convicts.
10.Fine not paid.
11.So far as confiscation of property in a disproportionate assets case is concerned, reference can be made to the decision of theHon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka versus Selvi J. Jayalalitha & Ors. 2017(6) SCC 263. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Para 163, 564 and 565 as under:
"163.Section 22 of the Act also makes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applicable to a proceeding in relation to an offence punishable thereunder, subject to certain modifications as mentioned therein. Here as well, the applicability of Section 452 of the Code otherwise empowering a criminal court to order for disposal of the property at the conclusion of the trial before it, has not been excluded.
564.In our comprehension, the course adopted by the Trial Court cannot be faulted with. To reiterate, in terms of Section 5(6) of the Act, it was authorised to exercise all powers and functions exercisable by a District Judge under the Ordinance. The offences at the trial were under Sections 13(1)(e), 13(2) of the Act, Sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code encompassed within paragraphs 4A and 5 of the Schedule to the Ordinance. These offences were unimpeachably within the contours of the Act and triable by a special Judge thereunder. Having regard to the frame and content of the Act and the limited modifications to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in their applicability as occasioned thereby and the authorization of the special Judge trying the offences thereunder to exercise all the powers and functions invocable by a District Judge under the Ordinance, we are of the opinion that the order of confiscation/forfeiture of the properties standing in the name of six companies, as involved, made by theTrial Court is unexceptionable. In any view of the matter, with the peremptory termination of the criminal proceedings resultant on this pronouncement, the direction of the Trial Court towards confiscation/forfeiture of the attached property, as mentioned therein, is hereby restored and would be construed to be an order by this court as well. The decisions cited on behalf of the respondents on this issue, are distinguishable on facts and are of no avail to them.
565.In Mirza Iqbal Hussain through Askari Begum v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 3 SCC 516, two fixed deposit receipts and the cash amount of Rs. 5200/ seized from the house of the appellant and proved to be the subject matter of charge under Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act, were ordered to be confiscated to the State. Responding to the plea of want of jurisdiction of the Special Court to order confiscation, this Court referring to Section 4(2) of Cr.P.C., held that in terms thereof, all offences under any law other than the Indian Penal Code have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigation, enquiry, trial or otherwise dealing with such offences. It was observed that none of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act provided for confiscation or prescribed the mode by which an order of confiscation could be passed and thus, it was ruled that the order of confiscation in the facts of the case could not be held to be de hors jurisdiction. The invocation of Section 452 of the Code, in absence of any provision in the Prevention of Corruption Act, excludingits operations to effect confiscation of the property involved in any offence thereunder, was thus affirmed."
For better understanding, the judgment in the case of Mirza Iqbal Hussain through Askari Begum vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 3 SCC 516 requires to be quoted in detail, which is as under:
1.By a judgment dated Feb. 16, 1976 the learned Special Judge, Deoria, convicted the appellant under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 on the charge that during the period of his office as a police constable, he was found in possession of property disproportionate to his known sources of income, for which he could not satisfactorily account. The learned Special Judge directed that the two fixed deposit receipts in the sum of rupees five thousand each and the cash amount of Rs.5,280/ which were seized from the house of the appellant and which formed the subject matter of the charge under S. 5(1) (e) shall stand confiscated to the State. The appellant filed an appeal against the judgment of the Special Judge to the High Court of Allahabad but that appeal was dismissed. No point was raised in the High Court that the order of confiscation passed by the trial Court was either without jurisdiction or was not called for on the facts of the case.
2.In this appeal by special leave, the only point raised by Mr. Bana on behalf of the appellant is that the learned Special Judge had no jurisdiction to pass an order of confiscation. We see no substance in this contention. Section 4(2) of the Code of CriminalProcedure provides that all offences under any law other than the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and "otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences". It is clear from this provision that in so far as the offences under laws other than the Indian Penal Code are concerned, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply in their full force subject to any specific or contrary provision made by the law under which the offence is investigated or tried. Therefore, what we have to ascertain is whether the Code of Criminal Procedure confers the power of confiscation, and secondly, whether there is anything in the Prevention of Corruption Act which militates against the use of that power, either by reason of the fact that the latter Act contains a specific provision for confiscation or contains any provision inconsistent with the power of confiscation conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the first of these questions, S. 452 of the Code provides by subsection (1), in so far as material, that if the trial in any Criminal Court is concluded, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal of property by confiscation. This power would, therefore, be available to a Court trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act unless that Act contains any specific or contrary provision on the subject matter of confiscation. None of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides for confiscation or prescribes the mode by which an order of confiscation may be passed. The Prevention ofCorruption Act being totally silent on the question of confiscation, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply in their full force, with the result that the Court trying an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act would have the power to pass an order of confiscation by reason of the provisions contained in S. 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order of confiscation cannot, therefore, be held to be without jurisdiction.
3.If we were to accept the above submission of Mr. Bana, it would lead to starting results. If, for example, a person is convicted for taking a bribe under the Prevention of Corruption Act, he could always say that since he has already taken the bribe and the money which forms the subject matter of the bribe belongs to him, no order of confiscation of that amount can be passed. A person who is found guilty of accepting the bribe is not only liable to be convicted and sentenced for the offence of bribery, but the amount which he has taken by way of bribe is liable to be confiscated by reason of the powers of confiscation conferred by Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the extent that the said provisions apply.
4.There is equally, no substance in Mr. Bana's contention that even assuming that the Special Judge had the power or the jurisdiction to pass the order of confiscation, he did not exercise his discretion properly in ordering the confiscation of the two fixed deposit receipts and the cash amount found in the house of the appellant. The appellant has been convicted under S. 5(1)(e) precisely for the reason that he was in possession of the two receipts and the aforesaid cash sum. It cannot then be said that the order of confiscationin regard to these amounts has not been properly passed or has been passed without any application of mind."
13.Therefore, as per Section 452 of Cr. P.C. and Section 5(6) of P.C. Act, 1988, this Court has the power to confiscate the property of the Convicts acquired through unfair means.
14.Since the DA in the case has been adjudicated to be Rs.62,92,088.55/, attachment of equivalent amount of assets, as they existed on the date of their seizure, is required to be made by this court.
15.An application for forfeiture of the property of the convicts to the tune of disproportionate assets was moved by the Ld. P.P./CBI, on the last date. Reply to the same was filed by the Ld. Counsel for the Convicts. Due to some clerical error in that application, a fresh one alongwith rejoinder to the reply filed by the Convicts has been moved today. Copies be supplied.
16.After taking option from the Convicts, the following properties seized by the CBI during search, described as below shall stand confiscated in favour of State:
MOVABLES
Sl. No. Particulars Value (in Rs.) 01. Maruti 800 Car bearing No.DBK3754, Model 1985 52,250/- 02. Cash recovered from Locker No.6, Allahabad Bank, Nehru Place, New Delhi 13.50,000/- 03. Cash recovered from Locker No.1500, Allahabad Bank, C.R. Park, New Delhi 2,60,000/- 04. Cash recovered from Locker No.5/17, PNB, Alaknanda, New Delhi 2,49,900/- 05. Cash recovered from 58, South Park Apartment, Kalkaji, New Delhi i.e. residence of the accused persons 33,38,000/- 06. NSCs (Total 20) in the name of accused persons, purchased from Post Office, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 1,24,000/- 07. Indira Vikas Patras (Total 163) purchased from various post offices 2,49,500/- 08. Kissan Vikas Patras 10,000/- Total 56,33,650/- FIXED DEPOSIT RECEIPTS (FDRs)
Sl. No. Particulars Value in Rs. 14. 7 FDRs issued by Allahabad Bank, C.R. Park, New Delhi in the name of accused persons and their family 2,15,000/- 15. 12 FDRs/TDRs issued by SBI Bank, G.K.-1, New Delhi in the name of accused persons and their family 2,86,000/- 16. 3 FDRs/TDRs issued by SBI Bank, G.K.-1, New Delhi in the name of accused persons and their family 20,000/- Total 5,21,000/- SHARES
Sl. No. Particulars Value in Rs. 17. Steel Srips Ltd. 32525/- 18. Ambuja Cement Eastern Ltd. 2000/- 19. Indo Gulf Industries Ltd. 4400/- 20. UTI/UGS-2000/TCS 16,150/- 21. G.E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. (Shriram Fibres Finance Ltd.) 7500/- 22. UTI/UG-64 3440/- 23. SRF Limited 51190/- 24. SRF Nippon/Denso India Ltd. 2000/- 25. Mafatlal Dyes & Chemicals Ltd. 2840/- 26. Usha India Ltd. 4500/- Total 1,26,545/- Grand Total of the assets ordered to be forfeited = 62,81,195/-IO/HIO to take necessary steps for their forfeiture.
17.It is clarified that in case the assets so ordered to be attached, are not made available by the Convicts, if not already seized by the CBI, the Convicts shall be liable for that particular amount alongwith interest @ 6% compounded annually from the date of seizure till the date of pronouncement of judgment. Notice for providing the said asset shall be given by the I.O./HIO/any other authorized CBI Officer to the Convicts and if the Convicts fail to do so within 30 days of thenotice issued to them to this effect, the same may be realized by attachment of flat bearing No. Flat No. L-11/29A Kalkaji, Delhi, without obtaining any formal order of this Court.
18.At this stage, an application under Sec. 389 (3) Cr.P.C. has been moved on behalf of both the Convicts seeking suspension of sentence for a period of one month to enable them to file appeal against the impugned order of Conviction before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. Copy supplied to Ld. Sr. P.P/CBI. In view of the submissions, same is allowed subject to Convicts furnishing of bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- each. Bail bonds furnished and accepted. The sentence shall remain suspended for a period of 30 days. Copy of the judgment and this order be given to Convicts forthwith.
Announced in the open Court this the 5th day of February, 2024. (BHUPINDER SINGH) SPL. JUDGE (PC Act) (CBI) -06 RADC/NEW DELHI”
Learned counsel has further drawn our attention to the order dated 27.11.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in CRLA-198/2024, R.C. Bakshi & Anr. Versus Central Bureau of Investigation, whereby the operation of the confiscation order was stayed during the pendency of the appeal. The relevant portion of the order reads as under:
“1.By way of the present application, the applicant seeks stay of confiscation order dated 05.02.2024 during the pendency of appeal, passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI (PC Act)-06, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi alongwith the order on sentence dated 05.02.2024.
2.Learned counsel for the applicants/appellants submits that the appellants’ sentences were suspended vide order of this Court dated 04.03.2024 and in light of the same, it is contended that if the confiscation proceedings of the disproportionate assets as per the learned Trial Court is not stayed, then the present appeal would become infructuous.
3.Considering that the appeal stands admitted, the order directing confiscation shall remain stayed during the pendency of appeal.
4.The application is accordingly disposed of
CRL. M.A.8489/2024 (for calling TCR)
Since the TCR has already been received, this application has become infructuous and is disposed of as such.
CRLA 198/2024
1.Admit.
2.List in due course.”
We have carefully considered the aforesaid submissions and the material placed before us. The subsequent order on sentence dated 05.02.2024 and the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court on 27.11.2024 do not have any bearing on the facts and circumstances which were the subject matter of consideration in the impugned order dated 17.03.2025.
It is also relevant to note that the order dated 05.02.2024 was already in existence when the matter came to be considered by this Tribunal. The subsequent proceedings before the Hon’ble High Court, including the order staying the confiscation proceedings during the pendency of the criminal appeal, are developments arising out of the said order and do not alter the factual or legal position which formed the basis of the order under review.
A review jurisdiction is confined to the parameters prescribed in law and cannot be invoked merely for re-appreciation of an aspect which has already been considered, or for bringing on record a subsequent development which does not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record.
In the present case, the material sought to be relied upon by the Review Applicant, namely the order on sentence dated 05.02.2024 and the subsequent order dated 27.11.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court, does not establish any error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of review jurisdiction. The relevant aspect concerning the criminal case had already been noticed in the order dated 17.03.2025, particularly in paragraph 2.1 thereof.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find that no ground for review of the order dated 17.03.2025 is made out. The Review Application is, accordingly, dismissed.
Since the Review Application is dismissed, pending M.A(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No order as to costs.