Union Bank Of India vs Mrs. Shaik Vahida & Anr.

"30.

X x x condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial."

"32.

x x x At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."

"There is no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel could be laid. The expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay."

"Unless the Respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by." It was further held in para 14 that :

"Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the Courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and had not been negligent and callous in prosecution of the matter."

38.

Firstly, this ground seeks to use events temporally subsequent to the expiry of the limitation period to justify the delay. To revisit Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the text of the statute provides that an appeal or application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the "appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period". Hence, the appellants are required to explain that they were diligent during the prescribed period of limitation and could not file the appeal because of a "sufficient cause" arising within the prescribed period.

41.

A party cannot be allowed to take advantage of its deliberate inaction during the limitation period. Allowing to the contrary would distort incentives for parties and create dystopian consequences for our judicial process. To put this in right perspective, two scenarios can be juxtaposed : one, where the appellants had been vigilant and had preferred an appeal within the limitation period, but would have failed to succeed as the governing law during that time was as stated by Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183, para 17 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353, para 11 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] ; and second, where the appellants deliberately allowed the limitation period to expire and have now approached this Court using the subsequent change of law as a ground for allowing the appeals. Now, if the appellants are allowed to file the appeals in the second scenario, it will lead to an anomalous situation where the appellants that were vigilant were not able to get the remedy but the ones that were sleeping over their rights would obtain relief. This would run counter to the purpose of the Limitation Act, which, instead of giving finality to the proceedings, would be permitting the parties to use the delay to their advantage.

42.

Thirdly, if subsequent change of law is allowed as a valid ground for condonation of delay, it would open a Pandora's box where all the cases that were subsequently overruled, or the cases that had relied on the judgments that were subsequently overruled, would approach this Court and would seek a relief based on the new interpretation of law. There would be no finality to the proceedings and every time this Court would reach a different conclusion from its previous case, all such cases and the cases relying on it would be reopened.

44.

Finally, the fourth reason why subsequent overruling of a judgment cannot be a sufficient cause is because when a case is overruled, it is only its binding nature as a precedent that is taken away and the lis between the parties is still deemed to have been settled by the overruled case. 22 It is a settled principle of law that even an erroneous decision operates as res judicata between the parties R. Unnikrishnan versus V.K. Mahamudevan (2014) 4 SCC 434. Hence, when Manoharlal14 overruled Pune Municipal Corpn.4 and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. 6, as well as all other cases relying on them. it only overruled their precedential value, and did not reopen the lis between the parties. The mere fact that the impugned orders in the present case were overruled by Manoharlal'4 would not, therefore, be a sufficient ground to argue that the cases should be reopened.

46 There can, however, be no doubt that a lis will have to be decided as per the new interpretation if during its pendency, the law has been construed in a different manner by a subsequent judgment. We say so for the reason that such new construction shall be deemed to be the correct understanding of the statute from its very inception. We find support in this regard from Shyam Madan Mohan Ruia v. Messer Holdings Ltd. [Shyam Madan Mohan Ruia v. Messer Holdings Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 252, para 18 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 241], in which the High Court had dismissed the suit based on the decision of this Court in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai [Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai, (2015) 6 SCC 412 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 333] During the pendency of appeal, Foreshore Coop. Housing Society [Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai, (2015) 6 SCC 412 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 333] was overruled in Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties [Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 671]. This Court while deciding the issue in Shyam Mohan Ruia [Shyam Madan Mohan Ruia v. Messer Holdings Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 252, para 18 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 241], held that since the precedent forming the very basis of the High Court's decision stood overruled, the dispute before it must be decided as per the later decision.

ORDER