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I.A.No.85/2026 is filed for condonation of delay of 228 days in preferring appeal against the order and judgement dt.16.05.2025 passed by Ld. DRT-II, Hyderabad in O.A. No. 889 of 2018 whereby Ld. DRT partly allowed the O.A. but held that 'no order is passed against Item Nos. 1&3 as there is no valid mortgage against the said properties'.
The instant appeal is preferred against the order and judgement dt.16.05.2025 passed by Ld. DRT-II, Hyderabad. The present appeal is filed on 29.01.2026 along with an application for condonation of delay wherein the Appellant Bank submitted that the delay in filing the appeal was not intentional, rather it was due to the improper advice and that the decision to prefer the appeal was to be on hold. Instead of preferring the appeal, the Appellant proceeded under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 to recover the dues and when the SARFAESI action of the Bank was challenged by the borrower, further advice was sought for by the bank in December, 2025. Thereafter, the proper authority accorded permission for preferring the appeal. Then, the Bank applied for certified copy of the impugned order dt.16.05.2025 on 08.01.2026. Application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was moved on 30.01.2026 and the appeal was filed when the competent authority accorded proper approval on 20.12.2025. Ld. Counsel for the Appellant would submit that the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional, rather it was beyond the control of the Appellant and due to improper advice, the appeal could not be filed in time and the Bank proceeded under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 when the same was challenged by the borrower, on further advice, the Appellant obtained proper approval from the competent authority for preferring the appeal. Ld. DRT held that there was no valid mortgage with respect to Item No.1 & 3 of properties. The Appellant would put to hardship if the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned.
Ld. Counsel for the Respondents would submit that the Appellant failed to make out any valid ground for showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay which was well within the knowledge of the Appellant when the Ld. DRT held that no valid mortgage is created with respect to Items No.1 & 3 properties. Despite that, they issued a notice dt. 14.11.2025 which was challenged. Thereafter when Ld. DRT passed order dt. 11.12.2025 restraining the Bank from proceeding further with respect to Properties No. 1&3, the Appellant preferred the instant appeal.
As far as the question of delay is concerned, law is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others -vs- Union of India & Another [(2023) 10 SCC 531] wherein it was held in paragraphs 30 and 32 as under:
"30.X x x condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial."
"32.x x x At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in State (NCT of Delhi) -vs- Ahmed Jaan [(2008) 14 SCC 582], held that proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent. In para 10 it is held that "There is no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel could be laid. The expression 'sufficient cause' must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through LRs -vs- Narasamma (Dead) through LRs [(2013) 11 SCC 341] in para 12 it was held that-
"Unless the Respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by." It was further held in para 14 that :
"Since sufficient cause has not been defined, thus, the Courts are left to exercise a discretion to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable diligence and had not been negligent and callous in prosecution of the matter."
It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that in an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, sufficient cause has to be shown for condonation of delay. There is difference between excuse and sufficient cause, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) -vs- The Special Deputy Collector (LA)[(2024)12 SCC 336] has referred to Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Others vs- Katiji & Others [(1987) 2 SCC 107] wherein it was held that :
"x x x x ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases liberal approach', justice-oriented approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."
It is further held that it must be borne in mind, while construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of the decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed.
Hon'ble Apex Court has also referred to Basawaraj and Another -vs- Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 wherein it was held in paragraph 23 that:
"The discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds."
Hon'ble Apex Court also placed reliance on paragraphs 12 and 15 of the Basawaraj and another (supra) which reads as under :
"12.It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period per of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute."
"15.The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case, a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."(emphasis supplied)."
In paragraph 26 of the Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"26.On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i)Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii)A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii)The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv)In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v)Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi)Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii)Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
Sufficient cause has to be shown by the Appellant for condonation of delay. There is difference between excuse and sufficient cause which is to be looked into as to whether the Appellant is successful in proving sufficient cause for condonation of delay? In the present case, the impugned order was passed by the Ld. DRT on 16.05.2025 wherein a categorical finding is recorded that valid mortgage is not created with respect to Item Nos.1 & 3 properties. If the Bank is aggrieved by the said finding, immediately they should have preferred an appeal within the period of limitation. It is submitted by the Bank that an improper advice was given to them but no details as to who advised them or whether any written commutation was received from competent authority that no appeal is to be preferred, are produced by the Appellant. Even the competent authority of the Bank acted negligently in pursuing the matter where a categorical finding was recorded against the Bank. It was the duty of the Bank officers to look into the matter and prefer appeal against the judgement which was not done in the present case. Further, action under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was initiated by the Bank which was when challenged, an interim order was passed by the Ld. DRT-II, Hyderabad, then the Bank woke up and obtained proper approval for filing the appeal which could not be held to be a valid or sufficient ground for condonation of delay. Law is well settled that when an Appeal is not filed within the period of limitation and a right accrues in favour of the Respondents for not filing the Appeal within a period of limitation, it is incumbent upon the Appellants to show and prove the sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal. If it can be done by the Appellant, only then the right accrued in favour of the Respondents can be divested but the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court nowhere permits or allows that even in the case of state or state instrumentality, a liberal approach should be adopted by the Courts for condonation of delay or to divest the right accrued in favour of the Respondents.
In the present case the only inference which can be drawn is the negligence of the concerned officers of the Bank for not preferring the Appeal within a period of limitation. Appellants utterly failed to show or prove any sufficient cause for condonation of delay in preferring the Appeal.
Accordingly, I do not find any ground for condoning the delay of 228 days in filing appeal against the order and judgement dt.16.05.2025 passed by the Ld. DRT-II, Hyderabad. Accordingly, Application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 is liable to be dismissed.
ORDER
I.A.85/2026 under Section 5 of Limitation Act is dismissed. Consequently, appeal being Appeal Dy. No. 109 of 2026 is also dismissed as time barred.
File be consigned to record room.
Copy of the judgement/final Order be uploaded in the Tribunal's website.
Order dictated, signed and pronounced by me in the open Court on this the 28th day of April, 2026.