Tunia vs Emperor

Bucknill, J.—This was an application made in criminal revisional jurisdiction. It was made by one Mt. Tunia, a young woman, who was convicted by a Magistrate of the First Class at Arrah of an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 193, I.P.C., that is to say, with having committed perjury in the course of a judicial proceeding. She was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200, and in default of payment thereof, to serve a further term of two months rigorous imprisonment. From her conviction and sentence the applicant appealed do the Sessions Judge of Shahabad; but on the 1st of June last the appeal was dismissed summarily.

The circumstances which have led up to the prosecution of this woman and her conviction are certainly somewhat peculiar. It would seem that at the end of July last year a burglary took place in the house of a lady residing in the town of Arrah. A man named Tara Prasad, who is in the employment of this lady, reported the burglary to the Police; and upon being asked whether he had any suspicion as to by whom the offence had been committed, he is said to have replied that he thought that it was not improbable that one Ramsakal Singh of Gonouli might have been concerned in the matter. He added that this Ramsakal Singh lived in the same mahalla where the burglary had been perpetrated, that his (Ramsakal's) uncle was on bad terms with the lady whose house had been broken into and that Ramsakal himself was the associate of evil persons.

As a result of what had taken place at the police station, it would seem that, on the 27th of August last, this Ramsakal instituted proceedings against Tara Prasad charging him with having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 500, I.P.C., that is to say, with having committed defamation. Tara Prasad was put on his trial; we are informed at the Bar that he was eventually acquitted. What defences he put forward I do not know; but it would seem that, amongst them, must have been one which contemplated some plea in the nature of justification, for he called as a witness in the defence the applicant here. So far as I can gather his object in calling this woman was to show that she was a woman of easy virtue and had been the kept mistress of the man Ramsakal Singh, and I suppose that it would have been urged that if it could have been shown that Ramsakal Singh had kept company with a woman of ill repute the suggestion made by Tara Prasad in the statement which he made to the police, when reporting the burglary, that Ramsakal was the associate of evil companions might have been held in some measure to be justifiable. Now, when the applicant was put into the witness-box, she does not appear to have realized that it was in no way incumbent upon her to answer any questions which might have reflected upon her own probity or virtue and it is somewhat remarkable to notice that no attempt at protecting her from having to reply to questions of that nature appears to have been offered to her by the officer who was trying the case. On the other hand it would seem that she was interrogated very fully as to her morality and as to her immoral association with Ramsakal Singh; how such a proceeding could have been allowed unless she had been (which she was obviously not) willing to assist Tara Prasad by blackening her own character, it is difficult to understand. However, the fact remains that she was asked a variety of questions of character which I have mentioned and that she answered in a manner protective of her own character. There is, however, not the least doubt that a number of her answers were not true; she had been put upon her oath and it is, of course, needless for me to point out that if one answers questions put to one in a judicial proceeding when one has sworn to tell the truth and if one's answers are not true, one commits perjury, whether those questions which one answers are not questions which should have been or could have been properly asked. After the applicant had given her evidence which I may point out was, of course, not in favour of Tara Prasad, she was eventually charged as I have mentioned above, tried, convicted and sentenced. I think that it must be admitted that the circumstances were extremely difficult and painful for the applicant; she was placed in an unenviable position and, no doubt, was completely ignorant of her right to refuse to answer questions which would reflect upon her own character and had the unpleasant alternative either of telling the truth and admitting that she was a loose woman, or as she did, of telling untruths and making herself out better than perhaps she really was.

It is, however, I think, not unimportant to observe the actual averments which were made against her which formed the basis of the charge of perjury brought against her, Although it is true that superficially some of these questions do not appear in themselves to be such as if answered truthfully would have thrown any discredit upon the applicant's character, yet, on further examination, they will all be found to be connected more or less closely with the illicit association which it was being attempted to be proved had existed between the applicant and Ramsakal Singh. The first untrue statement which she is alleged to have made is that she did not know this man at all. There can be no doubt from the evidence of at least six witnesses and from documentary evidence as well that this was not true. The second statement was that she had never stated that Ramsakal Singh, this particular individual, used to visit her frequently. This again was, undoubtedly, not a true statement. The statement in which she is, alleged to have perjured herself was that she denied that the person named Ramsakal against whom and herself a woman named Dularia in 1923 had brought some criminal proceeding was the same Ramsakal as that concerned in the case which was being brought against Tara Prasad. Again there can be no doubt that this statement was not true. The fourth question which she is said to have answered untruthfully was that she denied that when her house had been entered for the purpose of executing some legal purposes Ramsakal had been found there in her company. This, however, again was undoubtedly shown to be a falsehood. The fifth and the last answer which she is said to have made falsely is the point-blank avowal that she was not the mistress of this Ramsakal. The Magistrate has stated that the evidence of all the witnesses for the defence and indeed of the main prosecution witnesses shows that this statement was, as he terms it, "a deliberate lie." There can therefore be no doubt whatever that this woman in the witness-box made statements which were untrue, and which she knew to be untrue. There are however, obviously reasons for coming to the conclusion that he position was allowed to be one which it ought not to have been allowed to be. I think that she ought to have been informed that it was in no way incumbent upon her to reply to questions her answers to which might, if true, have reflected upon her moral character.

Under these circumstances, although there undoubtedly has been a commission of the offence to which I have referred it seems to me that the sentence is altogether too severe. We are informed by the learned advocate who appears for the applicant that the applicant has already served 21 days in jail. I am satisfied, in my own mind, that this is an ample punishment for the offence committed under the remarkable circumstances to which I have drawn attention. Whilst therefore affirming the conviction, the sentence of imprisonment which was passed upon the applicant will be reduced to that period of imprisonment which she has already served. The fine of Rs. 200 will be remitted and if it has already been paid it must be refunded.

Ross, J.

I agree.