The Union Of India & Ors. vs Kunda Pradeep Babu & Ors.

Heard Sri Challa Dhananjay, Additional Solicitor General of India, assisted by Sri Jupudi V K Yagnadutt, Central Government Counsel, for the petitioners and Sri T. Sreedhar, learned counsel for the respondent.

The Union of India, Ministry of Railways, along with others (writ petitioners) have filed this writ petition challenging the Order dated 28.01.2026 in O.A.No.933 of 2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad (in short „CAT‟). The said O.A was filed by the present respondent (applicant), challenging the Order of Transfer issued by the Director/Estt. (Spl.), Railway Board, vide proceedings No.E(O)III-2025/TR/437, dated 29.08.2025.

The applicant was transferred by the said Order from SS/IRAS/South Central Railway to North Eastern Railway and posted in the cadre against an existing vacancy.

The O.A has finally been allowed. The order of transfer has been set aside. The writ petitioners were directed to allow the applicant to continue his services at Secunderabad with certain other directions and also granting the liberty to the writ petitioners to take appropriate action if the applicant committed any breach of the conditions imposed by the High Court while granting bail to the applicant.

The applicant was initially given appointment in the Indian Railway Accounts Service (IRAS) vide appointment order No.2015/E (GR-I) 10/2, dated 04.12.2015. While working at Guntakal Division, Andhra Pradesh, the applicant was charged for the offences punishable under Section 61 (2) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) Act, 2023 (Criminal Conspiracy) and under sections 7, 8, 9, 10 & 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act (in short „PC Act‟), wherein the applicant along with several employees were apprehended by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) while laying a trap in Rc.No.2182024A0013/CBI/AC-III/New Delhi and the said crime was under investigation by the CBI. The applicant was detained beyond 48 hours by CBI and so he was placed under suspension which was subsequently extended from time to time, but finally, on the recommendations of the Review Committee, the Deputy Secretary, Railway Board had revoked the suspension of the applicant vide proceedings dated 26.08.2025. Thereafter, the applicant was transferred from South Central Railway (SCR) with immediate effect to North Eastern Railway (NER) vide Office Order dated 29.08.2025 and was consequentially relieved by relieving Order No.077 of 2025, dated 01.09.2025 issued by the Railway Board against the existing vacancy at North Eastern Railway.

The applicant being aggrieved from the order of transfer dated 29.08.2025 approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderbad Bench, Hyderabad in O.A.No.933 of 2025 in which he also prayed for suspension of the Order of relieving dated 01.09.2025, which the CAT declined to grant. The applicant then filed W.P.No.29679 of 2025 on 24.09.2025 in the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, which was disposed of vide Order dated 26.09.2025 with a direction to the Central Administrative Tribunal to dispose of the stay application within a period of two weeks and also directed the writ petitioners to continue the applicant at Guntakal till the adjudication of the stay application by the CAT. Pursuant to the said Order, the applicant reported to duty on 17.10.2025 before the Office of the Principal Financial Adviser‟s Officer, South Central Railway at Secunderabad, and later on the applicant made a representation dated 17.10.2025 to post him to a non-sensitive post at Guntakal of South Central Railway Headquarters, as also for payment of salary. The writ petitioners‟ case is that the period of absence from duty of the applicant from relieving date i.e., from 01.09.2025 from South Central Railway until the date of reporting at Headquarters of South Central Railway on 17.10.2025 (from 01.09.2025 to 16.10.2025) was not regularized. The applicant‟s request made by such representation was deferred.

In the OA, the applicant, inter alia, submitted that the CBI conducted searches on 04.07.2024 and implicated him as Accused No.2, and he was arrested on 05.07.2024. However, he was granted conditional bail in Crl.R.C.No.620 of 2024, vide Orders in I.A.No.1 of 2024, dated 02.08.2024 by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The conditions of the bail granted in the said Order were subsequently relaxed vide Order dated 09.12.2024 in I.A.No.3 of 2024.

The applicant also stated about his grievances or inconveniences, to be faced by such transfer Order to North Eastern Railways, including his personal grievances with respect to the health issues and of his wife. The applicant also raised the point that the Order of Transfer was passed without providing an opportunity of hearing to him. The Order of Transfer as also the Relieving Order were said to be in violation of the Order dated 09.12.2024 granting bail, as also the Order dated 26.09.2025 in W.P.No.29679 of 2025 by the High Court for the State of Telangana, under which direction was issued to continue the applicant in Guntakal till adjudication of his stay application by the Central Administrative Tribunal.

The applicant also raised the issue before the CAT that the South Central Railway was further sub-divided and the Guntakal Region was merged with South Coastal Railway Zone (SCRZ) with Headquarters at Visakhapatnam, and at that time the applicant was reporting to South Central Railway at Secunderabad, which in his submission, was altogether a different zone, pursuant to the Orders of revocation of suspension. The prayer was made to declare the Order of Transfer, as also the Relieving Order, as void having been passed without providing an opportunity of hearing.

The writ petitioners (respondents in OA) filed their counter opposing the O.A. It was submitted that the applicant was under deemed suspension with effect from 05.07.2024 to 27.08.2025, following his arrest and detention by CBI, Anti Corruption Bureau-III on 04.07.2024 and his suspension was revoked on 26.08.2025 and the decision was taken by the competent authority that the applicant should be transferred out of his present railway zone to avoid any possibility of the applicant in influencing the witnesses or hampering of the CBI investigation and be posted against a non-sensitive post. The applicant was transferred from South Central Railway to North Eastern Railway. The applicant did not raise any grievance on administrative side, i.e., by filing representation raising his personal grievances or problems. It was submitted that the transfer is an incidence of service, so, the applicant must have reported at work place of transfer and then ought to have made representation. The medical conditions of the applicant, as also of his wife, as mentioned in the OA, were said to be an afterthought, stated only on receipt of his transfer order, as the same were not previously reported. The recommendations of the Suspension Review Committee had the approval of the Cadre Controlling Authority (CCA) in Railway Board‟s office. So, the applicant was ordered for transfer from South Central Railway to North Eastern Railway on administrative exigency. The applicant was a Group-A Officer in Indian Railway Accounts Service having all India transfer liability. The Order of Transfer was in accordance with law and the conditions of service of the applicant, under administrative exigencies.

The applicant filed rejoinder affidavit reiterating his stand as was taken in the OA. It was further stated that the Zonal Railway transfer from Guntakal division of South Central Railway to North Eastern Railway with its headquarters at Gorakhpur was unfair and contrary to mandatory procedure governing posting of Senior Scale Officers with IRAS rank, and the Suspension Review Committee had no authority to recommend transfer. So, any administrative action based on such recommendation was beyond its jurisdiction and was a colourable exercise of power.

The Central Administrative Tribunal on consideration of the case of the parties as also the submissions advanced from both the sides allowed the OA. It considered and recorded the reasons for its Order. The CAT in its Order observed that in the pending OA, pursuant to the directions of the Tribunal, the writ petitioners filed instructions from the Railway Board dated 02.12.2025 and stated that since the CBI enquiry was still pending and there was no change in the administrative situation, the original transfer order dated 29.08.2025 should be maintained. There was no feasibility of accommodating the applicant to any nearer place outside Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. But considering the directions of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in W.P.No.29679 of 2025, dated 26.09.2025, the applicant was retained at Headquarters at Secunderabad temporarily vide Orders dated 07.01.2026 in MA.No.30 of 2026. The CAT observed that in spite of the Order of the High Court for the State of Telangana, staying the transfer order dated 29.08.2025, directing to continue the applicant at Guntakal till his stay application was adjudicated by the Tribunal, the writ petitioners while implementing the said Order, instead of allowing the applicant to resume his duties at original place of work i.e., at Gunthakal, they posted the applicant at Headquarters Secunderabad where the applicant had joined and had been serving at Secunderabad. The main reason, according to the CAT for transferring the applicant from out of Gunthakal division was to avoid influencing of witnesses or tampering evidence, though no such reason was assigned in the transfer order. The CAT further observed that on enquiry being made from the learned Assistant Solicitor General and the officials present from the Office of the Headquarters, Secunderabad upon joining of the applicant at Secunderabad on the point as to whether the applicant was interfering with the investigation of the CBI or was indulging in any objectionable activities, the Tribunal was informed that they had not received any such complaint against the applicant. The Tribunal thereafter, recorded in paras-11 and 12 that the health issues of the applicant and his wife and she having delivered a son on 28.08.2025, and there was no other family member, except the applicant‟s wife‟s mother to look after the newly born child and the applicant‟s wife, so, if the applicant was forced to join at the transferred place, it would not only cause hardship to the applicant, but also to his family, the Tribunal taking into account that there were vacancies at Secunderabad where the applicant was working at the headquarters under South Central Railways and that the applicant was earlier posted at Gunthakal prior to the order of transfer, which came under South Coast Railway after bifurcation of the South Central Railway into two zones and that the writ petitioners themselves modified the original transfer place while posting him at Secunderabad, held that the impugned Order of Transfer dated 29.08.2025 had to be declared as null and void. Thus, in view of the domestic problems and the health issues coupled with the fact that the applicant was not indulging in any activities detrimental to the administration nor interfering with the investigation by CBI, the OA was allowed and the Order of Transfer was quashed by the Tribunal. The direction was issued to allow the applicant to continue his services at Secunderabad, his present posting place observing further that, that would also enable the applicant to comply with the conditions imposed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Crl.RC.No.620 of 2024 while granting bail. At the same time, the Tribunal also granted liberty to the writ petitioners to take appropriate action if the applicant committed any breach of conditions imposed in the bail order.

The directions issued by CAT as in paras-12 to 14 are reproduced as under:

Sri Challa Dhananjay, Additional Solicitor General of India, submitted that the Order of the Tribunal cannot be maintained. He submitted that the law is well settled that the transfer is an incidence of service. The applicant‟s post is a transferable post and he can be transferred at any place in India. He submitted that there are well recognized grounds on which only, an order of transfer is open for interference. No such ground existed in the present case. The interference by the Tribunal with the Order of Transfer is on the grounds of the alleged personal problems, may be health issues or the distance, but in every transfer there are bound to be some issues, however, that would not be the ground on which the Order of Transfer could be interfered with. He submitted that in any case, the applicant must have obeyed the Order of Transfer first by joining at the transferred place and thereafter, in case of any grievance, the proper way was to make a representation to the competent authority, which should have taken into consideration those factors, and could have passed an appropriate order, but it was not open for the Tribunal to interfere with the Order of Transfer on such grounds, it being an incidence of service.

Learned counsel for the writ petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Sri Pubi Lombi v. The State of Arunachal Pradesh^{11.(2024) 12 SCC 292} to contend that the scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by mala fide. Non-observation of executive instructions does not confer a legally enforceable right to an employee holding a transferable post. He submitted that there was no violation of any statutory provision. The Order of Transfer was passed in the exigency of service on administrative grounds.

Sri T. Sreedhar, learned counsel for the applicant raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. He submitted that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the OA was decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad, which falls in the State of Telangana. Previously, when in the OA interim relief was not granted by the Tribunal, the applicant approached the High Court for the State of Telangana in W.P.No.29679 of 2025. The said writ petition was decided on 26.09.2025 after affording opportunity of hearing to the present writ petitioners. But in the said writ petition any objection with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court for the State of Telangana was not raised. The writ petitioners submitted to the jurisdiction of the High Court for the State of Telangana and consequently they are now estopped from challenging the final order of the Tribunal in this Court (High Court of Andhra Pradesh). He submitted that the remedy of the writ petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is before the High Court for the State of Telangana.

Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the cause of action has no relevance to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. He placed reliance in Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay^{22.(2022) 3 SCC 133}, Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh v. Union of India^{33.1960 SCC OnLine SC 12} and Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India^{44.2026 SCC OnLine SC 1098}.

Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that any such objection was also not raised in the OA by the writ petitioners that the Tribunal at Hyderabad had no jurisdiction. He submitted that if according to the writ petitioners, the jurisdiction, cause of action was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh falling within the jurisdiction of this Court, such an objection with respect to the maintainability of OA at Hyderabad should also have been raised.

He submitted that at the time the Order of Transfer was passed the applicant was working at the Headquarters, South Central Railway. The territorial jurisdiction is not with this Court. The Order of Transfer has been issued from SS/IRAS/South Central Railway to North Eastern Railway by the Director/Estt (Spl), Railway Board, vide proceedings No.E(O)III-2025/TR/437, New Delhi, dated 29.08.2025.

Sri T. Sreedhar, learned counsel for the respondent/applicant, further submitted that the preliminary objection with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court should be decided first and only thereafter, the matter could be proceeded with on the merits.

On such submission, learned counsel for the applicant initially avoided from advancing any arguments on the merits of the matter, submitting that the objection with respect to the territorial jurisdiction be decided first.

On the aspect of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Sri Challa Dhananjay, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, for the writ petitioners, submitted that the transfer of the respondent/applicant is in fact from Gunthakal in South Central Railway to the North Eastern Railway, so, the transfer is from a place in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The OA was filed, initially in the State of Andhra Pradesh, at the Circuit Bench at Vijayawada of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad. He submitted that the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad is for both the States i.e., State of Telangana, and also for the State of Andhra Pradesh. The OA was specifically referred „from Andhra Pradesh‟ and was numbered as O.A.No.933 of 2025 (Andhra Pradesh). He submitted that though the Central Administrative Tribunal is in the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, but for the purposes of the service matters of the Central Government employees in Andhra Pradesh, the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad is the Central Administrative Tribunal for Andhra Pradesh, and therefore, for those matters from Andhra Pradesh, the territorial jurisdiction will be of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh though the Central Administrative Tribunal is situated at Hyderabad. He submitted that it cannot be said that there is no territorial jurisdiction when the Order has been passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad in the matters of the State of Andhra Pradesh.

Sri Challa Dhananjay, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, further submitted that the applicant was granted bail in Crl.RC.No.620 of 2024 (Accused No.2) in I.A.No.1 of 2024, subject to the conditions imposed, out of which, conditions 2 and 3 read as under:

The submission is that the applicant was required to attend the enquiry only once in a month after the modified condition No.3 of the bail order, which could be attended without any inconvenience in spite of the order of transfer, though he further submitted that the hardship or inconvenience is no ground to interfere with the order of transfer.

In view of the submissions advanced, the following points arise for our consideration:

We make it clear that so far as Point No.B is concerned, we will enter into that aspect only if we are satisfied on Point No.A that the writ petition is maintainable by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. If there is no territorial jurisdiction, certainly we would not enter into the legality of the impugned judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal. But if we reach the conclusion on point No.„A‟ that the writ petition is maintainable in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, it having territorial jurisdiction, the legality or otherwise of the impugned judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal would be considered in the light of the submissions advanced, as also the law on the subject of transfer.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as under:

Sri T. Sreedhar, learned counsel for the respondent/applicant, vehemently placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) to contend that the concept of cause of action is alien to Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the said concept is to be applied with respect to the suits, while considering the territorial jurisdiction, but when it comes to the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in view of that judgment of the Constitution Bench the question of cause of action or part of cause action does not arise at all. He referred to the various paragraphs from that judgment. Consequently, we are referring to that judgment, though Constitution (Article 226) was amended after the judgment in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) and the law on determination of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court stands deleted to great extent.

In Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh (supra) two questions arose for consideration by the Constitution Bench consisting of Seven Hon‟ble Judges. The first question was,

On the first question, namely, whether the Government of India as such can be said to have a location in a particular place viz. New Delhi, the main argument advanced was that the Government of India is all pervasive and is functioning throughout the territory of India and therefore every High Court has power to issue a writ against it, as it must be presumed to be located within the territorial jurisdiction of all State High Courts. The Hon‟ble Apex Court with respect to that argument observed that, that argument confused the concept of location of a Government with the concept of its functioning. A Government may be functioning all over a State or all over India; but it certainly is not located all over the State or all over India. It is true that the Constitution has not provided that the seat of the Government of India will be at New Delhi. That, however, does not mean that the Government of India as such has no seat where it is located. It is common knowledge that the seat of the Government of India is in New Delhi and the Government as such is located in New Delhi. The absence of a provision in the Constitution can make no difference to this fact. The Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that what was to be seen was whether the words of Article 226 mean that the person or authority to whom a writ is to be issued has to be resident in or located within the territories of the High Court issuing the writ? Referring to Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood then, the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that so far as a natural person is concerned, there can be no doubt that he can be within those territories only if he resides therein either permanently or temporarily. So far as an authority is concerned, there can be no doubt that if its office is located therein it must be within the territory. But do these words mean with respect to an authority that even though its office is not located within those territories it will be within those territories because its order may affect persons living in those territories? It was observed that it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Article 226 does not depend upon the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief; it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within those territories. It was further observed that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. Thus, if a person residing or located in Bombay, is aggrieved by an order passed by an authority located, in Calcutta, the forum in which he has to seek relief is not the Bombay High Court though the order may affect him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court where the authority passing the order is located. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that it would, therefore, be wrong to introduce in Article 226 the concept of the place where the order passed has effect in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court which can give relief under Article 226. The introduction of such a concept may give rise to confusion and conflict of jurisdictions. The Hon‟ble Apex Court, held that the relevant words of Article 226 as read, there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction conferred by that Article on a High Court is with respect to the location or residence of the person or authority passing the order and there can be no question of introducing the concept of the place where the order is to have effect in order to determine which High Court can give relief under it. The Hon‟ble Apex Court reiterated that the effect of an order by whomsoever it is passed can have no relevance in determining the jurisdiction of the High Court which can take action under Article 226. Functioning of a Government is really nothing other than giving effect to the orders passed by it. Therefore it would not be right to introduce in Article 226 the concept of the functioning of Government when determining the meaning of the words “any person or authority within those territories”. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that these words in Article 226 refer not to the place where the Government may be functioning but only to the place where the person or authority is either resident or is located. So far as a natural person is concerned, he is within those territories if he resides there permanently or temporarily. So far as an authority (other than a Government) is concerned, it is within the territories if its office is located there. So far as a Government is concerned it is within the territories only if its seat is within those territories.

The Hon‟ble Apex Court, with respect to the seat of a Government, observed that, whether the seat of a Government is mentioned in the Constitution or not, there is undoubtedly a seat from which the Government as such functions as a fact. What Article 226 requires is residence or location as a fact and if therefore there is a seat from which the Government functions as a fact even though that seat is not mentioned in the Constitution the High Court within whose territories that seat is located will be the High Court having jurisdiction under Article 226 so far as the orders of the Government as such are concerned.

In Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), the view taken in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, in which it was held that there are two-fold limitations on the power of the High Court to issue writs etc. under Article 226, namely,

On the second question, namely whether it was possible to introduce the concept of cause of action in Article 226 so that the High Court in whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose would be the proper one to pass an order thereunder, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) held that Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to the accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrues being within its territorial jurisdiction. The proceedings under Article 226 are not suits; they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and give powers of correction to the High Court over persons and authorities and these special powers have to be exercised within the limits set for them. One of limitations is that the person or authority concerned must be within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that it would be going, in the face of the express provision in Article 226 and doing away with an express limitation contained in Article 226, if the concept of cause of action were to be introduced. The concept of cause of action cannot be introduced in Article 226, for by doing so would be doing away with the express provision contained therein which requires that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued should be resident in or located within the territories over which the High Court has jurisdiction.

So far as the aforesaid second question is concerned, the concept of part of cause of action was considered irrelevant or non-considerable to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for the reason that Article 226 as it stood at that time, there was no concept under Article 226 for „cause of action‟. The writ proceedings were not the civil suits, so as to apply that concept of part of cause of action from the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as applicable to suit or other proceedings, and the writ proceedings being not covered under other proceedings in Code of Civil Procedure.

So, on the first question it was held in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) that the only limitation is that the person or authority to whom the writ is to be issued is to be resident in or be located in an area over which the High Court had the jurisdiction.

Learned counsel for the respondent placed much reliance in the judgment of Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh (supra) to contend that writ can be issued only to the person, resident in or the authority located within the territories over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. The concept of part of cause of action is not to be introduced while determining the territorial jurisdiction for the cases of Article 226 of the Constitution. It was so held in Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh (supra).

No doubt it has been so laid down in the aforesaid judgment of Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh (supra), on both the questions, but the said judgment was rendered on 05.12.1960. Thereafter, Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been amended, Clause (IA) was inserted and thereafter, it was renumbered as Clause(2) specifically referring to the “cause of action wholly or in part” and “notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories”.

We are therefore of the view that now it cannot be argued on the strength of Lt. Khajoor Singh (supra) that while considering the territorial jurisdiction in the context of the maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court, the concept of cause of action is not relevant or is wholly irrelevant. We are of the view that the cause of action wholly or in part if arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, the writ petition would be maintainable in that High Court in view of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

We shall now refer the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on the aforesaid aspect, i.e., after the amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which also took into consideration Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) and Election Commission v.Saka Venkata Rao^{55.AIR 1953 SC 210}, and K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission^{66.AIR 1954 SC 207}, which were affirmed in Lt. Khajoor Singh (supra).

In Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra^{77.(2000) 7 SCC 640} on the point of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as under in paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 as under:

In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu^{88.(1994) 4 SCC 711} on the point of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause - notwithstanding anything in Article 32 - and provides that every High Court shall have power “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, “within those territories” directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

Paragraph 5 of Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra) reads as under:

The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra) considered the expression „cause of action‟ and observed that it is well settled that the expression “cause of action” means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. It was held that in determining the objections of lack of territorial jurisdiction, the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the writ petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition.

Paragraph 6 of Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra) reads as under:

In Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra) a submission was advanced that clause (2) was introduced in Article 226 of the Constitution to enlarge the scope of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in Election Commission v Saka Venkata Subba Rao {AIR 1953 SC 210}. The Hon‟ble Apex Court while interpreting Article 226 as it then stood, observed that the rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot be applied to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority „within the territories‟ in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Referring to the said judgment, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra) observed that the said view, taken in Saka Venkata Subba Rao case which was followed in the subsequent cases also resulted into a situation that the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction on the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. The consequence as in that case was, that only the High Court of Punjab could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Union of India and other bodies located in Delhi. To remedy this situation, clause (1-A) was inserted by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963, to confer on the High Courts‟ jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 against the Union of India or any other body or authority located in Delhi if the cause of action has arisen, wholly or in part, within its jurisdiction. Clause (1-A) was later renumbered as clause (2) of Article 226. Therefore, it was observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court that the amendment was introduced to supersede the view taken by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Saka Venkata Subba Rao (supra).

The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission (supra) reiterated that on a plain reading of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution it is clear that the power conferred by clause (1) can be exercised by the High Court provided the cause of action wholly or in part, had arisen within the territorial limits. It rejected the submission raising the preliminary objection that, the cause of action wholly or in part has no relevance in determining the territorial jurisdiction exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The submission was held contrary to the settled position. The well settled position restated was that if the cause of action wholly or any part has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the particular High Court, such High Court shall have the jurisdiction. With respect to Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) it was observed that, that was „rendered‟ at a time when Article 226 was unamended and did not provide for the cause of action wholly or in part arising within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court. The position changed by the amendment made in the Constitution inserting clause (1A) by 15^th Amendment Act 1963 i.e., after the judgment in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), which followed the 1954 judgment. Clause (1A) was re-numbered as Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution. It narrates the expression " The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories”. So, clause (1) of Article 226 is to be read along with clause (2) and the cause of action wholly or in part if it arises within the territorial jurisdiction has importance and it cannot be said that the cause of action has no relevance in determining the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd.^{99.(2002) 1 SCC 567} the same law has been reiterated in paragraphs 16 and 17, which read as under:

In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India^{1010.(2004) 6 SCC 254}, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the Court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on a writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act, whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act. It was held that where the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act is challenged, then subject to applicability of that Act, its effect throughout territory of India and that aspect be kept under territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 (2).

In Kusum Lngots and Allys Ltd (supra), the concept of cause of action was also considered. It was held that the cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove, constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action.

The Hon‟ble Apex Court also considered Section 20 (c) of CPC, though observed that, in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to writ proceedings, but certainly in the considered view of the Hon‟ble Apex Court on the expression „cause of action‟ the decisions of the Court on the interpretation of the expression „cause of action‟ as used in Code of Civil Procedure could be of assistance. The Hon‟ble Apex Court clearly held that even if a small fraction of cause of action accrued within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter, in view of the expressions used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Paragraphs 6 to 10 and 22 of Kusum Ingots & Alloyes Ltd. (supra) read as under:

In Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India^{1111.(2014) 9 SCC 329} the Hon‟ble Apex Court considered Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood originally, the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao {AIR 1953 SC 210}, K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission {AIR 1954 SC 207} and Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh v. Union of India {AIR 1961 SC 532}, as also Article 226 as amended thereafter inserting Clause (1A) by the Constitution (Fifteenth) Amendment Act, 1963, subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976. It was observed and held that on a plain reading of the amended provisions in Clause (2), it was clear that now the High Court can issue a writ when a person or authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the territorial jurisdiction.

Paragraphs 7 to 9, 14, 15 & 16 of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) are reproduced as under:

In State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutins (P) Ltd.^{1212.(2023) 7 SCC 791} the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that while dealing with an objection as to lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain writ petition on the ground that the cause of action has not arisen within its jurisdiction, that High Court, essentially has to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of the averments made in the petition memo treating the contents as true and correct, that is fundamental principle. The Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that the determination of a question as to whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court.

Paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd. (supra) are reproduced as under:

Before proceeding further we shall also refer to the judgments on the point of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India over the Tribunals.

In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India^{1313.(1997) 3 SCC 261} the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the power of judicial review vested in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. With respect to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, it was observed that all decisions of the Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. It was further observed that the Tribunals so created are also competent to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls and it will not be open for the litigants to directly approach the High Court even in the cases questioning the vires of statutory legislations except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged.

Relevant paragraphs 90 to 92 of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) read as under:

Recently, in State of H.P. v. Yogendera Mohan Sengupta^{1414.(2024) 13 SCC 1} the Hon‟ble Apex Court reiterated that the High Court exercises the review jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution over the orders of the Tribunals. The power of judicial review vested with the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution and the Hon‟ble Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure and therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. That power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. In Yogender Mohan Sengupta (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court referred to the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (supra).

Paragraphs 103, 104, 105, 108 and 109 of Yogender Mohan Sengupta (supra) read as under:

In the present case, the O.A was filed by the applicant at Vijayawada in Andhra Pradesh. It was numbered as the subject or the case from Andhra Pradesh. The Circuit Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal is located at Vijayawada. The O.A was though decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad, it was, as the case from Andhra Pradesh. In the background of these facts, we are of the view that it cannot be held that the Central Administrative Tribunal deciding the O.A, as the O.A from Andhra Pradesh, is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court for the purposes of Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. To hold to the contrary is beyond reasonable limits. It cannot be held reasonably that because the Central Administrative Tribunal is situated at Hyderabad, though it entertains the cases for the State of Andhra Pradesh as well, it will be outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

The averments in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition are clear that the respondent/applicant was working at Guntakal Division in the State of Andhra Pradesh. He was charged for the offences punishable under Section 61 (2) of BNSS Act 2023 and criminal conspiracy under Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act. He was apprehended along with other employees while CBI laying a trap and the said crime was under the active investigation by CBI. The respondent was detained beyond 48 hours by CBI. He was placed under suspension while working at Guntakal Division in Andhra Pradesh. The Order of Suspension was extended periodically and finally it was revoked vide proceedings dated 26.08.2025. The respondent was transferred from South Central Railway with immediate effect to North Eastern Railway vide office order dated 29.08.2025. He was relieved on 01.09.2025 against the existing vacancy at North Eastern Railway. He filed O.A. The O.A. was filed at Vijayawada registered as a case from Andhra Pradesh which is evident from its number O.A.No.933 of 2025 (Andhra Pradesh). When interim order was not granted, he approached the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in W.P.No.29679 of 2025 which was disposed of vide Order dated 26.09.2025 with direction to the Central Administrative Tribunal to dispose of the stay application within a specified time and directed that the respondent shall continue at Guntakal till the stay application was adjudicated. The respondent then reported to duty on 17.10.2025. He also made a representation to the Authority on 17.10.20205 with a request to post him to a non-sensitive post at Guntakal of South Central Railway Headquarters. His request vide representation was deferred.

Thus, the settled position in law with respect to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, over the orders passed by the Tribunal is that the High Court has such jurisdiction of judicial review, to be exercised by the Division Bench. The Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad has the jurisdiction for both the States (State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh). So, it cannot be said that for all the O.A(s) decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad, the territorial jurisdiction for a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India shall be only at High Court for the State of Telangana. An O.A. relating to Andhra Pradesh though decided by Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad, the judgment in such an O.A., can be challenged in Andhra Pradesh. The CAT at Hyderabad for such case shall be within the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The same shall be the position if the part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the A.P High Court. The OA decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad in case of part of cause of action falling in Andhra Pradesh and the part in State of Telangana, both the High Courts shall have the territorial jurisdiction and in such a case the applicant shall have to exercise the choice of Forum.

Learned counsel for the respondents (applicant) submitted that prior to the final order dated 28.01.2026 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in O.A.No.020/0933/202 the Guntkal Division stood operationally reorganized and merged into the newly formed South Coastal Railway (SCoR) Zone, with its Zonal Headquarters at Visakhapatnam. He submitted that the applicant/respondent reported to the South Central Railway Headquarters at Telangana on 17.10.2025. The respondent/applicant was illegally implicated in the F.I.R No.Rc2182024/A0013 of 2024 of CBI AC-III, New Delhi dated 04.07.2024. He was granted bail by this Court on 02.08.2024 in I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.R.C.No.620 of 2024. The applicant was suspended with effect from 05.07.2024 vide the order No.FA/CON/DAR/KPB/2024 dated 08.07.2024. The suspension was ultimately revoked on 27.08.2025. The applicant was directed to report at the Headquarters of SCR at Secunderabad from Guntkal and consequently he reported at Secunderabad. He stationed there since October, 2025. He further submitted that the applicant was not allotted a residential quarter at Secunderabad and was permitted to avail accommodation and constrained by the requirement of specialized medical treatment at Hyderabad his address for stay of his family by convenience was shown at Guntkal. The applicant was not serving at Guntkal Railway Department since he reported to the South Central Railways at Secunderabad. He submitted that the applicant approached the High Court for the State of Telangana by filing W.P.No.29679 of 2025 and the same was disposed of by order dated 26.09.2025. It attained finality so the jurisdiction cannot be with High Court of Andhra Pradesh but shall be with the High Court for the State of Telangana. The aforesaid submission deserves rejection. Even if objection to the jurisdiction of High Court for the State of Telangana was not raised in W.P.No.29679 of 2025, that does not mean that the High Court for the State of Telangana shall have jurisdiction for all the times, even if part of cause of action has arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is also well settled that on the point of jurisdiction there cannot be an estoppels.

The submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents that judicial scrutiny over a Central Administrative Tribunal‟s order must be maintained before the Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction it is situated i.e High Court for the State of Telangana, is not sustainable. The reason is that the applicant, while his posting at Guntkal (AP), was placed under suspension. The suspension was revoked on 27.08.2025. He was transferred on 29.08.2025. So, he was transferred, infact, while he was posted at Guntkal in Andhra Pradesh. So, the part of cause of action is certainly within the State of Andhra Pradesh falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Further, the applicant challenged the order of transfer by filing the O.A.No.933 of 2025 at CAT/HYD Bench at Vijayawada on 23.09.2025 (Ex.P.2 to the rejoinder appended). The Central Administrative Tribunal conducted many hearings at the Circuit Bench at Vijayawada i.e on 23.09.2025, 17.10.2025, 30.10.2025 and 21.11.2025. Then the O.A was transferred to CAT-Hyderabad on 21.11.2025 and it was directed to be listed on 1.12.2025 at CAT, Hyderabad Bench and it was disposed of on 28.01.2026. These averments are supported by Exs.P.1 and P.2 to the rejoinder affidavit. The applicant‟s own case in his counter is that since October, 2025, he has been at Headquarters of SCR at Secunderabad. The order of transfer is dated 29.08.2025. The said order was passed transferring the applicant from Guntkal from where he had been relieved on 01.09.2025.

The law is well settled that even if a part of cause of action occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, it shall have jurisdiction. The part of the cause of action may be very small fraction of the whole cause of action. Then the said High Court shall have the jurisdiction. Transfer from a place in Andhra Pradesh and filing O.A in State of A.P challenging the order of transfer constituted, in any case, part of cause of action for filing writ petition within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. This Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not to be determined based on the cause of action is misconceived and contrary to the settled legal position as discussed in the earlier part of this judgment.

Learned counsel for the respondent/applicant placed reliance in the case of Baksish Ahmad (supra) to contend that the Delhi High Court was held to have territorial jurisdiction because of the situs of the office of the Union of India and since situs of the authority in the present case is not in the State of Andhra Pradesh, in the absence of such situs, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh will have no jurisdiction. Para 27 of Baksish Ahmad (supra) read as under:

In Baksish Ahmad (supra), it was held that notwithstanding that the cause of action arose outside the territorial limits of the Delhi High Court or that the events which triggered such an order occurred outside its limits, etc., still the Delhi High Court would have territorial jurisdiction in light of situs of office of the Union of India and the Director General, BSF/the officer in whom is vested supervision and command of the other CAPF, as per clause (1) of Article 226.

We are of the view that the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is not the correct understanding of the judgment in Baksish Ahmad (supra). In the said case, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that because of the situs, at New Delhi, the Delhi High Court shall also have the jurisdiction. The Hon‟ble Apex Court did not hold that the only jurisdiction was with the Delhi High Court. It has also not been held that the cause of action which occurred outside the Delhi High Court territorial jurisdiction, and if falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the other High Court as well, based on the cause of action such other High Court will have no jurisdiction.

In Union of India vs. Alapan Bandyopadhyay^{1515.(2022) 3 SCC 133} upon which also learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance, the cause of action did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court with respect to order of transfer of O.A made by the Principal Bench at New Delhi of the Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 25 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, which order of the Principal Bench at New Delhi was interfered with by the High Court of Calcutta. It is so evident from para 32 which read as under:

In the present case, certainly the cause of action is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

We are of the considered view that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh shall have the territorial jurisdiction.

We accordingly hold on point No.A that Andhra Pradesh High Court has the jurisdiction.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the applicant could be transferred on administrative exigencies. It is not that the applicant unless reaches the selection Grade cannot be transferred. The applicant had no statutory right to continue at the place of his choice. The guidelines for transfer are non-statutory and the respondent/applicant has no legal right to be posted at particular place under the guidelines which are enforceable under law.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the ground of illness etc were never reported to the petitioner. It was for the first time so mentioned in the O.A, after receipt of the order of transfer. The decision for transfer of the applicant was taken by the competent authority. It has the approval of the President of India since his service were duly necessitated at the transferred railway zone into the existing vacancy. The transfer was not punitive but in administrative exigency. The applicant did not submit any kind of request and the order of transfer was challenged in O.A after almost one month. He placed reliance in S.C. Sexena vs. Union of India and others^{1616.2006(9)SCC 583} to contend that even in case of violation of the non-statutory guidelines, an order of transfer is not to be set aside. The Central Administrative Tribunal has set aside the order of transfer based only on the alleged inconveniences that might be faced, because of the transfer. There are no statutory grounds available to the applicant to challenge the order of transfer. It has not been set aside on any legally permissible grounds. There must be the judicially recognized grounds for interference with the order of transfer. He further submitted that; in the case of the Co-accused, there was vacancy whereas there is no vacancy existing on non-sensitive post. That cited judgment has no relevancy in the case of the applicant. The grounds on which the order of transfer has been set aside are legally impermissible.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted on merits that the impugned transfer order contravenes the office Order No.E(O)-III/2014/PL/05 dated 31.08.2015 of the Railway Board, Ministry of Railways, Government of India as under it a Group-A Officer (respondent) will not be transferred out of his allotted Zone/Unit till Section Grade. The respondent did not get selection grade. He submitted that the Railway Board had issued certain guidelines dated 12.02.2018 stating that Critical/Terminal illness of dependents requiring staying at a station for the sake of continuity of treatment can be considered on case to case basis. He submitted that the illness conditions of the dependents of the applicant as also of the applicant taking medical leave by applying at Hyderabad, the order of transfer, violated the Railway Board proceedings dated 14.05.2018. He submitted that there was violation of the Railway Board‟s letter in E(O)III-2014/PL/03 dated 10.06.2014. There was violation of the transfer policy. While transferring, the employer must look into the personal inconveniences of the employee. The transfer was at a distant place at Gorakhpur in North Eastern Railway (NER). The applicant could not be denied the basic service conditions, nor the applicant‟s family. The applicant had to attend the pending case. He further submitted that in the case of a co-accused namely U. Akki Reddy, who was also transferred to a different zone, had filed the O.A.No.021/940/25 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, which had been allowed by order dated 06.03.2026, setting aside the order of his transfer. So, the applicant is also entitled for equality. The order of Tribunal deserves not to be interfered.

The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that prior to the final order dated 25.01.2026 in O.A, the Guntakal was operationally reorganized and merged in newly formed South Central Railway, SCOR, Zone with its Zonal Headquarters at Visakhapatnam has been disputed and denied by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitting that, on the date of the judgment dated 28.1.2026 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, no final notification was released or published by the Central Government for such reorganization. So, the applicant‟s transfer was from South Central Railway, Guntkal and not from South Coastal Railway Zone.

We have considered the above submissions in Point-B and are of the view that the transfer order has been set aside on the reasons assigned in the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal and that is, the alleged inconvenience to the applicant and his family. The observation made is that the material placed before the Tribunal by the applicant showed the hardships of the applicant so it warranted consideration and interference. A reading of the impugned order shows that, what prevailed is only inconvenience, due to the order of transfer. Legally, on such ground an order of transfer should not be interfered with. In every transfer there is bound to be some inconvenience. It is well settled that the judicial review of an order of transfer is permissible, only on grounds of violation of the statute or mala fide. It is settled that even if there is violation of non statutory transfer policy it would not vitiate the order of transfer. There is no right for enforcement of the guidelines on transfer unless those guidelines are statutory in nature. Based on the inconveniences or hardship, it is for the applicant to file application for consideration of his case by the competent departmental authorities. The applicant did not file any response before the authority.

In Union of India and others vs. S.L. Abbas,^{1717.(1997) 4 SCC 357} the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held in paras 6 and 7 as under:

In Sri Pubi Lombi vs. State of Arunachala Pradesh (Civil Appeal No.4129 of 2024 dated 13.03.2024), it was held in paras 9 and 10 which read as under:

Law is well settled, as been held in S.C. Sexena (supra) that a Government servant cannot disobey a transfer order by not reporting at the place of posting. Paras 6 and 8 read as follows:

Thus, considered our conclusions on the points A and B are as under:

In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 28.01.2026 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad in O.A.No.020/0933/2025 is quashed/set aside.

No order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.