The State Of Jharkhand & Ors. vs Krishnajee Rai

Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.

Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

This I.A. seeks condonation of the delay of 255 days in filing the appeal against the judgment dated 29.08.2024 made by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6591 of 2023.

From a perusal of the averments in the I.A., and upon hearing the Learned Counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to disclose any sufficient cause to explain the said inordinate delay of 255 days.

The application, in a nutshell, merely chronicles the acquisition of legal opinions, the collection of relevant records, and internal departmental procedures. It then concludes with a bare assertion that the grounds of appeal were subsequently drafted and the present appeal preferred. Also, and most importantly, the appellant has made no effort to account for the specific time intervals consumed at each stage of these departmental processes.

To be precise, it is apparent from paragraph 5 of the I.A. that the impugned order was passed on 29.08.2024. Yet, the very first concrete step adverted to in the application is dated 23.10.2024, i.e., after a lapse of almost two months. This step was taken when the representation received from the Respondent/Petitioner on 16.10.2024, along with a copy of the judgment dated 29.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6591 of 2023, was processed.

The I.A. seeks to attribute this initial delay to the shoulders of the Respondent/petitioner because the representation was filed by him only on 16.10.2024. However, such an explanation is wholly untenable. The impugned order was made after hearing the Appellant’s Counsel. Therefore, it was equally open to, and indeed incumbent upon, the appellant-department to diligently pursue the matter and ascertain its outcome.

Furthermore, the application is conspicuously silent as to any step taken by the department during this two-month period to inquire into the status of the writ petition.

Progressing further, Paragraph 8 of the application concludes by stating that the file was endorsed to the Deputy Director/Director on 25.11.2024 and thereafter to the Director-in-Chief for approval. However, following 25.11.2024, the file was transmitted to the Under Secretary only on 09.01.2025, after a hiatus of nearly 45 days, by the office of the Director-in-Chief.

This interregnum period remains wholly unexplained by the Appellant-State. That a duration of 45 days was utilized merely to route the file to the next administrative authority demonstrates gross apathy and laxity in the State’s functioning. Such institutional inertia constitutes nothing short of willful negligence and chronic lethargy, which cannot be countenanced under the scheme of the Limitation Act, 1963.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention that between 23.10.2024 and 07.03.2025, the file was placed before the Under Secretary for endorsement or perusal on as many as nine occasions. Similarly, during the very same period, the file was put forward before the Office of the Deputy Director, Director, and Director-in-Chief more than eight times. A duration of over five months was thus consumed merely in routine intra-departmental movements of the file; that too within the confines of the same administrative complex. This is precisely what the Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly deprecated, reiterating that the mere shuttle or processing of files from one departmental desk to another can never constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Moving forward, on 12.03.2025, the file was endorsed to the Additional Chief Secretary for granting approval. The said approval was granted on 08.04.2025, following which the file was once again transmitted to the office of the Under Secretary. It is pertinent to note here that a period of almost 27 days was consumed by the Additional Chief Secretary merely to grant approval to the file. In the absence of a plausible or cogent explanation for this period of inaction, this delay stands wholly unexcused.

Lastly, Paragraph 18 of the application asserts that upon obtaining the opinion of the learned Advocate General, the file, along with the grounds of appeal and the statement of facts, was transmitted to the office of the concerned Law Officer on 30.04.2025. However, despite the file having been so dispatched, the appeal came to be lodged before this Court only on 10.06.2025, after an unaccounted delay of 40 days.

The I.A. is entirely silent regarding this 40-day hiatus. Even at the final leg of institution, the delay remains wholly unexplained, failing to disclose “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and thereby disentitling the applicant to any discretionary relief.

Accordingly, what emerges from the above is that the delay is unsupported by any coherent or continuous explanatory chronology. The application merely catalogues routine departmental steps without addressing, even cursorily, why the matter remained dormant for such extended periods at the most material stages. An applicant seeking the extraordinary relief of condonation of delay must do more than narrate what eventually happened; it must also account for what did not happen.

Moreover, the law is well settled that casual averments and formulaic bureaucratic explanations do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay of this magnitude. The mere recitation that files moved through proper channels, that legal opinion was sought and obtained, that service records were called for, and that the appeal was eventually prepared, cannot, without more, justify the exercise of discretion in favour of the appellants. accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. In Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that delay cannot be condoned where the Government Department or the persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter and taking appropriate steps. The Court has held that in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government seeks condonation. The claim of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several noting cannot be invariably accepted in view of modern technologies being used and available. It was reiterated that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

In Union of India &Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D), through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even the length of the delay is a relevant factor that the Court must consider when dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Court noted that, from the tenor or approach of the appellants, it appeared that they sought to fix their own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost its right to have the matter considered on the merits because of its own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed that the delay was not deliberate, and in such circumstances the party cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserves to be preferred against technical considerations.

The Hon’ble Court also held that, when considering a plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if the cause assigned by the litigant is sufficient and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring the merits of the matter into aid for the purpose of condoning the delay. Further, the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity.

The Hon’ble Court held that the ‘Sword of Damocles’ cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for an indefinite period to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. The Court noted that in a plethora of decisions, it has been said that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. Where the appellants failed to demonstrate that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter, the delay cannot be condoned. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and casual attitude, the delay cannot be condoned on the grounds of doing substantial justice.

In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court conveyed an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delay should not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said, but courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, which also equally suffers the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimising effect to such a callous attitude of the State authorities or their instrumentalities and should remain extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at a later stage.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

Applying the above principles to the gross facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no sufficient cause has been shown; consequently, we dismiss this I.A. seeking condonation of the delay of 255 days in filing the accompanying appeal.

Resultantly, the accompanying appeal and the IAs, if any, therein, will not survive and are disposed of.