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Judgment
Kulwant Sahay, J.—I have had the advantage of reading the judgment about to be delivered by my learned brother Macpherson, J. and I agree with him and for the reasons given by him that this appeal should be dismissed.
I was a party to the decision in Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211 and although I agreed with the learned Acting Chief Justice that the appeals then under consideration should be decreed, I did not agree with his Lordship in all the reasons given by him for decreeing the appeals, la my opinion there is no absolute bar co the accrual of occupancy right in zerait land, and the only bar to the acquisition of such right is under circumstances contained in Section 116, Ben. Ten. Act, namely, when it is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year. If the landlord does act take the precaution of letting out the zerait land under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year he cannot prevent the accrual of occupancy right in zerait land.
Macpherson, J.
This appeal originally came before a Judge of this Court who referred it to a Division Bench and this Special Bench has now been constituted to determine it.
In the suit out of which the appeal has arisen the plaintiff who was the proprietor of the village sought confirmation of possession or in the alternative recovery of possession of a small plot of land on the allegation that it was his zerait so recorded in the Cadastral Record-of-Rights (apparently of 1899), with-his possession of which the defendant had interfered in 1331 P. on the strength of the erroneous entry in the Revisional Record-of-Rights of 1919 that it is the kaimi kasht of the defendant. The defendant pleaded that the entry in the Revisional Record-of-Rights was correct, and that in fact he had taken settlement of the plot from the plaintiff about nineteen years before suit on payment of salami, had been in possession ever since= and had a right of occupancy therein.
The Munsif held that the plaintiff had'' failed to rebut the presumption in favour of the land being defendant''s kaimi kasht which attaches to the entry to that effect in the Revisional Record-of-Rights, that defendant apart from being a settled raiyat of the village had proved possession for more than 12 years before suit, hat the suit was barred by limitation and that the disputed land was not the plaintiff''s zerait.
In appeal the learnel District Judge-also accepted the story of the defendant that he had taken raiyati settlement of of the land 19 years previously and had been in possession ever since and held that there was no evidence to rebut the.'' presumption attaching to the Revisional Record-of-Rights that the defendant was an occupancy raiyat of the plot. He further held in the absence of proof of the elements set out in Section 120, Ben. Ten. Act that the land was not zerait and'' tint the suit was barred by limitation.
In second appeal it is urged by Mr. Janak Kishore, first, that the lower appellate Court has erred in law in failing give effect to the presumption attaching, to the Cadastral Record-of-Rights that the land is zerait; and, secondly, that if the land is zerait as he contends, then on the decision in Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211 no occuyancy right can accrue in it.
In my opinion neither submission is sound. As to the first contention, the entry in the Revisional Record-of-Rights is in direct conflict with the entry in the earlier Cadastral Becord. Manifestly the later entry imports more than that the defendant has acquired a right of occupancy in land which is zerait, it implies that the plot is not zerait at all. If the finding had been that the defendant had acqnired a right of occupancy in land which is zerait, the entry would have been zerait kaimi or zerait dakhilkar as in the eases from the same district dealt with in the decision relied upon, and not kaimi kasht. It was for the plaintiff to rebut by evidence the presumption attaching to the entry in the recent Record-of-Rights. The lower appellate Court held that he failed to do so by the [evidence which he adduced. As has been pointed out in Abhiram Bedanta Vs. Chintamani Bedanta and Another, mere production of a contrary entry in an earlier Record-of-Rights, which was practically his only evidence, would not in law rebut the presumption that the land is not zerait. Indeed as was there said
It cannot in the absence of other consideations be said to be even reasonable to prefer the earlier entry, since the presumption is that it would not have been altered by the officer revising the Record-o�-Rights unless for good reasons. Such might be either that the position had changed or that the former entry was, in spite of the presumption of correctness attaching to it, proved to his satisfaction to be erroneous.
In the present instance the entry, which the officer revising the Record-of-Rights made, implies not merely that the position had changed in the interval by the acquistion of a right of occupancy in land which was zerait but that the entry of "zerait" in the record under revision was wrong (a fairly frequent occurrence in the early settlements in North Bihar), and ought to have been merely "bakasht malik" and further that the defendant raiyat as a consequence held as kasht and in fact had acquired a right of occupancy thereto (as on the evidence he certainly would do u/s 19, and as apparently he actually did u/s 21, Ben. Ten. Act from the date of settlement). Under the statute it lay on the plaintiff to rebut the consequent presumption in both its aspects, that is to say, to prove that the land is zerait, and further that even if it is zerait, a right of occupancy had not accrued in it in favour of defendant. The Courts below have found against plaintiff on both these points of fact.
In respect of the question of zerait, it is indeed further urged on behalf of the appellant that there were on the present record the same materials upon which the Revisional Officer arrived at his decision. But even if such were the case, the argument seeks to ignore the presumption of correctness attaching to the Record-of-Rights. The civil Court is not a Court of appeal from the decision of the officer who frames the Record-of-Rights but is bound to maintain the record unless it is definitely proved by evidence to be incorrect. Further more, the suggestion that the same materials are available to the civil Court as to the officer preparing or revising the Record-of-Rights is almost always untrue. It is based on a complete misapprehension of the circumstances attending the preparation of a Record-of-Rights locally, many important considerations before the settlement authorities being such that it is not feasible to indicate them in writing repeatedly, still less to record them in extenso. Then again in the present instance there are several special considerations of which two may be indicated.
In the first place an entry directly in opposition to the earlier entry would not be made without deep examination and the plaintiff has failed to put in evidence the proceedings before the revisional officer on which the latter changed the entry, as appellant contends erroneously. Further, it must be remembered that between the earlier and the later entry the law as to what was to be entered as zerait was altered in 1907 by the insertion of Sub-section 2(a) in Section 120 and it would be upon the plaintiff to show inter alia that the new provision could not apply. Accordingly the lower appellate Court committed no error of law in finding on a consideration of all the evidence that in spite of the presumption attaching to the Cadastral Record-of-Rights at the date when it was framed, the plaintiff''s evidence failed to rebut the presumption attaching to the entry of 1919 revising the entry of 1899 and that in fact the plot in controversy is not zerait of plaintiff.
As to the second point, it is a complete illusion that under the Bengal Tenancy Act a right of occupancy cannot accrue in true zerait land in Bihar. A person who, as in the case of defendant, holds land under another and who is liable to pay rent for it, is a "tenant" thereof. For the purposes of Bengal Tenancy Act a tenant includes a raiyat. If the tenant, as in this instance, holds the land for the purposes of cultivation he is a raiyat. A raiyat will in certain circumstances, which apply here, obtain a right of occupancy in that land under Ch 5 and non occupancy rights under Ch. 6 unless Section 116 is a bar. Section 116 which is in Ch. 11, which deals inter alia " with non-accrual of occupancy and non-occupancy rights," runs:
Nothing in Ch. 5 shall confer a right of occupancy in and nothing in Ch. 6 shall apply to a proprietor''s private lands known...in Bihar as zerait...where any such land is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year.
Manifestly Section 116 introduces a clear-out exception to the provisions of Ch. 5 the plain effect of which is that a right of occupancy is not under those provisions conferred in zerait in Bihar where the zerait is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year, but which does not extend to zerait not held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year. Prima facie there is nothing in the enactment to support the view that in no circumstances can a right of occupancy accrue in zerait. In the present instance there was neither a lease for a term of years nor a lease from year to year, so that even assuming the land to be zerait the exception does not cover it nor bar the accrual of a right of occupancy. If any possible doubt could arise on this point a consideration of Section 43 read with Section 118, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, would dispel it. There "landlord''s privileged lands" are differentiated into two Classes (1) the manjhihas found in bhuinhari villages in the Ranchi district and (2) other lands of the class.
Now under the provisions of Section 43 a right of occupancy shall not, notwithstanding the provisions of Ch. 4 of the Act (relating to the acquisition of a right of occupancy and corresponding to Ch. 5, Ben. Ten. Act) be acquired at all in manjhihas, whereas in the 2nd Class corresponding (with small distinctions immaterial for the present purpose) to zerait under Bengal Tenancy Act, a right of occupancy is explicitly barred only when they are held on registered lease for a term of years or on a lease for a period of one year or less. Palpably the legislature contemplated that in landlord''s privileged lands in Chota Nagpur other than manjhihas a right of occupancy could be acquired in all circumstances in which such acquisition is not expressly barred.
On behalf of the appellant reliance is placed substantially upon the decision of Jwala Prasad, A.C.J., in Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211 . It was indeed mainly to consider that decision that this Bench was constituted. Mention was also made of a recent decision of Jwala Prasad, J., in Shiva Shankar Prasad Pande Vs. Kali Ojha and Others, in which the learned Judge expressed the same view where the subject-matter of the litigation was manjhihas land in the Ranchi District. On behalf of the respondent reliance is placed on the language of the statute and on precedents and the points taken are (1) that the interpretation put upon Section 116 in these two decisions is for the reasons given above unsound and that there is nothing to prevent a right of occupancy from accruing in zerait except where the land is actually held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to. year; (2) that apart from the decisions cited there has been a long cursus curiae in favour of the accrual of occupancy and non occupancy rights in zerait under the local Tenancy Act save in exceptional circumstances set out in the statute in force for the time being, and that the view expressed in the oases cited on behalf of the appellant is in effect those of a single Judge, which was not shared by his learned colleagues was moreover not necessary for the decision of the case, and has been expressly held in the recent decision of this Court in Shiva Shankar Prasad Pande Vs. Kali Ojha and Others, to be, so far as the earlier decision is concerned, obiter dictum and (3) that the reasoning in the last mentioned decision applies in the present case.
The facts in that case shortly were that the defendants had in 1913 taken for agricultural purposes zerait land on a tenancy created otherwise than under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year and it was held rejecting the plea that non-occupancy rights cannot be acquired in zerait, that at the date of the institution of an ejectment suit within 12 years of 1913 the tenant had acquired non-occupancy rights notwithstanding Section 116, Ben. Ten. Act, on the plain meaning of which such rights were not barred under its provisions.
In my opinion the submissions on behalf of the respondent cannot be gain, said, and the view relied upon by the appellant is unsound.
The Rent Act 10 of 1859 denned for the first time the manner in which a right of occupancy could be acquired. Section 6 runs
Every raiyat who has cultivated or held land for a period of 12 years has a right of occupancy in the land so cultivated or held by him, whether it be held under patta or not, so long as he pays the rent payable on account of the same, but this rule does not apply to khamar, nij-jote or sir land belonging to the proprietor of the estate or tenure and let by him on lease for a term or year by year...
In interpreting this provision Glover and Mitter, JJ., held as follows in Gour Huree Singh v. Behari Raut [1869] 12 W.R. 277:
Although that section does exclude khamar, nij-jote and sir lands belonging to the proprietor of an estate, it only does so when such lands have been let by him on a lease for a term of years, or year by year. In this case, there is no evidence to show that the land was let to the defendant for a special term, or that he was only a yearly tenant of the same. There is nothing per se in the fact of the land being nij-jote which prevents a cultivator from acquiring rights of occupancy in it; and in this case, it has been found by the Judge on the evidence as a fact, that the plaintiff has been for more than 12 years in possession of the land paying rent to the trustee of the endowment, and that he has therefore acquired a right of occupancy.
That decision was followed by Morris, J., in Sheikh Ashruf v. Ramkishore Ghosh [1875] 23 W.R. 288. where it was held that before the case of a raiyat could be brought within the exception to Section 6 it must be shown by the landlord whether the raiyat has held on a lease for a term or year by year. In 1873 Phear and Morris, JJ., after expressing the view that unquestionably the Act did not prevent the zamindar from creating a holding in his nij-jote or kamat land if he chose, held in Jotee Roy v. Bheechuck Meah [1873] 20 W.R. 288. that where kamat land is let by a zemindar for a term of years and upon the expiration of that term tacitly let to the same tenant from year to year for a long period the tenant does not thereby acquire a right of occupancy. This decision was based on the language of Section 6
and let by him on lease for a term or year by year,
but when enacting the�Bengal Tenancy-Act in 1885 the legislature substituted in Section 116 the words
where the land is held under a lease for a. term of years or under a lease from year to year.
thereby considerably restricting the bar to the acquisition of a right of occupancy. Whereas on the language of Section & as interpreted in Jotee Roy v. Bheechuak Meah [1873] 20 W.R. 288. it was a sufficient bar that the tenant had been introduced on a lease and had on the expiry of the lease been allowed to carry on from year to year, u/s 116 mere introduction under a lease for a term followed by a verbal or a tacit reletting from year to year, is not enough to prevent the accrual of a. right of occupancy the raiyat must hold under a lease even if he holds from, year to year. The change is important as indicating that in 1885 the deliberate intention of the legislature was to limit further the non accrual of a right of occupancy and not enlarge it. Briefly the legislature in Section 116 intended to preserve zerait from an occupancy if the proprietor demonstrated in a specified manner his intention that it should be preserved from that right. No disability is imposed upon him. It would indeed be entirely unsafe to assume that it is in all circumstances in the interest of the proprietor to retain his zerait exempt from a right of occupancy. It may well be to his advantage to alter the status of the land for an immediate consideration whether in the shape of permission or of high rent. The great economic changes which have taken place must not be lost sight of and in particular the scarcity of labour for khas cultivation. First there has been the gradual loss of begari which the lower castes have long been increasingly reluctant to render either free or at traditionally low rates and again there has been a great increase in the cost of hired labour. There are on the other hand no considerations rendering unlikely the straightforward interpretation of Section 116 that it provides for the non-accrual of a right of occupancy only where the zamindar himself has taken the precaution of leasing for a term or leasing from year to year his zerait land and that it does not protect him when his failure to do so indicates that he is not concerned to prevent the accrual of a right of occupancy. Assuming that the heading of Chap. 11 is of value in construing Section 116, I hold that that provision does no more than bar the accrual of a right of occupancy in the circumstances specified.
The decisions of the Calcutta High Court on Section 116 support this view. Banerji and Rampini, JJ., in Sheonandan Roy v. Ajodh Roy [1899] 26 Cal. 546 said:
As was understand the section, its object is evidently to exclude the proprietor''s private lands from the operation of Chaps. 5 and 6 Ban. Ten. Act, provided that the proprietor has taken a certain precaution which is indicated by the concluding words of the section where any such land is held under a lease for a term of years or a lease from year to year.
The precaution is a lease of one of those two kinds which under the operation of Section 17(d), Registration Act must be registered. A similar view was taken in Masudan Singh v. Gudar Nath Pandey [1905] Cri.L.J. 456. and in Deonundun Pershad v. Meghu Mahton [1906] 34 Cal. 57 which referred to the two earlier cases. The decision in Dwarka Nath v. Tafazar Rahman [1916] 44 Cal. 267 is concerned with a question of limitation in respect of a tenant of zeraifc who was sought to be ejected on the expiry of a lease for a term and is on the same lines as the decision of the Judicial Committee in Jagannath Das v. Janki Singh AIR 1922 P.C. 142 to be presently noticed.
The earliest decision of this Court which has been cited is Janki Singh v. Jagannath Das [1917] 3 Pat. L.J. 1.
There the question for determination was whether the suit of a proprietor to eject his lessee of zerait who retained the land after the expiry of his lease in spite of the lessor''s demand for possession at such expiry, was subject to the limitation of six months provided in the case of a non-occupancy raiyat in Article 1(a), Schedule 3, Ben. Ten. Act and the majority of the Full Bench held in the affirmative on the basis that the defendant was a non-occupancy raiyat. In Jagannath Das v. Janki Singh AIR 1922 P.C. 142 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that in such circumstances defendant had become a trespasser on his refusal of the demand for possession and thus was not a tenant, so that he could not be a non-occupancy raiyat. The decision of their Lordships is restricted to the case where on the expiry of the lease there was no further tenancy and is manifestly of no assistance in cases like the present where there never had been a lease. But it is to be observed that the majority of the Full Bench held the view that under the Bengal Tenancy Act occupancy and non-occupancy rights can be acquired in zirait and indeed are clearly contemplated by Section 116 itself. In Babu Tilakdhari Lal and Another Vs. Mr. Abdul Wahab Khan and Others, . Miller, C.J. observed with reference to that section:
The kamat lands...may in cases where they are settled but not from year to year or for a term of years become subject to occupancy rights in the tenant.
Here he expressed the accepted view that zerait is not immune from the accrual of a right of occupancy except in circumstances where the lease specified in Section 116 exists.
There is a remark in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Dhakeshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Gulab Kuar AIR 1926 P.C. 60 with reference to the private lands of the zamindar that
in these lands the raiyat cannot acquire a right of occupancy,
but as is pointed out by Ross, J. in Shiva Shankar Prasad Pande Vs. Kali Ojha and Others, it occurs in a broad distinction drawn between raiyati and private lands and the later discussion of the case indicates that their Lordships'' decision cannot be read as laying down the proposition advanced by the appellant.
The subject-matter in Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211 decided in 1924 was land which formerly was indigo zerait of the Jaitpur factory. The ten second appeals filed by the proprietor which were heard together, though presenting considerable divergence of circumstances, have this in common that in both Records-of-Rights the land had been recorded as zerait (except in one case in which the land entered in the second Record-of-Rights as kaimi kasht was held to be actually zerait that the land had been held on lease in all instances even where the defendant had not (as was generally the case) been introduced by lease registered or unregistered for a term of years, and (sic) shortly that the last lease (sic)(sic) was insti-before the suit in ejectment been entuted. The defendants had also (sic) is, tered as zerait ghair.(sic)(sic) occupancy right (sic) (sic) in the case already men(sic) and in one other in which the entry in both records was zerait kaitmi. Introduction or holding by registered lease had been followed in most cases by a period of no lease, and then by a period of unregistered annual kabuliyats for bight or nine successive years and sometimes introduction by unregistered lease had been followed by a registered lease for a term of years. The term of a registered kabuliyat was usually five years except perhaps in one case where it may have been for ten years. In cases where introduction had been by registered lease, the view of Jwala Prasad, A.C.J. was that in the period of no lease the defendant was "holding under an expired lease" so that u/s 116, T.P. Act the defendant became a tenant from year to year. And broadly the view which he favours is that a right of occupancy cannot at all accrue in zerait.
Now it is important to observe that the cause of action alleged was the expiry of the lease on which the defendant had held. Prima facie, therefore, observations occurring in the judgment in those second appeals on the subject of zerait held otherwise than on lease would be obiter. The view expressed by the learned Judges who decided Shiva Shankar Prasad Pande Vs. Kali Ojha and Others, is that the observations of Jwala Prasad, A.C.J. in Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211 were obiter on the question before them. That question was whether Section 116, Ben. Ten. Act operated to prevent accrual of non-occupancy right in zerait which had not been held on a lease for a term or under a lease from year to year.
Now a right of occupancy in zerait will be barred by Section 116 in the same circumstances as a non-occupancy right so that the decision in Shiva Shankar Prasad Pande Vs. Kali Ojha and Others, is a direct authority of this Court that a right of occupancy can accrue in zerait. The conclusion at which I have arrived is that Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211 even apart from the fact that one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench declined to subscribe to the views there expressed, is not an authority for the contrary proposition. No doubt the argument in S.A. 725(to which S.A. 726 was similar), described as "the strongest case for the defendants," that the defendant having been inducted on the zerait verbally and before execution of a registered kabuliyat, the (sic) (sic) of a non-occupancy right was (sic) (sic) by Section 116 since on the Term of Zerait is held under (sic) (sic) lease for a term of zerait is held (sic) years or under a was rejected by Jwala (sic) in the following observations:
No doubt there are authorities to allow that in order to avail himself o� the provisions of Section 116 the landlord mast take the precaution of settling zerait lands under a lease for a term of years or a lease from year to year and consequently where ha brings the tenant upon the land under a verbal lease he is not entitled to the benefit of Section 116. The trend of the authorities no doubt favours this contention but after having given due consideration to the point and having considered fully the objects and scope of the Bengal Tenancy Act I doubt whether the contention is sound and the view talon by the various authorities is correct. It appears to mi that the Bengal Tenancy Act purports to deal principally with raiyat lands and to deal with the relationship between landlord and tenant. It seem to ma that the proprietor''s private lands are wholly outside the scope of the Bengal Tenancy Act and settlement of those lands are governed not by the Bengal Tenancy Act but by the codified law in the Transfer of Pro-party Act. The concluding words of Section 116 are not happy and may give rise to the view hitherto advocated that the accrual of occupancy and non-occupancy rights in zerait lands will only be barred in cases where the landlord settles the land with a tenant under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year which read with Section 107, T, P. Act means a registered lease in writing.
The learned Judge then expressed the view that the lesseeof zerait is not a raiyat but is a tenant of a class outside the classes enumerated in Section 4, Ben. Ten. Act and cited his own decision in Janki Singh v. Jagannath Das [1917] 3 Pat. L.J. 1. His conclusion is that the section required to provide only against a lease for a term of years and a lease from year to year.
Now the defendant in S.A. 725 had been shown in both Records-of-Rights as zerait ghair dakhilkar and had in 1902 executed a registered kabuliyat for five years. From the absence of an entry of occupancy right in 1899 (the defendant being a settled raiyat) the learned Acting Chief Justice inferred very recent settlement and said;
They (defendants) might have held the zerait lands just before the rights of the parties were settled by the registered kabuliyat of 1902.
Manifestly therefore the finding of fact is that in the circumstances of the case under discussion the settlement with the defendant was substantially under the kabuliyat of 1902. Apart, therefore, from the question whether the decision itself is correct, it is clearly obiter so far as it relates to zerait which the tenant does not hold under a lease such as is specified in Section 116.
But, in my judgment, the observations quoted, which obtain no support in any of the numerous decisions on the point, do not for the reasons stated above give a correct interpretation of the law. Further, the existence of Section 116, Ben. Ten. Act itself shows that zerait is not wholly outside the scope of the Bengal Tenancy Act while Section 117, Transfer of Property Act excludes leases for agricultural purposes from the operation of Chap. 5 of that enactment which includes Section 116. I can find no support in Jagannath Das v. Janki Singh AIR 1922 P.C. 142 for the view that a tenant of zerait is a tenant at will and cannot be a raiyat, nor for the view that the concluding words of Section 116, Ben. Ten. Act are not happy or mean anything but what they say. To my mind the law gives protection against accrual to a raiyat of a right of occupancy or non-occupancy in zerait only so long as the land is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year, which lease must be registered. Nothing else can prevent a raiyat from acquiring such right in zerait. Even when the term of a lease expires and the lessee continues expressly or by implication in occupation as a raiyat, only a fresh lease of the kind specified in Section 116 can prevent accrual of a right of occupancy under Chap. 5.
I would hold therefore that Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211 was not correctly decided. A word is necessary as to the decision in Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo and Another Vs. Jagannath Mahto and Others, . That turned upon the very simple question whether a notice to quit was necessary, before a lessee of manjhihas land holding on annual leases could be ejected on the expiry of his last lease. The first point of course is that manjhihas, which is a peculiar tenure confined to certain aboriginal villages in the Ranchi district, does not at all correspond to zerait in Bihar. The latter, as already indicated, approximates to that variety of '' landlord''s privileged lands described in Clause 1(a), Section 118, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act which excludes manjhihas. In the case cited Wort, J. based his decision on the fact that there was no tenancy from year to year but merely an annual one which terminated with the end of the year by the effluxion of time so that notice could not be necessary. No more was necessary for the determination of the question at issue.
Jwala Prasad, J., however, followed the lines of his decision in Ramji Ram v. Banshi Raut AIR 1925 Pat. 211. But in a case relating to manjhihas no question could arise as to landlord''s privileged lands other than manjhihas, and manifestly his observations were obiter. Indeed u/s 43, Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act there is, as already indicated, a clear differentiation between manjhihas and other '' landlord''s privileged land '' in respect of the acquisition of occupancy right therein under Chap. 4 or the application thereto of the provisions (i.e. Chap. 6) of the Act relating to non-occupancy right. In the case of manjhihas no occupancy right can be acquired under Chapter 5 nor does Chap. 6 apply whereas in respect to the other class of landlord''s privileged lands there are provisions in the Act substantially on the lines of Section 116, Ben. Ten. Act (with modifications in details due to local conditions). Only the latter can have any analogy to zerait in Bihar. And the law as to acquisition of occupancy and non-occupancy right (subject to the aforesaid modifications) is the same in respect of both.
In my opinion this appeal is without merit and I would dismiss it with costs.
Dhavle, J.
I agree.