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Judgment
In view of the commonality of the issue and grievance, these Writ Petitions are analogously heard and taken up for disposal by way of this common order. For the sake of convenience, the facts in W.P.No.31413 of 2025 are taken as reference.
The Writ Petition No.31413 of 2025 is filed seeking to set aside the order dated 02.01.2020 passed in I.A.No.131 of 2019 in USR No.751 of 2019 by the 2nd respondent - Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and to direct the 2nd Respondent to receive the Appeal bearing USR No.751 of 2019 filed against the order of the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, EPFO, Patancheru, Sanga Reddy District vide TS/PTC/39408/7Q/Order/374 and TS/PTC/39408/14B/ Order/373.
The Writ Petition No.37788 of 2022 is filed seeking to set aside the order dated 02.01.2020 passed in I.A.No.132 of 2019 in USR No.752 of 2019 by the 2nd respondent - Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and to direct the 2nd Respondent to receive the Appeal bearing USR No.752 of 2019 filed against the order of the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, EPFO, Patancheru, Sanga Reddy District vide TS/PTC/39407/14B Order/369 and TS/PTC/39407/7Q Order/370.
Heard Sri N.Sreedhar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for TGSPDCL for the petitioner and Sri G.Venkateswarlu, learned Standing Counsel for E.P.F.O. for respondent No.1 in W.P.No.31413 of 2025 and Sri R.Vinod Reddy, learned Standing counsel for TGSPDCL, for the petitioner and Sri B.Manoj Kumar, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.1 in E.P.F.O in W.P.No.37788 of 2022. Perused the record.
Learned counsel for petitioner in W.P.No.31413 of 2025 submits that the petitioner company was established by the Government of Telangana to distribute electricity, engaged contractors for certain works, who in turn employed workers. As per agreements, the petitioner paid wages and provident fund amounts to the contractors, who were responsible for remitting them to the Provident Fund Commissioner. Earlier, under Section 7A of the EPF Act, the Provident Fund Commissioner vide order dated 25.02.2008 ordered the petitioner Company to pay Rs.16,20,033 /- for the period from January 2003 to February, 2006. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner Company filed an appeal before the EPF Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi bearing Appeal No.473 (1)/2008 and the same was allowed vide common order dated 23.04.2008 in APA Nos.471, 472 and 473(1)/2008 by quashing the order dated 25.02.2008 passed by the PF Commissioner. Despite this, the PF authorities reopened the case and issued fresh summons and orders in 2016 - 2017, demanding Rs.7,32,024/- (interest under Section 7Q) and Rs.15,91,104/- (penal charges under Section 14B), and directly debited Rs.23,23,128/- from the petitioner's bank account without prior notice. The petitioner filed an appeal on 12.06.2018 but, due to delay, also filed a condonation petition under Section 7-I(2) of the EPF Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The 2nd respondent dismissed the condonation petition on 02.01.2020 without considering the reasons for the delay and wrongly held that no petition under the Limitation Act was filed. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. It is submitted that the 2nd respondent's order is against the law and the EPF Act, as it ignores the Tribunal's earlier order quashing the 2008 proceedings. Reviving those proceedings violates res judicata. The delay petition was dismissed without reasons, notice, or hearing, breaching natural justice and is liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel for the respondents submit that, under Rule 7 of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997, an appeal must be filed within 60 days, with an additional 60 days available for condonation if sufficient cause is shown, making a total of 120 days, but the present appeal was filed well beyond the maximum permissible period. He relied on case of Commissioner of Custom and Central Excise Vs. Hango Indian Pvt. Ltd1, wherein it is stated that in the absence of any clause to condone the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this case, since the appeal was filed after expiry of the Limitation period of 611 days excluding the statutory period of 60 + 60 days, the same is not maintainable. Hence, the Tribunal rightly dismissed the condone delay petition.
Learned Standing Counsel for the respondents relied on the Order dated 06.11.2024 passed by this Court in W.P.No.26481 of 2023. He further relied on the Judgment dated 08.11.2021 passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.539 of 2008, wherein the operative portion in the said order is as follows:
“The statutory provisions governing the field as contained under Rule 7 of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997, are reproduced as under:
“Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal”
(1)Every appeal filed with the Registry shall be accompanied by a fee of two thousand rupees to be remitted in the form of crossed demand draft on a nationalised bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the station where the seat of the said Tribunal is situated
(2)Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an Order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.
Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.
Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by a Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal [a Demand Draft Payable in the Fund and bearing] 75 per cent of the amount due from him as determined under Section 7-A;
Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section 7-O."
The aforesaid statutory provision of law makes it very clear that an appeal has to be preferred within 60 days from the date of the order passed under Section 7-A of the Act of 1952 and the Tribunal enjoys power to condone the delay up to a period of 60 days after the prescribed period. After 120 days, the Tribunal does not have a jurisdiction to entertain the appeal or to condone delay
In these circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, Tribunal was justified in dismissing of appeal and the learned Single Judge was also justified in dismissing the Writ Petition. In the considered opinion of this Court, as the Act of 1952 does not provide for condonation of delay beyond 120 days, this Court also cannot rewrite the Statute by condoning the delay."
Considering the submissions made by both the learned counsel and a perusal of the record, it is evident that the appeal before the Tribunal was filed beyond the statutory limitation period of 120 days prescribed under Rule 7 of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997. It is noted that the Tribunal rightly dismissed the condonation petition as it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed after the prescribed period. Further, the petitioner has failed to show sufficient cause for delay, and the principles of natural justice were not violated. The plea of res judicata is also not applicable to the fresh proceedings. Hence, these writ petitions are devoid of merits and the same are liable to be dismissed.
In the above findings and in the light of the Judgment passed by the Hon'ble Division bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.539 of 2008, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
Footnotes
- 1.2009 Vol.5 SSC page 791