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Judgment
HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (Oral)
The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of an appropriate writ or order in the nature of certiorari for quashing the selection of respondents No.5 to 7 on the post of Assistant Professor as per advertisement dated 17.07.2014 and appointment thereof qua the post of Assistant Professor having been made on extraneous consideration and same is liable to be set aside. Further praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents No.1 to 4 to give appointment to the petitioner on the post of Assistant Professor in Commerce being higher in merit than the private respondents.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that respondent No. 3 issued an advertisement dated 17.07.2014 (Annexure P-1), inviting applications for three posts of Assistant Professor in Commerce under the General Category. As per the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement, a candidate was required to possess a Master's degree in the relevant subject from a recognised university with at least 55% marks and to have qualified the National Eligibility Test (NET) in the relevant subject, subject to the applicable exemptions. The petitioner, being fully eligible for the post, applied for the same. Learned counsel further submits that the selection criteria, as reflected in Annexure P-3, provided for allocation of marks for academic qualifications and other relevant achievements, including teaching experience, publications, participation in seminars and other prescribed activities, besides marks for the interview. It is contended that the selection process was required to be conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed criteria to ensure fairness and transparency in the selection.
Learned counsel argues that the petitioner was awarded 36 marks out of 50 under the prescribed criteria, whereas respondent No. 5, Anil Kumar, was awarded 23 marks, as discernible from Annexure P-4. On this basis, learned counsel contends that the petitioner had secured more marks under the prescribed criteria than the selected candidates and that the award of marks during the interview materially altered the relative merit position of the candidates. Learned counsel further emphasises that there are discrepancies between the marks reflected in Annexure P-4 and those appearing in Annexure R-3/2 filed by respondent No. 3. It is contended that the variation between the two sets of marks raises serious questions regarding the manner in which the marks were assessed and awarded to the candidates. Learned counsel particularly alleges that respondent No. 5 was awarded marks for publications and seminars despite, not possessing publications or participation particulars warranting the award of such marks. It is, therefore, argued that the marks awarded under these heads were unjustified and that the selection process was not conducted in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
Learned counsel also places reliance upon the communication dated 18.06.2014 issued by the Director General, Higher Education, Haryana, annexed as Annexure P-8. The said communication prescribed the permissible range of marks to be awarded in interviews for the posts in question and stipulated that marks below 5 or above 15 could be awarded only in exceptional cases where the candidate was found to be exceptionally good or poor, with reasons for awarding such marks duly recorded in the proceedings signed by all members of the Selection Committee. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was awarded only 6 marks in the interview, whereas the selected candidates were awarded substantially higher marks. It is contended that the disparity in the interview marks, particularly when considered alongside the alleged discrepancies in the marks awarded under the other heads, gives rise to a serious apprehension regarding the fairness of the selection process.
Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner sought information under the Right to Information Act regarding the candidates who had appeared for the interview, the marks awarded to them, the constitution of the Selection Committee and the approval granted to the selected candidates. It is contended that the information received did not satisfactorily explain the discrepancies alleged by the petitioner. Further the award of interview marks substantially affected the final merit position, resulting in the selection of candidates who had allegedly secured fewer marks than the petitioner under the other prescribed criteria.
On the aforesaid basis, learned counsel contends that the selection and appointment of the private respondents are vitiated by arbitrariness and deviation from the prescribed selection criteria. It is accordingly prayed that the selection of the private respondents be set aside and appropriate consequential directions be issued in favour of the petitioner in accordance with law.
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT’S
Learned counsel for respondents No. 4 and 5, while making their submissions jointly, contends that the petitioner has not placed the complete record on the writ petition file. It is submitted that the record was summoned by this Court vide order dated 12.03.2020 and was subsequently produced before the Court. Learned counsel, therefore, contends that the petitioner has raised disputed questions of fact which cannot appropriately be adjudicated in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Learned counsel for respondent No.3, on the other hand, submits that the original record was produced before this Court on earlier occasions and is also available in Court today. Referring to the original record, learned counsel contends that the petitioner’s assertion that she secured 36 marks under the prescribed criteria, whereas respondent No.5 secured 23 marks, is factually incorrect. It is further submitted that the petitioner does not figure amongst the first nine candidates. Learned counsel further submits that respondent No.5 was awarded 10 marks for publications and 5 marks for seminars, as reflected in the marks awarded under the prescribed selection criteria. It is contended that the relevant supporting documents were placed before the Selection Committee. Learned counsel further submits that photocopies of the said documents are in the possession of the inspecting officials and have been produced before the Court today.
OBSERVATIONS
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case with their able assistance. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that, under the prescribed selection criteria, she had secured 36 marks under the heads of Academic Record and Assessment of Domain Knowledge and Teaching Skills, whereas respondent No.5 had allegedly secured only 23 marks, thereby leaving a difference of 13 marks in her favour. The petitioner contends that such a difference could not have been overcome by respondent No.5 except by awarding him disproportionately high marks in the interview and by awarding her an artificially low score.
It is relevant to notice that, while considering the matter at the initial stage, this Court, vide order dated 19.03.2015, recorded the aforesaid submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Taking note of the nature of the grievance raised, the Court dismissed the writ petition qua respondents No. 6 and 7, observing that the marks obtained by them were not as low as those obtained by respondent No. 5, and issued notice of motion qua the remaining respondents. The aforesaid order, however, recorded the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner at that stage. The correctness of the comparative marks, therefore, falls to be examined in the light of the complete record subsequently produced before the Court.
A perusal of the selection criteria prescribed for the post in question, as reflected in Annexure P-3, read with the comparative statement of marks furnished by respondent No. 3 and the material produced before this Court, reveals that the petitioner secured 37 marks, whereas respondent No. 5 secured 38 marks under the heads of Academic Record and Assessment of Domain Knowledge and Teaching Skills, taken together, out of 80 marks. Thus, the petitioner’s assertion that she had secured 36 marks, whereas respondent No. 5 had secured only 23 marks, resulting in a difference of 13 marks in her favour, is not borne out by the aforesaid comparative statement. Rather, respondent No. 5 secured one mark more than the petitioner under the aforesaid heads. The relevant selection criteria and distribution of marks prescribed under Annexure P-3 read as under:
“CRITERIA DISTRIBUTION — MARKS DISTRIBUTION
(A)Academic Record — 50%
(B)Assessment of Domain Knowledge & Teaching Skills — 30%
(C)Interview Performance — 20%
Total: 100 Marks
(A)Academic Record — 50 Marks
(B)Assessment of Domain Knowledge & Teaching Skills — 30 Marks
I. Publications — Maximum 10 Marks
II. Research Performance — Maximum 5 Marks
III. Co-curricular Activities — Maximum 5 Marks
IV. Sports — Maximum 5 Marks
V. Teaching Experience — Maximum 5 Marks
(C)Interview — 20 Marks
(i)Subject Knowledge & Concept Clarity — 10 Marks
(ii)Communication Skills & ICT Knowledge — 5 Marks
(iii)Overall Personality — 5 Marks
Grand Total: (A) 50 + (B) 30 + (C) 20 = 100 Marks.”
The aforesaid criteria has to be read alongside the comparative statement of marks furnished by respondent No.3 in its written statement. The said statement records the following position:
| Marks as per | ||
| criteria | ||
| 33 | ||
Anil Kumar (respondent No. 2. 38 15 53 5) 3. Dr. Rakhi 38 14 52 Suman Rani Pannu 4. 37 6 43 (petitioner)
A perusal of the aforesaid statement reveals that the petitioner was awarded 37 marks under the prescribed criteria, as against 38 marks awarded to respondent No. 5. Thus, the assertion that the petitioner had secured 36 marks whereas respondent No. 5 had secured only 23 marks under the first two heads is not borne out by the comparative statement relied upon by respondent No. 3. Rather, the said statement reflects that respondent No.5 secured one mark more than the petitioner under the prescribed criteria.
It is further evident from the comparative statement that respondent No. 5 was awarded 15 marks in the interview, whereas the petitioner was awarded 6 marks. Consequently, respondent No.5 secured 53 marks in all, while the petitioner secured 43 marks. The difference in the interview marks is, therefore, apparent from the record. However, the mere fact that one candidate secured higher marks in the interview than another does not, by itself, establish that the selection process was arbitrary or that the marks were deliberately manipulated. The legality of the selection has to
| Marks in | |
| interview | |
| 15 | |
| Total | ||
| marks | ||
| 48 | ||
be assessed with reference to the prescribed criteria, the material available on record and the specific allegations raised by the petitioner.
The petitioner has also questioned the award of marks to respondent No. 5 under the heads of publications and seminar participation, alleging that he did not possess the requisite supporting credentials to justify the award of such marks. The said contention was noticed by this Court vide order dated 12.03.2020, pursuant to which respondent No. 3 was directed to produce the record. In response thereto, the comparative statement of marks and photocopies of the supporting documents have been produced before this Court. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the marks under the aforesaid heads were awarded on the basis of the material placed before the Selection Committee. The petitioner, on the other hand, has questioned the correctness of the assessment made by the Selection Committee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the mere allegation that respondent No. 5 was not entitled to the marks awarded to him, in the absence of sufficient material establishing that the assessment was contrary to the prescribed criteria, does not, by itself, warrant interference with the selection.
The petitioner’s challenge to the selection must, therefore, be considered on the basis of the material available on record and not merely on the numerical comparison pleaded in the writ petition. The comparative statement furnished by respondent No. 3 contradicts the petitioner’s assertion that respondent No.5 had secured only 23 marks under the prescribed criteria. The petitioner has, thus, failed to substantiate her principal contention that respondent No. 5 overcame an alleged shortfall of 13 marks solely through the award of interview marks. The difference in the interview scores, by itself, is insufficient to establish arbitrariness in the selection.
Furthermore, it is settled law that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the proper remedy. A two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 1, speaking through Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, has held as follows:
"16.In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
Further a two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Orissa Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bharati Industries 2005 (12) 725 while speaking through Justice Arijit Pasayat, observed that as follows:
“9.A bare perusal of the High Court's judgment shows that there was clear non-application of mind. On one hand the High Court observed that the disputed questions cannot be gone into a writ petition. It was also noticed that essence of dispute was breach of contract. After coming to the above conclusions the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition. Surprisingly, the High Court proceeded to examine the case solely on the writ petitioner's assertion and on a very curious reasoning that though the appellant-Corporation claimed that the value of articles lifted was nearly rupees 14.90 lakhs no details were specifically given. From the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court it is crystal clear that relevant details disputing claim of the writ petitioner were given. Value of articles lifted by the writ petitioner is a disputed factual question. Where a complicated question of fact is involved and the matter requires thorough proof on factual aspects, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. Whether or not the High Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would largely depend upon the nature of dispute and if the dispute cannot be resolved without going into the factual controversy, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition. As noted above, the writ petition was primarily founded on allegation of breach of contract. Question whether the action of the opposite party in the writ petition amounted to breach of contractual obligation ultimately depends on facts and would require material evidence to be scrutinised and in such a case writ jurisdiction should not be exercised. (See : State of Bihar v. Jain Plastic & Chemicals Ltd., 2002(1) SCC 216).
10.In a catena of cases this Court has held that where dispute revolves round questions of fact, the matter ought not be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution”
CONCLUSION
In the absence of sufficient material establishing that the prescribed selection criteria were violated or that the marks were awarded arbitrarily, no ground is made out for interference by this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
The original record, after examination by the Court, is returned to the person concerned.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
