Sudama Paswan & Ors. vs State Of Jharkhand & Ors.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

This batch of writ petitions is heard together, as the relief and the contentions by the parties sought is common in nature and disposed of as a common order. On the request of the parties, WP(S) 4915 of 2025 (Abhishek Kumar and Ors v. State of Jharkhand and Ors) is taken up as the lead case.

In the instant petitions, the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order, bearing Reference No. 1575, dated January 16, 2025, issued by the First Appellate Authority-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Palamu (Annexure-7), by which the services of the Petitioners have been terminated. The Petitioner has further prayed for all consequential reliefs.

Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Ld. Counsel representing the Petitioners, assisted by Mr. Parth Jalan. Adv, submits that the Petitioners in these batch of cases are all para-teachers working in two blocks within the District of Palamu, i.e., Naudiah Bazar and Chhatarpur. The services of the Petitioner have been terminated by virtue of the impugned order dated 16.1.2025 by the First Appellate Authority-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Palamu.

Ld. Counsel further submits that the impugned order is common in all the petitions. The impugned order contains eight annexures (Annexure A to H). Annexure-A and B are such para-teachers, whose appointment and qualification has found to be in accordance with law.

Annexure C and Annexure D, are persons serving as para-teachers in Naudiah Bazar and Chhatarpur respectively. The persons mentioned in these categories are those whose services have been terminated on the ground that the Block level recommendation submitted by candidates, did not match with the recommendation in the Block Offices. The persons whose name feature in Annexure C of the impugned order have filed WP(S) 4785 of 2025 and whose names are part of Annexure D of the impugned order have filed WP(S) 4917 of 2025.

Learned counsel for the Petitioners, further submits that the next category of Petitioners is those whose names feature in Annexure E and Annexure F of the impugned order. These are such para-teachers whose services are terminated on account that they failed to provide documents pertaining to their recommendations from the block office. Their recommendation was also not found in the block offices. Such persons whose names feature in Annexures E have filed WP(S) No. 4915 of 2025, WP(S) No. 4787 of 2025 and WP(S) No. 5240 of 2025. Persons whose name feature in Annexure F of the impugned order have filed WP(S) No. 5080 of 2025.

Learned counsel representing the Petitioners on merits submits that the Petitioners’ appointment was made between the years 2006 and 2008 under the Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan implemented by Notification dated August 4, 2002, and accordingly the Petitioners were in service for more than 16 years. The appointment of para teachers under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan was made by the Aam Sabha of the concerned village pursuant to an advertisement. Recommendations made by the Aam Sabha was submitted to the block office, whereupon after proper scrutiny, agreements were executed by and between the selected candidate and Secretary of the Aam Sabha.

The Ld. counsel submits that in the case at hand, advertisements were issued, and pursuant to the selections, recommendations were made to the block office, after which agreements were signed.

Learned counsel further submits that in the year 2012, an inquiry was initiated on the basis of certain complaints raising concerns pertaining to a discrepancy in the selection/appointment of para-teachers. However, as the inquiry itself suffered from several lacunae, another inquiry was directed in the year 2019. The findings returned in the inquiry conducted in the year 2019, contradicted with the findings returned in the year 2012. This resulted in the constitution of a special committee by the Vidhan Sabha, which recommended that a fresh inquiry be conducted by a high-powered committee. In light of such recommendation, a high-powered committee was constituted vide notification dated 19.03.2021 (Annexure E of the counter-affidavit).

The High-Powered Committee, in its report dated 30.11.2022 (Annexure F of the counter-affidavit), found that a total of 512 para-teachers (302 para-teachers from Chattarpur and 210 para-teachers from Naudiah Bazar), whose selection/recommendation was not in accordance with the guidelines. On the basis of this, the respondent JEPC, in its 64th sitting on 10.7.2023, recommended that such persons who met the eligibility criteria, at the time of their appointment but their selection process suffered from some discrepancy in the selection process would be treated as a special case, and all benefits under the Jharkhand Assistant Teacher Service Rules, 2015, would be given to such candidates. However, the services of such candidates who neither met the eligibility criteria, nor was their selection process done in accordance with law, was to be removed from service. These recommendations were forwarded to the disciplinary cum administrative committee for further action. Pursuant to such a recommendation and until a decision was taken by the disciplinary cum administrative committee, the State Project Director, vide his order dated 13.10.2023, directed that no services would be taken from these 512 teachers. The petitioners assailed the said order by filing a batch of writ petitions, being WP(S) No. 6021 of 2023 and other analogous cases. This Court, vide its order dated 1.7.2024, refused to interfere with the order dated 13.10.2023, primarily on the ground that the issue was pending before the disciplinary cum administrative committee, but directed that the concerned authority should take a decision expeditiously.

The Disciplinary Administrative Committee took a decision in favour of the petitioners on 13.03.2024 and 27.04.2024. However, the said decision was assailed before the First Appellate Authority (i.e. Deputy Commissioner, Palamu), who passed the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner.

On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Gadodia representing the Petitioners submits that the impugned order is not only arbitrary but also perverse. He contended that the cases of such para-teachers whose selection process suffered from certain procedural lacunae were treated to be special cases, and their services were to be regularised. The Ld. Counsel, on basis of paragraph xi) of the counter-affidavit (filed in WP(S) No. 4915 of 2025), submits that the admitted position is that the disciplinary cum administrative committee had held in the favour of the Petitioners. He further submits that only such candidates who did not possess the eligibility criteria were liable to be terminated.

Learned counsel specifically submitted that the Petitioners before this Court are meeting the eligibility criteria as required at the time of their appointment. According to the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner, this is apparent from the fact that such persons who did not possess the eligibility criteria were kept in a separate category, and their names feature in Annexure G and Annexure H of the impugned order, while the name of the Petitioners before this Court features in Annexure C to F of the impugned order.

Further, the Learned counsel submits that it was not the onus of the petitioners to submit the recommendation made by the block-level committee. The same was an internal procedure which had to be done by the respondents themselves. He has tried to substantiate the same by placing heavy reliance on the information provided to the Special Committee on 26.07.2019, which categorically states that the onus to maintain all documents pertaining to the selection of the para teachers was to be maintained in the office of the block education project officer or in the office of the District Education Superintendent.

The Ld. counsel further submits that the long-term service of the petitioner has been terminated merely on the premise that either the block-level recommendation submitted by the petitioners did not match with that found in the block-level office, or the petitioners failed to submit the same before the first appellate authority. He submits that when the onus to maintain the documents was with respondent itself; there was no occasion for the petitioners to have submitted such recommendation.

Learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on the documents containing details for verification and updation, uploaded by respondent itself on e-vidyavahini portal, which specifically contains the date of approval by the block committee/induction training. He submits that the e-vidyaavahini portal was formed pursuant to notification issued on 24.10.2019, the purpose for which was to update all information pertaining to the para-teachers. Once the respondent themselves has accepted the date of approval by the block committee, the findings returned by the first appellate authority become perverse. A table to this effect has been submitted by the Learned counsel for the Petitioner, which is reproduced as under:

Mr. Gadodia submitted that the RTI reply dated 8.7.2015, strengthens his contention that the impugned order has been passed on the basis of conjunctures, as in the reply to an application preferred under the Right to Information Act, 2005, it has been categorically stated that no list pertaining to the recommendations made by the block-level committee is present at the block office.

It is next contended that the first appellate authority has passed the impugned order without considering the recommendation made in the 64th committee meeting. He submits that the impugned order violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as even the case of the petitioner also ought to be treated as a special case as, even if the grounds taken in the impugned order are accepted, the same would only amount to a procedural lacuna and would not make the appointment itself illegal, especially in light of the fact that the petitioners possessed the required eligibility criteria at the time of their appointment.

In order to buttress his arguments further, the Ld. Counsel representing the petitioner has relied in the case of Shankar Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand and Ors (MANU/JH/0013/2010), wherein the Hon'ble Court had held that long-term services cannot be terminated on the basis of allegations that the appointment process was not followed. Drawing strength from the order passed in the case of Arjun Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Ors reported in (2017 (2) JLJR 647), the Ld. counsel representing the petitioner submits that the employee cannot be penalized if any document which ought to be in the custody of the employer is not produced or goes missing.

He lastly submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gaurav Mehla and Ors v. State of Haryana and Ors reported in (2026 SCCOnline SC 1107), has divided any recruitment process into three distinct stages, which are-issuance of proper advertisement, conducting a fair and transparent selection process, and appointment by a competent authority. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when the first two stages, that is, issuance of proper advertisement and conducting a fair and transparent selection process, are done properly, any discrepancy in appointment by a competent authority cannot go into the root of the recruitment process itself, and would not vitiate, more so when such persons have already served for a long time.

Per contra, Mr. Krishna Murari, Ld. Counsel representing the Respondent-JEPC, vehemently opposed the relief sought by the petitioners on the ground of maintainability of the writ petition itself. He submitted that petitioners ought to have approached the second appellate authority, that is, the State Project Director, in terms of Rule 16 of the Jharkhand Assistant Teacher Service Rules, 2021. He submits that in the presence of an alternate and efficacious remedy, this court cannot exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to further buttress his argument, he has relied on the case of Leelawati N. and Ors v. State of Karnataka and Ors reported in (2025 SCC Online SC 2253). The respondents have filed a specific interlocutory application with respect to the same.

Learned counsel representing the Respondent further submits that, even otherwise, this Court cannot look into the soundness of the decision, but can only see if proper procedure has been followed. This argument has been strengthened by him relying on the case of Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Ors v. AMR Dev Prabha and Ors reported in (2020) 16 SCC 759.

As far as the merits of the case are concerned, the Ld. counsel on behalf of the respondent submits that block-level recommendations are mandatory, and in the case of the petitioner, such block-level recommendation was lacking. This aspect of the matter, according to the petitioner, has been long settled by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Usha Kumari and Ors v. State of Jharkhand and Ors (LPA No. 151 of 2018).

Respondents further submitted that the petitioners are persons who did not possess the requisite qualification at the time of their appointment, and also due procedure was not followed. In such cases, no sympathy is warranted to the Petitioners. The Ld. Counsel has relied on the case of State of Orissa and Anr v. Mamta Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436, where the Hon'ble Apex Court held that education connotes the process of training and developing the knowledge, skills, minds, and character of students by formal schools. As the excellence of instruction provided by an educational institution mainly depends directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, it is important that they themselves possess a good academic record/minimum qualification prescribed as an eligibility standard, failing which education cannot be maintained.

Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner in reply had submitted that there is a distinction between entertainability and maintainability of a writ petition. The exhaustion of statutory remedy is a rule of judicial policy and discretion, rather than an absolute judicial bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He categorically submits that where the action by a subordinate authority is perverse, unreasonable, and suffers from a manifest error going to the very root of determination, then, in such a case, the self-imposed restriction of an alternate remedy would not apply. He submits that, in the case at hand, the impugned orders were passed without taking into consideration vital documents such as the verified and uploaded records in the e-vidyavahini portal, which leave no doubt that the petitioners’ appointment were approved from the block-level committee. Once it is established that vital evidence, which must have been considered by the authority, has been overlooked, then, in such a case, the impugned order would suffer from manifest error and perversity, leaving it open for this Court to entertain the writ petition.

He further submits that the alternative remedy proposed should also be efficacious. In the case at hand, the second appellate authority is the State Project Director who has already disclosed his mind as being a member of not only the 64th committee meeting held on 10.7.2023 but also the authority that had discontinued the services of the petitioner, pending a decision from the disciplinary cum administrative authority. Thus, it is submitted by the petitioner that relegating the petitioner to the alternate statutory remedy would not be efficacious.

It is next submitted that the block-level recommendation, even if mandatory and not made, cannot be a ground to terminate the services of the petitioner after a lapse of more than 20 years. More so, in light of the fact that the petitioners possess all requisite qualifications and there are no instances of any complaints as against the petitioners in discharge of their duties.

Having heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the records, the issues for the adjudication of these petitions is carved as under:

Coming to the first issue, that is, the maintainability of the instant writ petition, the Ld. Counsel for the respondent-JEPC has seriously objected to the maintainability of the instant writ petition on the ground of an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy being present. His submission is primarily based on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Leelawati N. and Ors v. State of Karnataka and Ors reported in (2025 SCC Online SC 2253).

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the above-mentioned case, relegated the parties to the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal while returning a finding that such tribunals are the primary authority vested with the jurisdiction to hear matters pertaining to recruitment in light of the judgment rendered in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261.

The submission of the Ld. counsel of the respondent-JEPC seems to hold water, at first sight; however, this Court cannot lose sight of the arguments advanced by the Ld. counsel for the petitioners. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in issuing a writ under Article 226 has been frequently considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, and the same is no longer in doubt. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakub v. K.S Radhakrishnan and Ors reported in (1964) 5 SCR 64, has held that once it is established that an order impugned suffers from manifest error or perversity, the plea of alternative remedy would not come to the aid of the respondents. 33. Thus, once manifest error or perversity is established, this Court has a constitutional duty to correct such perversity or manifest error by exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The term “perversity” has been defined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PSA Sical Terminals Private Limited v. The Board of Trustees of VO Chidambranar Port Trust, Tutikorin and Ors reported in (2021 INSC 365), to mean a case “when a finding is based on no evidence, or a finding is based on taking into account something irrelevant, or vital evidence in arriving at its decision has been ignored, then a decision can be said to be perverse.”

On the basis of the submissions of the parties, it is apparent that the services of the petitioners were terminated for want of recommendations by the block-level committee. The impugned order records the services of some of the petitioners were terminated on account of their failure to submit the block-level recommendations. In some cases where the petitioners submitted the block-level recommendations, the same did not tally with the records in the block office, or there were no records found in the block office altogether. 35. The respondent has never disputed the records as contained in the e-vidyavahini portal. The said record, unambiguously reflects that the appointments were made, that the petitioners were appointed after following due process of law, and there was a recommendation by the Gram Sabha, which was approved by the block-level office. Further, the records clearly reveal that the petitioners were not only inducted into service after approval by the competent authority but were further given induction training and continued in the service of the respondent.

This report generated by the respondents has not been considered by the First Appellate Authority. The impugned order further fails to reflect any consideration by the authority with respect to the proposals/recommendation made by JEPC in its 64th meeting. Such non-consideration of vital evidence would not only make the impugned order suffer from manifest error, but also make the order perverse. Once such perversity is prima facie established, this court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to further examine as to whether any interference is warranted.

This Court further finds force in the alternative argument advanced by the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner, that the statutory remedy would no longer be efficacious. The Second Appellate Authority in the case at hand is the State Project Director, who seems to have already disclosed his mind, while issuing the order dated 13.10.2023, by which the Petitioners were restrained to disclose their duties and their honorarium/salary was stopped, subject to the decision of the disciplinary cum administrative authority.

The State Project Director is the head of Respondent-JEPC and admittedly, it was the decision of JEPC to challenge the order passed by the disciplinary cum administrative authority, which was in favour of the petitioners.

The principle that ‘Justice should not only be done but also seem to have been done’, is an important aspect of the judicial system of this country. Once the second Appellate authority disclosed his mind by restraining the petitioners to discharge their duties and stopping their honorarium/salary and further appealing the order of the disciplinary cum administrative authority; then relegating the Petitioners to this authority would be an empty formality. It would essentially be a case of appeal from Caesar to Caesar's wife. In such cases, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held, as in the case of, Dhampur Sugar Mills Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors reported in (2007) 8 SCC 338, that, alternate remedy would not be a bar in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

This also distinguishes these cases from that of Leelawati N. and Ors v. State of Karnataka and Ors reported in (2025 SCCOnline SC 2253), which dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of an alternative remedy available in the form of the State Administrative Tribunal. However, in this case, no such independent tribunal has jurisdiction to look into the grievances of the petitioners. The issue is accordingly decided in favour of the petitioner.

As a consequence, the interlocutory applications raising the issue of maintainability also stands dismissed.

The next issue pertains to the legality of the impugned order. The impugned order dated 16.01.2025 is divided into and contains 8 annexures. The instant batch of writ petitions is in connection with Annexures C, D, E, and F. Annexures C and D are para-teachers of Naudiah Bazar and Chhatarpur, respectively, who had provided the block recommendations available with them to the respondents. However, these recommendations did not tally with the records. The respondent therefore considered this to be an absence of the block-level recommendations itself.

Annexures E and F are para-teachers of Naudiah Bazar and Chhatrapur, respectively, and are such persons who could not provide any block-level recommendations to the Respondent. The respondents have terminated their service, as no records pertaining to such recommendations could be found by them.

The primary contention raised by the petitioners in this respect is that it is not the duty of the petitioners to maintain or keep a record of the block-level recommendation. Rather, these records is to be maintained by the respondents themselves. The respondent in a reply to an application filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005, dated 8.7.2015, has already held that no such list is available at the block-level office/center (Annexure SA/1). Moreso, the records obtained from the e-vidyavahini portal and attached as part of the instant petition show that respondents accepted that approvals were made by the block-level committee and the petitioners had undergone induction training. He submits that all the petitioners entered into an agreement, and for more than 16 years, an honorarium was paid to them by the respondents.

This Court is of the firm view that in case the records have gone missing or do not tally with the records submitted by the petitioners, the petitioners cannot be penalized for the same, especially in light of the fact that the duty to maintain such records is with the respondents and not the petitioner.

As already indicated above that e-vidyavahini portal, which contains the service details of the petitioners, is admittedly maintained by the respondents, and no malpractice has been alleged against any of the petitioners regarding entries of their names and details in the said portal.

The lynchpin of this issue rests on who was responsible for maintenance of the recommendations made by the block-level committee. The letter dated 26.7.2019 (page 145), issued to the member of the special committee constituted by the Vidhan Sabha, categorically records an admission that the onus to maintain the block-level recommendation is the duty of the Block Education Officer or the District Superintendent of Education.

Even otherwise, the candidate selected by the Aam Sabha had no role to play in the said recommendation, and as such, they cannot be held responsible for maintaining documents pertaining to such recommendation.

The chart submitted by the petitioner, which is based on the data obtained from the e-vidyavahini portal, further supplements this fact, beyond any doubt that verification of block-level recommendations of the petitioner had taken place had been uploaded/updated on the portal.

This Court in the case of Abhay Prasad v. State of Jharkhand reported in (2005 (1) JCR 167 (Jhr), held that a person, even if initially appointed on a temporary/contractual basis, who continues to work for 17-18 years, cannot be thrown out on the street only on the basis of conjuncture that the appointment of the person was illegal. This Court has, in the case of Shankar Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand (MANU/JH/0013/2010), held that after prolonged service, the services of the petitioner cannot be terminated on the ground that it was illegal and not done in accordance with law. More recently, in the case of Arjun Singh v. State of Jharkhand reported in (2017 (2) JLJR 647), this Court has held that prolonged service cannot be terminated on the ground that documents of which the employer was custodian were not produced or had gone missing as it is to be presumed that the appointment and continued service were after proper verification.

Once it is established that the duty to maintain the documents pertaining to block-level recommendation was that of the respondents, and in the past such verifications were undertaken, it would be illegal to terminate the services of the petitioner on this ground alone. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the updated data from the e-vidyavahini portal, is a vital document and has not been considered in the impugned order.

The argument of the respondents that illegal appointment cannot be allowed to continue, especially when block-level recommendation was mandatory as per the notification of Sarva Siksha Abhiyan as well as the Assistant Teacher Service Rules, 2021, is also not tenable in light of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Gaurav Mehla and Ors v. State of Haryana and Ors (2026 SCCOnline SC 1107). The Hon'ble Apex Court was examining the appointments of the appellants (therein), to the post of Clerk-cum-Salesman and Poen-cum-Chaukidar in Thanesar Co-operating Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited, Kurukshetra. The appointments were made in terms of the Primary Cooperative Marketing Processing Society Limited's Staff Service Rules, 2003, which contain the mandatory requirement for the recommendation to be made by the Assistant Registrar Cooperative Society, Inspector Cooperative Society, and District Manager. Such recommendation was absent in the case of the appellants.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that any process of recruitment can be divided into three categories, i.e, issuance of proper advertisement, conducting a fair and transparent selection process, and appointment by the competent authority. A recruitment process would not stand vitiated if it would not go to the root of the matter, i.e., if proper advertisement was made and a fair and transparent selection process was carried out.

In the case at hand, there is no dispute that proper advertisements were issued, and pursuant to such advertisement, the names of the petitioners were recommended by the Aam Sabha. After the recommendation, an agreement was executed by and between the petitioners and the competent authority. As such, even if it is admitted that block-level recommendation was absent, such absence of block-level recommendation would not go to the root of the matter.

Lastly, the argument of the respondents that the petitioners did not have the requisite eligibility criteria does not hold water as such; persons who did not possess the requisite qualifications have been put in a separate category and form part of Annexures G and H of the impugned order. The argument of the respondents that the petitioners did not meet the eligibility criteria at the time of their appointment is not at all reflected in the impugned order. It is established law that the respondent cannot substantiate or add reasons to the impugned order in the shape of an affidavit or otherwise. This principle is well enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohindhr Singh Gill and Anr v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi (1978) 1 SCC 405. The issue is accordingly decided in favour of the petitioners.

In sequitur, the impugned order, is, hereby quashed and set aside and the Petitioners shall be reinstated in service with immediate effect. From the record, it would further transpire that even during the pendency of the decision to be taken by the disciplinary-cum-administrative authority, the petitioners were restrained from discharging their duties and were not even paid honorarium/salary. Ultimately, the disciplinary-cum-administrative authority held that the petitioners were validly appointed, vide orders dated 13.03.2024 and 27.04.2024. Despite this, the petitioners were not allowed to resume their duties. Thus, the principle of ‘no work no pay’ would not be applicable, in the given facts and circumstances of the case.

In view of the cumulative effects, it is hereby ordered that the petitioners would be paid the entire salary/honorarium with effect from 13.03.2024 and 27.04.2024, that is the date on which the disciplinary or administrative authority held in favour of the petitioner, till the date of the reinstatement. The said people would be treated as continuing in service with all consequential benefits.

The concerned respondent is accordingly directed to issue necessary order permitting the respective petitioners to rejoin services forthwith, but in any case, not beyond a period of 4 weeks, from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. However, the direction regarding payment of honorarium/salary for the intervening period and other consequential benefits so attached shall be complied with within a further period of 8 weeks.

The writ petitions accordingly stand allowed. Pending I.As, if any, also stand closed. Parties to bear their own cost.