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Judgment
S. Haque, J.—Sri Pratul Bhattaharjee, an Office Assistant in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Sonitpur at Tezpur was acquitted on benefit of doubt by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in O.R. Case No, 3746 of 1981 u/s 5/6 of the Essential Services Maintenance Act. The charge was that Mr. Bhattacharjee was absent from duty on strike on 19th and 21st November 1981.
This revision is preferred by Mr. Bhattacharjee for expunging the expression �on the benefit of doubt'' added after the expression ''accused person is acquitted.'' Learned Counsel Mr. C. Choudhury had taken this Court through the judgment dated 25.9.84 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, The Magistrate came to the findings that Mr. Bhattacharjee absented from office but prosecution failed to establish the reasons of his absence; and that there was no evidence that Mr. Bhattacharjee voluntarily, purposely and intentionally observing the strike that day; and that male absence from office could not be regarded as absence on strike to attract the provision of Section 5/6 of the Essential Service and Maintenance Act. Therefore, the Magistrate acquitted him.
Was the espression ''on the benefit of doubt'' warranted in the judgment of the Magistrate?.
Generally, the trial Courts, deciding Criminal cases on facts, use this expression while acquitting accused without perhaps knowing where and in what circumstances it is necessary to be used. In a case in which the prosecution evidence does not or fails to establish the charge beyond all reasonable doubts, although the proof of the charge can be accepted minus that doubt, then only that expression is to be added because the accused is entitled under Criminal Jurisprudence for existence of such doubt. It is not to be used in each and every case ending on acquittal. Prosecution must prove the charge in all cases beyond all reasonable doubts except the cases in which burden shifts to the accused, by implication of law under special acts, on presumption at a stage of trial on proof of a fact or part of the charge by prosecution or due to the nature of defence of plea. For example a case under Prevention of Corruption Act is one of the such nature or defence pleas under Chapter IV of the IPC. elibi etc. In such cases also the burden of the accused need not be equally similar to that of prosecution, but making out a case of preponderance of probability of the defence plea for a reasonable doubt is enough. But a remote possibility in favour of the accused cannot be a ground for holding absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt once the guilt of the accused is fully established. Some courts easily pick up such remote possibility to free the accused by using the expression ''benefit of doubt; but the Hon''ble Supreme Court has cautioned in this regard in Himachal Pradesh Administration Vs. Om Prakash, by stating that "the benefit or doubt to which the accused is entitled is reasonable doubt the doubt which rational thinking man will reasonably, honestly and consciously entertain and not the doubt of a timid mind which fights shy-though unwittingly it may be-or is afraid of the logical consequences, if that benefit was not given. The maxim that the prosecution must prove beyond doubt the guilt of the accused or, otherwise he is entitled to the benefit of doubt does not mean that the prosecution evidence must be so strong as to exclude even a remote possibility that the accused could pot have committed the offence. On the contrary once the guilt of the accused is established the mere fact that there is only a remote possibility in favour of the accused is itself sufficient to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt."
The trial Courts should be very cautions in using expression in a case where Government servant is involved. It should not be used as a fashion or ornamentally, if not warranted because the expression may be detrimental to the service career of the person getting acquittal. When the trial Court conies to the finding that the prosecution totally fails to prove the charge then the user of the expression ''benefit of doubt in acquitting he accused is improper and illegal. The present'' case comes within this category.
Accordingly, this revision is allowed. Rule is made absolute. The expression �benefit of doubt'' is hereby expunged from the judgment dated 19.11.81 in G.R, case No. 3746 of 1981 of the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Tezpur.
Inform all concerned.
