Panna Mehta vs State of M.P.

S.L. Kochar, J.

The applicant has filed this petition for expunging remarks viz. "benefit of doubt" from the judgment dated 12th March, 2001 (Annexure A-3) delivered by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore in Criminal Case No. 154/96.

To appreciate controversy and contentions of the parties a reference to the relevant facts leading for filing of this petition would be apt:

The respondent submitted a chargesheet accusing the applicant for the offence punishable under sections 467, 420/511 of the Indian Penal Code before the Court below. It was alleged that the applicant was holding post of Cashier-cum-clerk in the State Bank of India, in City Branch at Indore and on 27-1-1985 she went to the Manager of the main branch of the Bank at Indore and presented a letter before the Manager purported to be signed by Dr. Vijay Jain. In the said better a request was made to transfer an amount of Rs. 30,17000/- to his other A/c No. 28938 with the main branch of the Bank at Mumbai. It was, further, alleged that the bank may retain Rupees 25000/- for adjustment towards loss of interest. On presentation of such letter, suspicion arose in the mind of the Branch Manager and therefore, he lodged FIR at police station, Sanyogitaganj, Indore.

After usual investigation, chargesheet was filed for the aforesaid offence. The trial Court convicted the petitioner u/s 420/511 Indian Penal Code (attempt to cheat).

Against this judgment, petitioner appealed and the learned Appellate Court vide judgment dated 12-4-1999 (Annexure P/2) delivered in Criminal Appeal No. 79/96, set aside the conviction and remanded the case back to the trial Court for examination of prosecution witness Dr. Vijay Jain and thereafter delivery of judgment on merit.

Learned trial Court, after receiving the case back, given umpteen opportunities to the prosecution for securing the presence of Dr. Vijay Jain for his examination as a prosecution witness to prove important document, letter Article 44, said to have been written by him, but the prosecution did not secure his presence. Learned trial Court again delivered the judgment (Annexure P/3) on 12th March 2001 and acquitted the applicant/petitioner from all charges giving her benefit of doubt. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, acquittal has been recorded in the following words:-

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Mr. S.C. Bagadia, Senior Advocate has submitted that because of use of words "benefit of doubt" the management issued show cause notice dated 3-1-2002 (Annexure P4) chosen to revive show cause notice dated 14-2-1986 for dismissal (Annexure P5). According to him, the Management may ultimately dismiss the petitioner for misconduct or they may reinstate her without back wages of these 17 years. Thus prayed for interference of this Court invoking inherent powers enshrined u/s 482 Criminal Procedure Code for expunging the words "benefit of doubt" from the judgment dated 12-3-2001 (Annexure P/3). He placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1994 552 (SC) .

On the basis of the provisions of Reserve Bank of India (Staff) Regulation, 1948, according to the petitioner, since there is absolutely no material against the petitioner, learned trial Court should have acquitted her/petitioner by using words "clean acquittal" or "honourable acquittal". Since the acquittal is based by giving benefit of doubt, the management may consider the same as stigma and dismiss the petitioner from service or even reinstate her without backwages. All these submissions of the counsel is based on presumption and assumption. Nothing can be said at this stage. It would just and proper to reproduce para 2 of the aforesaid judgment in case of The Management of RBI, New Delhi vs. Bhopal Singh (supra):

The bank relied on Regulation 46(4) of the Regulations and refuse reinstate the employee in service on the ground that he had not earned an honourable acquittal of the offence. The respondent-employee, therefore, raised an industrial dispute which was decided on 19th May, 1983, by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. By the said Award, the Industrial Tribunal held that Regn. 46(4) was invalid and improper and militated against industrial jurisprudence as developed and applied by the courts in the country. The tribunal further held that the dismissal was unjustified and quashed the same and ordered the Bank to reinstate the employee with full back-wages and to allow him continuity in service as if he was never dismissed from service.

The facts are clearly revealing that regulation 46(4) was held invalid by the Industrial Tribunal and the same has not been interfered by the Supreme Court in this Judgment, which is clear from the facts mentioned at page 557 in the following words:-

While doing so, the tribunal also held that Regulation 46(4) was invalid. It is not necessary for us in these proceedings to decide as to whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to hold such regulation invalid.

The ratio decidendi in this Judgment is that suspension of employee arrested for criminal offence acquitted subsequently employee does not automatically become entitled to full pay and allowances for suspension period. Discretion in that matter is rested exclusively in Bank and that power is unassailable. (emphasis supplied)

Mr. Girish Desai, learned Deputy AG appearing for the respondent/State has submitted that in Indian Penal Code or Criminal Procedure Code or even in Criminal Jurisprudence applicable in India, there is no words like "honourable acquittal" or "clean acquittal". If the person who has been tried for any offence, his acquittal simpliciter or by giving him benefit of doubt, there is no difference in the acquittal of the accused and will have the same effect. He submits that acquittal of the person concerned, will have the effect of completely wiping out of the charge for which he was tried.

In the Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Penal Code, Evidence Act or any other enactment, the word "acquittal" has not been defined. As per the Law Lexicon, the Encyclopedic Law Dictionary (Edn. 1992) "Acquittal" defined, Act X of 1882, section 403, the word "acquittal" is verburn equivocum, and may in ordinary language be used to express either the verdict of a jury, or the formal judgment of the Court, that the prisoner is not guilty (Per Tindal, C.J. Burgess vs. Boetefeur, 13 LJMC 126 : 135 ER 193). It is generally said that a party is acquitted by the jury, but in fact, the acquittal is by the judgment of the court (ibid). According to the Oxford Dictionary, "acquittal" means that a person is not guilty of a crime, with which he has been charged. So in a Criminal Jurisprudence there is no difference between "clean acquittal", "honourable acquittal" or acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt When the accused is acquitted by giving benefit of doubt means the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

As ruled by the Supreme Court in case Manni Lal Vs. Parmai Lal and Others, and Dilip Kumar Sharma and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, , order of acquittal means a person concerned, has not committed the offence for which he was charged and tried. Criminal Courts are recording acquittal when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and benefit of doubt given to the accused does not mean that the accused was involved in the case but the same could not be proved by the prosecution. In Criminal Law, words "beyond reasonable doubt" cannot be termed as stigma or proof of any criminal charge against acquitted accused. Therefore, petition for expunging the same is not maintainable u/s 482 Criminal Procedure Code and the same is misconceived.

In the wake of the foregoing discussions, nothing is made out for invoking extraordinary powers as enumerated u/s 482, Criminal Procedure Code.

Consequently, this petition is dismissed.