Shiv Kumar Aggarwal vs Development Credit Bank Ltd.

The appellants had filed an S.A. before the Tribunal below praying for quashing/setting aside the sale notice dated 8th January, 2010. This S.A. had been dismissed by the Tribunal below on 19th March, 2012. The appellants had accordingly filed the present appeal to impugn the said order.

Appellants would not only challenge this order on merit, but would plead that the Tribunal below had heard arguments on two pending interim applications (I.A. No. 422/2011 and 781/2011) on 7th March, 2012 and had kept the case for pronouncement of order on 19th March, 2012. Grievance is that while deciding these two I.As., the Tribunal has also dismissed the S.A. without hearing any submission in the S.A.

The facts noticed in brief in this case are that the appellants had obtained certain credit facilities from respondent No. 1 Bank. Property bearing No. C-134-D, Surya Nagar, District Ghaziabad, U.P. was mortgaged in favour of the Bank to secure the said credit facilities. When the appellants could not maintain financial discipline, the Bank issued a notice dated 8th January, 2010, which was published in the newspaper on 12th January, 2010 making a demand of Rs. 3,13,80,466/-. The notice under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short the SARFAESI Act) was also followed the notice under Section 13(2) of the Act. The appellants on their part questioned both the notices by filing an application (S.A.) under the SARFAESI Act pleading that the said notices were issued in violation of the relevant provisions of the rules. The Tribunal, however, stopped further recourse to any of the action by the Bank vide its order dated 12th February, 2010 when it found that notices had not been issued to one of the applicants, namely, Mr. Rajender Kumar Sadhu (respondent No.3). The Bank, however, was given liberty to issue fresh notice rectifying the defect.

The Bank, accordingly, issued a fresh notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 25th February, 2010. This was replied to by the applicants through their Counsel on 21st April, 2010. Thereafter, notice under Section 13(4) of the Act was issued on 6th September, 2010. In terms of the order dated 15th October, 2010, the possession was handed aver to the Receiver appointed by the Court and sale notice was published fixing the reserve price at Rs. 240 lacs. It is stated that the Bank received a bid for Rs. 245 lacs. It appears that at this juncture the applicants brought four intending buyers who had offered better price and the Tribunal, vide its order dated 13th April, 2011, directed inter se bidding amongst the said four intending buyers to be held under the supervision of Recovery Officer (R.O.) on 19th April, 2011. The Tribunal had issued direction to the R.O. to follow the rules under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules (for short, the Rules) so far as the deposit of sale consideration is concerned.

The sale accordingly was conducted on 19th April, 2011 at about 3 p.m. The matter was adjourned to 21st April, 2011 and GCG Enterprises Private Ltd. was declared as successful buyer for Rs. 311 lacs. The authorised officer directed the purchaser to complete the process of sale in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the rules. It is alleged that the sale was conducted in violation of Rules 9(3) and 9(4) of the Rules and hence is challenged by the appellants. In this regard, the appellants filed I.A. No. 422/2011 pleading that the highest bidder and the authorized officer had violated the order dated 21st April, 2011 of the Tribunal below alleging that Rules 9(3), 9(4), and 9(5) of the Rules stood violated. The plea was that the payments were not made within the time stipulated either as per the order of the Tribunal or as regulated under the Rules. The plea accordingly was for directing resale of the property and forfeiture of the amount deposited by the highest bidder.

In response to the notice in this I.A., the Bank had filed its reply disputing the averments made in the application. In its reply, the Bank has disclosed that GCG Enterprises was declared successful bidder on 21st April, 2011. 23rd April, 2011 GCG Enterprises deposited a draft of Rs. 52 lacs being 15% of the remaining consideration to be deposited. On 26th April, 2011, GCG Enterprises wrote to the authorized officer for extension of time for payment of the balance amount. On 2nd May, 2011, the Bank gave a letter to GCG Enterprises to deposit the amount within 30 days from the date of sale. On 18th May, 2011, a draft of Rs. 233 lacs being the balance amount payable was deposited. It was accordingly pleaded that the GCG Enterprises had not violated any order passed by the Tribunal. As per the sale notice, 15% of the bid amount was to be deposited within seven days of the confirmation of sale and the balance 75% within 30 days of the confirmation of sale. Without prejudice to the right of the Bank, it was stated that as per Rules 9(3) and 9(4) the balance amount could be deposited as may be agreed between the parties. The auction purchaser requested for extension of time, which was granted and the sale certificate was issued and the sale proceeds stands adjusted against the dues.

Another application (I.A. No. 781/2011) was filed on 10th October, 2011 pleading that the order dated 21st April, 2011 was violated by the respondent. Plea further was that the respondent had also violated the relevant rules attracting the sale. As per the applicants, where rules were violated in public auction, the sale was liable to be set aside and in such an event the property is required to be resold. The plea in this application was accordingly to direct the authorized officer to conduct re-auction of the property and to allow the applicants to bring a better buyer for a sum of Rs. 325 lacs.

The auction purchaser filed reply to this application pointing out that 15% of the balance amount was deposited on the next working day itself as 22nd April, 2011 happened to be a holiday for the Bank, being Good Friday. The balance amount statedly was paid on 18th May, 2011 after taking permission from the Bank. The Bank, however, did not file any reply to this application. The Counsel expressed his preparedness to meet the submissions made in the application. The Bank had pointed out that the applicants were in the habit of filing petitions while the case was ripe for disposal and in this regard adverse comments were made by this Tribunal and the High Court against the conduct of the applicant-appellant.

The record would show that some suo motu proceedings were initiated against Mr. Vinay Garg (applicant No. 4) and Mr. Rajender Kumar Sadhu (applicant No.6) for filing false affidavit before the Tribunal below. They were issued notices requiring them to show cause as to why appropriate legal proceedings be not initiated against them for filing false affidavit in a judicial proceedings. The Tribunal, after considering the various submissions had ultimately dismissed the S.A. and so also I.A. No. 422/2011 and I.A. 781/2011 with cost of Rs. 10,000/- each Miscellaneous Application 19/2011 was closed. Now, the appellants are in appeal against this order.

From the submissions made by the Counsel for the parties it can be discerned that the appellants have mainly pressed this appeal on the ground that the respondent auction purchaser had not deposited the bid amount in terms of the Rules and, rather, did so in violation of the Rules and hence sale in its favour needs to be set aside. During the course of hearing, the Counsel for the appellants has also challenged the infer se bidding as such and would also raise various objections which may need to be examined.

The facts as noticed would show the circumstances under which this application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act case to be filed by the appellants. The Tribunal below caused first interference through its order dated 12th February, 2010 when it found that the notice had not been served upon one of the borrowers (applicant No. 6). This action by the Bank in issuing notice under Section 13(2) was thus held to be illegal. The Bank was given liberty to serve a fresh notice on the said borrower under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law. When the case came up for hearing before the Tribunal below on 15th October, 2010, the Counsel appearing for both the sides agreed that the property may be sold as per law and the sale proceeds may be adjusted towards the dues. The Counsel for the applicants pleaded that the possession be taken over from the Bank and it be handed over to the Receiver appointed by the Tribunal at the first stage. The Counsel also sought time to take instructions for fixation of reserve price besides seeking liberty to bring a better buyer if required. On the basis of such request as made by the Counsel for the applicants, the Tribunal observed that it did not see any difficulty or legal impediment in allowing the prayer so made by the Counsel for the applicants. Mr. Lajwinder Singh, Advocate, was appointed as Receiver. He was directed to prepare inventory as per Rule 8 of the Rules. Bank was directed to handover the keys of the property to the Receiver who was required to seal the property and put this signature on the seal. The patties were directed to appear before the Tribunal on 1st November, 2010 for fixing reserve price of the property.

The order passed on 1st November, 2010 is not on record. However, on 23rd November, 2010, the applicants charged their Counsel who appeared before the Tribunal and contested the agreed order which was passed on 15th October, 2010. The Tribunal, however, rejected the said stand of the applicants and finding that the applicants had failed to file any valuation report, fixed the value of the plot area, rate and value of the land and building. The appellants, thereafter, filed an appeal against this order before the Tribunal. This Tribunal, however, did not find any merit in the plea raised and found these pleas to be an after-thought on the part of the appellants/applicants. This Tribunal found that the appellants were trying to jibe their previous stand and that their flip-flop stand has further weakened their case. Finding no force in the appeal, the same was dismissed on 2nd February, 2011.

The appellants, thereafter, preferred a writ petition against the said order before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, which was also dismissed. This information was placed before the Tribunal when the case came up for hearing on 23rd March, 2011. Counsel for the respondent Bank also pointed out that the sale had been held pursuant to the order dated 15th October, 2010 and the Bank received a highest bid of Rs. 245 lacs against the reserve price of Rs. 240 lacs fixed by the Tribunal. The Counsel for the Bank also informed the Tribunal that the outcome of the auction has been intimated to the appellants/applicants through a registered letter dated 9th March, 2011 and they had been given 15 days time to bring a better buyer in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal below. Counsel appeared before the Tribunal below and the Tribunal below gave the applicants time of 15 days to bring a better buyer making the time to commence from the date when the case was taken up on 23rd March, 2011.

On 13th April, 2011, applicants introduced two buyers. The first buyer was Quadros Impex Pvt. Ltd. which offered a sum of Rs. 250 lacs. The second buyer, i.e., ADPS Consultants Pvt. Ltd. made an offer of Rs. 255 lacs. While proceedings were on, GCG Enterprises entered appearance through a Counsel and submitted an offer of Rs. 260 lacs, which was accompanied by a resolution passed by the Company stating that it was willing to enter into inter se bid with intending buyers. Thus the Tribunal found there were four prospective buyers willing to purchase the property. Counsel appearing for the appellants raised an objection to the offer submitted by GCG Enterprises. His plea was that GCG Enterprises never participated in the auction proceedings and now it cannot be allowed to participate in the sale process. Counsel referred to some decisions, but failed to produce any citation. The Tribunal below relied upon the settled position of law laid down by the Apex Court that if property is sought to be sold in public auction, efforts should be made to fetch maximum price. The Tribunal, in my view has rightly observed that the sale had not been concluded till then and it was still ongoing process. Only 10% of the amount had been deposited by the intending buyers. The Tribunal, therefore, was of the view that efforts should be made to fetch best price which would be for the benefit of every party concerned. As per the Tribunal, this would also not cause any prejudice to the appellants as their liability would stand proportionately reduced. Considering these facts and to ensure maximum price for the property, the Tribunal directed the authorized officer to hold and inter se bidding after ensuring that the intending buyers deposit 10% of the amount as Earnest Money Deposit. The Tribunal below further directed that the inter se bidding would take place under the supervision of the R.O. and fixed the 3 p.m. on 19th April, 2011 for the same. The Tribunal further clarified that except for original intending buyer who had offered Rs. 245 lacs, the other intending buyers would be at liberty to either participate or withdraw their officer before the process of inter se bidding starts and in such case they would be entitled to get back their respective amount deposited. The Tribunal further directed that after the process of inter se bidding was concluded, the balance amount would be deposited by the highest bidder as per the rules governing the sale of immovable assets as contained in the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. The authorized officer was to inform the Tribunal about the outcome of the inter se bidding on the next date fixed, which was 20th April, 2014.

On the next date fixed, the Tribunal was informed that GCG Enterprises Private Ltd. was the successful bidder which had made an offer of Rs. 311 lacs. The authorized officer was, therefore, directed to further proceed in accordance with law. The Tribunal also passed an order that in the event the highest bidder, namely, GCG Enterprises Private Ltd. failing to deposit the amount within the stipulated time as per the Rules, the Bank would give a chance to the second highest bidder to deposit 25% amount (10% amount already deposited + 15% amount to be deposited). The authorized officer was also asked to forfeit the amount deposited by the highest bidder in case he failed to deposit the balance amount as per the Rules. The Tribunal had further ordered that 75% of the balance amount would be deposited by the highest bidder as per the provisions of the rules. It is primarily these directions, violation of which is alleged by the appellants and they have, therefore, filed the application I.A. No. 422/2011, as already noticed, with the prayer to forfeit the amount deposited by the highest bidder being in violation of the order dated 21st April, 2011 and for directing the authorized officer to conduct a fresh auction. The S.A. and the said application along with another application (I.A. No. 781/2011) had been dismissed, as already noticed.

Mr. S.L. Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, would contend that the respondent highest bidder Las not only violated the Rules while making the deposit, but has made deposit in violation of the direction issued by the Tribunal below. As per the Counsel, the Tribunal below, therefore, was not justified in declining the prayer made in I.A. No. 422/2011 for forfeiting the earnest money deposited by the said buyer. As per the Counsel, the Tribunal is further misconceived in ignoring the violation and in permitting the deposit by the highest bidder. Counsel made reference in detail to various orders passed by the Tribunal below. The appellants would not only object to the deposit being allowed to GCG Enterprises in violation of the order and the Rules, they would contest their very participation in the auction proceedings as such.

I have not been able to appreciate the submission made by the Counsel for the appellants that GCG Enterprises was wrongly allowed to participate in the auction proceedings. The appellants never objected to the participation of GCG Enterprises in the auction. When such an application was moved by GCG Enterprises and was entertained by the Tribunal, no objection was made and the order passed by the Tribunal was accepted by the appellants without any demur or protest. Apparently, the appellants have started raising objection when they have found that the better buyer introduced by them has not succeeded in getting the property. It will be now too late in the day to raise an objection that it being not a participant in the auction sale could not be allowed to participate in the inter se bidding. I have rather been unable to understand the purpose behind the submissions being made on behalf of the appellants. Their efforts seem to be oust GCG Enterprises and give the property to a person who had offered much lower amount than the one offered by GCG Enterprises. The offer made by the next highest bidder was Rs. 255 lacs. GCG Enterprises had made the highest bid of Rs. 311 lacs. Why the appellants would be keen to seethe sale of this property at a lesser price whereas the price offered by GCG Enterprises would be to their benefit and would further lessen their liability. There may be something more than what meets the eye. But, be that as it may, 1 do not find any justification in the plea now raised by the appellants to object to the participation of GCG Enterprises in the inter se bidding when they never raised any objection at the time when this order was passed and did not challenge this order at that stage.

The next line of submission in this appeal is that GCG Enterprises did not deposit the amount within the stipulated period as per the Rules or as was directed by the Tribunal below. The inter se bidding was held on 19th April, 2011 as per the directions issued by the Tribunal below. On 20th April, 2011, the outcome of the inter se bidding was reported to the Tribunal below. Perhaps, on the request made by the appellants, the case was adjourned to 21st April, 2011. On this date, the Tribunal directed the authorized officer to proceed in accordance with law, i.e., as per the Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 22nd April, 2011 was Good Friday and thus the Bank was closed and so was the Tribunal. The respondent highest bidder deposited the 15% of the amount on 23rd April, 2011. The Counsel for the appellants would contend that this would reveal violation of the Rule 9(3) of the Rules.

The provisions of Rule 9(3) of the Rules, provides that on every sale of immovable property the purchaser shall immediately pay a deposit of Rs. 25% of the amount of sale price to the authorized officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property forthwith be sold again. The Counsel would emphasise the word 'immediately' used in this rule. As per the Counsel, once the purchaser was required to deposit 25% of the amount immediately, it ought to have been done on 21st April, 2011, but the auction purchaser having deposited the amount on 23rd April, 2011, which is four days after the bid, it would in violation of the provisions of Rule 9(3) of the Rules.

The Counsel for the respondent auction purchaser, however, submits that there was no delay in making the deposit of 25%. The inter se bids were received on 19th April, 2011 by about 3 p.m. The outcome of inter se bidding was reported on 20th April, 2011, which was the date fixed before then Tribunal below. It is on the request of the appellants that the case was adjourned to 21st April, 2011. On this date, the Tribunal approved the inter se bidding and directed the authorized officer to further proceed in accordance with the rule position. It is only thereafter that auction purchaser could be required to make deposit of 25% of the bid amount as per the Rule. Since 22nd April, 2011 was Good Friday and holiday, the deposit could not be made and it was done on 23rd April, 2011, which was the next working day. As per the Counsel, the word 'immediate' cannot be read to mean that very moment and as such there was no violation of any rule having regard to the facts as stated which are not is dispute.

In a sense, the requirement is to see the implication of the word 'immediately' used in sub-rule, whether this word require payment at the spot or there is some allowance for making this deposit. In support of his plea that immediately would not require deposit at that very moment or on the spur of the moment, but would have some leeway of time for making deposit, the Counsel has made reference to the case of Rao Mahmood Ahmad Khan through their L.R. v. Ranbir Singh, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 275. This was a case where auction sale of the land was held as per U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952. Rule 85-0 of the said Rules provides for deposit of 25% of the bid amount by the purchaser immediately and in case of default the land was forthwith to be resold. The Supreme Court while holding the provision to be mandatory went on to interpret the word 'immediately' and 'forthwith'. It is held that the word 'immediately' connotes and implies that the deposit should be made without undue delay and within such convenient time as is reasonably requisite for doing the thing same day with all convenient speed excluding the possibility of rendering the other associated corresponding act and performance of duty nugatory. In the said rule, the word 'immediately' was held to connote proximity in time to comply and proximity in taking steps to resell on failure to comply with the requirement of deposit as first condition that is to take place within relatively short interval of time and without any other intervening recurrence. The word 'immediately' seen in this context certainly would mean that the respondent could have made deposit only after 21st April, 2011 when the Tribunal was informed of the auction and further direction was issued in this regard. Until the respondent GCG was conveyed the acceptance of its bid, it could net be asked or expected to make the deposit of 25% of bid amount. It could not be expected to deposit the amount either on the same day or the next date, which happened to be a holiday. On the very next day, the respondent purchaser made the deposit. It can, thus, be said that the deposit had been made by the respondent without undue delay and within such convenient time as is reasonably requisite for doing the act of deposit. The word 'immediately' as interpreted by the Supreme Court would imply that deposit should be made without undue delay and with such convenient speed for doing thing same day. Obviously, the respondent could not have made the deposit on the same day or the next clay for the reasons beyond its control. The holiday intervened and it was due to this it was not possible for the respondent to make the deposit and it did on the following day. These facts, in my view, would not show or reveal violation of the requirement of rule which requires the deposit to be made immediately. I do not find that there was any delay on the part of the purchaser to make the deposit. He could possibly make this deposit only on 23rd April, 2011 and no violation of Rule 9(3) is seen in this case.

It is next contended before me that the balance due amount was required to be deposited on or before 15th day of confirmation of sale of the said property, which was done only on 18th May, 2011. Accordingly, this is alleged to be in violation of Rule 9(4) of the Rules.

The Counsel for the auction purchaser would rely upon the prayer made by him to seek extension of time from the authorized officer, which was granted, and accordingly payment was made within the extended time as was granted by the authorized officer. Through its letter dated 26th April, 2011, the purchaser had approached the authorized officer for extending the time to 30 days from the date of auction for depositing the balance sale consideration. The authorized officer, vide its letter dated 2nd May, 2011 granted 30 days from the date of auction, i.e., 19th April, 2011, to the auction purchaser to make deposit. According to the Counsel for the auction purchaser, this is permissible as per the rules hence there was no violation of Rule 9(4) as well.

Sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 provides that the balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between the parties. The Counsel for the purchaser would rely upon this rule which itself makes provision for extending the period as may be agreed upon in writing between the parties. Counsel has referred to the relevant correspondence whereby extended time was allowed to the purchaser to make deposit of the balance amount which it did within the time so extended by depositing the amount on 18th May, 2011.

Counsel for the appellants would not only contest the authority of the authorized officer to extend this period, but would also submit that the permission for extending the time ought to have taken from the Tribunal as the Tribunal had directed that the sale be completed in terms of the rule position. The Counsel would also submit that the period could be so extended if it had been agreed upon in writing between the parties and the parties 'would include the owner-borrower of the property in question. The Counsel has placed before me the judgment in the case of Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar, HI (2014) BC 657=VII (2014) SLT 17=(2014) 5 SCC 610, whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that rule has been held to be mandatory and thus any violation of the rule would lead to nullifying the auction sale held in favour of the auction purchaser. Counsel has also relied upon the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, 110 (2004) DLT 665 (SC)=II (2004)BC 397 (SC)=II (2004) SLT 991 =AIR 2004 SC 2371, to substantiate his plea that the parties referred to in Rule 9(4) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules would include the borrower.

On the other hand, the Counsel for the respondent Bank had placed before me a Division Bench judgment for the Delhi High Court rendered in I (2011) BC 125 (DB)=174 (2010) DLT 310 (DB)=Writ Petition No. 13152/2009, Ram Murty Pyara Lal v. Central Bank of India, where the Court has considered the right of redemption available under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, which can be so exercised before the date fixed for sale or transfer. In K. Chindambara Manickam v. Shakeena, III (2008) BC 6 (DB) = 2008(1) C.T.C. 660, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has held that the sale of a secured asset in public auction in terms of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, which culminated in issuance certificate under Rule 9(7) of the Rules is complete absolute sale for the purpose of the SARFAESI Act. The sale certificate issued under Rule 9(7) of the Rules does not require registration with registrar of assurances and non-registration thereof does not affect completeness of sale of property in public auction. The contention that right of redemption embodied in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act is available to mortgagor until it is extinguished by the act of parties and until the sale is complete by registration was rejected as the registration of sale certificate is not obligatory in terms of Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act.

In the above noted case, the property was sold on 19th December, 2005, sale certificate was issued on 6th January, 2006. Borrower had tendered the amount on 2nd January, 2006. The Court held that it did not agree that any bar is created under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, as the sale had already taken place on 19th December, 2005. The Court also rejected the contention that the borrower has a right to redeem the mortgage by paying the amount after sale certificate was issued but before the registration.

I have applied myself to the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellants. Rule 9 of the Rules deals with time of sale, issue of sale certificate and delivery of possession. The reading of entire rule would show that the borrower comes into picture in Sub-rule (1) which provides that no sale of immovable property under these rules shall take place before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as referred to in the proviso to Sub-rule (6) or notice of sale has been served to the borrower. Thereafter, Sub-rule (2) only talks of sale which is to be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has offered the highest sale price in his bid or tender or quotation or offer to the authorized officer and shall be subject to the confirmation by the secured creditors. Sub-rule (3) talks of purchaser to deposit 25% of the sale price to the authorized officer conducting sale. Then comes Sub-rule (4) of depositing the balance price payable, which again is required to be paid by the auction purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the 15th day of the confirmation of sale or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between the parties. In my view, the reading of Sub-rule (4) in any manner does not convey that the parties here would include the borrower as well. The payment of 25% is to be made to the authorized officer conducting the sale. He is the one who has to receive the balance amount within 15 days of the confirmation of sale unless there is an agreement between the parties to extend the period. The parties in Sub-rule (2) is the auction purchase and the authorized officer. There is no mention made about the borrower which could lead to interpretation for extending the time with the concurrence of the borrower or his agreement would be needed.

Counsel for the appellants did make an attempt to interpret the word 'parties' used here to say that it includes the borrower by making reference to Rule 8 of the Rules. He would refer to the provisions of Sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 which says that the sale by any method other than public auction or public tender, shall be on such terms as may be settled between the parties in writing. I do not find any reason to interpret the word 'parties' in Sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 by taking aid of Sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 of the Rules. Rule 8 talks of procedure which is required to be followed while conducting sale of immovable secured assets. Sub-rule (8) talks of sale when it is conducted by method other than public auction or public tender, which shall be on such terms as may be settled between the parties in writing. I still have my doubts as to whether the parties here would refer to or include a borrower. In any case, I am clear in my mind that the word 'parties' referred to in Sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 has no relevance to the word 'parties' used in Sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 of the Rules. It is required to be appreciated that the price payable is to be paid by the purchaser to the authorized officer. It is the authorized officer who is authorized to receive the amount can extend the period prescribed in the rule. The money is not to be paid or received by the borrower that his concurrence would be needed for extending the time. The issue in Sub-rule (4) is between the purchaser and the authorized officer Sale is for the benefit of secured creditor. Even the Tribunal may not be in picture in this regard as the auction as per rules is also conducted by the Bank or the authorized officer. The Tribunal had allowed the auction as per rules. Rules permit extension of time. Once this extension in time was allowed, the auction purchaser now cannot be put to prejudice. I am, thus, not prepared to accept the submission made by the Counsel for the appellants that the extended period of time to make deposit needed concurrence of the borrower as well. Once the authorized officer had granted extension of time and the deposit was made within the extended time. I do not see any violation of this rule as well for which any interference or action is called for. The plea, though not pressed during the hearing but was only mentioned, that the Tribunal has decided S.A. while hearing I.As. is rendered meaningless. Once the Counsel for the appellants agreed for sale and its objection to the sale so held has been dealt with, nothing remained in the S.A. The appellants also is unable to point out as to what remained to be considered once the appellants have willingly participated in the auction sale and brought better buyer who could not succeed. It is only a desperation which seems to be at play. Appellants should be happy that the process has fetched best price and their liability is also lessened. The appellants, therefore, have not been able to point out any infirmity in the auction sale or to show any violation of rule by the purchaser in making the deposit. I, therefore, find no merit in the appeal and would dismiss the same.