Rammurti Pyarelal And Ors. vs Central Bank Of India And Ors.

J.M. Malik, J

Who will get preponderance in case both the parties, i.e., borrowers on the one hand and the Bank on the other hand display brazen disregard for the law, and rules and regulations are given a go-by. Adumbrated in brief, the facts of these two appeals concerning the same property are these. Certain credit facilities were granted to M/s. Ram Murti Pyare Lal, a partnership firm, Mr. Subhash Kumar and Mr. Amit Aggarwal by Central Bank of India, 1st respondent. The appellants had created an equitable mortgage in respect of residential House No. BN-34, Shalimar Bagh (W), Delhi. The appellants failed to adhere to the financial discipline and could not repay the loan. Subsequently, their account was declared NPA. The respondent Bank served notice dated 9.9.2004 upon the borrowers under Section 13(2) of the SRFAESI Act wherein a demand of Rs. 98,64,986.99 as on 9.9.2004 was raised. The appellants/borrowers sent their objections to the notice sent by the Bank. On 10.12.2004, the appellants sent a communication to the Bank by Registered Post informing the Bank about the change of their address and requesting the Bank to send all the future communication to the appellants at their new address at F-29, Back Side, Kamla Nagar, New Delhi. The Bank took symbolic possession of the premises in dispute. Aggrieved by the action of the Bank of taking over the symbolic possession of the premises in dispute in exercise of its right and powers under Section 13(4) of the SRFAESI Act, the above said three borrowers filed an S.A. before the DRT on 26.9.2005. The respondent Bank filed reply to the above said S.A. 50/2005 where for the first time it was disclosed that the property of the appellants was sold to some third party in auction dated 11.6.2005. The learned DRT dismissed the S.A. vide its order dated 24.5.2010. The first appeal has been filed by the borrowers against the said order. The second appeal arises out of the order dismissing the S.A. filed by Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and Mr. Harish Aggarwal, on 28.7.2010. Mr. Harish Aggarwal has since expired. Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and the legal heirs of deceased Mr. Harish Aggarwal, who are kiths and kins of the borrowers, are appellants in the instant appeal. The Bank took over the symbolic possession of the property in question and proceeded to sell the same. The case of the appellants, herein, is that Mr. Subhash Kumar and Mr. Amit Aggarwal, the respondents 2 and 3, in the second appeal, had approached Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and late Mr. Harish Aggarwal for leasing out the ground and first floors of the BN-34 (W) Shalimar Bagh, Delhi, the suit premises, they agreed to the proposal made and paid huge Pagri to Mr. Subhash Kumar and Mr. Amit Aggarwal and took the said premises on lease on 1.9.1998. The relations of the respondents 2 and 3 with Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and Mr. Harish Aggarwal were cordial at the initial stage but subsequently the same became strained. In July 2004, the respondent No. 2 came along with his Gunda elements to the premises and misbehaved with Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and threatened that she would be eliminated in case she did not vacate the premises and misbehaved with Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and threatened that she would be eliminated in case she did not vacate the premises in dispute. She immediately filed a suit for permanent injunction against Mr. Subhash Kumar and Mr. Amit Aggarwal. In that suit, summons were issued to respondents 2 and 3. On 9.9.2004, the Counsel for respondents 2 and 3 made a statement before the Court that the respondents 2 and 3 would not evict Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal without following due process of law. On such assurance, the appellant No. 1 withdrew her suit. According to these appellants, in November 2004, it transpired that respondents 2 and 3 had taken loan from Central Bank of India some time in the year 2002. It also came to light that respondents 2 and 3 were avoiding payment of the dues owed by them with the sole objective to create a situation where the respondent Bank could initiate proceedings to forcibly take over the possession of the premises in question from Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and late Mr. Harish Aggarwal. In order to safeguard their interest and to protect and safeguard their rights, Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and late Mr. Harish Aggarwal preferred a suit for permanent injunction before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. In the meantime, the premises in dispute were auctioned by the Bank in favour of respondents 4 to 7. They also filed the written statement before the Hon'ble High Court. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi was pleased to direct Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and late Mr. Harish Aggarwal to file a petition under Section 17 of the SRFAESI Act. Consequently, they preferred such a petition before the learned DRT. The property in dispute was auctioned by the Bank on 11.6.2005. Later, on the death of Mr. Harish Aggarwal, Mrs. Anjana Aggarwal and Mr. Gaurv Aggarwal were substituted in his place. In the meantime, the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the suit filed by them for permanent injunction filed on 14.12.2004 vide its order dated 23.12.2009.

Aggrieved by the said order, the appellants filed a Regular First Appeal being RFA (OS) No. 8/2010 before the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. The Hon'ble High Court passed an order with the consent of the appellants and the Counsel for respondents, thereby directing that the findings on merits on the claims of the appellants in the order dated 23.12.2009, passed by the Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court, were set aside, in which the Hon'ble Single Judge had held that the suit was not maintainable and denied remedy to the appellants. It was further directed that the appellants would be entitled to approach other appropriate Fora for redressal of their grievance, if any, and such Fora would deal with the matter uninfluenced by the findings on merits returned by the learned Single Judge and in accordance with law. Vide the impugned order dated 28.7.2010, the learned DRT-II, dismissed the S.A. filed by the above said appellants with costs, which were quantified at Rs. 50,000/-. Aggrieved by that order, the present second appeal has been filed.

I have heard the Counsel for the parties. The first objection raised by the appellants is that the respondent Bank has failed to make substantial compliance of the proviso appended to Rule 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, which provides that the secured creditor shall cause a public notice in two leading newspapers one in vernacular language having sufficient circulation in the locality by setting out the terms of sale. In the instant case, the public notice was published in two newspapers, namely, 'Veer Arjun' and 'Business Standard'. It is an admitted fact that in both the newspapers the publication was done in English language.

The learned Counsel for the Bank as well as the auction purchasers vehemently argued that this is not an illegality but an irregularity which has resulted in no substantial injury to any one. They invited the attention of the Court to various authorities. The learned Counsel for the Bank cited a judgment of a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, M/s. Kayjay Industries (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Asnew Drums (?) Ltd. & Ors., : (1974) 2 SCC 213. The relevant extracts of the said judgment run as under:

Certain salient facts may be highlighted in this context. A Court sale is a forced sale and notwithstanding the competitive element of a public auction, the best price is not often forthcoming. The judge must make a certain margin for this factor. A value's report, good as a basis, is not as good an actual offer and variations within limits between such an estimate, however, careful, and real bids by seasoned businessmen before the auctioneer are quite one the cards.

It was further held:

Businessmen make uncanny calculations before striking a bargain and that circumstance must enter the judicial verdict before deciding whether a better price could be had by a postponement of the sale.

It was further held in Para 9:

9......The expression 'material irregularity in the conduct of the sale' must be benignantly construed to cover the climax act of the Court accepting the highest bid. Indeed, under the Civil Procedure Code, it is the Court which conducts the sale and its duty to apply its mind to the material factors bearing on the reasonableness of the price offered is part of the process of obtaining a proper price in the course of the sale. Therefore, failure to apply its mind to this aspect of the conduct of the sale may amount to material irregularity. Here, substantial injury without material irregularity is not enough even as material irregularity not linked directly to inadequacy of the price is insufficient.

The learned Counsel for the Bank also invited my attention towards authorities Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank & Am: v. M/s. Ashok Saw Mill, III (2009) BC 640 (SC)=VI (2009) SLT 10=: AIR 2009 SC 2420, Shri Sudesh Kumar v. Shri Atam Parkash & Ors., 20 (1981) DLT (SN 9) and K. Rajesh v. Government of Tamil Nadu, Writ Appeal Nos. 1341 to 1343 of 2008, decided on 5.2.2009 by Hon'ble Madras High Court.

The learned Counsel for the auction purchasers has invited the attention of the Court towards the authority Jaswantlal Natvarlal Thakkar v. Sushilaben Manilal Dangarwala, : 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 691, wherein it was held that "For, under Order 21, Rule 90 it is not sufficient for the appellant to contend that there was an illegality or irregularity in the conduct of the sale, he must also prove by adducing sufficient facts that some substantial injury has been caused to the petitioner as a result of the order under Order 21 Rule 72 having been passed without such notice.

The learned Counsel also referred to the cases Ram Maurya v. Kailash Nath & Ors., : (1999) 9 SCC 276 and State Bank of India v. Hon'ble Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors., : 169 (2010) DLT 212 (DB)=III (2010) BC 38.

These arguments are bereft of merits. In the case of Swastik Agency and Others v. State Bank of India, Bhubaneswar and Others, : AIR 2009 Ori 147 (D.B.), the judgment was authored by Hon'ble Justice Dr. B.S. Chauhan, the then Chief Justice and now Hon'ble Judge of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein it was observed:

As the compliance of the statutory requirement had not been made and there is nothing on record to show that the valuation report had been made properly and the reserve price has been fixed accordingly. If it is presumed that it was done properly, then question arises how the property has fetched more than three times of the value fixed by the Bank. More so, non-publication of the notice in Oriya language is also fatal as it might have deprived persons not knowing English language to participate in the proceeding.

Non-compliance of such a mandatory requirement vitiated the proceedings. The Tribunal and DRAT have dealt with various issues without touching the most material issues involved in this case as explained hereinabove. The Tribunal and DRAT have misdirected themselves without entering into the legal issues, particularly the requirement and compliance of statutory provisions as non-compliance thereof would vitiate the entire proceedings. It seems to be highly arbitrary and unreasonable that for the recovery of a sum of amount about Rs. 4 lakh a property had been sold for Rs. 14 lakh and after adjusting its outstanding dues a sum of rupees more than double of their outstanding dues had been remitted to the petitioners. The petitioners did not accept the amount and returned the same to the Bank. The recovery proceedings had definitely not been made complying with the statutory provisions tantamount to fundamental procedural defects which enable the Court to set aside the confirmed sale even after issuance of sale certificate.

Non-compliance of statutory requirements of publication of possession notice and auction notice in vernacular language rendered the statutory requirement as farce. There should be purposeful compliance of the provisions of law and it cannot be reduced to an empty formality. The requirement to cause publication in 'vernacular language' in the newspaper is fundamental and the statutory requirement which cannot be compromised. It is not for the borrower or guarantor to establish that non-publication of the said notices in 'vernacular language' in thee newspaper has caused any prejudice to its cause. It is for the respondents to establish that non-compliance of the statutory requirements has not caused any prejudice at all. Proof of prejudice is unnecessary where requirement of statutory provision is mandatory. It ill-comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced'. Vide S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors., : AIR 1981 SC 136; and State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal & Anr., : AIR 1998 SC 3038.

In view of the above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. All proceedings subsequent to notice under Section 13(4) of the Act, 2002 being in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions are liable to be quashed. The case is squarely covered by the judgments of the Apex Court referred to above in Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalai, 2008 AIR SCW 5817 (supra), Divya Manufacturing Company (P) Ltd. & Anr., : AIR 2000 SC 2346 (supra) and Valji Khimji and Company, 2008 AIR SCW 5828 (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that no giving wide publication of the auction notice itself is a good ground for quashing the confirmed sale. In such a fact situation opposite party No. 4 is entitled to refund of the amount deposited by him. The opposite party-Sank shall refund the amount deposited by opposite party No. 4 with interest @ 10% per annum to him within four weeks from today. Opposite party No. 1 is directed to recalculate the amount due from the petitioner within four weeks from today. We further direct that as the opposite party-bank proceeded illegally, it is entitled to claim for legal expenses or recovery expenses from the petitioner. On receipt of the recomputed demand from the Bank, the petitioner shall deposit the same within four weeks from the date of receipt failing which the Bank shall be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner for making full recovery of its outstanding dues in accordance with law.

Aggrieved by that order, a SLP was preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 9.4.2009 made the following observation:

Head learned Counsel for the petitioner.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order.

In Manoj D. Kaposi and Another v. Union of India and Others, 111(2005) BC 592 (DB) it was held that requirement under Rules 8(6) and 9(1) are mandatory. See also Govind Chandra Pattnaik v. Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal & Ors., : 2009(2) OLR 374. I took the same view in case Shakumbhari Expo. Impo. Ltd., U.P. v. Shri Ram Overseas, Noida (U.P.) & Ors., 2011 (2) BJ 161.

Consequently, the above said auction is liable to be set aside on this short score. Secondly, it is apparent that 'Veer Arjun' newspaper is neither a leading newspaper nor it has sufficient circulation in Delhi. 'Business Standard' is also not a leading newspaper though some High Courts have approved it as leading newspaper. Again, it is published for six days a week. Even if it is assumed that one of the two newspapers was leading newspaper, it does not go to satisfy the requirement of law.

It is an indisputable fact that the auctioneer appointed in this case is Mr. Amarjit Vedi who is also an Advocate of the Bank as is apparent from the notice dated 21.12.2004. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in another case decided on 1.12.2010, WP(C) No. 8037/2010, was pleased to hold:

There are two other aspects to the matter. The first is that the receiver appointed by the DRT as per order dated 15.11.2010 is undisputedly the son of the Counsel for the respondent Bank which position is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondent Bank. The petitioners have been burdened with fee of the receiver quantified at Rs. 50,000/-. We consider it appropriate to stay the operation of this direction contained in the order of the DRT dated 15.11.2010 for a period of one month from today to enable the petitioners to avail of the appellate remedy. We must observe that it is certainly not appropriate the son of the Counsel for the respondent Bank where the parties are at lis with each other. If an Advocate is to be appointed, it should be an independent person.

It thus dampens the ardour of Bank's case.

The learned Counsel for the appellants has invited my attention towards the fact that the property had been constructed in a plot of 300 sq. yds. As per the valuation report dated 10.7.2002, the market value of the land and building was Rs. 159.29 lakh. This information is available at column 18 of the valuation report. At column 20 of the report, it is stated that the building is insured and its value is Rs. 145 lakh. At Column 21, it is stated that if the Bank would sell the property the approximate realizable value would be Rs. 145 lakh. Again, the distress value of the property as per the report dated 21.3.2005 is stated to be Rs. 126 lakh. In the report the fair market value given is Rs. 1,79,66,700/-. However, the property was sold for Rs. 1,26,30,000/- only. See the law laid down by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in a case Mr. A.K. Jain v. Canara Bank & On., Manu/D.E./8620/2007, decided on 14.9.2007 in WP(C) 6575/2006 by Division Bench.

To make the matter worse, only one person came forward to bid in the auction held. It must he borne in mind that the properly in dispute is situated at a prime location of this cosmopolitan city. The publication of sale notice in Hindi language in a leading newspaper would have attracted more bidders. Doubt strews the whole case.

M/s. Ram Murti Pyara Lal. Mr. Subhash Aggarwal and Mr. Amit Aggarwal in Para 30 of their S.A. made the following averments:

That the present petition is being tiled well within the period of forty-five days from date of knowledge of alleged sale when the respondent Bank first time stated the said fact during the course of proceedings on 6.9.2005 in S.A. 204/2005. Accordingly, the present petition under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act has been filed.

The learned Counsel for the auction purchasers submitted that the above said S.A. was barred by lime. In support of his case, he has cited an authority Kamlesh Babu & Ors. v. Lajpat Rai Sharma & On:. IV (2008) SLT 244-11 (2008) CLT 219 (SC)=: (2008) 12 SCC 577. In Paras 22 and 23 of the said judgment it was held:

Apart from Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act even Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure casts a mandate upon the Court to reject a plaint where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law, in this case by the law of limitation. Further, as far back as in 1943, the Privy Council in Lachhmi Sewak Sahit v. Ram Rup Sahu held that a point of limitation is prima facie admissible even in the Court of last resort although it had not been taken in the lower Courts.

The reasoning behind the said proposition is that certain questions relating to the jurisdiction of a Court, including limitation, goes to the very root of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain and decide a matter, as otherwise, the decision rendered without jurisdiction will be a nullity. However, we are not required to elaborate on the said proposition, inasmuch as in the instant case such a plea had been raised and decided by the trial Court but was not versed by the first appellate Court or the High Court while reversing the decision of the trial Court on the issues framed in the suit. We, therefore, have no hesitation in setting aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and to remand the suit to the first appellate Court to decide the limited question as to whether the suit was barred by limitation as found by the trial Court. Needless to say, if the suit is found to be so barred, the appeal is to be dismissed. If the suit is not found to be time-barred, the decision of the first appellate Court on the other issues shall not be disturbed.

The Counsel for the auction purchasers has cited another authority K.P. Jayan, Konackal House Edathala v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 22192 of 2007, decided by Hon'ble Kerala High Court on 2.4.2009 wherein it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has got no application under the SARFESI Act.

For the following reasons, I see no force in the arguments urged by the learned Counsel for the auction purchasers. The case of the appellants/borrowers is that they were not aware of the auction sale. The appellants in the first appeal has placed on record a true typed copy of the letter dated 10.12.2004 sent to Chief Manager of Central Bank, Connaught Circus Branch, New Delhi by Mr. Subhash Kumar, F-29 Kamla Nagar, Delhi, wherein they had specifically mentioned:

As you are aware that there are disputes going on with the tenants and are aware of my address as F-29, Kamla Nagar, Delhi, Kindly do all correspondences at the above mentioned address.

As you are aware that I am old sick man and living on medicines therefore I would request you that in case of any work please write me or meet me at above mentioned address.

There is no evidence that the notice was sent to Mr. Subhash Kumar at the address given in the said letter. The appellants have also placed on record a true copy of the postal receipt, which is dated 10.12.2004.

Consequently, the delay stands explained. However, without entering into the Controversy whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable or not because the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the authority UCO Bank v. Kanji Manji Kothari & Co., 2008(3) BJ 438, has decided that in the interest of justice Section 5 of the Limitation is applicable However, in the instant case, the question of application of Section 5 does not arise. Here the period of 45 days would start from the date of knowledge of sale.

The next logic trotted out by the Counsel for the auction purchasers was that the appellants have raised fresh issues and those issues should not be considered at the appellate stage. He also cited few authorities in support of his case.

I see no force in this argument. In the grounds set up by the appellants/ borrowers alleged that the action of the respondent Bank per se is contrary to the SRFAESI Act and rules made thereunder and deserved to be set aside. They have given grounds from 'A' to 'O' and almost cover all the grounds, in the petition under Section 17 of the SRFAESI Act. The first point covers all the rules and regulations and therefore those pleas raised by the borrowers/appellants have to be considered. It must be borne in mind that the paramount duty cast upon the Tribunals and appellate Tribunals is to promote the cause of natural justice.

Now, I advert to the next submission made by the Counsel for the auction purchasers and the Bank. The learned DRT by order dated 28.7.2010 came to the following conclusion. Before adverting to his conclusion, it may be mentioned here that, as a matter of fact, Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and others had previously filed an appeal against the interim order passed by the learned DRT. I had directed a preliminary inquiry. The learned trial Court held that the appellants in both the cases had fabricated two lease deeds, one in favour of Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and another in favour of Mr. Harish Aggarwal. Those lease deeds were executed on 1.9.1998 on the stamp papers purportedly purchased on the same dated from one Mr. Ramesh Chand, stamp vendor with Licence No. 495. The original stamp papers were not produced in any of the Courts. For the first time this was produced before this Court by the alleged tenants, who produced backside of the said stamp showing the name of the stamp vendor, licence number and date. Mr. Ramesh Chand, stamp vendor, was examined in the Court and the deposed that he got the licence as stamp vendor on 31.3.1999 vide letter No. F7 (495) SV/96-202-206. Consequently, the question of selling of stamp paper by him on 1.9.1998 or execution of the proposed lease on 1.9.1998 could not have possibly arisen. It was argued that the lease deeds were fabricated at the time of filing of proceedings to prevent the Bank from taking possession of the mortgaged property under the provisions of the SRFAESI Act. It is also apparent that the Hon'ble High Court also appointed a local commissioner to find out as to who is in possession of the premises in dispute. The local commissioner inspected the premises and submitted his report. His report clearly proves that Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal and others were never in possession of the secured asset, but report also reveals that Mrs. Shruti Aggarwal was found present in the premises in dispute with her servant. Consequently, the learned trial Court dismissed the appeal filed by the alleged tenants with costs which were quantified as Rs. 50,000/-.

The learned trial Court, in the order dated 24.5.2010 passed in other connected case, came to the conclusion that the conduct of the borrowers/ applicants makes them disentitled to any relief. In support of this conclusion the Presiding Officer of the DRT has cited authorities A.P. State Financial Corp. v. M/s. Gar Rerolling Mills, : 1994(2) SCC 647. Orissa State Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Hotel Jogendra, : 1996(5) SCC 357, Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, 110 (2004) DLT 665 (SC)=II (2004) BC 397 (SC)=II (2004) SLT 991, S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, II (1993) BC 546=: AIR 1994 SC 853 and FICOM Organics Ltd. v. Laffans Petrochemicals Ltd., (2009) 99 COM CASE 471 (Guj.).

The learned Counsel for the auction purchasers has also invited my attention towards a few authorities in this respect as well. In a recent authority Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., IX (2009) SLT 167=: (2010) 2 SCC 114, it was held in Para 2:

In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posted by this new creed of litigants, the Courts have, from time-to-time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

The indictment made against the appellants pales into insignificance when the Bank has so many skeletons in its cupboards. It is thus clear that the case of the Bank is littered with the evidence of its weaknesses. A haze of obscurity covers the entire case. It must be borne in mind that under CPC the Court sale is effected under Order 21 and the sale is set aside on ground of irregularity or fraud under Order 21 Rule 90. The sale in that case is a Court sale. These powers have been given to the authorized officer of the Bank. They are supposed to discharge their duties and sell the properties as Courts do, impartially, and their actions must be transparent and above board. In view of these flaws and illegalities, the offences committed by the appellants can be ignored. The matter between the appellants inter se does not come within the purview of this Court. Both the parties have admitted their relationship of landlords and tenants. Their dispute, if any, is of civil nature. Their remedies lie in Civil Court or in the Court of Rent Controller. For the reasons stated above, the sale is liable to be set aside. I, accordingly, set aside the sale. It is an indisputable fact that the appellants/borrowers have already paid off the entire debt. They are, under the circumstances, entitled to get their property redeemed. However, if any amount has been left out to be paid, they are directed to pay the said amount to the Bank within 15 days of passing of this order. The Bank, in turn, will return their title deeds and issue a 'No Dues Certificate' within a period of four days from the receipt of entire outstanding dues. The Bank is also directed to return the amount deposited by the auction purchasers within 15 days from today along with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date it was deposited till realization. There shall be no order as to costs.

There is an application (No. 189/2011 in Appeal No. 256/2010) filed by one Mr. V.K. Gupta, intervenor. I have heard Mr. Pallav Saxena, Counsel for the applicant/intervenor. The Counsel for the intervenor argued that only in case the appeals are dismissed, his application be considered. Since this Court has accepted the appeals, therefore, the instant application is dismissed as having been note pressed.

Both the appeals are disposed of. Copies of this order be furnished to the parties as per law and another copy, along with lower Court records, be sent to the learned DRT forthwith.