Sheo Narayan Pathak and Others vs Lalman Pathak

Rowland, J.—This appeal arises out of a suit for damages in which the plaintiff had claimed Rs. 361, the Munsif had awarded Rs. 301 and the Subordinate Judge on appeal had awarded Rs. 200 as damages. The nature of the claim will appear sufficiently from the findings of the Munsif and of the Subordinate Judge. The Munsif found that on several occasions members of the defendants first party had thrown brickbats on the house of the plaintiff damaging his tiles; that the defendants had sounded musical instruments at night while the sons of the plaintiff were seriously ill with the intention to annoy and vex the plaintiff; that the defendants had threatened and abused the plaintiff on several occasions; that the plaintiff had had to engage peons for protection of himself and his family and that the defendants were harassing the plaintiff and attempting to interfere by such foul means with his practice as a physician by insulting and abusing him before strangers, and trying to harm his reputation, and not to speak of the mental and bodily anxiety he was put to by such actions of the defendants. The Subordinate Judge held that the defendants first party did throw brickbats over the house of the plaintiff as alleged with the deliberate intention of annoying him and making his house unsafe to live in. Both Courts granted a decree of injunction against the defendants restraining them from throwing brickbats, etc., on the plaintiff''s house, and so far as this portion of the order is concerned no argument has been addressed to me in second appeal, but it is said that both the Courts have failed to observe the legal principles in the assessments of damages and that the decree so far as it refers to damages is not sustainable. The particulars of the claim as given in para. 10 of the plaint are these: the damage caused to the plaintiff''s house by the defendants is assessed at Rs. 50, expenses for medical treatment of the plaintiffs sons in consequence of the throwing of brickbats, etc., at Rs. 50; the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in engaging peons for the safety of his family and his house against the actions of the defendants Rs. 207-5-6; the claim reduced by the plaintiff to Rs. 105; and compensation for anxiety, irritation, insult, abuse, annoyance, assault, vexation, molestation and mental and bodily pain caused by the acts of the defendants Rs. 151; and Rs. 5 earnest money for hire of a house to remove his family in consequence of the molestation. Out of this amount the Munsif gives compensation to the extent of Rs. 151 for anxiety, bodily and mental pain, etc., and Rs. 150 in one lump for the other items. The Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff could recover nothing for the medical treatment and assessed the compensation at Rs. 125 for anxiety, mental and bodily pain caused to the plaintiff by wrongful acts of the defendants, and Rs. 75 in one lump sum for damage to the house and the cost of retaining peons. It is argued that there were no materials before the Courts on which they could properly assess the damages as above; that before such damages could be awarded evidence should be strictly insisted on a pecuniary loss caused to the plaintiff up to the measure of the damages claimed, the test being compensation and not restitution.

As regards the allegation of abuse reference has been made to Girish Chander Mitter v. Jatadhari Sadukhan [1899] 26 Cal, 653, where it is said that the mere use of abusive language is not actionable unless special damage is proved. It was further contended that for bodily injury damage should not have been allowed without proof of actual bodily hurt and expenses incurred in curing it, and that for mental injury no damage should have been allowed, for mental injury is not by itself a ground of suit for damages. In my opinion the above arguments could have no application to the present case. Abusive language is not the sole cause of action here. The plaintiff has proved against the defendants the commission of wrongful acts actionable in themselves and falling within both trespass and assault. The general principle for action in tort is no doubt as stated in Halsbury''s Laws of England, Vol. 10, p. 340, para. 626. The principle is that such damages are recoverable as are the natural and probable result of the acts complained of. Principles for the computation of damages have been laid down in some cases, but such rules are not precise and in all actions of tort whether to the property, or the person, or the reputation, damage may be indefinitely enhanced by reason of the malicious, or insulting, oppressive conduct of the defendant. It is further stated in para. 628, p. 341:

that the rule that only such damages are recoverable as are the natural and probable result of the wrongful act is somewhat obscured in its application to actions of trespass by the fact that the amount of damages in such an action may always be indefinitely enhanced by evidence of malicious motive or violent and insulting conduct on the part of the defendant.

On the findings which the lower Courts have recorded, I have no doubt that the law as summarized above clearly supports the decree passed. This was not a case where it was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove rupee by rupee every portion of the damage that he claimed. It was a case for the assessment of a reasonable amount having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the party.

The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.