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Judgment
Parties to the lis have entered into a compromise with reference to the settlement of all the issues-past, present and future.
In the instant petition, the petitioners are seeking quashment of FIR bearing No. 91/2015 registered in Police Station SafaKadal, under Sections
498-A, 413 RPC, lodged on the compliant of the Respondent No.1, namely, Ms Rabia, i.e. the respondent No.1 herein.
On the previous date of hearing, when asked, Mr Javed Iqbal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that mutual settlement between
the parties has an effect of compounding the offences with reference to the registration of the case, notwithstanding the other legal infirmities. In that
background, the learned counsel for the parties, were directed to ensure appearance of the petitioner No.1, i.e. the husband, and, the Respondent
No.1, i.e. the wife, as the main contour of difference and allegations in the FIR are at the behest of the Respondent No.1 (wife) against the
petitioner No.1 (husband).
Today, both husband and wife have appeared. The Respondent No.1, i.e. the wife, when asked, submits that she, without any influence, undue
approach and coercion on part of the petitioners, has willingly entered into a compromise with reference to the settlement of her disputes with the
petitioner No.1, therefore, they are living a peaceful and comfortable matrimonial life with their seven year old child.
The Respondent No.1, on whose instance the case has been registered, has willingly disclosed her intention of shunning the path of litigation with
reference to closing of all matters which have been lodged in the Police Station or are pending in any Court of law against the petitioners.
In order to proceed further, it has become necessary to have the statement of both the petitioner No.1, i.e. the husband and respondent No.1,
i.e. the wife, recorded before the Registrar Judicial of this Court today itself. On recording the said statement, the Registrar Judicial shall re-submit
the file for disposal.
The Registrar Judicial, has recorded the statement of the parties as directed, perusal whereof, reveals that the Respondent No.1-wife, has
supported the compromise with reference to the settlement of the difference/ disputes with the petitioners and has further stated that she wants to
live a peaceful matrimonial life with her husband, i.e. the petitioner No.1 herein along with their child. She has further stated that the FIR lodged on
her complaint against the petitioners was only out of her anger and that she wants to withdraw the said complaint and has no objection if the Court
quashes the same. The statement of the petitioner No.1, i.e. the husband, who has joined his other relatives as co-petitioners in the present petition,
seeking quashment of the FIR, initially on merits, but now, subsequently, on the strength of the compromise, is also recorded.
Mr Javed Iqbal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, when asked, submits that this Court is competent enough to quash
the FIR and the proceedings thereon in view of the compromise, as arrived at between the parties. The learned counsel further submits that such a
course is permissible in terms of the applicable laws and strengthens his arguments with the support of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court of
the country in case titled ""B. S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr."", reported in ""AIR 2003 Supreme Court 1386"", paragraph Nos. 14 and
15 being relevant, are noticed as under:
There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to
prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a
husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The
hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against the object for which this provision was added. There is
everylikelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from
settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or
FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.
Mr Javed, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in case titled ""Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab & Anr""., reported in ""(2012) Supreme Court Cases 303"", paragraph Nos. 58 and 61 being relevant, are extracted as under:
Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has
been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an
exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing
the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in
wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he
and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made
compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other
offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal
sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,
mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to
dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between
them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the
framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such
settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be
casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts
and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court
for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it
has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse
of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the
offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.
Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though
the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact
on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any
basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly
civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial,
mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category
of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise
with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
Further reliance is placed on the judgment passed in an identical matter arising out of the same set of facts rendered by the Division Bench of
the Bombay High Court in criminal application No. 1004 of 2017, titled ""Azar Feroze Koul & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra & Anr."", relevant
portion whereof is reproduced below, verbatim et literatim:
In terms of memo of compromise, the parties have started residing together.
Respondent No.2 is personally present in the Court. She has accordingly filed affidavit dated 13th October, 2017. In paragraph
No.3 she has given no objection to quashing the subject F.I.R.
The Apex Court in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana reported (AIR 2003 SC 1386) has held that in the event of settlement of
matrimonial dispute, the FIR under Section 498A can be quashed, even though the said offence is not compoundable in terms of
Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are contained in Paras 14 and 15 which are reproduced
herein below:
There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to
prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a
husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The
hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against the object for which this provision was added. There is
every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from
settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or
FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.
Accordingly, the present application is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a), (b) and (c). The F.I.R. bearing No. 4 of 2017,
registered with Malad Police Station, Mumbai, at the instance of respondent No.2, for offence punishable under Sections 498(A),
377, 354, 406, 504, 506, of the Indian Penal Code is hereby quashed and set aside.
Mr Sheikh Feroz, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.1, i.e. the wife, supports the compromise arrived at between
the parties and submits that he has no objection with regard to grant of relief as being permissible under law.
Mr Dar, the learned Additional Advocate General, appearing vice Mr B. A. Dar, Senior Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, when asked, submits that such type of compounding the offences is not permissible as the same may lead to
unnecessary chaos in the system with reference to scuttling the process and procedure as enshrined in the legislature. He further submits that the
intention of the legislature with reference to the well settled procedure vis-?-vis not allowing the compromise to form the basis for compounding of
the offences, is clear and unambiguous.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and considered the matter.
True that the statement of the complainant and the accused cannot form the basis for compounding the offences with reference to its
permissibility, but the same is not the case in hand. The detailed out facts and circumstances make a vital reference to the net result of the
proceedings. The investigation, if allowed, can only lead the parties to no good benefit and can form as a basis for putting them in disorder again.
Such is not the intention and approach of the legislation aimed at disformation of the Union of a family.
No law on the surface has reference to disturbing the unionism of a family, which is only aimed at allowing them to settle in the way of
formation as designed by the Creator. In the event, the relief prayed for, not only by the petitioners, but also supported with the help of the
respondent No.1, i.e. the wife of petitioner No.1, is not allowed, same may lead to allowing the police to proceed in a matter where the
complainant herself is not interested in prosecuting the same as she has settled all issues with her husband, who are now living a peaceful
matrimonial life alongwith their child.
I have examined the provisions of law, as in vogue in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, corresponding to the provisions discussed by the Apex
Court and the Bombay High Court. There is a similarity in the provisions of law in the Centre and our State. Therefore, there is no option for the
Court, but to apply the judgments, as referred hereinabove/passed in the similar set of cases, to the instant case.
In the above background, while allowing the instant petition, the FIR bearing No. 91/2015 registered at Police Station, SafaKadal, on the
basis of the complaint filed by the Respondent No.1, i.e. wife of petitioner No.1, and the subsequent proceedings initiated based on such
complaint/ FIR before the Court of 3rd Additional Munsiff, Srinagar, in case titled ''Mrs. Rabia Altaf v. Sheikh Rouf & Ors.'', are quashed.
561-A petition disposed of as above.