Tribunals and CommissionsDivision Bench(2026) 08 CAT CK 6203

Shailendra Mishra vs Uol & Ors.

Central Administrative Tribunal · Decided on 5 August 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anil Kumar Ojha, Member (Judicial) · Pankaj Kumar, Member (Administrative)
CASE NUMBER
Original Application No. 332/00173 of 2017

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Judgment

65 paragraphs · 3,708 words

Per Hon'ble Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Member-Administrative

In this case relating to charge sheet in departmental proceedings, the applicant has sought following reliefs:

"(a)

To quash the impugned charge sheet dated 23.03.2017 issued by respondent No. 3 as contained in Annexure A-1 to the OA with all consequential benefits.

(b)

Any other order which this Hon'ble Tribunal deems just and proper in the circumstances of the case be also passed.

(c)

To pay the cost of this application."

2.1

The facts of the case are that the applicant was initially appointed in 1994 as Extra Departmental Packer (now known as Gramin Dak Sevak or GDS). He applied in 2009 for appearing in Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) known as Lower Grade Official (LGO) for the post of Postal Assistant and he was selected vide order dated 18.01.2011 and he underwent training and joined as Postal Assistant on 14.12.2011. The applicant was proceeded against departmentally by the respondents with the issue of charge sheet dated 23.03.2017 under rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 [CCS(CCA) Rules] alleging his involvement in a criminal act pertaining to question paper leak during the Postman Examination 2005 and concealment of the factum of criminal case no. 1631/06 pending against him while applying for LGO Examination 2010. Aggrieved, the applicant has preferred this OA.

2.2

The following interim order was passed by this Tribunal on 26.05.2017:

"13.

In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the following interim protection is given to the applicant that the departmental proceedings may go on but no final decision shall be taken therein till the next date."

(emphasis supplied)

3.

The applicant's first objection is that the charge sheet has been backdated to circumvent this Tribunal's stay order dated 21.03.2017 in OA No. 71 of 2017 in which the applicant had challenged his reversion from the post of Postal Assistant. His second objection is that the charge sheet is hit by delay for having been issued after 12 years of the alleged misconduct in the year 2005. His third objection is that in the form to be filled for LGO Examination 2010, there was no column for disclosing any criminal case and so he cannot be charged for not having disclosed the same; rather it was the responsibility of the respondents to disclose it as per paragraph 6 of the order dated 18.01.2011 declaring the result.

4.

The respondents state that a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged on 02.07.2005 against unknown persons for leak of question paper pertaining to departmental examination for promotion from GDS to Postman in 2005 and following investigation, a charge sheet dated 16.04.2006 under section 417, 418, 419 and 420 of IPC was filed in the competent Court against the applicant and another person. The respondents contend that paragraph 7 of the order dated 18.01.2011 declaring the result of LGO Examination 2010 allows deletion from list of successful candidates if it is found later that the candidate was not eligible. They state that they received information through application filed under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and public complaint that the applicant was under criminal trial at the time of appearing in LGO Examination and on investigation by the Vigilance Office, the complaint was found to be correct and the applicant's statement was recorded on 30.09.2016. They contend that at the time of applicant's participation in LGO Examination 2010 and the declaration of result, the department had not received any information that the applicant had been charge sheeted in criminal case no. 210 of 2005.

5.

We have heard both the parties. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned charge sheet is highly belated in terms of State of Madhya Pradesh vs Bani Singh AIR 1990 SC 1308 and P V Mahadevan vs M D Tamil Nadu Housing Board (2005) 6 SCC 363 et al.

6.0 Backdating of Charge Sheet

6.1

The first objection of the applicant is that the charge sheet dated 23.03.2017 has been issued in backdate by the respondents to circumvent the stay order passed by this Tribunal on 21.03.2017 in OA No. 71 of 2017 in which the applicant had challenged his reversion from the post of Postal Assistant.

6.2

A perusal of this Tribunal's order dated 21.03.2017 in OA No. 71 of 2017 reveals the following position:

"19.

Accordingly, the impugned order of the reversion dated 10.02.2017 shall be kept in abeyance till further orders subject to furnishing an indemnity bond along with an undertaking by the applicant to the effect that if the present OA is dismissed, he shall repay the amount of difference of salary and allowances of the post of Postal Assistant and of Postman to the department within two months from the date of dismissal of present OA...

20.

However liberty is granted to the respondents to proceed against the applicant in accordance with law if so desired."

(emphasis supplied)

It is noted that on 21.03.2017 this Tribunal had stayed the order reverting the applicant and granted liberty to the respondents to proceed against the applicant. We fail to comprehend what incentive the respondents had to backdate the charge sheet to circumvent this Tribunal's stay order which related to the applicant's reversion from the post of Postal Assistant and which allowed the respondents to proceed against him in accordance with law.

6.3

Even factually, we find that the applicant's contention is without merit as the stay order in OA No. 71 of 2017 was passed on 21.03.2017 while the charge sheet is dated 23.03.2017.

7.0 Delay

7.1

The second objection of the applicant pertains to the delay of 12 years reckoned from filing of the FIR in 2005 till the issue of charge sheet in 2017. On the aspect of delay, it would be apposite to refer to the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan 1998 (4) SCC 154 which have been quoted in P V Mahadevan (supra):

"19.

It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."

(emphasis supplied)

7.2

Further, in Bani Singh (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:

"4... The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then..."

(emphasis supplied)

In addition to the above, in a recent judgment dated 01.04.2025 in Amresh Shrivastava vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors (Civil Appeal No. 10590 of 2024) involving belated issue of charge sheet to a Tehsildar for granting land settlement in favour of ineligible persons, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:

"17.

As to the second question, regarding whether delay is a ground for stopping the departmental proceedings at the stage of the chargesheet itself, suffice it to say that this varies from case to case. However, in the instant case where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct being within the knowledge of the department, but still no departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must go in favour of the employee. However, there may be cases where the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based on material considerations of factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process of departmental proceedings."

(emphasis supplied)

7.3

It follows from the judgments quoted above that inordinate delay can be fatal to the disciplinary proceedings if such delay is not explained; further, the nature of the charge is also a relevant consideration.

7.4

In the present case the respondents have stated that they themselves were not aware of the criminal case against the applicant when he applied for the post of Postal Assistant through LGO Examination 2010 and the matter came to light subsequently through RTI queries and public complaint. In view of this position, it cannot be said that the delay in issuing the charge sheet is without adequate or reasonable explanation. Moreover, it is noted that the charge against the applicant is of a grave nature alleging involvement in criminal act pertaining to question paper leak during the Postman Examination 2005. Considering these circumstances, on balance, we find that it would not be in the interest of justice to quash the charge sheet merely on account of the delay.

7.5

There is another aspect, i.e., the criminal proceedings in regard to question paper leak and the departmental proceedings involving the same matter against the applicant, which requires our consideration. Here is would be apposite to refer to the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association vs NOIDA JT (2007) 2 SC 620:

"... The conceptual difference between departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this Court in several cases. Reference may be made to Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. T. Srinivas [2004 (7) SCC 442], Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Others v. Sarvesh Berry [2005 (10) SCC 471] and Uttaranchal Road Transport Corpn. v. Mansaram Nainwal [2006 (6) SCC 366].

The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution is two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty the offender owes to the society, or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the department enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances.

A three-judge Bench of this Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors [1997 (2) SCC 699] analysed the legal position in great detail on the above lines.

The aforesaid position was also noted in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors [1996 (6) SCC 417].

There can be no straight jacket formula as to in which case the departmental proceedings are to be stayed. There may be cases where the trial of the case gets prolonged by the dilatory method adopted by delinquent official. He cannot be permitted to, on one hand, prolong criminal case and at the same time contend that the departmental proceedings should be stayed on the ground that the criminal case is pending.

In Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd [1999 (3) SCC 679], this Court indicated some of the fact situations which would govern the question whether departmental proceedings should be kept in abeyance during pendency of a criminal case. In paragraph 22 conclusions which are deducible from various decisions were summarised. They are as follows:

(i)

Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

(ii)

If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

(iii)

Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

(iv)

The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

(v)

If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.

(emphasis supplied)

It is noted that the charge sheet pertaining to leak of question paper in Postman Examination 2005, in which the applicant has been implicated along with another person, was filed in the year 2006. There is no material on record to show that the criminal proceedings have been concluded in the intervening two decades. Due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. Thus, there is no case for quashing or staying the departmental proceedings, in our view.

8.0 Alleged concealment of criminal case

8.1

The applicant's third objection is that he cannot be blamed for not having disclosed the criminal case against him while appearing in LGO Examination 2010. The applicant's contention has been rebutted by the respondents.

8.2

At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to the judicial pronouncements in the matter of issue of memorandum of charges. The Supreme Court, in Union of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena; JT 1992 (2) SC 532 observed:

"It is surprising that without apparently considering whether the memorandum of charges deserved to be enquired into or not, granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings as it has done. If the disciplinary proceedings in such serious matters are stayed so lightly as the Tribunal appears to have done, it would be extremely difficult to bring any wrongdoer to book..."

"In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the Disciplinary Authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the Disciplinary Authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to Court or Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. Now if a court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is un-understandable how can that be done by the Tribunal at the stage of framing of charges?"

(emphasis supplied)

Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union of India & Another vs. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 observed:

"Admittedly, the respondent has not yet submitted his reply to the charge-sheet and the respondent rushed to the Central Administrative Tribunal merely on the information that a charge-sheet to this effect was to be issued to him. The respondent has the full opportunity to reply to the charge-sheet and to raise all the points available to him including those which are now urged on his behalf by learned counsel for the respondent. In our opinion, this was not the stage at which the Tribunal ought to have entertained such an application for quashing the charge-sheet and the appropriate course for the respondent to adopt is to file his reply to the charge-sheet and invite the decision of the Disciplinary Authority thereon."

In State of Punjab and Others v. Ajit Singh, (1997) 11 SCC 368, the Apex Court observed:

"We are, however, of the view that the High Court was in error in setting aside the charge-sheet that was served on the respondents in the disciplinary proceedings. In doing so the High Court has gone into the merits of the allegations on which the charge-sheet was based and even though the charges had yet to be proved by evidence to be adduced in the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, accepting the explanation offered by the respondent, has proceeded on the basis that there was no merit in the charges levelled against the respondent. We are unable to uphold this approach of the High Court."

(emphasis supplied)

Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906 further elaborated on the matter in following terms:

"The reason why ordinarily a Writ Petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at this stage the Writ Petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter."

(emphasis supplied)

8.3

Keeping in view the settled proposition of law quoted above, we are not inclined to examine merits of rival contentions regarding the alleged concealment of the criminal case by the applicant at this stage when the departmental proceedings are ongoing.

9.

In conclusion, we find that no case has been made out by the applicant for our interference in the charge sheet dated 23.03.2017.

10.1

In view of the foregoing, the interim order dated 26.05.2017 is vacated and this OA is dismissed for being devoid of merit.

10.2

Associated MAs also stand disposed of.

10.3

Parties shall bear their own costs.