Shaik Shareef vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

The petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the proceedings dated19.10.2026 issued by the fourth respondent, the Returning Officer, rejecting his nomination for the post of Chairperson of Dachepalli Nagar Panchayat in the ensuing ordinary elections to urban and rural local bodies. The petitioner seeks a direction to set aside the rejection and to direct the respondents to accept his nomination.

The case of the petitioner is that he submitted his nomination paper along with the required documents and declaration. According to him, the nomination was rejected on the ground that he had not furnished information regarding his involvement in a criminal case.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the nomination papers were otherwise complete and relies on the circular issued by the State Election Commission, which states that a nomination should not be rejected merely because information furnished in a declaration, is false or defective. Reliance is also placed on the Judgment in Manik Lal Prasad, Son of late Mahendra Prasad v. State of Bihar.

The learned counsel appearing for the State Election Commission opposes the writ petition on the ground that a challenge to the rejection of a nomination in an ongoing municipal election is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the petitioner must pursue the remedy available under the election law. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Meenakshi Natrajan v. Election Commission of India and another.

The following questions arise for consideration:

At the outset, it is necessary to consider the constitutional scheme governing municipal elections. Article 243 Z G (b) of the Constitution of India provides that no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided by or under the law made by the Legislature of the State. The object of this provision is to ensure that election disputes are decided through the special procedure provided by law and that the election process is not interrupted by proceedings before a constitutional court.

The present challenge is directed against the rejection of the petitioner’s nomination for a municipal election. The validity of that rejection is an issue arising directly out of the election process. The petitioner cannot avoid the constitutional restriction merely by describing the action of the Returning Officer as arbitrary or contrary to the circular of the State Election Commission. The election law provides a mechanism for challenging an election on the ground of improper rejection of a nomination. The petitioner may raise such aground before the competent forum in accordance with the applicable law, subject to the requirements and limitations prescribed therein.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Meenakshi Natrajan v. Election Commission of India and another ^{11.(2026 INSC 643)} , relied upon by the respondents, reinforces the principle that a candidate whose nomination has been rejected must ordinarily pursue the remedy provided by the election law rather than seek judicial intervention to interrupt the election process. The constitutional scheme does not permit the Court to create a separate category of pre-election challenges merely because a candidate asserts that the rejection is plainly erroneous. In the present case, no exceptional circumstance has been established that would justify departing from the constitutional scheme.

The petitioner relies on Manik Lal Prasad v. State of Bihar^{22.Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.6170 of 2022}. The facts of that case, as placed before this Court, concerned rejection of a nomination on the ground that a no-confidence motion had earlier been passed against the candidate. The issue there was whether that circumstance rendered the candidate ineligible to contest the election. The present case is materially different. Here, the stated ground for rejection is the failure to disclose information relating to a criminal case in the prescribed declaration. The decision relied upon by the petitioner, therefore, does not resolve the maintainability objection raised by the respondents and does not require this Court to entertain the present writ petition

notwithstanding Article 243ZG(b).

Even otherwise, the circular relied upon by the petitioner does not support his contention in the manner suggested. The relevant instructions distinguish between a declaration that has been filed in complete form but contains information alleged to be false or defective, and a declaration in which required information has not been furnished. The protection against rejection on the ground that information is false or defective applies where the prescribed declaration has been completed. The circular separately states that failure to furnish the required declaration or furnishing incomplete information may make the nomination liable to rejection.

In the present case, it is admitted for the purpose of this petition that the petitioner did not furnish information regarding his involvement in the criminal case. The petitioner’s contention that the remaining portions of the nomination papers were complete does not, by itself, establish that the prescribed declaration was complete. The omission of a required disclosure cannot automatically be treated as a mere defect in information already furnished. Whether the criminal case was of a nature that required disclosure, whether the declaration was otherwise compliant, and whether the Returning Officer correctly applied the relevant rules are matters that may be examined by the competent forum in an election challenge, if raised in accordance with law. In view of the constitutional bar and the alternative remedy, this Court need not record a final finding on those matters in this writ petition.

The petitioner has also referred to the representation dated 22.10.2026 said to have been sent by e-mail to the respondents. The fact that such a representation was made does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction on this Court to examine the validity of the rejection in disregard of the constitutional scheme. Nor does the filing of a representation suspend or displace the remedy prescribed by the election law.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition challenging the rejection of the petitioner’s nomination during the ongoing municipal election process. The petitioner is left at liberty to avail himself of the remedy available under the applicable election law before the competent forum, in accordance with law. All contentions on the merits of the rejection are left open to be considered by that forum, if and when properly raised.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.