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Judgment
The only ground urged by Mr. Amitesh Kumar, for seeking review of my judgement dated 22 April 2024, is that the judgement proceeds on the premise that his clients were not Multi-Disciplinary Institutions1, which they are.
In para 65 of the order under challenge, I have specifically noted Mr. Amitesh Kumar’s contention advanced before me, at the time when the writ petitions were argued, that, except for the fact that his clients were not MDIs, they satisfied all other requirements. I have taken a view that the requirement of being MDIs is mandatory and as Mr. Amitesh Kumar had himself pointed out that his clients were not MDIs, they were not entitled to the benefits sought.
Today, in the review petition, Mr. Amitesh Kumar’s contention is that his clients were, in fact, MDIs.
We have perused the entire review petition. There is no averment that the contention of Mr. Amitesh Kumar as noted, in para 65, of the judgment under review, was wrongly noted, or that he had not submitted, as noted in the judgement under review, that his clients were not MDIs. Nor is there any averment that the statement was made in error, or was otherwise incorrect.
Rather, Mr. Amitesh Kumar’s submission, on the basis of which he seeks review, is directly contrary to what was submitted before me when the writ petitions were heard.
To my mind, a review cannot be sought thus. The review petition would necessarily have to advert to the said submission, which, if made in error, might be open to a reconsideration in review. Review cannot, however, be sought on the basis of the basis of a directly contrary stance, without even adverting to the original submission.
The position in law, in this regard, stands encapsulated in the following passage from State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak2:
“4.When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.” [Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaram Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty3] We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. [Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Chandrabati Chowdhrain4] That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)
Avoiding all reference to the submission originally made, while seeking review, is simply not permissible.
The review petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications also stand dismissed.
As I have dismissed the Review Petitions on the basis of the principles set out in Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, without examining them on merits, this order would not inhibit the review petitioners from preferring fresh Review Petitions in sync with the declaration of the law in the said judgement.