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Judgment
ORDER
The applicant has filed the OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,1985, seeking the following relief:
“.......... to call for the proceedings of the 5th respondent NO.P.227/MDU-Adm/DAR/Maj/SV/3586, dated 26.02.2019 and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents to provide back wages and terminal benefits to the applicant from the date of his suspension with all consequential and retirement benefits from 31.12.2018 onwards and pass such other or further orders may deem fit and proper as per the circumstances of the case and thus render justice”.
The essential facts which are necessary for adjudication of the case are as follows:
The Applicant joined service in the Division Account Office as Clerk Grade-II on 13.07.1977. He was subsequently promoted as Clerk Grade-I and thereafter as Accounts Assistant in the office of the 5th Respondent. The Applicant rendered approximately 23 years of unblemished service. While the Applicant was in service, the 5th Respondent issued a Charge Memorandum, dated 11.02.2000, based upon a Police complaint alleging that the Applicant was running finance and chit-fund activities in the names of his mother and close relatives. On 19.02.2000, the Applicant was arrested and remanded to judicial custody in connection with the said allegations under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1997. The fact of his arrest and remand was immediately communicated by the Police Authorities to the Respondents. The Applicant also caused the same to be communicated to the Respondents through his relatives. The Applicant was placed under suspension on 19.02.2000, which was communicated by the Respondents vide proceedings dated 14.03.2000. He was subsequently granted bail on 20.04.2000. In the meantime, disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the Applicant in respect of the allegations referred to in the Charge Memorandum, dated 11.02.2000. The said disciplinary proceedings were not duly communicated to the Applicant in the manner prescribed under the applicable Service Rules. Nevertheless, the Applicant was served with the first Charge Memorandum, dated 11.02.2000, to which he submitted his detailed reply on 29.06.2000. The 5th Respondent thereafter initiated a preliminary enquiry and appointed the Additional Divisional Finance Manager, Madurai, as the Enquiry Officer. Upon enquiry and investigation, the Enquiry Officer found that there was no documentary evidence available to establish the charges against the Applicant and consequently held the charges to be not proved. Thereafter, the Applicant's suspension was unconditionally revoked on 21.11.2005 vide Letter No. P.227/MDU/Admn/DAR/SV/MAJ/Aug.2003, and the Applicant was reinstated in service with effect from 01.12.2005. Immediately thereafter, the Applicant submitted a representation dated 07.12.2005, requesting payment of full back wages for the period during which he had remained under suspension. To the Applicant's shock and surprise, a sealed-cover Charge Memorandum, dated 27.08.2003, bearing was subsequently handed over to him only on 09.12.2005. The said Charge Memorandum contained allegations substantially identical to those which had already been enquired into pursuant to the earlier Charge Memorandum dated 11.02.2000 and which had not been proved. An Enquiry Officer had already been appointed vide proceedings dated 09.12.2003. On receipt of the said proceedings and Charge Memorandum, the Applicant submitted a representation dated 14.12.2005, requesting the Respondents to drop the disciplinary proceedings, particularly in view of the earlier enquiry and the findings therein. Without considering the Applicant's representation, the Respondents proceeded with the disciplinary enquiry and directed the Applicant to appear before the Enquiry Officer. The Applicant consequently submitted a further representation dated 28.12.2005, reiterating his request for dropping of the disciplinary proceedings. The Applicant also submitted a representation dated 08.02.2006 to the Chairman, Railway Board, requesting, inter alia, payment of subsistence allowance, dropping of the disciplinary proceedings and consideration of his earlier representations. Subsequently, the Office of the Senior Divisional Finance Manager forwarded the disciplinary proceedings to the Disciplinary Authority vide Letter, dated 30.05.2007, stating that, on the basis of the ex parte enquiry, the Applicant was found guilty of the charges. The Disciplinary Authority thereafter imposed the extreme penalty of dismissal from service upon the Applicant. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the Applicant preferred an appeal dated 23.06.2007 before the 4th Respondent. The Appellate Authority, by order dated 15.07.2008, upheld the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, which order was communicated to the Applicant vide Letter dated 22.07.2008. The Applicant, being aggrieved by the appellate order, preferred a Revision Petition dated 30.08.2008, seeking setting aside of the penalty imposed upon him. The Revision Authority, however, upheld the penalty and communicated the same to the Applicant vide Letter , dated16.04.2009. Aggrieved by the said order, the Applicant approached this Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 537 of 2009 which was disposed of by this Tribunal, whereby the order of the Revision Authority was upheld, with a direction concerning payment of subsistence allowance. Subsequently, the criminal proceedings arising out of the very allegations on the basis of which the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated culminated before the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (TNPID) Court. By judgment/order dated 28.04.2017 in C.C. Nos. 25 to 34 of 2008, the Applicant was acquitted in all the criminal cases. In view of the acquittal and the fact that the disciplinary proceedings had arisen out of the same set of allegations, the Applicant submitted several representations dated 08.02.2019, 25.02.2019, 18.03.2019 and 20.03.2019, requesting the Respondents to revoke/set aside the disciplinary action and to grant him consequential benefits, including back wages. Despite the said representations and the judgment of acquittal, the Respondents failed to consider the Applicant's request or pass any appropriate and reasoned order thereon. Having exhausted the available departmental remedies and being left without any effective remedy, the Applicant is constrained to approach this Tribunal by filing the present Original Application, seeking appropriate relief against the disciplinary action and consequential denial of service and monetary benefits.
The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the initiation and continuation of the ex-parte disciplinary proceedings were wholly unjustified and contrary to the principles of natural justice. He contended that the applicant was not paid subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension from 19.02.2000 to 20.11.2005/30.11.2005. According to the learned counsel, the non-payment of subsistence allowance caused severe financial hardship to the applicant and materially affected his ability to participate in the disciplinary enquiry. Despite the applicant's inability to attend the enquiry on account of such financial constraints, the disciplinary proceedings were continued ex-parte. It was therefore argued that the applicant was effectively denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself, rendering the proceedings contrary to the principles of natural justice.
The learned counsel further submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were continued notwithstanding the unconditional revocation of the applicant's suspension by order dated 21.12.2005. He contended that the order of revocation had been passed unconditionally after due consideration and application of mind by the competent authority. According to him, once the suspension had been unconditionally revoked, the respondents could not thereafter proceed in a manner that effectively took the applicant back to the position prevailing during the suspension. On this premise, it was argued that the subsequent continuation of the enquiry and imposition of penalty were contrary to the principles of natural justice.
The learned counsel also drew attention to the considerable delay in conducting and concluding the disciplinary proceedings. He submitted that the prescribed time schedule for major penalty disciplinary proceedings was approximately 150 days, i.e., five months. However, in the case of the applicant, the 5th respondent took approximately 46 months to complete the proceedings, from August 2003 to May 2007. Such prolonged and unexplained delay, according to the learned counsel, caused serious prejudice to the applicant and was contrary to the principles of natural justice.
The learned counsel further submitted that there was also substantial delay at the appellate stage. The Appellate Authority, namely, FA & CAO/G/MAS, took approximately 13 months to dispose of the applicant's appeal, from June 2007 to July 2008. He contended that the cumulative delay in the disciplinary and appellate proceedings had caused further prejudice to the applicant and vitiated the proceedings.
The learned counsel submitted that the applicant had repeatedly approached the respondents by submitting representations dated 07.12.2005, 14.12.2005, 30.12.2005, 14.01.2006 and 08.02.2006. However, according to him, none of the said representations was considered or disposed of before the penalty advice was issued to the applicant. The applicant was consequently denied a reasonable and effective opportunity to place his defence before the disciplinary authority. The learned counsel therefore contended that the failure to consider the applicant's representations constituted a violation of the principles of natural justice.
The learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570. He particularly drew the attention of the Tribunal to paragraph 15 of the judgment and submitted that, where the criminal and departmental proceedings arise from an identical charge and the same set of facts, the findings recorded by the competent criminal court are required to be duly considered by the disciplinary authority. On the strength of the said judgment, the learned counsel contended that the findings rendered by the judicial authority in respect of the allegations against the applicant ought to have been given due consideration in the disciplinary proceedings.
The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Others, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446. He submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered a case where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were founded upon the same set of facts, evidence and witnesses, and the competent criminal court had acquitted the employee. According to the learned counsel, the principles laid down in the said judgment were applicable to the applicant's case, particularly in view of the findings recorded by the competent court in relation to the allegations forming the basis of the disciplinary proceedings.
The learned counsel finally submitted that the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Revisional Authority had failed to apply their minds properly and had passed the impugned orders in an arbitrary manner. He contended that the TNPID Court, after examining the matter, had categorically found that the allegations relating to forgery were not attributable to the applicant. According to the learned counsel, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate/Revisionary Authority had failed to properly appreciate the said findings and had not relied upon cogent and reliable documentary evidence to establish the charges framed against the applicant.
The learned counsel therefore submitted that the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 19.09.2007 and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 30.04.2009 were arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in law. He contended that, in view of the violation of the principles of natural justice, the prolonged delay in the disciplinary proceedings, the non-payment of subsistence allowance, the non-consideration of the applicant's representations, and the findings recorded by the competent court, the impugned orders were liable to be set aside. He accordingly prayed that the reliefs sought for by the applicant in the present Original Application be granted.
Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents, relying upon the reply statement, submitted that the Applicant was working as an Accounts Assistant in the office of the Divisional Accounts Officer, Madurai Division, Southern Railway. He was placed under suspension with effect from 19.02.2000, pending disciplinary proceedings in respect of the charges framed against him for major penalty on 11.02.2000. The charges related, inter alia, to the alleged running of a finance company in the name of his mother and close relatives. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that, before the conclusion of the aforesaid enquiry, the Respondents received further information regarding other acts of misconduct allegedly committed by the Applicant. Consequently, a fresh Charge Memorandum, dated 27.08.2003, containing three charges and proposing major penalty, was issued against him. After conducting a regular departmental enquiry in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the Disciplinary Authority, by order dated 28.05.2007, imposed upon the Applicant the penalty of dismissal from service. The appeal preferred by the Applicant against the said order was dismissed on 15.07.2008, and the Revisional Authority thereafter confirmed the same on 15.04.2009.
It was further submitted that, challenging the order of dismissal as confirmed by the Appellate and Revisional Authorities, the Applicant filed O.A. No.537 of 2009 before this Tribunal. By order dated 10.03.2010, this Tribunal upheld the order of dismissal. The Applicant did not challenge the said order before any higher forum and, consequently, the same attained finality. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that, in the said O.A. No.537 of 2009, the Applicant had also sought payment of subsistence allowance and, pursuant to the direction issued by this Tribunal, the Respondents paid a sum of Rs.3,25,773/- towards subsistence allowance on 04.06.2010.
The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Applicant thereafter filed O.A. No.145 of 2012 seeking enhancement of the subsistence allowance, which came to be dismissed by this Tribunal by order dated 06.11.2012. He also pointed out that the Applicant subsequently filed M.A. No.467 of 2014 in O.A. No.537 of 2009, seeking recall of the order dated 10.03.2010 on the ground that the said order had allegedly been obtained by the Respondents by fraud. This Tribunal, however, dismissed the said application by order dated 27.06.2014. It was contended that, despite the aforesaid orders having attained finality, the Applicant, without disclosing the complete facts and the earlier proceedings, continued to submit representations before the Respondents seeking payment of subsistence allowance. Thereafter, he filed O.A. No.1482 of 2019 before this Tribunal seeking a direction to the Respondents to pay the subsistence allowance. The Tribunal, without entering into the merits of the claim, disposed of the said Original Application at the admission stage by directing the fifth Respondent to consider and dispose of the Applicant’s representation dated 26.07.2019, vide order dated 13.10.2019.
The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that repeated representations do not give rise to a fresh cause of action and that mere consideration of such representations cannot extend or revive the period of limitation, nor can it overcome the principles relating to delay and laches. In support of his submission, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. C. Girija and Others, reported in (2019) 15 SCC 633, particularly paragraphs 15 to 22.
He further contended that the issues raised by the Applicant had already been considered and adjudicated upon by this Tribunal in O.A. No.537 of 2009, by order dated 10.03.2010, and in M.A. No.467 of 2014 in O.A. No.537 of 2009, by order dated 27.06.2014. Having failed to challenge those orders before the competent higher forum, the Applicant could not be permitted to indirectly reopen or assail the same issues by submitting repeated representations and instituting fresh proceedings. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the earlier orders operate against the Applicant on the principle of res judicata. In support of this contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pravinkumar v. Union of India, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471. In view of the above submissions, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents prayed for dismissal of the Original Application.
We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant Mr. A. Mohan as well as Mr. V. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Counsel for Ms. Meera Gnanasekar at length, perused the pleadings and materials available on record. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the judicial decisions relied upon the by the respective parties.
Before going to the merits of the issue, we would like to refer to the order, dated 10.03.2010 of this Tribunal in OA No.537 of 2009 which was filed by the applicant challenging his dismissal from service. The relevant findings of the Tribunal are extracted below:
“7.It is not in dispute that the applicant was arrested and was kept under custody for more than 48 hours. It is an admitted fact that this fact brought to the notice of the respondents only by the police authorities and not by the applicant. It is submitted by the respondents that the applicant has not reported to the respondents after he came out on bail for a long time. Moreover, the applicant himself has admitted that his house was sealed by the police authorities and as such his whereabouts was not known to the respondents, and the applicant has also failed to inform the respondents about his whereabouts. We find from the records that the inquiry conducted against the applicant was in conformity with the rules. It is also seen that the applicant was given adequate opportunity to participate in the inquiry and defend his case. However, the applicant did not participate in the inquiry and started representing to the higher authorities for quashing of the disciplinary proceedings. As such the inquiry was conducted exparte without the participation of the applicant. Thereafter, inquiry report was supplied to the applicant to submit his representation. The applicant submitted his representation and after considering the representation of the applicant the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. The applicant submitted his appeal to the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority after analysing the facts and circumstances of the case upheld the order of the Disciplinary Authority and rejected the appeal. The applicant has filed revision petition, which was also rejected upholding the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority. Thus, it is seen the applicant was given adequate opportunity and therefore, no can be said illegality o have been caused to the applicant. However, the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority are reasoned and speaking order. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned orders, and they are confirmed.
8.During the course of the arguments, it was submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant was not paidsubsistence allowance for the period when he was under suspension. This fact was also admitted by learned counsel for the respondents. The respondents have also satisfactorily explained the reason for non-payment of subsistence allowance inasmuch as the whereabouts of the applicant was not known to them. We, therefore, direct the respondents to work out and pay the admissible subsistence allowance to the applicant as per law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”
Subsequently the applicant filed OA No.145/2012, claiming enhanced subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% and consequential benefits. This Tribunal by its order dated 6.11.2012 dismissed the OA in the following terms:
“16.Though the applicant is legally entitled, we have to see the conduct of the applicant. The applicant was involved in a criminal case, he had cheated the public investors to the tune of Rs.1,33,91,400/- He is involved in a criminal case which is pending, he was arrested, he did not inform the respondents about his whereabouts, he was removed from service, that has been upheld by this Tribunal. The civil servant is involved in a criminal case and without prior permission, he had left the Headquarters. Under these circumstances, the applicant is not entitled for any of the allowances under IREC.
17.For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that the applicant failed to establish for grant of HRA and CCA and payment of enhanced subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% during the period of suspension. The respondents have justified in their reply statement that the applicant left the Headquarters Madurai without prior permission of the competent authority ie., the disciplinary authority and was in occupation of the CPWD Quarters at K.K. Nagar, Chennai. The OA is devoid of merit and accordingly the OA is liable to be dismissed.”
The applicant had also filed MA No.467/2014 in OA No.537/2009 to recall the order dated 10.03.2010 since it was obtained by the respondents by fraud. This Tribunal dismissed the MA No.467/2014, by order dated 27.06.2014, and the relevant portion of the order is extracted below:
“11.It is seen from the order dated 10.03.2010 in OA No. 537/2009 that this Tribunal had (in para 3 of the order) taken note of the proceedings relating to the charge memo dated 11.02.2000 as well as the initiation of fresh disciplinary action against the Applicant. The Applicant had himself made a reference to the proceedings connected with the charge memo dated 11.02.2000 in para 4(ii) of his OA. Thus, there was no fraud by the Respondents as alleged by the Applicant in the instant MA. On the contrary, It was the Applicant who has not disclosed in his MA the filing of another OA bearing No. 145 / 2012 before this Tribunal for enhancement of subsistence allowance and for payment of HRA and CCA for the period of suspension which indicated that the Applicant had implicitly acquiesced with the proceedings and orders of this Tribunal in OA No. 537/2009. The Applicant had got information including a copy of the IO's Report etc. in the proceedings arising out of the first charge-memo along with letter dated 12.07.2011 of the Department which was well before the filing of OA No. 145/2012. It is also seen that the fact of issue of a second charge-sheet instead of bringing to culmination the proceedings instituted with the issue of the first charge-memo was not included by the Applicant as a ground in the grounds for relief in OA No. 537 of 2009.
12.It is one of the well accepted principles of law that a person resorting to legal action should include in his /is the whole claim he is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. This policy of law is based on the principle that the opposite party should not be vexed twice for one and the same cause of action. Order II R.2 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be read in pari Materia for this legal position, though this Tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). Nevertheless, the principle in the said legal provision can be universally applied in appropriate cases as a rule of prudence. It is also axiomatic that a person seeking legal recourse by filing a fresh case cannot seek the same relief by putting forth new grounds. When the fact of issue of two charge-memos was known to the Applicant, he should have raised this issue in the course of proceedings in OA No. 537/2009 or a writ petition could have been filed by him then assailing the order of this Tribunal. He has raised the issue after a lapse of more than 3 ½ years by filing this MA on the specious plea of fraud alleged to have been played on this Tribunal by the Respondents.
13.Though, in Kanilal Bera Vs. UOI & Ors_¹¹, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that second enquiry on the same charge which could not be proved during first enquiry was not permissible, the second charge memo is said to contain additional charges regarding suppression of information by the Applicant regarding his arrest by Police and his affidavit given to the investing public in connection with the affairs of the Financial Company. It is open to a Disciplinary Authority to cancel the first charge-sheet if he finds some deficiency in it and issue a fresh charge-sheet, before conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings arising out of the 1st charge-sheet. In any case, it is not open to this forum at this juncture to go into these aspects in this MA. In para 11 above, the conclusion is that there was no fraud by the Respondents as alleged by the Applicant.”
It is also seen from the records that the applicant had filed MA No.87/2021 in OA No.537/2009 to initiate criminal proceedings against the respondents for given false evidence before this Tribunal in respect of filing reply statement in OA No.537 of 2019. This Tribunal by its order dated 21.11.2024 dismissed the MA by holding it is outside the purview of this Tribunal and the applicant has to seek his remedy in the appropriate forum in accordance with law.
In the present OA, the prayer sought by the applicant is to quash the impugned order dated 26.02.2019 in rejecting the claim of subsistence allowance, to provide back wages and terminal benefits. It is pertinent to mention here that the disciplinary findings have been culminated into penalty and the applicant challenged the same in OA No.537/2009 and has attained finality. In that OA itself this Tribunal directed the respondents to grant subsistence allowance. For enhanced subsistence allowance the applicant challenged the same in OA No.145/2012 and the same was also dismissed by this Tribunal. Now making repeated representation will not give fresh cause of action.
The Supreme Court in the case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 has held as under: -
“10.Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.”
In Union of India & Ors. Vs. M.K. Sarkar reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59, the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that if the Tribunal/Court directs to decide a representation in a stale matter and consequent thereupon, the representation is decided by a speaking order, yet it will not give any fresh cause of action to the employee. The Court must examine the question of delay and laches even if a ‘speaking order’ is within statutory period of limitation. It was held as under:
“The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of the respondent without examining the merits, and directing the appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. Moreover, a court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a “live” issue or whether it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Sahni vs State of U.P in SLP (C) 3008 of 2022, order dated 28.02.2022, has observed that
“4.At the outset, it is required to be noted that by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as such the petitioner prayed for a specific performance of Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated 19.09.2001. For the first time, the petitioner made a representation for allotment of 10% plot as per Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated 19.09.2001 in the year 2010, i.e., after a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed. Therefore, as such if the suit would have been filed for specific performance, the same would have been barred by limitation. Despite the above, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court and as observed hereinabove prayed for specific performance of Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated 19.09.2001 being Writ Petition No.37443 of 2011, which was also filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed. Therefore, as such when the earlier writ petition was filed in the year 2011 which was also barred by delay and latches, the High Court ought not to have entertained the same. Instead, the High Court entertained the said writ petition and directed the NOIDA to decide the representation of the petitioner, which as such was made after a period of 10 years, expeditiously and it gave the fresh blood to the litigation, which otherwise was barred by delay and latches. The High Court by passing the order dated 07.04.2017 as such did not realise and/or appreciated that the writ petition itself was required to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches as the same was filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed under which the right was claimed. We have come across number of such orders passed by the High Courts directing the authorities to decide the representation though the representations are made belatedly and thereafter when a decision is taken on such representation, thereafter it can be said on behalf of the petitioner that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Therefore, when such orders are passed by the High Courts either relegating the petitioner to make a representation and/or directing the appropriate authority to decide the representation, the High Courts have to consider whether the writ petition is filed belatedly and/or the same is barred by latches and/or not, so that in future the person who has approached belatedly may not contend that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Even in a case where earlier representation is rejected, the High Court shall decide the matter on merits.
5.As observed by this Court in catena of decisions, mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within reasonable time. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file a representation and/or directing the authority to decide the representation, once it is found that the original writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches. Such order shall not give an opportunity to the petitioner to thereafter contend that rejection of the representation subsequently has given a fresh cause of action.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of T.N. Vs Seshachalam reported in (2007) 10 SCC 137 has held as under: -
"16....... filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant."
Recently, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rajmati Singh, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh, holding that the respondent’s claim was inordinately delayed and was liable to be rejected on the grounds of delay and laches as well as limitation. The Hon’ble Court observed that the respondent had slept over her rights for more than 33 years and had not approached any competent forum until 2010. It was further held that the communication dated 04.06.2009 did not have the effect of reviving the cause of action. The Court also observed that, by her conduct, the respondent had waived her rights and abandoned her employment. Consequently, the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the appeal was allowed.
In the aforesaid circumstances, and having regard to the findings recorded and the judgments referred to hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the applicant has failed to establish any case warranting interference. The applicant has miserably failed to substantiate the relief sought. Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed as being devoid of merit. There shall be no order as to costs.