AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, learned counsel for the informant and the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the State.
The appellants have preferred the present appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Amendment) Act, 1989 against the rejection of their prayer for pre-arrest bail vide order dated 29.01.2026 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST (PoA) Act, Begusarai in A.B.P. No. 71 of 2026 arising out of Begusarai SC/ST P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 74, 351(2), 352 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'the BNS') and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1) (s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Amendment) Act, 1989.
As per the allegation made in the F.I.R., the informant, Kiran Kumari, wife of Raj Kumar @ Lallan Paswan, alleged that her brother, Neeraj Kumar, who resides at Bangalore, used to send money to her through the mobile number of appellant no. 1, Rupesh Kumar Yadav, who runs a "Pino bank" from his residence, and that she used to collect the money from him. It is alleged that on 20.04.2025, her brother transferred Rs.12,000/-to the said mobile number and that on 21.04.2025 at about 9:30 A.M., when she went to the residence of appellant no. 1 to collect the amount, he paid her only Rs.5,000/- after deducting Rs.7,000/- on the ground that her husband had borrowed that sum from his mother about seven years earlier. The informant is stated to have told him that her child was ill and that, if any such loan had been taken, she would repay it with interest later, but appellant no. 1 did not accept the request and she returned without receiving the money. It is further alleged that at about 12 noon, when her husband returned home and denied having taken any loan, both of them went to the house of appellant no. 1 to demand the amount, where an altercation ensued. It is alleged that thereupon the appellants, acting together, started abusing and assaulting them; that appellant no. 1 caught hold of the informant by her hair, threw her on the ground and abused her in filthy language by referring to her caste “Dusadhin”; and that, when her husband tried to save her, appellant nos. 2 and 3 caught hold of him and assaulted him with slaps, kicks and fists. It is alleged that villagers, on hearing the noise, intervened and saved them from further assault. The informant further stated that she had earlier given a written application at Nayagaon Police Station, which took no action and called both the sides to the police station and sought to get Rs.12,000/- returned, whereupon she submitted the present written application before the SC/ST Police Station, Begusarai on which the case was registered. P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025
After investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted final report vide chargesheet No. 42/2025 dated 30.06.2025 against the three appellants on the ground of lack of evidence. The learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST (PoA) Act, Begusarai, however, differed with the opinion of the Investigating Officer and, by order dated 04.09.2025, upon perusal of the case diary (paragraphs 3, 10, 12 and 27), found a prima facie case and took cognizance of the offences under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(2) and 3(5) of the BNS and Sections 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC/ST Act against the appellants and directed issuance of summons for their appearance. The prayer of the appellants for anticipatory bail was thereafter rejected by the impugned order dated 29.01.2026 with a direction to apply for regular bail, the learned court below being of the view that, having regard to the specific provision of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, it was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the appellants are innocent and have been falsely implicated owing to enmity arising out of village groupism. It is submitted that the entire occurrence arose out of a dispute regarding delivery of money after deduction of an alleged previous borrowing, and that the case under the SC/ST Act has been lodged only as a counterblast when appellant no. 1 demanded his rightful dues and is therefore a vexatious attempt to falsely incriminate the appellant along with his family members. It is submitted that no occurrence took place in the manner alleged. Learned counsel further submitted that after investigation the police did not find any evidence against the appellants and submitted final report; that there is no injury report on record to support the alleged assault upon the informant or her husband; that no independent witness has corroborated the allegations and nothing incriminating has been recovered from the appellants. It is further submitted that even if it is assumed that inappropriate language was used, there is no allegation or material that the same was uttered at a place within public view, and therefore the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act are not attracted; that the remaining offences are bailable in nature; that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act does not operate when the ingredients of the offence under the Act are not made out; that the appellants have no criminal antecedent; that investigation is complete and cognizance has already been taken, so that their custody is not required; and that the appellants undertake to cooperate with the trial, not to tamper with evidence and to abide by any conditions imposed by this Court.
Learned Spl.P.P. for the state has opposed the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellant.
To appreciate the rival submissions, it will be apposite to refer to the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which, inter alia, is as under:
3. Punishments for offences atrocities. - (1)
Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-
“(r)intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s)abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”
Section 18 of the Act provides that nothing in Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727 has held that where no prima facie case under the Act is made out, the bar under Section 18 / 18A does not apply - verify before retaining.
The expression "any place within public view" has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Swaran Singh & Ors. Vs. State through Standing Counsel & Anr., reported in (2008) 8 SCC 435, and in the case of Hitesh Verma Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Anr., reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710. The distinction between a "public place" and a place "within public view" has been noticed therein. The relevant para of Hitesh Verma (supra) is inter alia as under:
“14.Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below: “Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original)
Reference may also be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karuppudayar Vs. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors., reported in 2025 INSC 132, wherein, after reproducing Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s), it was held in paragraph 9 that for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(r), it has to be established that the accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view, and similarly, for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(s), it is necessary that the accused abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view. In paragraph 10 thereof, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the law laid down in Swaran Singh (supra), as extracted in Hitesh Verma (supra). Having so noted, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of Karuppudayar (supra) held as under:
“11.It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.”
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025, decided on 12.01.2026), arising out of a judgment of this Court, while referring to the ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) laid down in Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, further held in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 as under:
“14.With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).”
“15.Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.”
“16.In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.”
Having heard the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, as well as, having perused the allegation made in the F.I.R. and the materials available in the case diary, I find that the scope of enquiry at this stage is confined to examining, on a prima facie consideration, whether the ingredients of the offences under the SC/ST Act are made out against the appellants so as to attract the bar under Section 18 of the Act.
On a perusal of the F.I.R., it appears that the entire occurrence, including the alleged abuse, is stated to have taken place at the residence of appellant no. 1, Rupesh Kumar Yadav, where the informant had gone to receive money sent by her brother, and where she and her husband went again to demand the amount deducted. The F.I.R. does not state that the alleged utterance was made at a place open to the public, nor that any member of the public was present at the time when the alleged words were uttered. The villagers are stated only to have arrived/intervened on hearing the noise, that is, after the altercation and the alleged assault had begun, and there is no allegation that any of them witnessed or heard the alleged abuse. In the light of paragraph 11 of Karuppudayar (supra), it cannot be said, on the allegations as they stand, that the alleged abuse took place at a place within public view.
The allegation of abuse by caste name is, moreover, attributed in the F.I.R. only to appellant no. 1. As against appellant nos. 2 and 3, the allegation is confined to assault upon the husband of the informant, and no insult, intimidation or abuse by reference to caste is attributed to them. As held in paragraphs 14 to 16 of Keshaw Mahto (supra), the mere fact that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste is not enough, and the allegations must reveal that the insult or abuse was laced with caste name or hurled as an abuse with intent to humiliate on account of caste. The F.I.R. itself discloses that the incident arose out of a dispute over deduction of Rs.7,000/- from the money sent through appellant no. 1 on the allegation of an earlier loan, and the alleged abuse is said to have been uttered in the course of the altercation that followed. Prima facie, therefore, the specific ingredients of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act are not sufficiently made out against the appellants.
It is also relevant that, after investigation, the Investigating Officer found no sufficient evidence against the appellants and submitted Final report No. 42/2025, and that cognizance was taken only upon the learned court below differing with the opinion of the Investigating Officer in a casual and mechanical manner under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(2) and 3(5) of the BNS and Sections 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC/ST Act. No injury report of the informant or her husband has been brought to the notice of this Court. The investigation is complete and cognizance has already been taken, and no occasion for custodial interrogation of the appellants has been shown. It is not disputed, that the appellants have no criminal antecedent.
Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, particularly the place and circumstances of the alleged occurrence, the absence of any allegation that the alleged utterance was made within public view, the monetary dispute from which the occurrence arose, the materials which have been collected in course of the investigation and the fact that the investigation is complete, I find that, on a prima facie consideration, the specific ingredients of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act are not sufficiently established against the present appellants so as to attract the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act. The appellants have, therefore, prima facie made out a case to be released on pre-arrest bail.
The appellants, above named, are directed to be released on pre-arrest bail, in the event of their arrest or surrender before the learned court below within a period of four weeks from today, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/-(Rupees Ten Thousand) each, with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST (PoA) Act, Begusarai in connection with Begusarai SC/ST P.S. Case No.22 of 2025, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 482(2) of the B.N.S.S.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated 29.01.2026 is set aside and the present appeal is allowed.