Rohit Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand & Ors.

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

The instant application has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs:

The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated, read as under: -

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:

Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the order of detention, therefore, suffers from error and hence not sustainable in the eye of law.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has defended the order of detention taking the following grounds:

Learned counsel appearing for the State, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a case where the order of detention is said to suffer from an error.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the order of detention as also the pleadings made on behalf of the petitioners and the State as available in the writ petition and the counter affidavits.

The issues which require consideration herein are-

The issue no.(i) i.e. whether the representation submitted by the petitioner was not forwarded by the jail authorities to the Government and, if so, whether the failure on the part of the jail authorities amounted to mala fide action, resulting in non-consideration of the petitioner's representation by the Government?

In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that petitioner was not informed about his right of representation, and when petitioner was informed of his right of representation by the relative of the petitioner after due consultation with the lawyer, then, petitioner tried to send representation to the Detaining Authority, but, the same was refused by the Jail Authorities and it was communicated to him that the same would not be forwarded, which, clearly depicts the malicious and biased attitude of the Jail Authorities.

Hence, contention has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation submitted by the petitioner was not forwarded by the jail authorities to the concerned authority and, as a result thereof, the Government did not decide his representation.

Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to examine and appreciate the aforesaid contention of the petitioner on the basis of the material available on record and in light of the settled statutory provisions governing such matters.

At this juncture, Section 17 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes, 2002 needs to be referred herein. Section 17 of the Act, 2002 inter alia provides that ground of orders of detention to be disclosed and opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government shall be given to the person affected by the order. Section 17 of the Act, 2002 reads as under-

Further, Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates that the authority making the order shall as soon as may be communicated the grounds on which the order has been made to the person detained and the detaining authority shall afford to the person detained the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.

Following the mandate of Article 22(5), provision has been made under section 17 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes, 2002, wherein it has been provided that the detaining authority shall communicate the grounds to the detenue on which the detention order has been passed and shall afford to the detenue an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government.

In the present case, this Court finds that at paragraph-19 of the writ petition, detenue/petitioner has himself admitted that petitioner was handed over the copy of order passed by the District Magistrate (i.e. Respondent no.3) and the copy of the order confirming the preventive detention issued from the office of the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand (i.e. Respondent no.2).

Further, this Court finds from the impugned detention order dated 05.05.2026 contained in Memo No. 380(A) (Annexure- 2) to this writ petition, wherein the detaining authority i.e. Respondent No.3 had noted that copies of the detention order shall be given to the detenue, who is in custody for the compliance of the period specified under Section 17 of the Act,2002.

Again, this Court finds that in the counter affidavit dated 07.10.2026, it is specifically mentioned that petitioner was provided with the information regarding his representation and detention order by the authorities, as such there is compliance of the Article 22(5) of the constitution.

Hence, from the own admission of the detenue/petitioner at paragraph-19 of the writ petition and from the impugned detention order Annexure-2 and counter affidavit dated 07.10.2026 filed by the State, this Court come to the conclusion that one of the constitutional requirements as provided under Article 22(5) of Constitution of India and Section 17 of the Act,2002, as to communicate the grounds to the detenue on which the detention order has been passed has been fulfilled by the State/Respondent, by providing the petitioner, the ground of detention and detention order dated 05.05.2026(Annexure-2) passed by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, District-East Singhbhum.

Now, the controversy raised by the petitioner in the writ petition that his representation was not forwarded to the detaining authorities, by the Jail Authorities and hence, petitioner has alleged that jail authorities acted maliciously and with biasness.

In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, this Court has gone through the entire pleading of the writ petition as well as exhibit annexed therein and original record also, wherefrom it is apparent that in support of aforesaid statement the petitioner has not placed any cogent evidence and he has just stated that his right of representation has been curtailed by the Jail authorities.

It is settled position of law that allegation without evidence has no leg to stand and in the absence of cogent evidence the same can only be treated as bald and empty allegation. Further the initial onus to substantiate the allegation of not forwarding the petitioner‟s representation by the jail authorities lies on the petitioner himself and the petitioner has not been able to produce any evidence to substantiate his allegation.

At this juncture it would be pertinent to see the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex court on the question of burden of proving a case based on allegation of mala fide.

The Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Chandra Prakash Singh v. Purvanchal Gramin Bank, (2008) 12 SCC 292, has held that it is a proposition of law that the burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the court to substantiate the said allegations. There has to be very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption under law is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material, for ready reference the paragraph-34 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein below-

Further, in case of E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3, while dealing the issue of mala fide, Hon‟ble Apex Court laid down that the Court would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Paragraph-92 of the said judgment is being quoted herein below-

On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to prove mala fides against the jail authorities and has not produced any clinching evidence and merely imputing allegation against the jail authorities that jail authorities had not forwarded his representation, is not fit to be accepted.

Accordingly, Issue No.(i) is answered against the petitioner.

The issue no.(ii), is whether grant of bail to the petitioner in pending cases and subsequent submission of charge-sheet in the said cases, is ground for his release from the prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002?

In this regard petitioner has submitted that petitioner is already on regular bail or has been granted anticipatory bail by the Court of law, and the said cases were relied by the detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention dated 05.05.2026 (Annexure-2) and hence, detention order cannot be sustained.

This court from perusal of record finds that in the proposal submitted by Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, vide Letter No. 471/DCB dated 18.04.2026, to the District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur (Respondent no.-3), there is inter alia reference of five cases registered against the petitioner-

In his interlocutory application being I.A. No.15607 of 2026 filed on 28.10.2026, petitioner has stated that in Mango P.S. Case No.124/2018, Mango P.S. Case No.186/2024 and in Mango P.S. Case No.20/2026, he has been granted regular bail and in Mango P.S. Case No.185/2022 and Mango P.S. Case No.136/2025, he has been granted anticipatory bail. Again, in his petition, petitioner has stated that all these cases are pending for trial.

In the present case, this Court finds from the grounds of detention that all the five criminal cases pending against the petitioner involve serious offences. One or more of the said cases have been registered under Sections 302, 307 and 364A of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under the provisions of the Arms Act and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act). The nature and gravity of the offences alleged against the petitioner are therefore of a serious character.

Hence, so far as release of the detenue/petitioner on bail, which are registered under the various sections of IPC, Arms Act and NDPS Act, is concerned, this Court finds that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to maintenance of public order and in such circumstances, based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, that it would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities by resorting the normal procedures, the Detaining Authority had passed an impugned order detaining him under the Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002.

Further, the ground of bail cannot be said to affect the decision taken by the competent authority of detention, rather the accusation so made in the First Information Report is to be seen for the purpose to have the subjective satisfaction of the nature of accusation made in the said FIR.

Since the detention order is to be passed by the competent authority anticipating the criminality of the concerned and it would be evident from the accusation made in the ground of detention dated 05.05.2026, (Annexure-2) passed by the Respondent no. 3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, wherein inter alia aforesaid five pending criminal cases against the petitioner is mentioned.

The consideration of coming from judicial custody by virtue of order passed by the court to release on bail has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215 wherein detenue had challenged his detention order. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this case had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after release on bail detenue again started indulging in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. and hence, detenue appeal was dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the aforesaid judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court had noted the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order against the detenue, for the ready reference Paragraph-17 and 20 of D.M. Nagaraja(supra) case is quoted herein below -

Thus, from the impugned detention order dated 05.05.2026 (Annexure-2), it is evident that the petitioner is habitually involved in offences relating to murder, kidnapping for ransom, Arms Act, NDPS Act etc. and further on the basis of subjective satisfaction the detaining authority has arrived to conclusion that the well-organized manner in which such pre-judicial activities have been carried on and nexus between dates of incidents and passing of the detention order and the said observation is according to the ratio led down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others(supra) therefore, the said observation of the detaining authority cannot be said to be suffer from an error.

Accordingly, Issue No.(ii), has been answered herein.

Since both these issues, whether the petitioner falls within the purview of the definition of “Anti-social Elements”; and whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was duly recorded while passing the detention order, are interlinked and inseparably connected, this Court deems it appropriate to take them up together for consideration, both on the basis of the material available on record and in light of the settled principles of law governing preventive detention.

But before considering these issues, the statutory provisions as contained under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes,2002 needs to be referred.

The relevant provisions which require consideration are Sections 2(d) and section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes,2002, which are necessary to be referred herein.

“Anti-social Element” has been defined in section 2(d) of the Act,2002, which reads hereunder as: -

From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002, it is evident that "anti-social element" is a person who habitually commits or abets offenses listed in Chapters XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or certain other specific crimes. It needs to refer herein that this definition requires a pattern of behaviour, not isolated incidents, and aims to identify individuals whose acts cause alarm or terror among the public, warranting preventive detention to maintain public order.

It needs to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was meant to make special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social elements with a view to maintenance of public order. It also needs to refer herein that the “Law and Order” problems typically affect only individuals or small groups, whereas “public order” disruptions affect the community‟s normal functioning on a broader scale often generating fear or anxiety among the general public.

It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary element with respect to Section 2(d)(i) of the Act of 2002 seems to be the word "habitual". It would thus mean that a person who is frequently engaged in committing or attempting or abating commission of an offence in terms of Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code would be an antisocial element. In this context, we may refer to the case of Vijay Narayan Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the word "habitually" has been sought to be enumerated in the following manner:

Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if a person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act of 2002. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Further the expression "habitually" means "repeatedly" or "persistently". It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit.

Further, Section 12 of the Act,2002 empowers the State Government to detain a person, which reads as under-

Hence, power to make orders detaining certain persons are provided in section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Section 12(1) provides that if State Government is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained.

So, section 12(1) empowers the State Government to detain anti-social element if there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person. The anti-social element has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section 2(d)(i) of the Act provides that “Anti-social element” means a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid statutory provisions, the factual aspect of the present case is to be considered in order to consider these issues as formulated herein above.

Re-adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, the petitioner has challenged the order of preventive detention dated 05.05.2026 (Annexure-2) passed under section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crime Act,2002 by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, and subsequent orders of extension of detention of the petitioner latest one being 20.07.2026 (Annexure-3) by which detention of petitioner has been extended from 05.08.2026 to 04.11.2026 extending the period of detention. The petitioner has also challenged the order of confirmation of detention dated 23.06.2026(Annexure-4) and 24.07.2026(Annexure-5).

On going through the detention order dated 05.05.2026 (Annexure-2), this Court finds this detention order was passed by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, on the recommendations made by the Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, vide Letter No. 471/DCB dated 18.04.2026.

This Court finds from the ground of communication that out of the five FIR registered against the petitioner, which are pending for trial, petitioner is habitually involved in offences relating to murder, kidnapping for ransom, Arms Act, NDPS Act etc.

Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that petitioner habitually commits offences punishable under section Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code/BNS and hence comes under the purview of anti-social element as defined in section 2(d)(i) of the Act 2002.

Further the question of subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned while passing the order of detention is questioned herein and has submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is absence of material linking habitual criminality of the petitioner, therefore in absence of subjective satisfaction, the order of preventive detention is bad in law.

Before, proceeding further, it would be pertinent to mention the case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587, wherein Hon‟ble Apex Court has laid down certain principles to be observed by the Constitutional Court while examining the legality of orders of preventive detention. Paragraph-28 of this judgment is quoted herein below-

Hence, Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana (supra), on the issue of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has laid down that the order based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied. Hon‟ble Apex Court further laid down that the Court may examine that the satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain or is based on material which is stale.

In the present case, ongoing to the impugned detention order, passed by the detaining authority Respondent No. 3 dated 05.05.2026(Anneure-2), it is evident that the sequence of criminal cases registered against the detenue.

This Court has gone through the impugned detention order dated 05.05.2026 wherefrom it is evident that authority concerned has taken note of the fact that Rohit Singh (petitioner herein) has been habitually engaged in criminal activities which ranges from murder, attempt to murder, criminal conspiracy, extortion and the cases under arms act and NDPS Act which are prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order. The catena of criminal cases against the petitioner Rohit Singh as contained in the letter No. 471/DCB dated 18.04.2026(Annexure-1) of Superintendent of Police, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur, and substantiated by Mango PS Case no. 124/2018, Mango PS Case no. 185/2022, Mango PS Case no. 186/2024, Mango PS Case no. 136/2025 and Mango PS Case no. 20/2026, shows that the continued criminal activities as evidenced by the multiple criminal cases pending against petitioner demonstrate a proclivity to disturb the public peace and order.

It is further evident from the detention order 05.05.2026 that the detaining authority has categorically recorded his satisfaction with the material and report placed before him and taking into consideration the said material and further taking into consideration that the activities of petitioner are not merely a matter of 'Law and Order' but constitute a grave threat to "Public Order" has passed the order of detention.

Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that authority concerned has expressed its subjective satisfaction based upon the material available against the petitioner. Further it is apparent that the detaining authority respondent no.3 while passing the detention order 05.05.2026 (Annexure-2), has satisfied that petitioner if released from jail will act in manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

In the present case, the factual aspect as has been dealt with hereinabove while deciding the issue, this Court is of view that the detaining authority has taken into consideration the fact in entirety which shows the subjective satisfaction based upon the document as found to be available with the recommending authority which has been accepted by the detaining authority. Further, the, satisfaction has been arrived by the detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live and proximate link between the past conduct of a petitioner and material which is not stale and is in consonance of the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana and others(supra).

This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual aspect is of the view that respondent authorities after being satisfied from the material available on record has considered that the petitioner comes under purview of „‟Anti-social Elements‟‟ as defined under section 2(d)(i) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and detention of petitioner is required to maintain public order and while arriving the said satisfaction, the authority concerned has followed all the constitutional mandate.

Accordingly, Issue No.(iii) and Issue No.(iv) are hereby answered.

On the basis of discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the considered view that the orders of detention need no interference.

Accordingly, the detention order dated 05.05.2026(Annexure-2) passed by the Respondent No.3 and subsequent extension order dated 20.07.2026(Annexure-3), extending the detention from 05.08.2026 to 04.11.2026 and orders confirming the detention order dated 23.06.2026(Annexure-4) and 24.07.2026(Annexure-5) requires no interference.

Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed.

Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands dispose of.

Let the original record sent back to the authority concerned forthwith.

I agree. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)