AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, J.—Feeling aggrieved by rejection of his application for payment of compensation by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Additional District Judge''s Court, Vizianagaram, vide its order dated 02.06.2003 in O.P. No. 902 of 2001, the unsuccessful Petitioner in the O.P. filed the present appeal.
The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal are briefly stated as under:
The Appellant is a driver of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (A.P.S.R.T.C). While he was driving bus bearing registration No. AP 10 Z 5398 from Vizianagaram to Jaipur, it met with an accident involving a private bus bearing registration No. AP 35 T 3213. The claim of the Appellant that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the private bus was not found favour with by the Tribunal. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal held that the Appellant was guilty of the rash and negligent driving resulting in the accident. As this finding is not seriously questioned by the Appellant, it is not necessary for this Court to dwell into this aspect.
At the hearing, the learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that even if the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the Appellant can be sustained, the Appellant would still be entitled for compensation either u/s 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ''the Act'') or Section 163A of the Act. The learned Counsel placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kore Laxmi and Others Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Others, in support of his submission.
Ms. A. Triveni Reddy, learned Counsel representing Sri P. Harinath Gupta, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3 - insurance company, opposed the above noted contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant and submitted that having chosen to claim compensation u/s 166 of the Act, the Appellant cannot be permitted to invoke other provisions under the Act. In support of this submission, she relied on the judgment of this Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda,
Chapter X of the Act provides for liability for payment of compensation without fault in certain cases. Section 140 of the Act envisages liability for payment of compensation on the no fault principle. Section 163A of the Act enables a person to claim compensation on structured formula basis. If a claim under this section is made, the claimant is not required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. u/s 166 of the Act, an application for compensation arsing out of an accident is maintainable.
The Tribunal constituted u/s 165 of the Act is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the claims for compensation falling in any of these three provisions. An analysis of these provisions would reveal that while u/s 140 of the Act irrespective of fault on the part of the driver of the vehicle, which caused injuries, the owner or owners of the vehicles involved in such accidents are jointly and severally liable for compensation of a fixed sum of Rs. 50,000/- in case of death and of Rs. 25,000/- in case of permanent disablement.
u/s 141(3) of the Act, if any sum of compensation is payable on the principle of fault and if such sum is higher than the amount awarded u/s 140 of the Act, the person against whom the award is passed is liable to pay any amount in excess of the fault liability awarded u/s 140 of the Act. Similarly if a person who is entitled to receive compensation under the provisions of any other Act, the compensation payable to him under those Acts shall be after deducting the no fault liability u/s 140 or the compensation awarded u/s 163A of the Act.
u/s 166 of the Act, the person, who claims compensation shall have to prove fault on the part of the driver of the vehicle causing the accident in order to succeed in his claim for payment of compensation. The scheme of the Act thus envisages payment of compensation under different provisions dealing with different situations. Each of these provisions is independent of each other and it is, therefore, evident that the claims made under these provisions are not interchangeable.
In Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra 2), the claimants filed two applications, one u/s 163A of the Act and the other u/s 166 of the Act claiming separate sums for the death of their mother and father. The Accident Claims Tribunal awarded certain sums of compensation u/s 163A of the Act. On the appeal filed by the insurance company, the High Court, while reducing compensation, gave liberty to the parties to raise their respective factual and legal contentions in the pending petition filed u/s 166 of the Act. This judgment was questioned by the claimants. They have also filed petitions to review the judgment in The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. etc. Vs. Hansrajbhai V.Kodala and Others etc. etc., where under it was held that a proceeding u/s 163A of the Act was held to be a final proceeding, as a result whereof the claimants had been debarred from proceeding with their further claim made in terms of Section 166 of the Act. While dealing with these cases, the Supreme Court has dealt with the legislative history and the relevant provisions of the Act and the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 regarding the liability for payment of compensation and held that although the Act is a beneficial one which deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent, where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. The Apex Court interpreted Section 163A of the Act to the effect that the said provision does not contain any provision providing set off against a higher compensation unlike Section 140 of the Act and that in terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose annaul income is Rs. 40,000/- or less is covered there under i.e., Section 163A of the Act, whereas Sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society. The Court further held that having regard to the fact that Section 166 of the Act provides for a complete machinery for laying a claim under fault liability, the question of giving an option to the claimants to pursue their own claims thereof u/s 163A or Section 166 does not arise.
If the submission of the learned Counsel is accepted, the same would lead to an incongruity. It is trite that u/s 166 of the Act claim for compensation on the plea of fault liability is permissible. The persons making claims under this provision come out with the specific plea of fault on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle. Once the fault is proved, the owner of the vehicle is liable to pay compensation without there being any statutory limit unlike in the case of Section 140 of the Act or Section 163A of the Act subject to his satisfying loss under all permissible heads. The claimants having thus taken the specific stand while making a claim u/s 166 of the Act, it is not permissible for them to switchover from this provision to another provision u/s 163A of the Act under which a substantive claim for compensation is permitted to be made under a completely different set of circumstances. This is, precisely the view the Supreme Court has taken in its judgment in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra 2). The claimant u/s 166 of the Act cannot be permitted to fall back upon Section 163A of the Act as an alternative option on the verge of his losing his claim u/s 166 of the Act made based on the plea of fault liability. If this is permitted, Section 163A of the Act will be invoked as a standby provision for Section 166 of the Act to all those claimants who failed to establish fault u/s 166 of the Act. This certainly is not the legislative intent and object in introducing Section 163A of the Act.
Coming to the judgment of the Division Bench, which no doubt supports the plea of the Appellant, it requires to be held that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra 2), the view taken by the Division Bench is no longer good law.
On the premise as above, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.