Rajendra Chintaman Sarwatay vs Union Of India & Ors.

The applicant was allegedly absent from duty during the period from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014. After resuming duty on 07.10.2014, he had recorded pre-dated signatures on certain official documents so as to establish his presence in the office during the aforesaid period. Therefore, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

It is the case of the applicant that, after Smt. Sharda Anand took charge as Accounts Officer in the concerned office at Bhuj on 15.04.2014, certain differences arose between them. The applicant has alleged that he was not permitted to sign the attendance register and that his attendance was instead marked by the said officer. The applicant further states that he had brought this matter to the notice of the higher authorities in his communication dated 09.10.2014.

During August 2014, the applicant proceeded on medical leave on account of illness. He submitted a leave application dated 19.08.2014 along with a medical certificate, requesting commuted leave for 12 days and permission to remain at Ahmedabad for treatment. Thereafter, he again fell ill in September 2014 and resumed duty at Bhuj on 10.09.2014 after obtaining a medical fitness certificate.

Subsequently, on 13.10.2014, the applicant was informed by Smt. Sharda Anand that he had remained unauthorizedly absent for six days from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014 and was called upon to submit a leave application for the said period. The applicant, however, maintained that he had been present in the office during the said period and had discharged his duties as Senior Auditor. Thereafter, on 18.10.2014, he submitted an application seeking Earned Leave for the period from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014.

In the meantime, the applicant was transferred from the Office of the Accounts Officer (GE), Air Force, Bhuj to the Office of the Accounts Officer (GE), Army, Bhuj with effect from 28.10.2014 and he joined the transferred post accordingly.

On 21.05.2015, the applicant submitted a complaint/representation to the higher authorities alleging, inter alia, certain acts on the part of his superior officers. The disciplinary authorities subsequently took the view that the allegations made by the applicant against Smt. Sharda Anand, AO (GE) [AF], Bhuj and Smt. Manjula Mathur, retired PCDA (SC), Pune, were false and baseless.

A show-cause notice dated 20.08.2015 was issued to the applicant alleging that, during his service in the Office of AO (GE) [AF], Bhuj, he had remained habitually and willfully absent from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014, had subsequently recorded pre-dated signatures on official documents to justify his presence in the office during the said period, and had levelled allegations against his superior officer which were found, upon investigation, to be baseless.

Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority issued a Memorandum of Charges bearing No. AN/I/11310/RCS dated 07.10.2015 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Article I alleged unauthorized absence from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014, recording of pre-dated signatures on official documents after resumption of duty on 07.10.2014, and making a false and frivolous complaint against the superior officer. Article II alleged that the applicant had levelled false and baseless allegations against Smt. Sharda Anand and Smt. Manjula Mathur in his complaint dated 21.05.2015. The alleged conduct was stated to constitute violation of Rule 3(1)(ii) and (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

In response to the charge memorandum, the applicant sought inspection and copies of certain documents which, according to him, were necessary for preparing his defence. Some documents were furnished to him, while his request for inspection/copies of certain other documents was declined by the Disciplinary Authority on the ground that those documents were not relevant to the charges. The applicant thereafter submitted his written statement of defence dated 03.02.2016 denying the charges.

As the applicant denied the charges, the Disciplinary Authority instituted a departmental inquiry by order dated 11.03.2016, appointing Shri M.K. Sinha, SAO, as the Inquiry Officer and Smt. P. Mahalakshmi, AAO, as the Presenting Officer. The preliminary hearing was initially fixed for 20.04.2016 at Pune.

At the preliminary hearing held on 20.04.2016, the applicant requested that the venue of the inquiry be shifted from Pune to Ahmedabad, citing, inter alia, his own medical condition and the illness of his wife. The preliminary proceedings were thereafter adjourned. During the subsequent course of the proceedings, Shri M.K. Sinha was transferred and, by order dated 14.06.2016, Smt. Deepa Prakashan, Accounts Officer, was appointed as the new Inquiry Officer.

The regular inquiry thereafter proceeded at Ahmedabad. During the proceedings, the applicant raised issues concerning the documents relied upon by the prosecution and sought inspection of additional documents.

On 02.09.2016, the applicant also sought permission to engage Shri A.B. Parmar, a retired Senior Auditor, as his Defence Assistant. On the same occasion, he placed on record copies of documents concerning the alleged variations in dates and signatures. The Inquiry Officer thereafter issued notices to the prosecution witnesses, namely Smt. Sharda Anand, Shri N.M. Makvana and Shri Amar Raut, requiring their appearance at the next hearing.

On 21.09.2016, the applicant appeared before the Inquiry Officer along with his Defence Assistant. The three prosecution witnesses were examined by the Presenting Officer. According to the applicant, however, no opportunity was afforded to him to cross-examine the said witnesses. On the same date, the Inquiry Officer closed the inquiry and directed the Presenting Officer and the applicant to submit their respective written briefs.

The Presenting Officer submitted his written brief dated 27.09.2016, and the applicant thereafter submitted his defence brief. The Inquiry Officer subsequently submitted her report, dated 28.11.2016, holding the charges against the applicant to have been established. The Inquiry Officer relied upon documentary evidence and the statements of the prosecution witnesses and, inter alia, noted the applicant’s leave application dated 18.10.2014 seeking regularisation of the period from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014 and the evidence relating to the attendance register.

The Inquiry Officer concluded that the applicant had remained unauthorizedly absent from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014, that on resumption of duty he had recorded pre-dated signatures on official documents to justify his presence during the period of absence, and that he had made false and baseless allegations against Smt. Sharda Anand and Smt. Manjula Mathur in his complaint dated 21.05.2015. Both articles of charge were accordingly held to have been established.

A copy of the Inquiry Report was furnished to the applicant and he has submitted his detailed representation dated 07.04.2017 to the Disciplinary Authority. Upon consideration of the matter, the Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings of the Inquiry Officer and, by order dated 28.11.2017, imposed upon the applicant the penalty of reduction by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of one year, with the further direction that he would not earn increment during the period of such reduction, while the reduction would not have the effect of postponing his future increments.

Consequent upon the penalty order, Part-II Office Order No. 690 dated 28.11.2017 and Part-II Order No. 20 dated 05.01.2018 were issued giving effect to the penalty.

Aggrieved by the penalty, the applicant preferred a statutory appeal dated 18.12.2017, followed by a supplementary appeal dated 01.01.2018, before the competent Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority, exercising powers under Rule 27 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, considered the appeal and, by order dated 03.05.2018, rejected the same.

The applicant has thereafter approached this Tribunal by way of the present Original Application, challenging the charge memorandum dated 07.10.2015, the Inquiry Report dated 28.11.2016, the penalty order dated 28.11.2017, the consequential Part-II orders dated 28.11.2017 and 05.01.2018, and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 03.05.2018.

Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the charges leveled against the applicant are entirely false, fabricated, and malicious. The allegation that the applicant fraudulently put pre-dated signatures on the attendance register for the period from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014 is not true as the applicant was forcibly prevented from signing the register by Respondent No. 5 for over three months, an issue officially reported on 09.10.2014. It was further contended that the leave application dated 18.10.2014 was forcibly obtained by Respondent No. 5. Further, learned counsel for the applicant submits that leave was regularized later. Thus, no offence is made out. The charge sheet was thus framed out of sheer malice action due to the prior complaints filed by the applicant against Respondent No. 5 and her predecessor.

Learned counsel argued that the departmental inquiry was conducted in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The Inquiry Officer acted with clear bias and failed to remain impartial by continuously denying key defense documents requested by the applicant. The inquiry was abruptly closed on 21.09.2016. Furthermore, the IO relied on a Preliminary Investigation Report dated 17.07.2015 to hold Article II of the charges as proved, without supplying a copy of the same to the applicant. The IO also committed a procedural error by failing to conduct the mandatory examination of the applicant under Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 whereunder an Inquiry Officer is under a statutory obligation to generally question the delinquent, in the event of the said delinquent has not examined himself, on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the delinquent to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. In this regard, learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the judgment passed by Allahabad Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 330/00194/2023 dated 19.02.2025. The relevant para 13 and 14 is reproduced herein under: -

It was submitted that the Disciplinary Authority passed a mechanical and non-speaking order. The Disciplinary Authority completely failed to deal with or evaluate the specific defenses and procedural objections raised by the applicant in his representation dated 07.04.2017.

Learned counsel contended that the Appellate Authority passed a brief, non-reasoned order that completely ignored the major procedural lapses, statutory rule violations, and requests for forensic verification raised in the appeals. Therefore, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside.

Per contra, respondents have filed their reply and denied the contention of the applicant.

The present OA is completely premature, non-maintainable, and liable to be dismissed at the threshold as the Applicant has failed to exhaust the statutory remedy of filing a Revision Petition before the Financial Adviser (Defence Services) (Respondent No. 1) under Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Direct approach to this Hon’ble Tribunal without exhausting prescribed administrative channels violates Government of India Decision No. 11 under Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and DoP&T O.M. No. 11013/08/2013-Estt. (A-III) dated 31.08.2015.

The applicant was unauthorized absences during his postings at AAO (SC) Ahmedabad, ALAO (A) Dhrangadhra, and AO GE (AF) Bhuj. Major penalty proceedings under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were initiated vide Charge Sheet dated 07.10.2015 for unauthorized absence from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014, willful tampering of official records and making false, baseless, and malicious allegations against senior supervisory officers. Upon a full-fledged departmental inquiry conducted in adherence to natural justice, the Inquiry Officer found the charges proved. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority imposed a penalty of “Reduction of two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of one year, without earning increments during the reduction, and without postponing future increments” vide Order dated 28.11.2017. The appeal preferred by the Applicant was dismissed vide Speaking Order dated 03.05.2018, and it is submitted that the currency of the penalty ended on 27.11.2018, with his pay having already been restored.

The applicant’s contention that defense documents were ignored is entirely baseless, as his own leave application dated 18.10.2014 requesting regularization of the absence period was considered. Forensic examination is not mandatory in departmental proceedings, which operate on the principle of preponderance of probability rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The allegation of a forced leave application is denied, and statements of prosecution witness Shri N.M. Makvana confirmed the applicant’s absence from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014 along with the fact that attendance registers were freely accessible. Comparison of original records with photocopies produced by the applicant proved that he erased supervisory remarks stating “don't do manipulation with documents, change the date, you were absent on that date”. Further, as per the Daily Order Sheet dated 21.09.2016, the PO sought the permission of the IO & showed the CO his own leave application dated 18.10.2014 for the period of allegation which has been taken as Exhibit no-5 along with the MLS file. PO asked the CO when he himself had given the application; his absence would thus be proved.

Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that regarding the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 held that judicial review under Article 226 or C.A.T. jurisdiction is not an appellate re-appreciation of evidence but is strictly limited to procedural errors or violations of natural justice. Furthermore, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Apex Court affirmed that standard rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to departmental inquiries, and courts will not interfere if findings are supported by some evidence. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Apex Court upheld strict disciplinary penalties for unauthorized absence coupled with the falsification or manipulation of official office records. In light of the facts and legal submissions made above, the OA is required to be dismissed being premature and devoid of merit.

Whether the present OA is liable to be dismissed at the threshold as premature, on the ground that the applicant has not exhausted the alternative statutory remedy of a Revision Petition before the Financial Adviser (Defence Services) under Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, as urged by the respondents.

Whether the departmental inquiry culminating in the Inquiry Officer's report dated 28.11.2016 stands vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice, on account of (i) denial of inspection/copies of documents sought by the applicant for his defence, (ii) denial of opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses examined on 21.09.2016, (iii) reliance placed by the Inquiry Officer on the Preliminary Investigation Report dated 17.07.2015 to hold Article II proved, without the same having been supplied to the applicant, and (iv) non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 to generally question the applicant on the circumstances appearing against him, the applicant not having examined himself as a witness.

Whether the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer holding both Articles of Charge to be proved are based on legal evidence on record, or whether the same are perverse/unsupported by evidence, having regard to the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters.

Whether the orders of the Disciplinary Authority dated 28.11.2017 and of the Appellate Authority dated 03.05.2018 are vitiated for being mechanical, non-speaking orders that failed to deal with the specific defence and procedural objections raised by the applicant.

Whether the penalty of reduction by two stages in the time scale of pay for one year, and the consequential Part-II Orders, are liable to be quashed and set aside, and if so, to what relief, if any, the applicant is entitled, including restoration of pay with arrears and interest, costs, and the direction sought for initiation of disciplinary action against respondent No. 5.

Point 7.1: The respondents contend that the OA is premature since the applicant did not file a revision petition under Rule 29 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Section 20(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules. Under Section 20(2)(a), a person is deemed to have availed of all such remedies if a final order has been made by the competent authority rejecting any appeal preferred by him. The applicant’s statutory appeal and supplementary appeal were rejected by the Appellate Authority under Rule 27 by order dated 03.05.2018. The power of revision under Rule 29 is exercisable by the authorities specified therein either on their own motion or otherwise, and is not a further appeal which the applicant was bound to exhaust. Whatever be the scope of the Government of India Decision No. 11 under Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and the DoP&T O.M. dated 31.08.2015 relied upon by the respondents, executive instructions cannot curtail the jurisdiction conferred on this Tribunal by Sections 19 and 20 of the Act. The preliminary objection is, therefore, rejected.

In the present case, the applicant was served with a Memorandum of Charges dated 07.10.2015 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The charges related to his unauthorized absence from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014, recording of pre-dated signatures on official documents after his resumption of duty and making false and baseless allegations against his superior officers. The applicant denied the charges and participated in the departmental inquiry.

The record further shows that the applicant was afforded opportunity to participate in the inquiry proceedings. An Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed. The applicant sought shifting of the venue of inquiry from Pune to Ahmedabad, which was thereafter proceeded with at Ahmedabad. He was also permitted to engage a Defence Assistant. The prosecution witnesses were examined and the applicant submitted his defence brief. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer submitted her report dated 28.11.2016 holding both Articles of Charge to have been proved.

The applicant has alleged that he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that the inquiry was abruptly closed on 21.09.2016. He has also alleged that certain documents were not supplied to him and that the Preliminary Investigation Report dated 17.07.2015 was relied upon without furnishing a copy thereof.

A Cross-examination (Point 7.2(ii)): Under Rule 14(14) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the witnesses produced in support of the charge may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the Government servant. The Daily Order Sheet of 21.09.2016 records that the three prosecution witnesses were examined in the presence of the applicant and his Defence Assistant, and the Daily Order Sheet bears the signatures of the applicant and his Defence Assistant and no protest regarding denial of cross-examination was recorded on that date or raised in the defence brief. The contention that no opportunity of cross-examination was afforded is, therefore, not borne out by the record.

B Documents (Point 7.2(i) and (iii)): Copies of the documents relied upon to prove the charges must be made available to the charged officer, and their non-supply vitiates the proceedings unless it is shown that no prejudice was caused (Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 229). The documents whose inspection was declined in the present case were the bills which were allegedly kept in drawer by CO. They were not listed in Annexure-III to the charge memorandum and were not relied upon by the Inquiry Officer; and the applicant has not shown how they bore on his defence. As regards the Preliminary Investigation Report dated 17.07.2015, the record shows that it was not relied upon by the Inquiry Officer. The findings in Article – II is based on Preliminary Investigation report followed by Questionnaire and is not in accordance with the principle laid down in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, that material collected during an investigation cannot by itself be treated as evidence in the disciplinary proceeding, is therefore attracted.

As regards the remaining procedural objections, the applicant has not demonstrated that they caused any prejudice to his defence. In the present case, the material placed before us shows that the applicant was aware of the substance of the allegations, participated in the inquiry proceedings, submitted his defence and thereafter submitted a detailed representation against the Inquiry Report. The Inquiry Officer considered the documentary material as well as the statements of the prosecution witnesses before recording her findings.

The applicant has placed considerable reliance upon Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and the decision relied upon by him in support of the contention that failure to generally question the delinquent employee vitiates the inquiry. We have considered the said contention. However, the applicant has not demonstrated from the material placed before us that the alleged non-compliance, in the facts of the present case, resulted in failure of justice or deprived him of an effective opportunity to defend himself. The applicant had submitted his written statement of defence, participated in the inquiry proceedings and thereafter submitted his defence brief. Therefore, the mere assertion regarding non-compliance with Rule 14(18), without demonstrating consequential prejudice, cannot by itself justify quashing the entire disciplinary proceeding. We are conscious that in Ministry of Finance v. S.B. Ramesh, (1998) 3 SCC 227, the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the view of the Tribunal that non-compliance with Rule 14(18) was a serious error. That, however, was a case where the inquiry had proceeded ex parte, the statement relied upon had never been tested, and unproved documents were used against the charged officer. In the present case, the applicant participated throughout with a Defence Assistant, and addressed each circumstance appearing against him in his defence brief.

We also find that the findings of the Inquiry Officer cannot be said to be findings based on no evidence. The Inquiry Officer took into consideration, inter alia, the applicant’s leave application dated 18.10.2014 seeking regularisation of the period from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014, the attendance records and the statements of the prosecution witnesses. On consideration of the material, the Inquiry Officer concluded that the applicant had remained unauthorizedly absent during the relevant period and had subsequently recorded pre-dated signatures on official documents. However, we take that the charge –II as not proved as it relies upon Preliminary Investigation report and did not give up the CO opportunity to defend himself.

The applicant has disputed the aforesaid findings and has put forward his own explanation regarding the attendance register and the leave application. Such contentions essentially invite this Tribunal to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion for that of the Inquiry Officer. In our considered view, such exercise is outside the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings.

Regularisation of leave: The applicant contends that the period from 29.09.2014 to 04.10.2014 was later regularised vide letter dated 18.10.2014 (Annexure R/18) on account of urgent private work. He was also issued letter dated 13.10.2014 (Annexure R/35) to submit leave for his unauthorized absence, and copy marked to PCDA (CC). The applicant has placed sanction of E.L. (Copy of service book which indicates that E.L. has been sanctioned for the period). There is no indication as to who has sanctioned him leave and no letter containing this has been placed by respondents in this regard. However, the fact is that manipulation of record has been proven.

We further find that after receipt of the Inquiry Report, the same was furnished to the applicant and he submitted his detailed representation dated 07.04.2017. The Disciplinary Authority thereafter considered the matter and imposed the penalty of reduction by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of one year, with the stipulation that the applicant would not earn increment during the period of reduction, while the reduction would not have the effect of postponing his future increments.

The applicant thereafter availed the statutory remedy of appeal. The Appellate Authority, exercising powers under Rule 27 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, considered the appeal and supplementary appeal and rejected the same by order dated 03.05.2018. Thus, the applicant was afforded an opportunity at the appellate stage also to challenge the findings, procedure and penalty imposed upon him.

As regards the challenge to the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority as being mechanical and non-speaking, we do not find sufficient material to hold that the impugned orders suffer from such infirmity as would warrant interference. The applicant’s representation against the Inquiry Report was considered before the penalty was imposed and the statutory appeal was also considered by the competent Appellate Authority. Rule 27(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 requires the Appellate Authority to consider whether the prescribed procedure has been complied with, whether the findings are warranted by the evidence on record, and whether the penalty is adequate. The Appellate Authority Vide order dated 03.05.2018 has followed the prescribed procedure in this regar.

The contention of the applicant regarding forensic examination of the signatures also does not warrant interference with the disciplinary proceedings. Departmental proceedings are not governed by the strict rules of evidence applicable to criminal trials. The question before the disciplinary authority is whether, on the material available on record, the charges stand established on the applicable standard of proof. In the present case, the Inquiry Officer considered the relevant documentary and oral material and recorded findings against the applicant.

We also take note of the respondents’ submission that the currency of the penalty expired on 27.11.2018 and that the applicant’s pay was thereafter restored. Be that as it may, the applicant has challenged the very foundation of the disciplinary action and has sought consequential monetary reliefs. Having found no sustainable ground to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings or the penalty imposed, the consequential reliefs claimed by the applicant also cannot be granted.

In another judgment rendered by the Three Judge Bench in the case of SBI vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612: (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457, by referring the law laid down in B.C. Chaturvedi (supra) and catena of other judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:-

Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Karnataka & Anr. vs. Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC 563: (2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321, emphasized about the scope of judicial review by the Courts/Tribunal in the matter of disciplinary/departmental inquiry and held that:-

Laying down the broad parameters within which the High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 held thus :

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To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefore.