AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
The present Review Application has been preferred by the review applicants, who were the original respondents in O.A. No. 1113/2018, under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, seeking review of the order dated 18.08.2025. Along with the Review Application, an application for condonation of delay has also been filed, as the order under review was passed on 18.08.2025, whereas the Review Application was filed on 04.02.2026. In the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application, it has been stated that the certified copy of the order was forwarded by the counsel to the Railway Administration on 08.09.2025, and upon receipt thereof, the matter was placed before the competent authority for taking appropriate decision and necessary action. The competent authority, after examining the matter, referred it for legal opinion to Shri Prashant Mathur, learned Advocate and Senior Panel Counsel for the Railway, whose opinion was conveyed vide letter dated 14.01.2026, advising that filing of a Review Application was necessary. Thereafter, the Review Application was prepared and filed along with the application for condonation of delay. It has, therefore, been prayed that the delay in filing the Review Application be condoned and the matter be considered and decided on its merits.
Objection to the application for condonation of delay, as well as to the Review Application on merits, has been filed by the original applicant/opposite party, wherein it has been stated that the delay in filing the Review Application has not been satisfactorily explained or properly accounted for. It has been contended that the cause of action pleaded in the Original Application was recurring in nature and, therefore, if the respondents intended to seek review of the order, the Review Application ought to have been filed within the prescribed period of limitation. According to the opposite party, there is an inordinate delay in filing the Review Application, for which no sufficient or convincing explanation has been furnished. In support of the objection, reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Ajit Babu and Others v. Union of India and Others, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 473, and G. Narasimha Rao v. Regional Joint Director of School Education, Warangal and Others, reported in 2005 (4) SLR 720. It has, accordingly, been prayed that the application for condonation of delay be rejected and, consequently, the Review Application also be dismissed.
A reply to the objection filed against the application for condonation of delay has been submitted on behalf of the review applicants, wherein the facts and averments contained in the objection have been controverted on merits. It has been pleaded that the Original Application itself was not maintainable, as the issue involved therein had already been adjudicated by this Tribunal in an earlier O.A. No. 1396/2006 filed by the applicant himself, and, therefore, the subsequent Original Application was barred by the principles of res judicata. It has further been contended that the delay in filing the Review Application deserves to be condoned, as the same was occasioned due to the administrative process and has been sufficiently and satisfactorily explained. In support of the prayer for condonation of delay, reliance has been placed upon the judgment and order dated 15.12.2025 passed by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Writ-A No. 18824/2025, Union of India and 6 Others v. Shailendra Kumar Verma and 2 Others. It has, accordingly, been prayed that the delay in filing the Review Application be condoned and the Review Application be allowed.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Learned counsel for the review applicants submitted that the delay in filing the Review Application has been sufficiently and satisfactorily explained. It was argued that immediately upon receipt of the copy of the judgment and order, the matter was forwarded to the competent authority, which, after due consideration, referred the matter for legal opinion to Shri Prashant Mathur, learned Advocate and Senior Panel Counsel. Upon receipt of the legal opinion advising filing of a Review Application, the same was prepared, duly vetted and thereafter filed before the Tribunal. It was, therefore, contended that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate, but occurred on account of the administrative process involved in taking a decision at the appropriate level. Learned counsel further submitted that the issue raised in the Original Application had already been adjudicated by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1396/2006, wherein the claim of the applicant had been considered and rejected after noticing the inordinate delay. Consequently, the subsequent Original Application, filed on the basis of a subsequent order passed on the representation of the applicant, was not maintainable and was barred by the principles of res judicata. On the merits of the Review Application, learned counsel specifically referred to the order passed in O.A. No. 1396/2006, as also the averments contained in paragraph 11 of the Review Application, wherein it has been stated that the claim of the applicant pertains to a very old period and the relevant records are no longer available in the office. It was submitted that this aspect had also been considered in the earlier Original Application, but no relief was granted to the applicant. Since the issue raised by the applicant had already attained finality, it was argued that the subsequent Original Application was liable to be treated as non-maintainable. Learned counsel, therefore, prayed that the Review Application be allowed, the judgment and order passed in the Original Application be reviewed and treated as non est, and the matter be heard afresh, as there was an apparent error of fact and law. In support of his submissions, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, wherein reference was also made to the judgment in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and Another, (2008) 10 SCC 115.
Learned counsel for the original applicant/opposite party submitted that there is an inordinate delay in filing the Review Application, which has neither been sufficiently nor satisfactorily explained. It was further contended that the Review Application is not maintainable and that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same in the manner sought by the review applicants. Learned counsel reiterated reliance upon the judgments already referred to hereinabove and further submitted that, while deciding the Original Application, the Tribunal had duly taken into consideration the judgment and order passed in O.A. No. 1396/2006, which had been filed by the applicant himself, as well as the judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Sharwan Kumar v. State of U.P., reported in 2020 (0) Supreme (All) 1193. It was argued that the cause of action raised by the applicant in the Original Application is continuing in nature and that the impugned order therein had been passed by the respondents upon a fresh representation submitted by the original applicant. Therefore, in a case involving a continuing cause of action, the principle of res judicata would not apply, as the aggrieved person is entitled to approach the competent authority as well as the appropriate Court/Tribunal until the continuing grievance is duly redressed. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel prayed that both the application for condonation of delay and the Review Application be rejected.
I have considered the rival submissions and gone through the entire records.
It is not necessary to reproduce the entire facts pleaded in the Review Application hereinabove. The facts necessary for the just and proper adjudication of the Review Application have already been set out hereinabove.
The issue which arises for consideration is whether the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the Review Application is maintainable. This issue has already been considered by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Union of India and 6 Others v. Shailendra Kumar Verma and 2 Others (supra), wherein, relying upon the Full Bench judgments of the Hon’ble High Courts of Orissa, Calcutta and Kerala, it has been held that an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing a Review Application before the Tribunal is maintainable and that the Tribunal is empowered to condone such delay if sufficient cause for not preferring the Review Application within the prescribed period is shown. The aforesaid judgment was rendered against the order passed by this Tribunal, wherein, relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Ajit Babu and Others v. Union of India and Others, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 473, as well as the Full Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Narasimha Rao (supra), the application for condonation of delay had been rejected. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of the jurisdictional High Court, the issue regarding maintainability of an application for condonation of delay in filing a Review Application stands settled. As regards the sufficiency of the cause shown, the review applicants have specifically stated in the affidavit that immediately upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment and order, the matter was placed before the competent authority, which, after due examination, referred the matter for legal opinion, and upon receipt of such opinion, a decision was taken to prefer a Review Application. Thereafter, some time was consumed in preparing and vetting the Review Application, which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be considered unreasonable or deliberate. On a consideration of the explanation furnished in the affidavit vis-à-vis the objections raised on behalf of the original applicant, we are of the considered view that the review applicants have shown sufficient cause for the delay in filing the Review Application. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is allowed, the delay in filing the Review Application is hereby condoned, and the Review Application shall be treated as having been filed within the prescribed period of limitation.
Now we proceed to decide the review application on merit.
Almost similar grounds, as referred to hereinabove, have been taken by the learned counsel for the review applicant in the review application, contending, inter alia, that the OA was barred by the principle of res judicata and that the service records of the employee concerned were not traceable. It has further been contended that, upon receiving the certified copy of the order passed in the OA, the applicant obtained a legal opinion, whereafter the present review application has been filed. The prayer in the review application is to review the order passed in the OA and treat the same as non est.
The original applicant/opposite party in the review application has filed a joint application by way of objections to both the delay condonation application and the review application. The grounds taken by the original applicant have already been quoted hereinabove. The submissions advanced on behalf of the opposite party have also been considered while deciding the delay condonation application. Therefore, there is no necessity to reiterate the same, and the Tribunal proceeds to consider the review application on its merits.
While considering the scope of review, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389, referred to an earlier decision in the case of Shivdeo singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 and observed as under:-
“It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which is inherent in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all matters or errors committed by the Subordinate Court.”
Similarly in the case of Ajit Kumar Rath Vs. State of Orissa and Others, AIR 2000 SC 85, the Apex Court reiterated that power of review vested in the Tribunal is similar to the one conferred upon a Civil Court and held:-
“The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression “any other sufficient reason” used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently in the rule.
Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.” [Emphasis added]
In the case of Gopal Singh Vs. State Cadre Forest Officers’ Assn. and Others [2007 (9) SCC 369], the Apex Court held that after rejecting the original application filed by the appellant, there was no justification for the Tribunal to review its order and allow the revision of the appellant. Some of the observations made in that judgment are extracted below:-
“The learned counsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has traveled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect.”
It is also useful to quote the relevant portion of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Sharwan Kumar v. State of U.P., reported in 2020 (0) Supreme (All) 1193. The same is as under:-
12.Law in this regard is settled that if there is fresh cause of action, principle of res-judicata will not apply. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and another, (1999) 5 SCC 590, has held as under:
“31.Law on res judicata and estoppel is well understood in India and there are ample authoritative pronouncements by various Courts on these subjects. As noted above, the plea of res judicata, through technical, is based on public policy in order to put an end to litigation. It is, however, different if an issue which had been decided in an earlier litigation again arises for determination between the same parties in a suit based on a fresh cause of action or where there is continuous cause of action.....”
What cannot possibly be disputed here is, that it is now well settled principle of law, that the earlier order can only be reviewed if the case squarely falls within the legal ambit of review and not otherwise. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC read with Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 regulates the provisions of review of the orders. It is also well settled principle of law that the scope for review is rather limited and it is not permissible for the forum hearing the review application to act as an Appellate Authority in respect of the original order by a fresh and re-hearing of the matter to facilitate a change of opinion on merits. The original order can only be reviewed if case strictly falls within the domain of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC read with Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as explained by Hon’ble Apex Court in the indicated judgments and not otherwise.
The first plea raised by the review applicant is that OA No. 1396/2006, filed by the applicant himself, had already been decided, wherein his claim was held to be barred by limitation. The order passed in the aforesaid OA has been quoted in the judgment under review. The relief sought in OA No. 1113/2018 was to set aside the order dated 10.05.2018 passed on the representation of the applicant and to issue a suitable order or direction to the respondents for payment of pensionary benefits and settlement dues in respect of Late Munshi Lal. Although this Tribunal cannot sit as an appellate court over its own earlier order or re-examine the matter from a different perspective in another OA filed by the same party seeking substantially the same relief, it is noteworthy that, after the decision in OA No. 1396/2006, the applicant submitted a fresh representation/application claiming pensionary benefits, which came to be decided by order dated 10.05.2018, thereby giving rise to a fresh cause of action. The issue raised in the review application regarding the limitation of OA No. 1113/2018, on the basis of the judgment and order passed in OA No. 1396/2006, was duly considered by the Tribunal while passing the final judgment dated 18.08.2025 (under review). The ratio laid down in Sarvan Kumar (supra) was also considered and quoted, and a specific finding was recorded by the Tribunal on this aspect. Thus, it cannot be said that there is any error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the judgment. The ratio laid down in M.K. Sarkar (supra) is also of no assistance to the review applicant, as the issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in that case related to conversion from the NPS to the OPS, and the employee concerned had exercised his option for the NPS. In those circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:—
9.The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining & Anr. - 2009 (10) SCC 115 :
"The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored."
When a belated representation in regard to a `stale' or `dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do so, the date of such decision can not be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the `dead' issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. A Court or Tribunal, before directing `consideration' of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a `live' issue or whether it is with reference to a `dead' or `stale' issue. If it is with reference to a `dead' or `state' issue or dispute, the court/Tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or Tribunal deciding to direct 'consideration' without itself examining of the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect.
10.Even on merits, the application has to fail. In Krishena Kumar vs. Union of India - 1990 (4) SCC 207, a Constitution Bench of this Court considering the options given to the Railway employees to shift to pension scheme, held that prescription of cut off dates while giving each option was not arbitrary or lacking in nexus. This Court also held that provident fund retirees who failed to exercise option within the time were not entitled to be included in the pension scheme on any ground of parity. Therefore, the respondent who did not exercise the option available when he retired in 1976, was not entitled to seek an opportunity to exercise option to shift to the pension scheme, after the expiry of the validity period for option scheme, that too in the year 1998 after 22 years.
11.The respondent relied on the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. D.R.R. Sastri - 1997 (1) SCC 514 in support of his claim. The said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case, the respondent, a railway employee, had gone on deputation to Heavy Engineering Corporation, and later resigned from railway service with effect from 26.6.1973 and was absorbed in the service of the said Corporation. When the Liberalised Pension Scheme was introduced by the Railway Board by letter dated 23.7.1974, an opportunity was given to all persons governed by the Provident Fund Scheme who were in service of Railways as on 1.1.1973 to opt for the pension scheme. The Railway Board directed that the availability of such option should be brought to the notice of all retired railway servants who were in service as on 1.1.1973, The respondent therein who had left the Railway service on 26.6.1973 was not informed of the availability of the option. He could not therefore exercise the option. In fact, he retired from service of the Heavy Engineering Corporation without any pension as that Corporation had also no pension scheme. The respondent therein approached the Central Administrative Tribunal in 1993 alleging that he came to know about the said option only in 1993 and that his representation dated 12.6.1993 for relief was rejected by the Railway Board on 13.7.1993. The Tribunal held that the respondent should be given the opportunity to exercise his option to shift to pension scheme, in terms of the Railway Board's letter dated 23.7.1974, as he was prevented from exercising his option by the failure of Railways to inform him about the option. The Tribunal also took note of the fact that another railway employee was allowed to exercise the option long after the date for exercising the option had expired, but the respondent was not given a similar benefit. The said decision of the Tribunal was affirmed by this Court. The decision in D.R.R. Sastri is of no assistance as it does not lay down any proposition that the last date prescribed for exercising option is not relevant or that option could be exercised at any time, even if a last date had been stipulated for exercise of the option. That case was decided on its peculiar facts as the employee (who was on deputation and who resigned from the service of railways on 26.6.1973 when on deputation) was not made aware of the option to which he was entitled, even though there was a specific instruction that all employees who had retired after 1.1.1973 should be informed about the option. The facts of this case are completely different. Here the employee was in service of the Railways itself before and at the time of retirement. He was working as the Head of the Department and was receiving all communications relating to option for being circulated to all employees in his department. Therefore, the question of respondent not being aware of the option does not arise.
The said decision in M.K. Sarkar (supra) case is clearly distinguishable on the basis of observation recorded hereinabove. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr vs. Tarsem Singh Civil Appeal No. 5151-5152 of 2008 decided on 13.08.2008 held as under:-
4.The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A `continuing wrong' refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. `Recurring/successive wrongs' are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan - [AIR 1959 SC 798], explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963) :
"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury."
In M. R. Gupta vs. Union of India [1995 (5) SCC 628], the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held :
"The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant's claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred........."
In Shiv Dass vs. Union of India - 2007 (9) SCC 274, this Court held:
"The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.......... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years."
5.To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.
6.In this case, the delay of 16 years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances.
7.In view of the above, these appeals are allowed. The order of the Division Bench directing payment of disability pension from the date it fell due, is set aside. As a consequence, the order of the learned Single Judge is restored.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that a claim relating to payment or refixation of pay or pension may be entertained notwithstanding delay, particularly where such claim does not adversely affect the rights of third parties. In the present case also, the applicant is claiming settlement dues as well as pensionary benefits. Having regard to the nature of the claim raised by the applicant, it was observed that, despite the decision rendered in the earlier OA No. 1396/2006, the subsequent OA filed by the applicant seeking pensionary benefits could be entertained. In the present matter, the applicant submitted a fresh representation seeking consideration of his claim, pursuant to which a specific order dated 10.05.2018 was passed by the respondents denying the pensionary benefits, and the said order was thereafter challenged before the Tribunal. Since the claim relating to pensionary benefits is of a recurring nature, the submissions advanced on behalf of the review applicant in this regard cannot be accepted. Accordingly, I do not find any error apparent on the face of the record, either on facts or in law, warranting review of the judgment and order passed in OA No. 1113/2018. The plea that the service records of the deceased employee are not available or are not traceable, by itself, cannot constitute a ground for reviewing the judgment already rendered by the Tribunal. The grounds raised by the review applicant, therefore, do not disclose any sufficient ground for exercise of the review jurisdiction. The review application is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. All MAs also stand disposed of.