Rahul Kamalkant Parasrampuria vs Securities And Exchange Board Of India

Tarun Agarwala, Presiding Officer

The present appeal has been filed against the order dated August 31, 2018 passed by the Adjudicating Officer (“AO” for short) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI” for short) imposing a penalty for violation of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (“PFUTP Regulations” for short). There is a delay of 659 days in filing the appeal and accordingly an application for condonation of delay has been filed to condone the delay.

We have heard Shri Vikas Bengani, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Abhiraj Arora, the learned counsel for the respondent through video conference. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is, that the parents of the appellant got ill. The father was diagnosed Transient Ischaemic Attack on account of which there was a partial paralysis on one side of the body. In this regard a certificate dated September 25, 2018 has been annexed of a Medical Doctor. It was also contended that the mother of the appellant had a fracture of the fourth finger of the left foot and, to that extent, a medical certificate dated October 14, 2019 has been filed. It was also contended that the appellant is in financial distress and therefore on account of the aforesaid reasons could not file the appeal within the stipulated period. Thereafter, the lockdown started from March 2020 onwards which again delayed in the filing of the appeal.

Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and having perused the application we find that there is an inordinate delay in filing the appeal.

The reasons given is neither bonafide nor in good faith and appears to be an afterthought. The certificates are of the year 2018 and 2019. Noting has been brought on record to indicate that the parents of the appellant are still undergoing the treatment. In any case nothing prevented the appellant from approaching the Tribunal earlier and even during the lockdown the Tribunal was functioning.

In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 the Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judicially based on facts and circumstances of each case and that sufficient cause cannot be given a liberal interpretation if lack of bonafide is attributed to a party. The Supreme Court further held that delay cannot be condoned on equitable ground beyond the limits permitted expressly by statute.

The Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs Gobardhan Sao And Others (2002) 3 SCC 19 h5eld that the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Madanlal vs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535.

In Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 68 5Supreme Court held that the expression “sufficient cause” means the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are of no avail and, in any case, not applicable in the present circumstance of the case.

This Tribunal is possessed with the exercise of judicial discretion in condoning the delay if sufficient or adequate reason is given. It is also a settled proposition of law that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds as held by the Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Anr.

(supra). In the instant case we do find any legal or adequate reasons to condone the delay.

Thus for the reasons stated aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the application for condonation of delay and the same is rejected on the ground of laches, as a result of which, the appeal is also dismissed with no order as to costs.

The present matter was heard through video conference due to Covid-19 pandemic. At this stage it is not possible to sign a copy of this order nor a certified copy of this order could be issued by the registry. In these circumstances, this order will be digitally signed by the Presiding Officer on behalf of the bench and all concerned parties are directed to act on the digitally signed copy of this order. Parties will act on production of a digitally signed copy sent by fax and/or email.