Rafikbhai Ibrahimbhai Bhadula vs District Magistrate and Others

S.H. Vora, J.—Perused the petition, materials supplied to the detenu, detention order and affidavit-in-reply filed by the detaining authority and heard learned advocate Mr. P.A. Bhatt for the petitioner and learned A.G.P. MR LR Poojari for the respondent-State. By way of this petition, the detenu has challenged the order of detention dated 09.07.2013 passed by respondent No. 1 under the provisions of sub-sec (2) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "PASA Act")

Learned advocate for the petitioner-detenu has invited my attention to the order of detention by which the detenu was arrested and sent to Navsari Central Jail. The ground of detaining the accused is that one offence was registered against the petitioner before the concerned police station vide II-C.R. No. 3062 of 2013 for the offences punishable u/s 5, 6, 8 and 10 of the Animal Protection Act and 11(D)(L) of the Animal Cruelty Act. He is, therefore, a "cruel person" as defined u/s 2(bbb) of the PASA Act.

Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that except this solitary offence, there is no material with the detaining authority to detain the petitioner under the provisions of PASA Act and in absence of any other material to show involvement of the petitioner in similar activities, the detaining authority has recorded a subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is a cruel person. The definition of cruel person requires habitual involvement and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction and the consequential order are vitiated.

Learned AGP for the respondent has opposed this petition.

The order of detention is passed on the basis of what has come to be known as the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority such subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at on two points. Firstly, on the veracity of facts imputed to the person to be detained and secondly, on the prognostication of the detaining authority that the person concerned is likely to indulge again in the same kind of notorious activities. Whereas, normal laws are primarily concerned with the act of commission of the offence, the detention laws are concerned with character of the person who has committed or is likely to commit an offence. The detaining authority has, therefore, to be satisfied that the person sought to be detained is of such a type that he will continue to violate the laws of the land if he is not preventively detained. So, the commission of isolated laws of infraction of law, not done in an organized or systematic manner, may not be sufficient for the detaining authority to justifiably come to the conclusion that there is no alternate but to preventively detain the person.

No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detaining authority failed to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was no application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenu. It is also fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha Vs. State of T. Nadu tr. Sec. to Govt. and Another, wherein, it is observed by the Hon''ble Apex Court that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried for a criminal offence but the ordinary criminal law will not be able to deal with the situation, then and only then, preventive detention be taken recourse to.

Having regard to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, it would be necessary to refer to the definition of "cruel person" as given in Section 2(bbb) of the PASA Act which runs as under:-

2(bbb) "cruel person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of an offence punishable u/s 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 (Bom. LXXXII of 1954).

It is clear from reading of the definition that the person to be branded as a "cruel person" has to be either a member or leader of a gang habitually committing or attempting to commit or abetting the commission of offence punishable u/s 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954. The term "habitually" examined from any angle, literal or legal, would require presence of an element of repetitiveness. In the instant case, barring one offence registered against the petitioner, there was no material before the detaining authority to record a satisfaction that the petitioner is habitual or repetitively involved in the offences.

As a result of hearing and perusal of the record, it appears that the only material that was available with the detaining authority was one criminal case registered against the detenu and on that basis, it cannot be said that the activity of the detenu has become a threat to the maintenance of ''public order'' and ''public health''. Mere involvement of the detenu in such activity may not amount to dangerous activity by the detenu and mere mention of them, unless supported by any evidence, cannot be said to be material germane for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the activity of the detenu is prejudicial to the maintenance of ''public order'' and ''public health''. In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushkar Mukherjee and Others Vs. The State of West Bengal, where the distinction between ''law and order'' and ''public order'' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows:

Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.

Under the circumstances, the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is a cruel person on the basis of which he has been detained is vitiated. In the result, this Special Civil Application is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 09.07.2013 passed by the respondent No. 1 is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.