Priyadarshi Parimal Arohi vs The Union Of India & Ors.

Per: Mr. Kumar Rajesh Chandra, Member (A):

The applicant has preferred this Original Application (OA) seeking the following relief that pertains to quashing of a transfer order:

^Bench 2. The applicant has filed the present Original Application assailing the transfer order dated 22.01.2022 (Annexure A-1), whereby he was transferred from Bihar Circle to West Bengal Circle, and the consequential relieving order dated 30.04.2022 (Annexure A-2). The applicant has also sought consequential reliefs.

The case of the applicant, in substance, is that the impugned transfer is contrary to the BSNL Transfer Policy dated 07.05.2008. According to him, paragraph 11(a) of the said policy contemplates an 18-year tenure in a Circle and paragraph 11(f) gives consideration to executives having longer stay for out-of-Circle transfers. The applicant contends that, having completed only about 14 years, he ought not to have been transferred out of Bihar Circle. It is further alleged that the transfer was affected to accommodate another employee, namely Shri Kaushal Kishore, and that the action is therefore arbitrary, discriminatory and mala fide. The applicant has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.S.R. Subramanian v. Union of India in support of the plea regarding tenure.

The respondents have contested the Original Application. Their stand is that the applicant is working in the SDE cadre, and unlike a cadre which is confined to a particular Circle, officers in the SDE and higher cadres are liable to serve at different places in accordance with the requirements of the organisation. It is their specific case that paragraph 11(a) of the Transfer Policy ^Patna does not confer an indefeasible right upon an employee to remain in a particular Circle for the entire period mentioned therein and that the management retains the power to transfer an employee earlier whenever administrative requirements or service exigencies so warrant. The respondents have further contended that paragraph 11(f), relied upon by the applicant, operates in the context contemplated by the policy and does not take away the general administrative power of transfer.

The applicant filed a rejoinder and, during the pendency of the proceedings, placed on record subsequent developments relating to his request for transfer back to Bihar. It has been stated that after serving outside the Bihar Territorial Circle/Recruitment Unit for more than four years, the applicant applied through the HMS/Online Transfer Portal on 06.01.2026 for transfer back to Bihar, but the request was rejected on the ground of shortage of manpower in Bengal. The applicant has relied upon the case of Shri Kaushal Kishore, who, according to him, joined the non-territorial unit in Bengal subsequently but was thereafter transferred back to Patna.

The applicant has also referred to the educational needs of his daughter, who is stated to be due to appear in the ICSE Class X examination in 2027 at Bhagalpur, and has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Director of School Education, Madras & Ors. v. O. Karruppa Thevan & Anr., 1994 ^Patna Supp (2) SCC 666. A representation dated 18.05.2026 is stated to have been submitted before respondent No. 3 seeking consideration of his transfer to Bihar, preferably Bhagalpur.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and documents available on record.

The core issue which arises for consideration is whether the impugned transfer dated 22.01.2022 suffers from any violation of a statutory provision or whether the applicant has established mala fides, arbitrariness or exercise of power for an extraneous purpose.

It is well settled that transfer is ordinarily an incident of service and that an employee does not have a vested right to remain posted at a particular place. The scope of judicial review in matters of transfer is consequently limited. The Court or Tribunal does not sit in appeal over the administrative wisdom of the competent authority and ordinarily does not substitute its own decision regarding the place where an employee should be posted. Interference may, however, be justified where the order is shown to be contrary to a statutory rule, is passed by an incompetent authority, is vitiated by established mala fide, or is founded upon an irrelevant or extraneous consideration. The Supreme Court of India has reiterated these principles, inter alia, in Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659; Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357; and ^Patna Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 592. The same principle has been reiterated in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.

The applicant principally relies upon paragraph 11(a) of the BSNL Transfer Policy dated 07.05.2008. However, the respondents have specifically pleaded that the policy has to be read as a whole and that the management retains the power to effect transfers in accordance with administrative requirements and the interests of the organisation. The applicant has not placed before this Tribunal any statutory provision which creates an enforceable right in his favour to remain in Bihar Circle until completion of 18 years irrespective of administrative exigency.

A transfer policy framed by an employer is undoubtedly required to be considered by the competent authority and ordinarily should not be departed from, arbitrarily. At the same time, a policy guideline concerning tenure or transfer cannot, in the absence of an express statutory command, be construed as creating an absolute and indefeasible right to remain posted at a particular station or Circle. Whether the competent authority should transfer an employee before completion of the period mentioned in the policy depends upon the terms of the policy read as a whole and the administrative circumstances placed before the authority.

^Patna 12. In the present case, the respondents have relied upon the management’s general power under the BSNL Transfer Policy to transfer employees in accordance with business requirements and administrative needs. The applicant has not demonstrated that the authority which passed the impugned transfer order lacked jurisdiction or that the transfer was prohibited by any statutory rule.

The allegation that the transfer was made solely to accommodate Shri Kaushal Kishore also does not, on the material presently available, establish mala fide. The applicant has pointed out that Shri Kaushal Kishore was transferred from Bihar Circle to West Bengal Circle on 15.09.2021 and that the applicant was transferred on 22.01.2022. The record, as placed before this Tribunal, does not establish a direct nexus between the two orders or demonstrate that the applicant was transferred at the instance of, or for the exclusive benefit of, the said employee.

Mere comparative treatment of two employees does not, by itself, establish mala fide or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. For such a plea to succeed, the applicant must establish relevant factual circumstances showing that the impugned action was actuated by an impermissible consideration or that the competent authority exercised its ^Patna power for a purpose foreign to the power conferred upon it. No such material sufficient for interference has been demonstrated in the present case.

As regards the subsequent events of 2026, they cannot furnish a legal basis for quashing a transfer order dated 22.01.2022 unless they demonstrate that the original order itself was illegal or vitiated by mala fide. The applicant’s subsequent request for repatriation to Bihar constitutes a distinct administrative matter. The respondents have stated that his request was not accepted because of manpower requirements in the Bengal non-territorial unit. The applicant disputes that position by referring to the subsequent repatriation of Shri Kaushal Kishore. These rival assertions involve factual and administrative matters which cannot, in the absence of appropriate pleadings and material from both sides, be adjudicated conclusively in the present proceedings relating to the 2022 transfer order.

It is also significant that the subsequent representations and events relied upon by the applicant in 2026 were not part of the original cause of action when the Original Application was instituted in 2022. The respondents cannot reasonably be expected to meet newly introduced factual allegations without an opportunity to place their complete factual and administrative position on record. The principles of fairness and natural justice operate in favour of both sides.

^Patna 17. The applicant has also sought consideration of his representation dated 18.05.2026 on the ground of the educational needs of his daughter. The welfare and education of children are undoubtedly relevant human considerations. Nevertheless, the existence of such circumstances does not confer an absolute legal right upon an employee to secure a posting at a particular place. The judgment relied upon by the applicant in Director of School Education, Madras v. O. Karruppa Thevan was rendered on its own facts and cannot be treated as laying down an inflexible rule requiring an employer to retain every employee at a particular station whenever the employee pleads the educational requirements of a ward.

At the same time, where a representation concerning personal hardship or the educational needs of a ward is pending, the competent administrative authority is expected to consider the same objectively, in accordance with the applicable transfer policy and the exigencies of administration. Such consideration, however, is different from a direction to grant the requested transfer.

The applicant has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme court of India in the case of T.S.R. Subramanian v. Union of India, where a writ petition (W.P.(C) No.82/2011) was filed under Article 32 by a group of retired senior civil servants (including ex-Cabinet Secretary T.S.R. Subramanian) seeking ^Patna systemic reforms to insulate bureaucracy from arbitrary political interference. Relying on major committee reports (Hota Committee 2004; Administrative Reforms Commissions 2008– 09; Santhanam Committee 1962), the petitioners of that writ sought three principal remedies namely (i) creation of statutory Civil Services Boards (CSBs) at the Centre and States, (ii)a guaranteed minimum tenure (around two years) for civil servants; and (iii) a requirement that all orders and suggestions (including oral directions) be formally recorded in writing. The Supreme Court issued a notice to the Union and the States, and after hearing extensive arguments, delivered its judgment on 31 October 2013. It suggested, inter alia, that the transfer of officials should not be arbitrary but be based on proper consideration. In the facts and circumstances of the instant O.A. the Respondents do not appear to have violated any such instruction and the decision to transfer is not arbitrary.

I, therefore, find no legally sustainable ground for quashing the transfer order dated 22.01.2022 or the consequential relieving order dated 30.04.2022. No statutory violation or established mala fide has been demonstrated. The Tribunal cannot substitute its own assessment of administrative requirements for that of the competent authority because the applicant has personal difficulties at his present place of posting.

So far as the applicant’s representation dated 18.05.2026 (much ^Patna later than filing this O.A. in year 2022) is concerned, since the same is stated to be pending before the competent authority, I consider it appropriate to leave the matter to the competent authority.

However, it is being observed that the language of the applicant in this representation is highly objectionable. The statement made by the applicant in the letter is nothing short of an explicit threat to hold the respondents to ransom. The applicant cannot bargain with the Respondents that he will withdraw this O.A, only if the respondents accede to his demand of transfer.

This in effect means that the applicant is making a categorical assertion that he will intentionally prolong the adjudicatory process if his terms are not met. This is a stark, unambiguous admission of intent to commit an abuse of the process of law. Such dilatory, coercive, and vexatious tactics are highly deplorable and cannot be countenanced by this Tribunal.

With the aforesaid observationss, the Original Application is dismissed.

Pending M.A.s, if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

There shall be no order as to costs.