Prabhavathi Jain and 4 others vs The Government of Tamilnadu and Others

Somasundaram, J.—This writ appeal has been filed against the order in W.P. No. 4807 of 1985 dismissing the said write petition. The appellants are petitioners 2 to 6 in W.P. No. 4807 of 1985 and they are the legal representatives of one Hamsraj Bokaria, the first petitioner in W.P. No. 4807 of 1985, who died during the pendency of the writ petition. W.P. No. 4807 of 1985 has been filed for the issue of writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the notification No. VI 743/82 dated 2.7.1982 and the consequent notification No. VI (1) 844/2 dated 29.7.1982 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazettes (Part VI, Section 1) on 11.8.1982 and consequently to release the lands in questions, viz. R.S. No. 145/4, Egmore Village, belonging to Hamsraj Bokaria the 1st petitioner in W.P. 4807/85 from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1978 hereinafter referred to as the Act.

The case of the appellants is that the property which is the subject matter of the proceedings challenged in the writ petition, forming part of the larger extent of the property, belonged to the Thirunavukkarasu, who died on 29.3.1967, that the said deceased Thirunavukkarasu had urban lands to the extent of 64 grounds, that the said property belonged to the joint family and on the death of Thirunavukkarasu the property came to be owned by his petition (3rd respondent herein), his wife, Rajagopalamma, and his daughter, Kamatchi, and that the 3rd respondent was entitled to 42 grounds and Rajagopalamma and Kamatchi were entitled to 11 grounds each. When the Act came into force on 3.8.1976, the authorities under the Act initiated proceedings for declaring the excess land held by the 3rd respondent, as per the provisions of the Act. It is seen from the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2 in the issued in the first instance on 17.10.1979 not only to the 3rd respondent but also to his sister, Kamatchi, and mother, Rajagopalamma, calling upon them to produce the relevant records for the lands owned by them. The notice was served on 8.11.1979. The 3rd respondent received the notice on behalf of all the three persons. With regard to further proceeding, notices were issued again at every stage and on every occasion the 3rd respondent and his wife have been receiving the notice on behalf of all the three address. The matter was posted for final hearing on 10.12.1980 and the notice for the said hearing was received on 8.12.1980 requesting for an adjournment, he was directed to appear on 17.12.1980 the 3rd respondent did not appear and the enquiry proceeded without him. On 13.3.1981 the authorities under the Act concluded that there was a surplus of land and the 3rd respondent was entitled to retain 2000 sq. Mts. of vacant land. A notice was again served on the 3rd respondent after the determination of the surplus. That notice was issued by registered post and it was sent to the 3rd respondent was well as to his mother and sister. In spite of the receipt of such notices, no proceeding was initiated by the 3rd respondent to challenge the determination of the excess extent by the authorities, before the authorities challenging the action take them. Thereafter, a statement u/s 10(1) of the Act declaring an excess extent of 10255 Sq. Mts. of vacant land was published. The said notification was published in the Gazette on 14.7.1982. Then the Government took steps to allot the excess extent of land to public institutions. By B.O.Ms. No. 1728, Revenue, dated 16.10.1984 the Government allotted 3 grounds in R.S. No. 145/- 4 to the 4th respondent, who was directed to pay sum of Rs. 2,97,000/-. The said amount was paid by the 4th respondent on 13.1.1986 and possession was handed over to the 4th respondent on that day. By the very same Government Order. Portions of excess land were allotted to other public institutions, viz. Tamil Nadu Housing Board and Chinmays Vidyalaya. "Consequently, an alternative prayer was included in the prayer paragraph, viz. paragraph No. II, for a decree for specific performance with reference to the vacant plot measuring an extent of 2 grounds 450 sq.ft. situated in No. 1, Taylor''s Road

It is the further case of the appellants that the 3rd respondent entered into an agreement on 10.1.1�74 with Hamsraj Bokaria for selling an extent of 3 grounds and 20 Sq.Ft. in Rs. No. 143/1 for a consideration of Rs. 48,133/-. Clause 8 of this agreement provided that without prejudice to the right of the purchaser to recover the advances paid, it was open to the purchaser at his option to sue for specific performance of the agreement. Hamsraj Bokaria thereafter filed C.S. No. 202 of 1972 on the original side of this Court in October, 1974 praying for a decree for a sum of Rs. 60,427/- with interest at 18% p.a. on the principal sum of Rs. 43,000/- from the date of the plaint till the date of the decree. In paragraph 8 of the plaint, he had stated that he exercised his option to recover the plaint, he had stated that he exercised his option to recover the amounts advanced by his to the 3rd respondent, he did not, therefore, choose to pray for specific performance. He did not, therefore choose to pray for specific performance. The only relief claimed in the suit was for a direction to pay the money advanced by him to the 3rd respondent with interest thereon. On 24.9.1979 an application was filed in the suit, C.S. No. 202 of 1974, for the amendment of the plaint by including a prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 10.1.1974 with reference to an extent of 2 grounds, 450 sq.ft. paragraph 8 of the plaint was amended adding the following; "By reason of the breach committed by the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance of the suit agreement dated 10.1.1971 and the defendant should be directed to covey the vacant plot measuring an extent of 2 grounds and 45 square feet on the Taylors Road itself, more particularly described in the Schedule to the plaint. " Consequently, an alternative prayer was included in the prayer paragraph, viz. paragraph No. II, for a decree for specific performance with reference to the vacant plot measuring an extent of 2 grounds 450 sq.ft. situated in No. 1, Taylors''s Road, Madras-10. The schedule also describes a property measuring two grounds and 450 only to R.S. No. 143/1 measuring an extent of 3 grounds and 20 sq.ft. The amendment referred to R.S. No. 145 and an extent of 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. The parties entered into a compromise and the petition for amendment was only pursuance of the compromise, on the same day, a memorandum of compromise was filed by the parties in which there was an acknowledgement by the defendant of the receipt of Rs. 43,000/- and the entitlement of the plaintiff to have a decree for specific performance of sale in respect of a plot of land measuring 2 application for amendment and the application for passing a decree in decree dated 26.9.1979, which directed the 3rd respondent, who is the defendant in the suit, to execute a sale deed with a clause that in default the plaintiff shall be entitled to apply to the court for necessary relief, Hamsaraj Bokaria got a sale deed executed by the Assistant Registrar (Original Side) forthisCourton29.4.1981. The sale deed was registered by the District Registrar on 11.5.1981.

It was contended before the learned single Judge, who heard the Writ Petition, that pursuant to the sale deed dated 29.4.1981 Hamsraj Bokaria had been in possession and enjoyment of the land conveyed to him under the sale deed, that the proceedings under the Act initiated by respondents 1 and 2 were null and void, as there was no notice to him at any stage and that the said proceedings under the Act were affected by the doctrine of lis pendens. It was further contended before the learned single Judge on behalf of the appellants that the authorities under the Act did not give any notice to the wife and daughter of the deceased Thirunavukkarasu, who were also entitled to shares in the property left by Thirunavukkarasu. The further contention of the appellants before the learned single Judge is that the extents of the lands held by the owners of the land, viz. the 3rd respondent, his mother and sister, were not properly calculated by the authorities before coming to the conclusion that there was an excess extent over and above the ceiling area.

Learned single Judge, on a consideration of the entire material available on record, found that factually there was no agreement to sell any party of R.S. No. 145 to Hamsraj Bokaria in the first instance. The sale agreement dated 10.1.1974 related only to R.S. No. 143/1. For the first time R.S. No. 145 was introduced in C.S. No. 202 for 1974 only on 24.9.1979. If at all Hamsraj Bokaria got an agreement in his favour in respect of R. S. No. 145 it was only on 24.9.1979, after the Act came into force on 3.8.1976 when section 6 of the Act operated as a clear bar to the said transaction. Learned single Judge further found that even assuming that the original agreement in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria related to R.S. No. 145, which was the subject matter of the proceedings under the Act, there could not have been a sale in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria by the 3rd respondent, nor could there have been any decree by the court for specific performance in his favour, in view of Sections 6 and 43 of the Act. Learned single Judge also found that the decree of this Court in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 of 1974 under which Hamsraj Bokaria claims to have purchased the property is ineffective against the proceedings under the Act and consequently the sale in favour of him by the Assistant Registrar (D.S.) of this Court cannot be put against the proceedings initiated by the authorities under the Act. Learned single Judge again found that the proceedings under the Act are not affected by the doctrine of lis pendens. Ultimately, learned single Judge dismissed the write petition.

Before us, Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, while reiterating the contentions urged before the learned single Judge, submitted that the proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2 under the Act were null and void, as there was no notice at any state to Hamsraj Bokaria, who has become the purchaser of the land in questions pursuant to the decree for specific performance passed in C.S. No. 202 of 1974. Learned Senior counsel further contended that respondents 1 and 2 did not give any notice to the wife and daughter of the deceased Thirunavukkarasu, who were also entitled to shares in the property left by Thirunavukkarasu, who were also entitled to shares in the property left by Thirunavukkarasu. The further contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellants is that the extents of the land held by the owners of the land, viz. the third respondent, his mother and sister, were not properly calculated by the authorities before coming to the conclusion that there was contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is that the 3rd respondent herein, the vendor of Hamsraj Bokaria, was not holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act immediately before the commencement of the Act and, therefore, the proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2 under the Act are invalid and liable to be quashed.

Per contra, learned Government Advocate, appearing for respondents 1 and 2, and Mr. M.N. Padmanaban, learned Senior counsel appearing for the 4th respondent, submitted that notices were served on all the interested parties at every state of the proceedings and, therefore, the orders of the respondents 1 and 2 challenged in the writ petition are just, legal and proper. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submitted that the Act came into force on 3.8.1976, that there was a statutory prohibition u/s 6 of the Act against the grant of a decree for specific performance in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and that the decree in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and the sale deed dated 29.4.1981 executed by the Assistant Registrar (D.S.) of this Court pursuant to the decree for specific performance are ineffective against the proceedings under the Act.

In the light of the rival contentions of the Learned Counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration in this writ appeal:

(1) Whether the 3rd respondent, vendor of Hamsraj Bokaria, was holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed and Regulation) Act, 1978, immediately before the commencement of the Act?

(2) Whether, in view of Section 6 and 43 of the Act, the decree for specific performance granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 on 26.9.1979 and the sale deed dated 29.4.1981 executed by the Assistant Registrar (O.S.) of this Court in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria pursuant to the said decree for specific performance after the Act came into force on 3.8.1976 are invalid and ineffective and cannot be put against the proceedings initiated by the authorities under the Act?

(3) Whether the proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2 under the Act were null and void on the ground that no notice was issued to Hamsraj Bokaria and the daughter and wife of Thirunavukkarasu in the course of the proceedings under the Act?

Point No. 1: It is the admitted case of the appellants and Hamsraj Bokaria that the property in questions, forming part of the larger extent of property, belonged to one Thirunavukkarasu, who died on 29.3.1967, leaving behind him his only son - the 3rd respondent herein, his wife -Rajaagopalamma and daughter - Kamatchi. It is also not in dispute that the deceased Thirunavukkarasu has upon lands measuring 64 grounds and that the said urban lands belonged to the joint family consisting of the 3rd respondent, Rajagopalamma and Kamatch, after the death of Thirunavukkarasu. The sale deed dated 1.4.1975 executed by the 3rd respondent, his son-Senthilnathan, his mother - Rajagoplamma, and his sister - Kamatchi in favour of Dr. V. Chockalingam in respect of 2 grounds, produced at page No. 83 of the typed set of papers, clearly goes to show that the land in question is the joint family property. Even, according to the appellants, the 3rd respondent, the only son of Thirunavukkarasu, will be entitled to 2/3 share in the joint family property after the death of Thriuvanavukkarasu, that is to say, 42 grounds out of 64 grounds, and the widow and daughter of Thriunavukkarasu will be each entitled to 11 grounds. Even if the alternative case of the appellants that the property of Thriunavukkarasu would devolve on the three heirs of Thriunavukkarasu equally is accepted each of them will get roughly 21 grounds. In either case, there is no difficulty in holding that the 3rd respondent held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under that Act at the time of the commencement of the Act.

The other contention of Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, is that the two buildings, portion of the vacant land and the land appurtenant to the two buildings should have been exempted and if it is done, the area held by the 3rd respondent would have been below the ceiling are. We are unable to accept the above contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. It is seen from paragraph 5 of the additional counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents land that the two buildings, referred to above, were in a dilapidated condition and, therefore, respondents 1 and 2 u/s 23 of the Act treated the lands occupied by those two buildings also as vacant lands. Section 23 of the Act provides that where any building in the vacant land has been pulled down by the owner before or after the commencement of the Act and where any building is destroyed or demolished while or partly either before or after the commencement of the Act, solely or partly due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency and thereby the vacant land exceeds the ceiling limit fixed by the Act, the owners of such land are permitted to retain the vacant land for the purpose of putting new buildings on the vacant land, provided a statement is filled before the competent authority specifying the location, value and other particulars in From No. 11 within 90 days of the date of demolition or demolition or destruction of the building, admittedly, in the present case, the 3rd respondent did not file any such statement and in the absence of his complying with the requirements of Section 23 of the Act, it is not at all possible for the 3rd respondent, to contend that the building area and the appurtenant area should be excluded from the ceiling limit.

In paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit filed by respondents they have explained how and under what circumstances they determined the excess vacant land held by the 3rd respondent at the commencement of the Act at 10255 sq. mts. in the following terms:

It is submitted that an extent of 13191.000 sq. mts. of land in R.S. No. 145 of Egmore Village was lying vacant. The registered holder of the land is one Thirunavukkarasu Mudaliar who is no more. The legal heirs of the deceased Registered holder have not filed return u/s 7 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. 1978. Hence a notice u/s 7(2) of the Act was issued on 17.10.79 to Thiru. T. Shanmugasundaram, son of late Thiru. Thirunavukkarasu Mudaliar residing at No. 44 told No. 16) General Muthiah Mudali Street, Madras. The said notice was sent by registered post with acknowledgement due and it was acknowledged on 8.11.79. The Urban Land Owner has not appeared tor enquiry. Another Revenue summon was also issued to the urban land owner on 21.1.80 to appear for an enquirtyat 3:00 p.m. on 29.1.80. Another summon was served on the Urban Land Owner on 13.2.80 informing him that the surplus land of 12170 sq. mts. has to be surrendered. Section 9(4) notice was served on 14.3.80, but the urban land owner has not appear for enquiry before taking final decision the records in the sub registrar office were also verified to get details u/s 7(5) of the Act. In the enquiry, it was brought to notice that Thiru. T. Shanmugasundaram and other namely S. Senthilnathan, Son (minor), Tmt. Rajagopalamma, mother and Tmt. Kamatchi, Sister have sold some vacant land to Dr. V. Chockalingam. Revised section 9(4) notice was issued to the interested persons on 27.9.80 and enquiry was also posted on 10.12.80 at 11:00 a.m. The urban land owner Thiru. T. Shanmugasundaram in his letter dt. 11.12.80 has stated that he is bed-ridden and requested to allow him to appear for enquiry on 17.12.80 and it was duly served on 16.12.1980. But he has not appeared for enquiry. Notice u/s 10(1) of the Act was issued by the second respondent along with the proceedings in A2 4878/79 dt. 24.2.81 intimating him of the decision to acquire 01 Hectare, 11 acres and 91 sq. mtrs. of vacant land in R.S. No. 145/3 of Block 11 of Egmore village under the previsions of Tamil Nadu urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1978 after allowing to retain 2000 sq. Mtrs. Vacant land. This notice was duly served on 13.3.81. after verification of records in sub-registration office it was land to Tvl. B. Murugaiah Chetty, V. Viswanathan Chetty and C. Kandaswamy Chetty. Hence again revised notice u/s 9(1) and 9(4) and also u/s 9(5) were issued by the second respondent on 13.10.81 to all interested persons. No objection has been received. Final statement u/s 10(1) showing the excess vacant land of 10255.000 sq.mts. to be surrendered was sent to urban land owner by the second respondent through his letter A3/4848/79 dt. 28.11.81. The Director or Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax Reference D. Dist 10173/82 dt. 29.6.82 has scrutinised the 11(1) proposals sent by the second respondent and also approved the notification and it was finally published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette at page 327 of part VI section 1 dt. 14.7.82 No. objection has been received. Notification declaring the acquisition of excess extent vacant land under subsection (3) of section 11 was published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette at pages 384-385 of Part VI section I dt. 11.8.82.

It is clear from the averments in the counter affidavit, extracted above, that the 3rd respondent has been served with notices under the provisions of the Act at various stages and in spite of such notices he has not chosen to raise any objection at any stage. That being so, it is not open to Hamsraj Bokaria or the appellants herein, who are claiming through the 3rd respondent, to contend that the proceedings under the Act are invalid, long after the completion of the proceedings under the act. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding a that the 3rd respondent, vendor, of Hamsraj Bokaria, was holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act immediately before the commencement of the Act. Point No. 1 answered accordingly.

Point No. 2 The admitted facts are: The 3rd respondent entered into an agreement on 10.1.1974 with Hamsraj Bokaria for selling 3 grounds and 20 sq.ft. in R.S. No. 1474/1 for a consideration of Rs. 48,133/-. In October, 1974 Hamsraj Bokaria filed C.S. No. 202 of 1974 before this Court praying for a decree for a sum of Rs. 60,427/- with interest at 18% p.a., exercising his option to recover the amounts advanced by him under the sale agreement an did not choose to pray for a decree for specific performance initially. As already state that the Act came into force on 3.8.1976. On 24.9.1979 an application was filled in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 for amendment of the plaint by including a prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 10.1.1974 with reference to an extent of 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. in R.S. No. 145. It must be pointed out here that the sale agreement related to R.S. No. 145. It must be pointed out here that the sale agreement related to R.S. No. 143/1, measuring an extent of 3 grounds and 20 sq.ft., and the amendment referred to R.S. No. 145, measuring 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. The parties entered into a compromise and the petition for amendment was only in pursuance of the compromise. On the same day, i.e. 24.9.1979, a memorandum of compromise was filed by the parties in which there of the receipt of Rs. 43,000/- and the entitlement of Hamsraj Bokaria to have a decree for specific performance of sale in respect of a plot of land measuring 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. in R.S. No. 145. The application for amendment and the application for passing a decree in terms of compromise were ordered on 26.9.1979. On 29.4.1981, Hamsraj Bokaria got the sale deed executed by the Assistant Registrar (O.S.) of this Court pursuant to the decree in C.S.202/74 and the same was registered on 11.5.1981.

Section 6 of the Act prohibits a person, holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of the Act, from transferring any portion of such land and further declares that any transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void. Section 6 reads thus;

6 Transfer of vacant land - No person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land, or part thereof, by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or other wise until he has furnished a statement u/s 7 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under sub-section (1) of section 11; any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void.

In the present case, as already pointed out, the subject matter of the sale agreement dated 10.1.1974 between the 3rd respondent and Hasraj Bokaria was R.S. No. 143/1 measuring 3rd grounds and 20 sq.ft. R.S. No. 145 was introduced in the suit for the first time only on 24.9.1979, when the application for amendment of the plaint and the memorandum of compromise were filed in C.S. No. 202 of 1974. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the sale agreement, so far as it relates to R.S. No. 145 is concerned, came into existence only on 24.9.1979 when the memorandum of compromise was filled in C.S. No. 202/74 after the Act came into force on 3.8.1979, and therefore the sale agreement, so far as it relates to R.S. No. 145 is hit by Section 6 of the Act and it is void. It is a settled position of law that a decree for specific performance cannot be granted in contravention of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. Section 6 inhibits the coming into existence of any transaction, as the present one, and further says that such transaction will be null and void Further, in view of section 43 of the Act, the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any agreement or decree or order of the court.

In Samiappan, B.P. (died) and 4 Others V. Arunthavaselvan and 3 others (1994 1 LW 339) a question across before a Division Bench of this Court, whether Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act, 58 of 1961, which is in pari materia with section 6 of the Act, will invalidate only a transfer and not an agreement for sale. Repelling the contention of the appellants in that case that an agreement is not a transfer and therefore section 23 of Act 58 of 1961 does not come into play and invalidate the agreement for sale, the division Bench held as follows:

The plaintiff seeks to have the agreement enforced by a court of law and get a sale deed in pursuance thereof. If the Court grants a decree in favour of the plaintiff and it leads to a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, either by the party or by the Court, that sale is automatically void and it is deemed to be void always as per the provisions of the Act. The Court cannot be a party to a transaction which would be void in law. Hence, there is no substance in the contention that the agreements are not affected by the provisions of the Act.

In Mariamma Varghese V.K.V, Balasubramaniam & 11 others (1994 1 L.W 391) the appeal was filed before this Court against the decree, dismissing a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale. The Division Bench of this Court, which heard the appeal, dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a legal impediment to the grant of specific performance. The Division Bench of this Court by holding that by virtue of Section 6 of the Act the agreement could not be enforced observed as follows:-

The impediment is that the transaction, assuming it could fructify through the hands of the Court, will come within the mischief of section 6 of Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 24 of 1978, hereinafter referred to as the Act. That precision inhibits the coming into existence of any such transaction as the present one and further says that such transaction will be null and void. The court is not supposed to lend its hands for the purpose of arriving at this result, assuming that the plaintiff has got a case on merits otherwise.

A similar view was taken in Mariamma Varghese v. The Commissioner of Land Reforms (1990 W.L.R.280). The appellant in that case, holding an agreement for sale with the owner of excess land, submitted an application to the authorities exercising powers under the Act to exclude the land, which is the subject matter of the sale agreement, from the proceedings under the Act refunded to countenance the plea of the appellant on the ground that the sale agreement could not be valid u/s 6 of the Act. The Division Bench, upholding the order of the departmental authorities, held as follows:-

When we look into the rigour of the language of S. 6 of the Act, we find that the said reason is perfectly in order and has got to be upheld. S. 6 of the Act inhibits a person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of the Act, from transferring any land or art thereof until he has furnished a statement under S. 7 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under sub - S. (1) of S. 11 and the section further says that any such transfer, made in contravention of the same, shall be deemed to be null and void. The transaction admittedly comes within the mischief of S. 6 of the Act Certainly it would not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to put forth a plea for exclusion of the land from subject matter of agreement of sale in her favour. That would be giving sanction validating a transaction which is declared invalid by the Act. We do not propose to permit the petitioner to achieve that result.

The ratio of the decisions referred to above, directly applies to the facts of the present code.

As rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge, even assuming the sale agreement dated 10.01.1974 in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria related to the land which was the subject matter of the proceedings under the Act, there could not have been a sale in favour of him by the 3rd respondent, nor could there have been any decree by the Court for specific performance in his favour, because there is a statutory prohibition imposed by Section 6 of the Act against the grant of a degree for specific performance in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 in favour of Hamsraj Bokaris. In view of the statutory prohibition imposes by Section 6 of the Act against any transfer after the commencement of the Act we are of the view that this Court in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 could not have passed a decree directing execution of the sale deed by the 3rd respondent in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria. Further it has to be held that in view of Section 43 of the Act the said decree for specific performance granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and the sale deed executed by the Assistant Registrar (D.S) of this Court pursuant to the decree for specific performance granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria on 29.4.1981 are ineffective against the proceedings under the Act and that the sale deed dated 29.4.1981, which admittedly came into existence after the commencement of the Act on 3.8.1976, cannot be put against respondents 1 and 2 in initiating proceedings against the 3rd respondent under the provisions of the Act. as against any other law in force or any custom, usage or agreement or degree or order of the court. The said section 43 reads thus:

Act to over ride other laws: The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or agreement of decree of order of a court, tribunal or other authority.

In Singaram, T.K. v. The Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal, Chepauk (1992 W.L.R.389) a Division Bench of this Court dealing with the scope and effect of Section 43 of the Act observed thus.

As would be seen from a plain reading of the section, the Urban Land Ceiling Act overrides the other laws for the time being in force or any custom, or agreement or decree or order of a court, tribunal or other authority, In view of S. 43 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the proceedings which are pending on the date when the urban Land Ceiling Act comes into force would have to cease in case the urban Land Ceiling Act applies to those proceedings, to the extent of such application and declaration of the excess land.

In view of the legal and factual position, referred to above, we have hesitation in holding that the decree for specific performance dated 26.4.1979 granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and the sale deed 26.4.1981 executed by the Assistant Registrar (O.S.) of this Court in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria pursuant to the said decree for specific performance after the Act came into force on 3.8.1976 are invalid and ineffective and cannot be put against the proceedings initiated by the authorities under the Act Point No. 2 is answered accordingly.

Point No. 3: The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in this regards is that on notice was issued to the purchaser, Hamsraj Bokaria, or to the widow and daughter of Thirunavukkarasu at any stage before the authorities passed the orders under the Act, challenged in the writ petition and therefore the entire proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2 are null and void, There is no merit in this contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. We have already found under point No. 2 that in view of Sections 6 and 43 of the Act, the decree for specific performance granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and the sale deed dated 29.4.1981 in favour of Hansraj Bokaria are invalid, ineffective and cannot be out against the proceedings initiated by the authorities under the Act. In view of the said finding, the purchaser, Hamsraj Bokaria, is not entitled to notice for the proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2 under the Act and it is not open to him to contend that the proceedings under the Act are invalid on the ground that no notice was issued to him in the said proceedings. As far as the wife and daughter of Thirunavaukkarasu is concerned, a perusal of the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petition and the other records show that notices have been issued to them at various stages and that they have been served, Learned Single Judge, after going through the relevant files, has recorded a finding in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal as follows:-

In spite of the receipt of such notices, no proceeding was initiated by the third respondent to challenge the determination of the excess extent by the authorities. He kept quiet. Similarly, his sister and mother did no also take any proceedings before the authorised challenging the action taken by them. The reports filed by the authorities disclose to service of the repentances not only on the third respondent 4.5.1981 give by the Assistant Commissioner to the director of ULC and Chepauk, Madras. 5 under 12/4978/91, in which there is specific reference to the service of notices on them other and sister of the third respondent besides himself.

Further, it must be remembered that Hansraj Bokaria is a purchaser of the land in question not from the wife and daughter of Thirunavukkarasu, but he is a purchaser of the land from the 3rd respondent, who was holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act immediately before the commencement of the act. Therefore, neither Hamsraj Bokaria nor the appellants can put forward any claim that might have been put forward by the wife and daughter of Thirunavukkarasu. Hence, we reject the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that in as much as no notice was issued by respondents 1 and 2 to the window and daughter 1 and 2 under the Act are null and void. Point No 3 is answered accordingly. For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the learned single Judge is quite right in dismissing the writ petition and we see no infirmity in the order under appeal. There is no merit in the writ appeal and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.