Prabhavathi Jain and Others vs The Government of Tamil nadu and Others

Somasundaram, J.—This writ appeal has been filed against the order in W.P. No. 4807 of 1985 dismissing the said write petition. The

Appellants are Petitioners 2 to 6 in W.P. No. 4807 of 1985 and they are the legal representatives of one Hamsraj Bokaria, the first Petitioner in

W.P. No. 4807 of 1985, who died during the pendency of the writ petition.

W.P. No. 4807 of 1985 has been filed for the issue of writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the notification No. VI 743/82 dated 2.7.1982

and the consequent notification No. VI(1) 844/2 dated 29.7.1982 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette (Part VI, Section 1) on

11.8.1982 and consequently to release the lands in questions, viz. R.S. No. 145/4, Egmore Village, belonging to Hamsraj Bokaria the 1st

Petitioner in W.P. 4807/85 from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 hereinafter referred to as the Act.

The case of the Appellants is that the property, which is the subject matter of the proceedings challenged in the writ petition, forming part of the

larger extent of the property, belonged to the Thirunavukkarasu, who died on 29.3.1967, that the said deceased Thirunavukkarasu had urban

lands to the extent of 64 grounds, that the said property belonged to the joint family and on the death of Thirunavukkarasu the property came to be

owned by his petition (3rd Respondent herein), his wife,and his daughter, Kamatchi, and that the 3rd Respondent was entitled to 42 grounds and

Rajagopalamma and Kamatchi were entitled to 11 grounds each. When the Act came into force on 3.8.1976, the authorities under the Act

initiated proceedings for declaring the excess land held by the 3rd Respondent, as per the provisions of the Act It is seen from the counter affidavit

filed by Respondents 1 and 2 in the issued in the first instance on 17.10.1979 not only to the 3rd Respondent but also to his sister, Kamatchi, and

mother, Rajagopalamma, calling upon them to produce the relevant records for the lands owned by them. The notice was served on 8.11.1979.

The 3rd Respondent received the notice on behalf of all the three persons. With regard to further proceeding, notices were issued again at every

stage and on every occasion the 3rd Respondent and his wife have been receiving the notice on behalf of all the three address. The matter was

posted for final hearing on 10.12.1980 and the notice for the said hearing was received tin 8.12.1980 requesting for an adjournment he was

directed to appear on 17.12.1980 the 3rd Respondent did not appear and the enquiry proceeded without him. On 13.3.1981 the authorities under

the Act concluded that there was a surplus of land and the 3rd Respondent was entitled to retain 2000 sq. Mts. of vacant land. A notice was again

served on the 3rd Respondent after the determination of the surplus. That notice was issued by registered post and it was sent to the 3rd

Respondent was well as to his mother and sister. In spite of the receipt of such notices, no proceeding was initiated by the 3rd Respondent to

challenge the determination of the excess extent by the authorities, before the authorities challenging the action taken them. Thereafter ,a statement

u/s 10(1) of the Act declaring an excess extent of 10255 Sq. Mts. of vacant land was published. The said notification was published in the Gazette

on 14.7.1982. Then the Government took steps to allot the excess extent of land to public institutions. By G.O.Ms. No. 1728, Revenue, dated

16.10.1984 the Government allotted 3 grounds in R.S. No. 145/4 to the 4th Respondent, who was directed to pay sum of Rs. 2,97,000/-. The

said amount was paid by the 4th Respondent on 13.1.1986 and possession was handed over to the 4th Respondent on that day. By the very same

Government Order. Portions of excess land were allotted together public institutions, viz. Tamil Nadu Housing Board and chinmays Vidyalaya.

Consequently, an alternative prayer was included in the prayer paragraph, viz. paragraph No. II, for a decree for specific performance with

reference to the vacant plot measuring an extent of 2 groups 450 sq.ft. situated in No. 1, Taylor''s Road.

It is the further case of the Appellants that the 3rd Respondent entered into an agreement on 10.1.1974 with Hamsraj Bokaria for selling an

extent of 3 grounds and 20 Sq. Ft. in R.S. No. 143/1 for a consideration of Rs. 48,133/-. Clause 8 of this agreement provided that without

prejudice to the right of the purchaser to recover the advances paid, it was open to the purchaser at his option to sue for specific performance of

the agreement. Hamsraj Bokaria thereafter filed C.S. No. 202 of 1972 on the original side of this Court in October, 1974 praying for a decree for

a sum of Rs. 60,427/- with interest at 18% p.a. on the principal sum of Rs. 43,000/- from the date of the plaint till the date of the decree. In

paragraph 8 of the plaint, he had stated that he exercised his option to recover the plaint, he had stated that he exercised his option to recover the

amounts advanced by his to the 3rd Respondent he did not, therefore, choose to pray for specific performance. He did not therefore choose to

pray for specific performance. The only relief claimed in the suit was for a direction to pay the money advanced by him to the 3rd Respondent with

interest thereon. On 24.9.1979 an application was filed in the suit, C.S. No. 202 of 1974, for the amendment of the plaint by including a prayer for

specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 10.1.1974 with reference to an extent of 2 grounds, 450 sq.ft. paragraph 8 of the plaint was

amended adding the following; By reason of the breach committed by the Defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance of the suit

agreement dated 10.1.1971 and the Defendant should be directed to covey the vacant plot measuring an extent of 2 grounds and 45 square feet

on the Taylors Road itself, more particularly described in the Schedule to the plaint. Consequently, an alternative prayer was included in the prayer

paragraphy, viz. paragraph No. II, for a decree for specific performance with reference to the vacant plot measuring an extent of 2 grounds 450

sq.ft. situated in No. 1, Taylors''s Road, Madras-10. The schedule also describes a property measuring two grounds and 450 only to R.S. No.

143/1 measuring an extent of 3 grounds and 20 sq.ft. The amendment referred to R.S. No. 145 and an extent of 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. The

parties entered into a compromise and the petition for amendment was only pursuance of the compromise, on the same day, a memorandum of

compromise was filed by the parties in which there was an acknowledgement by the Defendant of the receipt of Rs. 43,000/- and the entitlement

of the Plaintiff to have a decree for specific performance of sale in respect of a plot of land measuring 2 application for amendment and the

application for passing a decree in decree dated 26.9.1979, which directed the 3rd Respondent, who is the Defendant in the suit, to execute a sale

deed with a clause that in default the Plaintiff shall be entitled to apply to the court for necessary relief, Hamsraj Bokaria got a sale deed executed

by the Assistant Registrar (Original Side) for this Court on 29.4.1981. The sale deed was registered by the District Registrar on 11.5.1981.

It was contended before the learned single Judge, who heard the Writ Petition, that pursuant to the sale deed dated 29.4.1981 Hamsraj Bokaria

had been in possession and enjoyment of the land conveyed to him under the sale deed, that the proceedings under the Act initiated by

Respondents 1 and 2 were null and void, as there was no notice to him at any stage and that the said proceedings under the Act were affected by

the doctrine of lis pendens. It was further contended before the learned single Judge on behalf of the Appellants that the authorities under the Act

did not give any notice to the wife and daughter of the deceased Thirunavukkarasu, who were also entitled to shares in the property left by

Thirunavukkarasu. The further contention of the Appellants before the learned single Judge is that the extents of the lands held by the owners of the

land, viz. the 3rd Respondent, his mother and sister, were not properly calculated by the authorities before coming to the conclusion that there was

an excess extent over and above the ceiling area.

Learned single Judge, on a consideration of the entire material available on record, found that factually there was no agreement to sell any party

of R.S. No. 145 to Hamsraj Bokaria in the first instance. The sale agreement dated 10.1.1974 related only to R.S. No. 143/1. For the first time

R.S. No. 145 was introduced in C.S. No. 202 for 1974 only on 24.9.1979. If at all Hamsraj Bokaria got an agreement in his favour in respect of

R.S. No. 145 it was only on 24.9.1979, after the Act came into force on 3.8.1976 when Section 6 of the Act operated as a clear bar to the said

transaction. Learned single Judge further found that even assuming that the original agreement in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria related to R.S. No.

145, which was the subject matter of the proceedings under the Act, there could not have been a sale in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria by the 3rd

Respondent, nor could there have been any decree by the court for specific performance in his favour, in view of Sections 6 and 43 of the Act

Learned single Judge also found that the decree of this Court in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 of 1974 under which Hamsraj Bokaria claims to have

purchased the property is ineffective against the proceedings under the Act and consequently the sale in favour of him by the Assistant Registrar

(D.S.) of this Court cannot be put against the proceedings initiated by the authorities under the Act Learned single Judge again found that the

proceedings under the Act are not affected by the doctrine of lis pendens. Ultimately, learned single Judge dismissed the write petition.

Before us, Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, while reiterating the contentions urged before the learned single

Judge, submitted that the proceedings initiated by Respondents 1 and 2 under the Act were null and void, as there was no notice at any state to

Hamsraj Bokaria, who has become the purchaser of the land in questions pursuant to the decree for specific performance passed in C.S. No. 202

of 1974. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that Respondents 1 and 2 did not give any notice to the wife and daughter of the deceased

Thirunavukkarasu, who were also entitled to shares in the property left by Thirunavukkarasu, who were also entitled to shares in the property left

by Thirunavukkarasu. The further contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants is that the extents of the land held by the owners of

the land, viz. the third Respondent, his mother and sister, were not properly calculated by the authorities before coming to the conclusion that there

was contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants is that the 3rd Respondent herein, the vendor of Hamsraj Bokaria, was not

holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act immediately before the commencement of the Act and, therefore, the

proceedings initiated by Respondents 1 and 2 under the Act are invalid and liable to be quashed.

Per contra, learned Government Advocate, appearing for Respondents 1 and 2, and Mr. M.N. Padmanaban, learned Senior counsel appearing

for the 4th Respondent, submitted that notices were served on all the interested parties at every state of the proceedings and, therefore, the orders

of the Respondents 1 and 2 challenged in the writ petition are just, legal and proper. Learned Counsel for the Respondents further submitted that

the Act came into force on 3.8.1976, that there was a statutory prohibition u/s 6 of the Act against the grant of a decree for specific performance

in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and that the decree in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and the sale deed dated 29.4.1981 executed by the Assistant Registrar

(D.S.) of this Court pursuant to the decree for specific performance are ineffective against the proceedings under the Act.

In the light of the rival contentions of the Learned Counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration in this writ appeal:

(1) Whether the 3rd Respondent, vendor of Hamsraj Bokaria, was holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed and Regulation)

Act, 1978, immediately before the commencement of the Act?

(2) Whether, in view of Section 6 and 43 of the Act, the decree for specific performance granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 on 26.9.1979 and the

sale deed dated 29.4.1981 executed by the Assistant Registrar (O.S.) of this Court in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria pursuant to the said decree for

specific performance after the Act came into force on 3.8.1976 are invalid and ineffective and cannot be put against the proceedings initiated by

the authorities under the Act?

(3) Whether the proceedings initiated by Respondents 1 and 2 under the Act were null and void on the ground that no notice was issued to

Hamsraj Bokaria and the daughter and wife of Thirunavukkarasu in the course of the proceedings under the Act?

Point No. 1: It is the admitted case of the Appellants and Hamsraj Bokaria that the property in questions, forming part of the larger extent of

property, belonged to one Thirunavukkarasu, who died on 29.3.1967, leaving behind him his only son - the 3rd Respondent herein, his wife -

Rajaagopalamma and daughter - Kamatchi. It is also not in dispute that the deceased Thirunavukkarasu has urban lands measuring 64 grounds and

that the said urban lands belonged to the joint family consisting of the 3rd Respondent, Rajagopalamma and Kamatch, after the death of

Thirunavukkarasu. The sale deed dated 1.4.1975 executed by the 3rd Respondent, his son - Senthilnathan, his mother - Rajagoplamma, and his

sister - kamatchi in favour of Dr. V. Chockalingam in respect of 2 grounds, produced at page No. 83 of the typed set of papers, clearly goes to

show that the land in question is the joint family property. Even, according to the Appellants, the 3rd Respondent, the only son of

Thirunavukkarasu, will be entitled to 2/3 share in the joint family property after the death of Thriunavukkarasu that is to say, 42 grounds out of 64

grounds, and the widow and daughter of Thriunavukkarasu will be each entitled to 11 grounds. Even if the alternative case of the Appellants that

the property of Thriunavukkarasu would devolve on the three heirs of Thriunavukkarasu equally is accepted each of them will get roughly 21

grounds. In either case, there is no difficulty in holding that the 3rd Respondent held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under that

Act at the time of the commencement of the Act.

The other contention of Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, is that the two buildings, portion of the

vacant land and the land appurtenant to the we buildings should have been exempted and if it is done, the area held by the 3rd Respondent would

have been below the ceiling are. We are unable to accept the above contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants. It is seen from

paragraph 5 of the additional counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and that the two buildings, referred to above, were in a dilapidated

condition and, therefore, Respondents 1 and 2 u/s 23 of the Act treated the lands occupied by those two buildings also as vacant lands. Section 23

of the Act provides that where any building in the vacant land has been pulled down by the owner before or after the commencement of the Act

and where any building is destroyed or demolished wholly or partly either before or after the commencement of the Act, solely or partly due to

natural causes and beyond the control of human agency and thereby the vacant land exceeds the ceiling limit fixed by the Act, the owners of such

land are permitted to retain the vacant land for the purpose of putting new buildings on the vacant land, provided a statement is filled before the

competent authority specifying the location, value and other particulars in From No. 11 within 90 days of the date of demolition or demolition or

destruction of the building, admittedly, in the present case, the 3rd Respondent did not file any such statement and in the absence of his complying

with the requirements of Section 23 of the Act, it is not at all possible for the 3rd Respondent, to contend that the building area and the appurtenant

area should be excluded from the ceiling limit.

In paragraph 2 of the counter affidavit filed by Respondents they have explained how and under what circumstances they determined the

excess vacant land held by the 3rd Respondent at the commencement of the Act at 10255 sq.mts. in the following terms:

It is submitted that an extent of 13191.000 sq.mts. of land in R.S. No. 145 of Egmore Village was lying vacant. The registered holder of the land is

one Thirunavukkarasu Mudaliar who is no more. The legal heirs of the deceased Registered holder have not filed return u/s 7(1) of the Tamil Nadu

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978. Hence a notice u/s 7(2) of the Act was issued on 17.10.79 to Thiru. T. Shanmugasundaram, son

of late Thiru. Thirunavukkarasu Mudaliar residing at No. 44 (old No. 16) General Muthiah Mudali Street, Madras - 1. The said notice was sent by

registered post with acknowledgement due and it was acknowledged on 8.11.79. The Urban Land Owner has not appeared for enquiry. Another

Revenue summon was also issued to the urban land owner on 21.1.80 to appear for an enquiry at 3.00 p.m. on 29.1.80. Another summon was

served on the Urban Land Owner on 13.2.80 informing him that the surplus land of 12170 sq.mts. has to be surrendered. Section 9(4) notice was

served on 14.3.80, but the urban land owner has not appear for enquiry before taking final decision the records in the sub-registrar office were

also verified to get details u/s 7(5) of the Act In the enquiry, it was brought to notice that Thiru. T. Shanmugasundaram and other namely S.

Senthilnathan, Son (minor), Tmt. Rajagopalamma, mother and Tmt. Kamatchi, Sister have sold some vacant land to Dr. V. Chockalingam.

Revised Section 9(4) notice was issued to the interested persons on 27.9.80 and enquiry was also posted on 10.12.80 at 11:00 a.m. The urban

land owner Thiru. T. Shanmugasundaram in his letter dt. 11.12.80 has stated that he is bed-ridden and requested to allow him to appear for

enquiry on 17.12.80 and it was duly served on 16.12.1980. But he has not appeared for enquiry. Notice u/s 10(1) of the Act was issued by the

second Respondent along with the proceedings in A2 4878/79/ dt. 24.2.81 intimating him of the decision to acquire 01 Hectare, 11 acres and 91

sq.mtrs. of vacant land in R.S. No. 145/3 of Block 11 of Egmore village under the provisions of Tamil Nadu urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation)

Act, 1978 after allowing to retain 2000 sq. Mtrs. Vacant land. This notice was duly served on 13.3.81. after verification of records in sub-

registration office it was land to Tvl. B. Murugaiah Chetty, V. Viswanathan Chetty and C. Kandaswamy Chetty. Hence again revised notice u/s

9(1) and 9(4) and also u/s 9(5) were issued by the second Respondent on 13.10.81 to all interested persons. No objection has been received.

Final statement u/s 10(1) showing the excess vacant land of 10255.000 sq.mts. to be surrendered was sent to urban land owner by the second

Respondent through his letter A3/4848/79 dt. 28.11.81. The Director or Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax Reference D. Dist 10173/82

dt. 29.6.82 has scrutinised the 11(1) proposals sent by the second Respondent and also approved the notification and it was finally published in

the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette at page 327 of part VI Section 1 dt. 14.7.82. No objection has been received. Notification declaring the

acquisition of excess extent vacant land under Sub-section (3) of Section 11 was published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette at pages 384-385

of Part VI section I dt. 11.8.82.

It is clear from the averments in the counter affidavit, extracted above, that the 3rd Respondent has been served with notices under the provisions

of the Act at various stages and in spite of such notices he has not chosen to raise any objection at any stage. That being so, it is not open to

Hamsraj Bokaria or the Appellants herein, who are claiming through the 3rd Respondent, to contend that the proceedings under the Act are

invalid, long after the completion of the proceedings under the act In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding a that the 3rd

Respondent, vendor, of Hamsraj Bokaria, was holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act immediately before the

commencement of the Act Point No. 1 answered accordingly.

Point No. 2 The admitted facts are: The 3rd Respondent entered into an agreement on 10.1.1974 with Hamsraj Bokaria for selling 3 grounds

and 20 sq.ft. in R.S. No. 1474/1 for a consideration of Rs. 48,133/-. In October, 1974 Hamsraj Bokaria filed C.S. No. 202 of 1974 before this

Court praying for a decree for a sum of Rs. 60,427/- with interest at 18% p.a., exercising his option to recover the amounts advanced by him

under the sale agreement an did not choose to pray for a decree for specific performance initially. As already state that the Act came into force on

3.8.1976. On 24.9.1979 an application was filled in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 for amendment of the plaint by including a prayer for specific

performance of the agreement for sale dated 10.1.1974 with reference to an extent of 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. in R.S. No. 145. It must be

pointed out here that the sale agreement related to R.S. No. 145. It must be pointed out here that the sale agreement related to R.S. No. 143/1,

measuring an extent of 3 grounds and 20 sq.ft., and the amendment referred to R.S. No. 145, measuring 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. The parties

entered into a compromise and the petition for amendment was only in pursuance of the compromise. On the same day, i.e. 24.9.1979, a

memorandum of compromise. was filed by the parties in which there of the receipt of Rs. 43,000/- and the entitlement of Hamsraj Bokaria to have

a decree for specific performance of sale in respect of a plot of land measuring 2 grounds and 450 sq.ft. in R.S. No. 145. The application for

amendment and the application for passing a decree in terms of compromise were ordered on 26.9.1979. On 29.4.1981, Hamsraj Bokaria got the

sale deed executed by the Assistant Registrar (O.S.) of this Court pursuant to the decree in C.S. 202/74 and the same was registered on

11.5.1981.

Section 6 of the Act prohibits a person, holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of the Act,

from transferring any portion of such land and further declares that any transfer made in contravention this provision shall be deemed to be null and

void. Section 6 reads thus:

6 Transfer of vacant land - No person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall

transfer any such land, or part thereof, by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or other wise until he has furnished a statement u/s 7 and a notification

regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under Sub-section (1) of Section 11; any any such transfer made in contravention

of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void.

In the present case, as already pointed out, the subject matter of the sale agreement dated 10.1.1974 between the 3rd Respondent and Hamsraj

Bokaria was R.S. No. 143/1 measuring 3rd grounds and 20 sq.ft. R.S. No. 145 was introduced in the suit for for the first time only on 24.9.1979,

when the application for amendment of the plaint and the memorandum of compromise were filed in C.S. No. 202 of 1974. In these

circumstances, it has to beheld that the sale agreement, so far as it relates to R.S. No. 145 is concerned, came into existence only on 24.9.1979

when the memorandum of compromise was filled in C.S. No. 202/74 after the Act came into force on 3.8.1979, and therefore the sale agreement,

so far as it relates to R.S. No. 145 is hit by Section 6 of the Act and it is void. It is a settled position of law that a decree for specific performance

cannot be granted in contravention of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act Section 6 inhibits the coming into existence of any transaction, as the

present one, and further says that such transaction will be null and void Further, in view of Section 43 of the Act, the provisions of the Act shall

have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any agreement or decree or order of the court.

In Samiappan, B.P. (died) and 4 Ors. v. Arunthavaselvan and 3 Ors. 1994 1 LW 339 a question across before a Division Bench of this

Court, whether Section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Lands) Act, 58 of 1961, which is in pari materia with Section

6 of the Act, will invalidate only a transfer and not an agreement for sale. Repelling the contention of the Appellants in that case that an agreement

is not a transfer and therefore Section 23 of Act 58 of 1961 does not come into play and invalidate the agreement for sale, the division Bench held

as follows:

The Plaintiff seeks to have the agreement enforced by a court of law and get a sale deed in pursuance thereof. If the Court grants a decree in

favour of the Plaintiff and it leads to a sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff, either by the party or by the Court, that sale is automatically void and it is

deemed to be void always as per the provisions of the Act. The Court cannot be a party to a transaction which would be void in law. Hence, mere

is no substance in the contention that the agreements are not affected by the provisions of the Act.

In Mariamma Varghese v. K.V. Balasubramaniam and 11 Ors. 1994 1 L.W. 391 the appeal was filed before this Court against the decree,

dismissing a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale. The Division Bench of this Court, which heard the appeal, dismissed the appeal

on the ground that there was a legal impediment to the grant of specific performance. The Division Bench of this Court by holding that by virtue of

Section 6 of the Act the agreement could not be enforced observed as follows:

The impediment is that the transaction, assuming it could fructify through the hands of the Court, will come within the mischief of Section 6 of Tamil

nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 24 of 1978, hereinafter referred to as the Act That precision inhibits the coming into existence of

any such transaction as the present one and further says that such transaction will be null and void. The court is not supposed to lend its hands for

the purpose of arriving at this result assuming that the Plaintiff has got a case on merits otherwise.

A similar view was taken in Mariamma Varghese v. The Commissioner of Land Reforms 1990 W.L.R. 280. The Appellant in that case,

holding an agreement for sale with the owner of excess land, submitted an application to the authorities exercising powers under the Act to exclude

the land, which is the subject matter of the sale agreement, from the proceedings under the Act refunded to countenance the plea of the Appellant

on the ground that the sale agreement could not be valid u/s 6 of the Act. The Division Bench, upholding the order of the departmental authorities,

held as follows:

When we look into the rigour of the language of Section 6 of the Act, we find that the said reason is perfectly in order and has got to be upheld.

Section 6 of the Act inhibits a person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of the Act, from

transferring any land or art thereof until he has furnished a statement u/s 7 and a notifications regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been

published under Sub-section (1) of Section 11 and the section further says that any such transfer, made in contravention of the same, shall be

deemed to be null and void. The transaction admittedly comes within the mischief of Section 6 of the Act. Certainly it would not lie in the mouth of

the Petitioner to put forth a plea for exclusion of the land from subject matter of agreement of sale in her favour. That would be giving sanction

validating a transaction which is declared invalid by the Act. We do not propose to permit the Petitioner to achieve that result.

The ratio of the decisions referred to above, directly applies to the facts of the present case.

As rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge, even assuming the sate agreement dated 10.01.1974 in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria related

to the land which was the subject matter of the proceedings under the Act, there could not have been a sale in favour of him by the 3rd

Respondent, nor could there have been any decree by the Court for specific performance in his favour, because there is a statutory prohibition

imposed by Section 6 of the Act against the grant of a degree for specific performance in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria. In

view of the statutory prohibition imposes by Section 6 of the Act against any transfer after the commencement of the Act we are of the view that

this Court in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 could not have passed a decree directing execution of the sale deed by the 3rd Respondent in favour of

Hamsraj Bokaria. Further it has to be held that in view of Section 43 of the Act the said decree for specific performance granted in C.S. No. 202

of 1974 and the sale deed executed by the Assistant Registrar (D.S) of this Court pursuant to the decree for specific performance granted in C.S.

No 202 of 1974 in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria on 29.4.1981 are ineffective against the proceedings under the Act and that the sale deed dated

29.4.1981, which admittedly came into existence after the commencement of the Act on 3.8.1976, cannot be put against Respondents 1 and 2 in

initiating proceedings against the 3rd Respondent under the provisions of the Act as against any other law in force or any custom, usage or

agreement or degree or order of the court. The said Section 43 reads thus:

Act to over ride other laws: The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time

being in force or any custom, usage or agreement of decree of order of a court, tribunal or other authority.

In Singaram, T.K. v. The Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal, Chepauk 1992 W.L.R. 389 a Division Bench of this Court dealing with the scope and

effect of Section 43 of the Act observed thus.

As would be seen from a plain reading of the section, the Urban Land Ceiling Act overrides the other laws for the time being in force or any

custom, or agreement or decree or order of a court, tribunal or outer authority. In view of Section 43 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the

proceedings which are pending on the date when the Urban Land Ceiling Act comes into force would have to cease in case the Urban Land

Ceiling Act applies to those proceedings, to the extent of such application and declaration of the excess land.

In view of the legal and factual position, referred to above, we have hesitation in holding that the decree for specific performance dated

26.4.1979 granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and the sale deed 26.4.1981 executed by the Assistant Registrar (O.S.) of this Court in favour of

Hamsraj Bokaria pursuant to the said decree for specific performance after the Act came into force on 3.8.1976 are invalid and ineffective and

cannot be put against the proceedings initiated by the authorities under the Act Point No. 2 is answered accordingly.

Point No. 3: The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants in this regards is that on notice was issued to the purchaser,

Hamsraj Bokaria, or to the widow and daughter of Thirunavukkarasu at any stage before the authorities passed the orders under the Act,

challenged in the writ petition and therefore the entire proceedings initiated by Respondents 1 and 2 are null and void. There is no merit in this

contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants. We have already found under point No. 2 that in view of Sections 6 and 43 of the

Act, the decree for specific performance granted in C.S. No. 202 of 1974 and the sale deed dated 29.4.1981 in favour of Hamsraj Bokaria are

invalid, ineffective and cannot be out against the proceedings initiated by the authorities under the Act. In view of the said finding, the purchaser,

Hamsraj Bokaria, is not entitled to notice for the proceedings initiated by Respondents 1 and 2 under the Act and it is not open to him to contend

that the proceedings under the Act are invalid on the ground that no notice was issued to him in the said proceedings. As far as the wife and

daughter of Thirunavukkarasu is concerned, a perusal of the counter affidavit filed by Respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petition and the other

records show that notices have been issued to them at various stages and that they have been served. Learned Single Judge, after going through

the relevant files, has recorded a finding in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal as follows:

In spite of the receipt of such notices, no proceeding was initiated by the third Respondent to challenge the determination of the excess extent by

the authorities. He kept quiet. Similarly, his sister and mother did no also take any proceedings before the authorised challenging the action taken

by them. The reports filed by the authorities disclose to service of the rele notices not only on the third Respondent 4.5.1981 give by the Assistant

Commissioner to the director of ULC and Chepauk, Madras. 5 under 12/4978/91, in which there is specific reference to the service of notices on

the mother and sister of the third Respondent besides himself.

Further, it must be remembered that Hamsraj Bokaria is a purchaser of the land in question not from the wife and daughter of Thirunavukkarasu,

but he is a purchaser of the land from the 3rd Respondent, who was holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act

immediately before the commencement of the act. Therefore, neither Hamsraj Bokaria nor the Appellants can put forward any claim that might

have been put forward by the wife and daughter of Thirunavukkarasu. Hence, we reject the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the

Appellants that in as much as no notice was issued by Respondents 1 and 2 to the window and daughter 1 and 2 under the Act are null and void.

Point No. 3 is answered accordingly.

For all the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the learned single Judge is quite right in dismissing the writ petition and we see no

infirmity in the order under appeal. There is no merit in the writ appeal and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed.

However, there will be no order as to costs.