Prabh Dayal and Others vs R.S. Sachdeva and Others

What is the scope of Section 19 of the J. & K. Contempt of Courts Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the State Act), is an issue which

requires to be settled in these appeals. A learned Single Judge of this Court expressed an opinion that no case is made for exercising contempt

jurisdiction. The appellants have preferred these appeals. The short question which is required to be gone into is : as to whether an appeal would

lie when a learned Single Judge of this Court has come to the conclusion that no case is made out for exercising the jurisdiction to punish for

contempt. An ancillary question would arise as to whether a person in whose favour some directions have been given, can be left high and dry,

without any remedy. Before noticing this aspect of the matter, it would be apt to notice Section 19(1) of the State Act. This provision reads as

under :

(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.-

(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;

(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court.

It would be again useful to notice the provision of Section 19(1) of the Central Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the

Central Act). This provision reads as under :

Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.-

(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;

(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court.

A perusal of the two sections makes it apparent that the Central and the State Acts are in pari materia. If this be the position, this view

expressed by the Supreme Court that an appeal would lie only if an order of punishment is recorded, would be fully attracted to these appeals

also.

Precise issue was dealt with by the Supreme Court in AIR 1974 SC 225 (sic). This was again dealt with in Purshotam Dass Goel Vs. Hon'ble

Mr. B.S. Dhillon and Others, . It was observed that an appeal could be preferred only if the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction to punish for

contempt. Where no order of punishment is recorded, the appeal would not be maintainable. Similar view has been expressed in J. Parihar Vs.

Ganpat Duggar and others, . While interpretting Section 19 of the Central Act, it was observed (at page 114; of AIR) :

Therefore, an apepal would lie u/s 19 when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the contemner has been passed. In

this case, the finding was that the respondents had not wilfully disobeyed the order. So, there is no order punishing the respondent for violation of

the orders of the High Court. Accordingly, an appeal u/s 19 would not lie.

Similar view was expressed in an earlier decision reported as State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another, . In this case it was

observed that it is only if the High Court passed an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of Court then only an

appeal shall be maintainable under Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act.

In this regard it would be apt to mention another fact. In exercise of the contempt jurisdiction, a fresh direction cannot be given. The only

jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act is find out if there is any disobedience of the order passed by the Court. Such a view was expressed

in para 6 of the judgment reported as J. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, .

This is one aspect of the matter. The question now arises as to whether notwithstanding the availability of a right of appeal, some relief can still

be given to the appellants. This aspect of the matter was noticed in Mehboob S. Allibhoy's case (supra). What was said in para 5 of the judgment

is noticed below (at page 2881; of Cri LJ) :

But even if no appeal is maintainable on behalf of the person at whose instance a proceeding for contempt had been initiated and later dropped or

whose petition for initiating contempt proceedings has been dismissed, he is not without any remedy. In appropriate cases he can invoke the

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and this Court on being satisfied that it was a fit case where proceeding for contempt

should have been initiated, which can set aside the order passed by the High Court. In suitable cases, this Court has to exercise its jurisdiction

under Article 136 of the Constitution in the larger interest of the administration of justice.

See also D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal, wherein it was observed that right of appeal will be available only against any decision or order of the High

Court where order of punishment is recorded.

If larger interest of the administration of justice is kept in view, then notwithstanding the fact that the learned single Judge expressed an opinion

that no case is made out for initiating contempt proceedings, yet, it is posible to issue directions which may advance the cause of justice. This

power would be available to this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The respondents can still be reminded of their obligation to

see to it that the direction, if any, given by this Court, are complied with. Therefore, we are of the opinion that (i) no right of appeal is available

when order of punishment is not recorded; and (ii) notwithstanding the view expressed above at (1), direction can still be issued which would

advance the cause of administration of justice.

So far as the appeal prefered by Prabh Dayal is concerned, learned single Judge has expressed an opinion that the respondent has considered

the case of the appellants. Whether the consideration was good or bad, is not to be investigated in contempt proceedings. The appellants were left

free to challenge the resultant order in appropriate forums. We are of the opinion that to this view expressed by the learned single Judge, again no

exception can be taken.

So far as the appeal preferred by Kalyan Singh is concerned, the view expressed by the learned single Judge is that payment could be made

only against proper receipt. This view expressed by the respondents was found to be valid. With this view, expressed by the learned single Judge

again we find no reason to differ.

In view of the above, these appeals are found to be without merit and are dismissed.