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Judgment
Veeraswami, J.—Though the Petitioners were different, their petitions have been heard together, as they turn upon a common point. Both of
them are existing rice mill owners in different villages. The third Respondent in each of the petitions applied for and obtained permits for installing
and running new rice mills in the particular villages under the provisions of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. The licensing authority
had considered and overruled the objections of the Petitioners why are existing rice mill owners. The Petitioners seek to quash the orders of the
Commissioner of Civil Supplies in both the cases.
The ground on which the orders of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies are canvassed is that as he exercises a quasi-judicial function u/s 5(4)
and (5) of the Act and as the orders passed under that section are quasi-judicial, they are defective in that they do not contain any reasons. It is
argued that because Sub-section 4 of that section directs the authority to cause a full and complete investigation to be made in the prescribed
manner in respect of certain specified matters before the application for permit is granted, the orders granting permits must ex facie show that the
licensing authority had taken those matters into consideration. I am unable to accept this contention. The Act is intended to regulate the rice milling
industry in the interests of the general public and for that purpose it provides for appointment of certain licensing officers and lays down the
principles on which they could grant permits. The Act also indicates that procedure to be followed by Applicants as well as the authority in
applying for and granting licenses. The Act contains other provisions relating to revocation, suspension and amending of licenses, certain
restrictions on rice mills and powers to inspect. It may be noticed that the Act provides for no appeals against orders made u/s 5, unlike in the case
of orders passed u/s 6 or 7. Having regard to these provisions, therefore, it seems to me that so far as the jurisdiction to grant permits u/s 5 is
concerned, it is purely administrative. The mere fact that Sub-section 4 of Section 5 directs the licensing authority to take into account certain
specified matters does not mean that for that reason its jurisdiction is quasi-judicial in character. The jurisdiction under this provision does not
involve, as it appears to me, any adjudication on rights. Due to exigencies calling for regulation, Section 5 makes provisions in order to effectuate
that purpose. It may be that in the course of giving effect to the regulatory provisions, persons, like the Petitioners as existing rice mill owners, may
indirectly be affected in a certain sense. But that is no justification by itself to hold that the jurisdiction exercised u/s 5 is quasi-judicial.
Even so, I think it is desirable that an authority acting u/s 5 briefly at least indicates the reasons for its orders, especially where objections to
grant of permits are made for its consideration. But that is not to say that failure to give such reasons will necessarily affect the validity of such
orders. Where no reasons are given in an order, prima facie it is liable to be considered to be arbitrary. For that reason it may be necessary to
issue rule nisi and call for the records so that this Court may be satisfied that the power u/s 5 has been justly and reasonably, and not arbitrarily,
exercised, more especially when the Act has provided no appeal against such orders.
It is true Rajagopalan J., in P.K.N. Abdul Mazid Vs. The State of Madras and Others, was of the view that the jurisdiction of the authority
issuing permits u/s 5 was quasi-judicial. But a Division Bench of this Court in Lakshmi Ammal v. P.V. Vaithilingam and Anr. Writ Appeal No. 195
of 1962 was apparently inclined to take a different view, when the Court observed:
This Court, on more than one occasion, has pointed out the desirability of administrative bodies performing statutory functions to disclose in their
order reasons sufficient to show that they have taken into consideration all those matters that the statute obliges them to do. But we do not
consider that a writ should issue in this case for that omission.
Jagadisan J., in S.S.R. AS. MS. M. Ramasundra Nadar and Co., Parasakthi Rice Mill v. State of Madras and Anr. Writ Petition No. 644 of
1961 was perhaps inclined to take the same view. A learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in I. Venugopala v. Venkata
Narasimhuiu AIR 1962 A.P. 362 held that in granting permission u/s 8(3)(d) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, the concerned authority
was under no obligation at any stage to act judicially, and that the order made by the authority was purely an administrative order of a ministerial
one, not liable to removal by certiorari.
It seems to me, however, that it is not necessary to express a final opinion in this case as to the character of the jurisdiction of the authority
functioning u/s 5 of the said Act. Apart from the desirability of such authority stating the reasons for its orders, there appears to be no defect in the
orders passed by it. The records sent up to this Court in both the petitions clearly show that investigation was made into the specified matters and
the authority was satisfied that there was enough surplus paddy in the neighborhood to justify the issue of the permits in question. The records also
show that the objections of the Petitioners were duly taken into consideration before they were overruled.
On that view, these petitions should fail. On behalf of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies it was argued that the objectors had no locus standi to
bring up these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. But, on the view I have expressed, namely, that the authority as seen from the
records was thoroughly satisfied about the surplus position of the paddy before issuing the permits, the petitions need not be dismissed on that
ground.
The petitions are dismissed, but in the circumstances with no costs.